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1 Introduction
“The Europeanized can be of all religions and nationalities of the Ottoman Empire, and
from  all  classes  of  society.  He  sports  the  outfit  rigorously  adopted  by  the
government  officers.  It  is  the  ceremonial  costume,  the  ‘black  coat’  of  the
progressives. It consists of the red fez, the black setri1 and black trousers. But the
excessively  Europeanized,  very  common  among  the  rich  classes,  pushes  things
much further. […] In Constantinople, Smyrna and other large cities of the empire,
one comes across bourgeois of exquisite and more modern taste who are not afraid
to  replace  their  fez,  in  an  urban  manner,  with  that  marvel  of  elegance,  the
victorious top-hat. At all times, they take care to carry a fez in their pockets, in case
they need to present themselves to a backward-minded authority.”2
In this study I am scrutinizing the politics of dress in the late Ottoman Empire and
early Turkish Republic. Beginning with the implementation of new dress codes, which
included the introduction of the epochal fez as the modern standard within the military
and the state bureaucracy, in 1826 and 1829 respectively, introduced by Mahmud II, I
analyze debates about and incidents related to appropriate headgear, especially for men.
My focus  is  on  shifting  power  relations  along  various  axes,  demonstrating  what  an
analytical  focus on masculinity  and dress  might  reveal  about  the meta-discourses  on
modernization,  westernization,  secularism  and  nationalism  during  this  period. I
scrutinize debates and controversies about headgear and the way performative dressing
acts  and  the  regulation  of  dress  were  intertwined  with  the  drawing  of  borders  and
projects of state- and nation-building. I am thereby looking at power struggles within the
Ottoman elite, the impacts of the politics of dress on different strata of Ottoman society,
and the construction of a body politic as a modernizing measure. My focus on dress in
1 Osman Hamdi Bey and Victor Marie de Launay in Les Costumes Populaires de La Turquie en 1873  term the
setri/setre as an Ottoman style  frock coat,  see Victor  Marie  de Launay and Osman Hamdi Bey,  Les
Costumes Populaires de la Turquie en 1873 (Constantinople: Levant Times & Schipping Gazette, 1873), 13.
2 This is a slightly changed translation by Ahmed Ersoy of the original French text, that can be found in
Osman Hamdi Bey and Victor Marie de Launay, ‘The Popular Costumes of Turkey in 1873’, in National
Romanticism: The Formation of National  Movements :  Discourses of Collective Identity in Central and
Southeast  Europe  1770–1945,  Volume  II,  by  Balazs  Trencsenyi  and  Michal  Kopecek,  Discourses  of
Collective Identity in Central and Southeast Europe 1770–1945 (Budapest: Central European University
Press,  2013),  174–80,  http://books.openedition.org/ceup/2300,  paragraph 23,  last  accessed 2016-03-31
17:55:31. For the original text see de Launay and Hamdi Bey, Les Costumes Populaires de la Turquie en
1873, 13.
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general and male headgear in specific aims to highlight the importance of the body in the
transformation  of  power  structures  and  the  way  this  was  accomplished  in  the  late
Ottoman period. Economic and political conditions in the late Ottoman Empire were to a
large extent set by European colonialism and imperialism and the specific location of the
Ottoman state  within  these  power  structures.  I  seek to  relate  these  external  (and/or
internalized)  conditions  to  dynamics  within  Ottoman  society,  neither  playing  down
Western  colonialist  influences/Western  European  hegemony  nor  reducing  Ottoman
politics  as  solely  triggered by them in  a  one-sided process.  Therefore,  I  regard it  as
important to scrutinize the Ottoman politics of dress in the light of the globalization of
modern male attire, on the one hand, as well as showing what certain incidents regarding
the regulation of dress might reveal about the interaction of various groups in certain
moments and places and what was at stake when borders and identities were negotiated
interdependently. I will trace how the formation of the state and the collective body of its
citizens were linked through the construction of male bodies as political spaces. A focus
on headgear will help me conceptualize Ottoman modernization beyond the paradigms of
Westernization  or  nationalism,  and  come  to  a  better  understanding  of  modernity.
Headgear was a crucial means in the construction of identities and subjectivities and was
employed by the state to reorganize state-subject relations, as well as by these subjects to
constitute or challenge their own relation with the state.
Dress is a forceful means of othering, and differences in Ottoman versus European
dress  as  perceived  by European visitors  of  the  Ottoman Empire  had been a  forceful
instrument  to  construct  the  Orient as  European  Other.  Yet  processes  of  mutual
identification were more complex than sometimes suggested. 
An instrument for this cultural othering and a source for the study of  Ottoman
pre-modern  dress  are  costume  books,  produced  by  Europeans  who  traveled  in  the
Ottoman Empire.3 These books not only formed an imagination of the Orient in the West
but also left impressions of Ottoman self-perception and appearance. In this reciprocal
perception of East and West European dress was also affected by depictions of Ottoman
3 See  Silke  Förschler,  ‘Zirkulation  und  Differenzierung  von  Motiven  des  kulturell  Anderen.
Kostümportraits in europäischen Reiseberichten und in der osmanischen Miniaturmalerei’, in Europa
und die Türkei  im 18.  Jahrhundert  =:  Europe and Turkey in the 18th Century ,  ed.  Barbara Schmidt-
Haberkamp (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, Bonn University Press, 2011), 342–62;  and Charlotte Jirousek,
‘Ottoman Influences in Western Dress’,  in  Ottoman Costumes :  From Textile to Identity,  ed.  Suraiya
Faroqhi and Christoph Neumann (Istanbul: Eren, 2004), 231–50.
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dress.4 Costume books were still present in the period of transition to a modern mass
fashion system, even though their function and centrality in the representation of dress
had probably ceased. 
The  introductory  quote  is  taken  from  the  famous  costume  album  titled  Les
Costumes  Populaires  de  la  Turquie  en  1873  or  Elbise-i  ‛Osmaniyye5 produced  on  the
occasion of  the  World Exposition in Vienna in 1873.  Commissioned by the Ottoman
government  and  produced by  the Ottoman official,  painter  and archaeologist  Osman
Hamdi Bey (1842-1910) and Victor Marie de Launay (1822-n.d.), also an Ottoman official
who came to the Ottoman Empire from France in about 1850 and who was interested in
Ottoman art and history; it contained seventy-four photographic plates depicting models
with  varied  attire  subdivided  into  regional  units.  The  accompanying  texts  provided
detailed information on these styles of dress and the respective regions.6
The quote  from the  Les  Costumes Populaires,  however,   does  not  refer  to these
regional and traditional types. It describes the European, the urban bourgeois, who can
appear in the moderate version and the “superwesternized” version, to speak in Şerif
Mardin's terms, who scrutinized of these types were mocked in Ottoman novels in the
late nineteenth century.7 
4 Silke Förschler in her study on costume books analyzed how mutual influence through the production
of  costume  portraits  made  in  Paris  and  Istanbul  at  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century  also
changed depictions of dress in Ottoman miniatures. Förschler suggested that a representation of the
Orient and the constructions of identity coming along with it were thus produced through mutual
exchange. She stresses that dress had been a major instrument to mark the cultural other since the
early 15th century.  Förschler, ‘Zirkulation und Differenzierung von Motiven des kulturell Anderen.
Kostümportraits in europäischen Reiseberichten und in der osmanischen Miniaturmalerei’.
5 de Launay and Hamdi Bey, Les Costumes Populaires de La Turquie en 1873. 
6 The photographs were taken in a studio in Istanbul, models had been friends of the editor Osman
Hamdi Bey, see Osman Hamdi Bey, 1873 Yılında Türkiye’de Halk Giysileri : Elbise-i Osmaniyye  ; Viyana
Uluslararası  Fuarı  için  Kurulan  Osmanlı  İmparatorluğu  Komisyonu’nun  Yardımlarıyla  Yayımlanan
Eser. / Osman Hamdi Bey, trans. Erol Üyepazarcı (İstanbul: Sabancı Üniversitesi, 1999). In Vienna at
the exhibition itself mannequins presented a huge collection of clothing in the main gallery of the
Ottoman section,  see Ahmet  Ersoy,  ‘The  Elbise  and  the  Ottoman Scholarly  Mission’,  in  Ottoman
Costumes:  From Textile to Identity,  ed.  Suraiya Faroqhi  and Christoph K. Neumann (Istanbul:  Eren,
2004), 256–70; and Bey and Launay, ‘The Popular Costumes of Turkey in 1873’.
7 Mardin scrutinized the appearance of this type in late Ottoman literature as an object of ridicule, see
Şerif Mardin, ‘Superwesternization in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of the 19th Century’, in
Turkey: Geography and Social Perspectives, ed. Peter Benedict and Erol Tümertekin (Leiden: Brill, 1974),
403–446.
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1.1 Modernities
Illustration 1: 'Her yiğidin bir yoğurt yiğişi vardır: muhafazakar, terakkiperver, ortacı 
[Every man has his way of eating yogurt: the conservative, the moderate, the progressive],' Cem (1911), in
Orhan Koloğlu, Türkiye Karikatür Tarihi, (İstanbul: Bileşim Yayınevi, 2005), 127.
This  is  a  satirical  depiction  of  these  masculinities  and  their  stances  towards
modernization, from a 1911 issue of the journal Cem, entitled “Every man has its way of
eating yoghurt: The conservative, the moderate, the progressive.”8 Here the style of dress
comes along with the embodiment  of  a  certain habitus.  Note  that  the  progressive  is
without headgear. In Hamdi Bey's and de Launay's account, the moderate type also wears
a fez, the red conical felt hat, and the istanbulin, the collarless frock-coat here called setri,
both as markers of Ottoman modernity. The so-called excessively Europeanized fellow
dons a top hat9 and a frock coat that corresponds to the latest fashion.
While  Osman Hamdi  Bey  and  de  Launay  acknowledged  the  leveling  effects  of
modern dress, they stress that traditional dress was more functional and hygienic. Loose
robes, baggy pants and headpieces such as the turban and külah10 were “mortal enemies
8 See Orhan Koloğlu, Türkiye Karikatür Tarihi, (İstanbul: Bileşim Yayınevi, 2005), 127.
9 Here termed as stovepipe: “tuyau de poele.” See de Launay and Hamdi Bey, Les Costumes Populaires de
la Turquie en 1873, 13.
10 Külahs “were  a  very  widespread  masculine  and  feminine  headgear,  worn  by  soldiers,  dervishes,
functionaries  and civilians.”  Yedida K.  Stillman,  Norman A.  Stillman,  and T.  Majda,  ‘Libās’,  ed.  P.
Bearman  et  al.,  Encyclopaedia  of  Islam.  Second  Edition,  2012,
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/libas-COM_0581; often made of
felt of woolen cloth and often conically shaped, a great number of varieties existed, also in combination
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of  the  flu,”  they  assessed.  They  were  “simple,  noble  and  comfortable,”  while
Europeanized modern dress was “tight, ungraceful and ridiculous.”11 
The world fairs had been established from the mid-nineteenth century as a space
where emerging nation-states presented their national and imperial might. The Ottoman
state,  following  “this  trend  without  delay,”12 organized  the  1863  Ottoman  General
Exposition13 in Istanbul, and participated in 1851 and 1862 in London and the Paris World
Fair in 1867.14 While the Album claimed to focus on the Ottoman commoner and reflected
a  realistic  and  comprehensive  picture,  thereby  countering  exotica  and  its  Orientalist
generalization,  at  the  same  time  it  followed  European  ethnographic  traditions  of
classification and exoticization of the Other of European or Western civilization under
the  claim  of  scientific  objectivity.15 Ahmet  Ersoy  argues  that  Osman  Hamdi  Bey
employed  European  techniques  of  ethnographic  classification  to  “challenge  current
western misinterpretations of the Orient.”16 He “manipulated the Orientalist genre as an
instrument  to  deliver  a  clear  alternative  message  informed  by  the  larger
cultural/ideological agenda” and thereby questioned Orientalist assumptions of the East
uncritically  produced  and  reproduced  by  European  artists.17 What  is  crucial  in  this
respect is  that the  Les Costumes Populaires aimed to produce a “late Tanzimat proto-
nationalist  construct,”  by  representing  a  construction  of  a  traditional  middle  class
composed of artisans (esnaf) and their guilds. 
By depicting pre-Tanzimat lifestyles,  the authors of the  Les Costumes Populaires
reworked  the  dynamic  past  along  Ottomanist  nationalist  lines,  by  creating  unity  in
diversity,  demonstrating “solidarity” and “confraternity” in contrast  to the “strict  and
with turbans or other trimmings, see ibid.
11 de Launay and Hamdi Bey, Les Costumes Populaires de la Turquie en 1873, 14. Interestingly, as early as
1860, Osman Hamdi Bey himself had been urged by his mentor in Paris, to abandon the practice of
wearing a hat instead of the fez, in order to retain his “authentic” Ottoman identity, see Edhem Eldem,
‘An  Ottoman  Archaeologist  Caught  Between  Two  Worlds:  Osman  Hamdi  Bey  (1842-1910)’,  in
Archaeology Anthropology and Heritage in the Balkans and Anatolia: The Life and Times of F.W. Hasluck,
1878-1920, ed. David Shankland, vol. 1 (Istanbul: Isis, 2004), 121–49.
12 Ersoy, ‘The Elbise and the Ottoman Scholarly Mission,’ 174.
13 Sergi-yi Umumi-yi Osmani. 
14 On  the  Ottoman  see  self-representation  at  these  fairs  see  Zeynep  Çelik,  Displaying  the  Orient:
Architecture of Islam at Nineteenth Century World’s Fairs , Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies. -
Berkeley, Calif. [U.a.] :  Univ. of California Press, 1987 12 (Berkeley, Calif.  [u.a.]: Univ. of California
Press, 1992).
15 See Ersoy, ‘The Elbise and the Ottoman Scholarly Mission,’ 259.
16 See Ibid., 265.
17 See Ibid., 265.
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cold uniformity”18 of modern (European) garments, as Ersoy argues. The variety of “local
costumes” depicted in the Elbise, “age old notions of dress”19 as markers of social stability
were contrasted to frequently changing modern fashions that, within that logic, implied
moral  decay.  It  suggested  popular  harmony  and  contained  an  alternative  vision  for
Ottoman modernization that reworked the Tanzimat reforms along cultural specific lines.
The interrelation between this kind of supposed alternative strand of modernization and
a supposedly hegemonic Western modernity is of particular interest to me. 
I  follow  the  critique  Arif  Dirlik  articulated  of  approaches  that  conceptualize
alternative  modernities.20 While  on  the  one  hand  he  acknowledges  their  counter-
hegemonic implications and their endeavor to a “new understanding of modernity”21 as a
challenge to Eurocentric accounts of modernity, he critically questions the emphasis on
culture within these approaches. I will follow this insight throughout my study, tracking
the alleged dichotomy between national authenticity and modern universality, which I
argue  are  two  sides  of  the  same  coin  and  inherent  to  modernity.  While  alternative
modernities  are  conceptualized  as  a  deviation  from a  presumed Western  model,  this
model itself is an “imaginary abstraction,” as Dirlik terms it.
The question of culture is central here. While theories of alternatives modernities
assume  that  there  can  be  different  manifestations  of  modernity  that  are  culturally
determined, this assumes that modernity is cultureless, as Dirlik argues. He references
how nation or civilization or other social entities, reifies “the pasts that inform ‘alterity’
in assertions of persistent cultural identity in those very spaces.”22 That is congruent with
Osman  Hamdi  Bey's  account  in  the  Les  Costumes  Populaires,  which  envisions  an
alternative Ottoman modernity with reference to assumed authentic national culture. It is
perceived as different from an imagined Euro/American model. Dirlik points out that,
similar  to  postcolonial  criticism,  an  analytic  shift  took  place  from  capitalism  to
colonization and from economy to culture. I think the most important point, and I agree
with Dirlik here, is to consider that both the political economy of capitalism and the
18 Ibid., 268.
19 See Ibid., 268.
20 I will turn to these in chapter two, i.e.  Bill Ashcroft, ‘Alternative Modernities: Globalization and the
Post-Colonial’, ARIEL 40, no. 1 (January 2009): 81–105.   
21 See Arif Dirlik, ‘Thinking Modernity Historically: Is “Alternative Modernity” the Answer?’, Asian Review
of World Histories 1, no. 1 (January 2013): 5–44, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.12773/arwh.2013.1.1.005, 6.
22 Ibid., 7.
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culture of modernity are intrinsically interwoven and interconnected; both are mutually
constitutive, as we will see. Dirlik suggests that modernity as a concept is “sufficient to
cover  the  newly  apparent  historical  complexities,”23 and  I  largely  agree  with  his
objections to concepts of alternative and multiple modernities even though I will take
considerations  of  these  into  account  in order  to  see  what  they can accomplish  with
regards to my questions.  Transferred to the question of Ottoman politics of dress and
headgear that means while the fez on the one hand could be treated as a symbol of an
alternative Ottoman modernity and of Ottoman national identity that was employed to
counter European imperialist hegemony, it on the other hand needs to be treated as an
intrinsic modern feature in a more general sense. It helped to create modern subjects, to
the  same  extent  as  it  created  Ottoman  subjects,  since it  was  a  means  of modern
techniques of power that related to other modern dressing practices.
In order to scrutinize modernity it is necessary to study translocal processes instead
of  individual  societies,  since  modernity  emerged  within  a  broad  global  context.24
Modernities  have  become  perceived  as  “alternative”  in  regard  to  culture.  Especially
nationalist anti-colonial movements put emphasis on their being different but modern, or
contemporary  but  native.  And  even  though  it  is  often  refused,  colonialism  and
globalization indeed shaped culture around the globe while it itself took shape. Thus,
modern culture is the result of translocal processes, and the supposed Euro/American
origin becomes blurred through the lens of those studies that take these interactions into
account.  “It  is  these  interactions  that  defined  spaces  of  globality  that  produced
modernity,”25 to quote Dirlik. This is, of course, not to neglect or deny Euro/American
hegemony and the power relations implied in the emergence of modern culture
Often,  claims  to  alternative  modernities  contain  counter-positions  to
Euro/American modernity that appear in the form of traditionalism and conservatism.
That  does  not  mean they are  anti-modern.  These conflicts  over  modernity  are “very
much part of the constitution of societies globally,”26 as we will later see, and they also
appeared within the context of Western European modernization. The notions that are
implied by these supposed anti-modern movements are most of the time products of
23 Ibid., 6.
24 Ibid., 25.
25 Ibid., 38.
26 Ibid., 22.
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modernity themselves, such as the national, the regional or civilizational, or stereotypes
of East and West.
The  definition  of  modernity  along  temporalities  and  spatial  boundaries  is
problematic. It is rather a self-perception of hegemonic Western European societies that
saw  and  sees  the  dawn  of  the  modern  age  within  its  own  space  and  time,  as  an
improvement from former conditions and beliefs within a narrative of steady progress.27
Scrutinized  from  a  different  perspective,  modernity  cuts  across  space  and  time  and
appears as “a historical process emanating from a multiplicity of political and cultural
spaces.”28
How does this culturalist dichotomy appear in discourses on headgear? 
Generally, headgear had, before the introduction of the fez, a vital significance in
Ottoman  society  as  a  marker  of  rank  and  religious  affiliation.29 The  abandoning  of
Muslim-connoted  headgear  and  the  wearing  of  headpieces  that  were  considered
European Christian, generalized under the term hat, was associated with apostasy, with
becoming of the Other, and could be punished by death.30 European Christian travellers
in the Ottoman Empire reported harsh reactions towards their headgear by people they
encountered in the streets, such as reports analyzed by Matthew Elliot of seventeenth
century  travellers,  whose  wigs  or  hats  had  been  torn  off  and  stamped  on.31 Yet,  as
Victoria Aksan points out,  cross-cultural,  multi-religious realities within the Ottoman
Empire,  such as  those lived by Franco-Leventine families,  and the existence of  those
European  figures  “turning  Turk”  and  their  histories,  surely  complicate  these  simple
divisions. The turban, even though treated as the badge of Islam, was actually sported by
27 Ibid., 35.
28 Ibid., 26.
29 See  Donald  Quataert,  ‘Clothing  Laws,  State,  and  Society  in  the  Ottoman  Empire,  1720–1829’,
International Journal of Middle East Studies : IJMES 403, no. 425 (1997).
30 Theologically this perception was based on the  hadith “min tashabbaha bi-qavm fa-huwa minhum”
("who imitates a(nother) people becomes one of them), see i.e.  Mirza Tokpınar, ‘Men teşebbehe bi-
kavmin fe-hüve minhum’ Hadisi Üzerine Bir İnceleme’, Hadis Tetkikleri Dergisi (HTD) 3, no. 2 (2005):
85–109. In the eighteenth century its equivalent in Christian Europe was the practice of  “Turning
Turk” as practiced by statesman and travelers such as Comte de Bonneval or Ahmed Paşa. This cultural
cross-dressing or “ethnomascerade” often encompassed more than disguise, as Virgina Aksan points
out,  but often went along with a certain political  or  other affiliation of  some kind up to cultural
passing. See Virginia H. Aksan, ‘Who was an Ottoman? Reflections on “Wearing Hats” and ’Turning
Turk’, in Europa und die Türkei im 18. Jahrhundert/ Europe and Turkey in the Eighteenth Century , ed.
Barbara Schmidt-Haberkamp (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, Bonn University Press, 2011), 305–18.
31 Matthew Elliot, ‘Dress Codes in the Ottoman Empire: The Case of the Franks’, in Ottoman Costumes:
From Textile to Identity, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi and Christoph K. Neumann (Istanbul: Eren, 2004), 117.
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many Ottoman non-Muslims as well. If a distinction was made, it was then mostly with
respect to color. Thus, the meanings of practices of dress have to be queried in between
fixed symbolic meanings and the more fluid material realities. 
After the introduction of the fez, the turban lost its symbolism, at least insofar as it
does not appear in the archival sources which report on conflicts about headgear that
mostly deal with the fez and the hat, as well as the kalpak, a cap made of asthrakan that
was donned in many varieties by likewise various Ottoman populations and later became
appropriated  by  emerging  Turkish  nationalism.  In  the  nineteenth  century,  the  hat
acquired the meaning of European imperial  domination,  and as we saw in the quote
above from the Costume Populaire, of far-reaching Ottoman modernization.
Two incidences that took place in the mid-nineteenth century illustrate this array
of meanings carried by the European hat. These two cases revolve around diplomacy and
headgear. 
One took place in 1858 on the Mediterranean island of Kastellorizo/Megisti/Meis
close  to  the south-western Anatolian coast.32 On that  island the English consul's  hat
reportedly had been thrown to the ground. The Ottoman government inquired into the
case.33 In the following year, 1860, an incident concerned an interpreter of the English
consulate  in  Jerusalem  named  Tonosi,34 and  another  person  mentioned  by  name,
characterized as an Ottoman subject/citizen.35 Both had been arrested because of donning
a hat. The document assessed that the wearing of the hat by these persons could not be
ignored because both were Ottoman subjects of high social standing: “Because these are
'well  known'  people  of  high  social  standing,  it  is  not  acceptable  that  citizens  of  the
sublime state don a hat.”36 The document issued by the foreign ministry on the issue of
Tonosi and his companion discussed whether it was necessary to react so strongly and
with such harsh measures to those wearing hats, as the English embassy had made a
complaint on this. The significance of the document reporting the case lies in the nexus
32 It was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1552 until French occupation in 1915. The island was mostly
inhabited by orthodox Christians. 
33 Başbakanlık  Osmanlı  Arşivi  (The  Ottoman Archives  of  the  Prime Minister’s  Office,  BOA)  HR.MKT.
270/92, ca .1858.
34 I am not sure about this name: it is spelled ىسونط, might also transliterated as Tunusi, Tunosi, etc.
35 BOA HR.MKT. 337/90, 21 Zi'l-kade 1276 (Juni 12th,  1860).
36 “Maʿlūm vālāları olduğu üzere tab’iyye-i devlet-i ʿaliyyede bulunan kimesnelerin şapḳa giymeleri yolunda
bir şey değil,” BOA HR.MKT. 337/90.
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drawn between dress, citizenship and social position.37 The strong objection of Ottoman
government  to  the  wearing  of  the  hat  and  the  fear  of  its  spread  indicates  that  it
considered this as disloyalty to the Ottoman state, renunciation of Ottoman citizenship,
and a danger for public order.
1.2 The Significance of the Study of Modern Bourgeois Dress
At the center of  my study of  dress is the entangled history of  modern fashion,
which  spread  throughout  the  globe  with  the  help  of  industrializing  capitalism.  The
consumption of clothes is a matter of market and economy as it is part of a “cultural
process to construct identity.”38 Besides, a focus on social structure, agency and practice
became crucial to the study of clothing.39 I regard clothing as a practice with which to
negotiate and constitute gender, class, national, ethnic, religious and other boundaries of
social distinction in the making of modern identities and political entities. I treat modern
fashion as a global phenomenon which took place under Western hegemony while, the
West itself locally pluralized. Even though my study revolves to a great extent around
the hegemony and spread of bourgeois styles, I seek to show how “dress influences travel
in  all  directions,  across  class  lines,  between  urban  and  rural  areas,  and  around  the
globe.”40 That means the notion of emulation of certain styles needs to be broadened, if
not replaced, by concepts like “bricolage,  hybridity,  and creolization”41 and/or mutual
exchange, as in the concept of entangled histories.42
Diane Crane poses the important question of who adopted certain styles and why.
Rather than focusing on the appearance and disappearance of different styles, her focus
shifted to the contexts in which a certain piece of clothing or style was worn. Crane's
approach helps to make sense of the Ottoman and Turkish politics of dress, as she uses
dress 
37 It is emphasized that Tunus' companion had changed his citizenship several times, sought refuge in
Russia earlier and then returned to the Ottoman Empire. BOA HR.MKT. 337/90.
38 Karen Tranberg Hansen, ‘The World in Dress: Anthropological Perspectives on Clothing, Fashion, and
Culture’,  Annual  Review  of  Anthropology  33,  no.  1  (2004):  369–92,
doi:10.1146/annurev.anthro.33.070203.143805, 370.
39 Ibid., 370.
40 Ibid., 372.
41 Ibid., 372.
42 See  Margrit  Pernau,  ‘Whither  Conceptual  History?  From  National  to  Entangled  Histories’,
Contributions to the History of Concepts 7, no. 1 (29 August 2012): 1–11, doi:10.3167/choc.2012.070101.
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“as a strategic site for studying changes in the meanings of cultural goods in relation
to changes in social structures, in the character of cultural organizations, in other
forms of culture.”43 
In her book  Fashion and Its Social Agenda she elaborates the historical as well as
sociological aspects of dress by scrutinizing dress in nineteenth century societies up to
the  contemporary  examples  from  France,  England  and  the  United  States. 44 She
emphasizes how clothes construct social identity and how dress is a means toward the
interpretation  of  culture.  Methodologically  important  for  me is  her  emphasis  on  the
active  role of  dress in the creation of  behavior.  She states  that people  enhance their
agency by manipulating the meaning of dress, an observation that is crucial for my own
study which traces how meanings of dress relate to the appropriation of certain items.
According  to  Crane,  with  the  industrialization  of  Western  societies,  dress  came  to
indicate primarily class and gender in contrast to more nuanced social stratification by
dress before.45 
“One of the most visible markers of social status and gender and therefore useful in
maintaining or subverting symbolic boundaries, clothing is an indication of how
people  in  different  eras  have  perceived  their  positions  in  social  structures  and
negotiated status boundaries.“46
1.2.1 History and Meaning of the Hat 
In contrast to the European Christian hats that are mentioned in sources of the
sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, those hats that appear in my sources have a quite
recent history, though often the exact kind of hats neither in the older or more recent
sources are mentioned. Thus it makes a lot of sense to look at developments of styles in
Europe and especially to make reference to the development of a bourgeois style after the
French  Revolution  which  replaced  the  clothing  style  of  the  nobility.  The  French
Revolution is regarded as a turning point in terms of dress, thereby the tricorne was
43 Diana Crane,  Fashion and Its Social Agendas: Class, Gender, and Identity in Clothing  (Chicago [u.a.]:
University of Chicago Press, 2000), 22 and 23.
44 Ibid.
45 See Ibid., 3 and 4.
46 Ibid., 1. 
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replaced by the top hat.47
Diane Crane provides an overview of what the hat meant in the 19th century.48 In
order  to  better  understand  late  Ottoman  politics  of  dress  and  the  appropriation  of
bourgeois dress codes, it is helpful to note, as Crane concludes from her study, that hats
in Western Europe had mainly been a signifier of social status, even though sometimes it
was used to transgress class boundaries. Interestingly, in her research on the diffusion of
middle-class styles throughout different social  strata in France England and the USA,
Crane found that most types of hats which were introduced in the 19th century were first
worn by a broader population until they became the symbol of a certain class. In addition
the meaning of  modern hats  was gendered.  How did the fez  fit  into  these  gendered
meanings of modern headgear? Similarly to other items of dress the fez used to be a
rather gender neutral piece of dress worn by men and women as well as different strata
of society but was adapted into the bourgeois dress code and its meanings throughout the
nineteenth  century.49 Crane  states  that  the  hat  in  western  Europe  had  been  an
outstanding item in the social distinction among men. Even though bourgeois women
wore hats,  they had a different  meaning.  Remarkably,  the hat was also worn inside,
indicating  a  different  definition  of  public  space  that  included  offices  and  other
workplaces. The spaces marked by the wearing of the hat were mainly male connoted, as
she argues. Customs relating to the hat, such as “hat tipping” which expressed deference,
were especially suitable to establish class boundaries performatively.50 
Crane describes the relation between gender and the hat as follows: 
47 See  Magrit Pernau, ‘Shifting Globalities - Changing Headgear: The Indian Muslims between Turban,
Hat and Fez’, in Translocality: The Study of Globalising Processes from a Southern Perspective , Studies in
Global Social History 4 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 257-258. On different types of headgear and their history
see  Greta Raikes,  Hats: A History of Fashion in Headwear  (Chalfont St. Gilles: Sadler, 1974); Beverly
Chico,  Hats  and  Headwear  around  the  World:  A  Cultural  Encyclopedia  (ABC-CLIO,  2013);  Colin
McDowell, Hats: Status, Style and Glamour, First pb. ed. (London: Thames & Hudson, 1997); Althea
Mackenzie,  Hats  and  Bonnets,  Fashion  Series  (London:  National  Trust,  2004);  Susie  Hopkins,  The
Century of Hats: Headturning Style of the Twentieth Century (London: Aurum, 1999);  Michael Harrison,
The History of the Hat (London: Jenkins, 1960).
48 Crane, Fashion and Its Social Agendas, 82-87.
49 I have only hints to pre-nineteenth century practices of the wearing of the fez, but secondary literature
frequently mentions the wearing of the fez by women. That does not exclude that the women and
different social strata wore the fez in a different style and manner. 
50 And the rejection of those customs could be a powerful sign of resistance to the acknowledgement of
social  hierarchies.  A  prominent  example  are  the  revolutionary  movements  in  England  of  the
seventeenth  century,  where  levelers,  commoners,  baptists  and  related  groups  denied  this  act  of
deference  to  the  authorities.  See  Peter  Linebaugh  and  Marcus  Rediker,  The  Many-Headed  Hydra:
Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic, [Nachdr.].  (Boston,
Mass.: Beacon Press, 2003), 105 and 118.
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“Since  men  represented  their  families  in  public  space,  men's  hats,  rather  than
women's, were used to indicate the status of the family. Women's head covering
during this period were more varied and more individualized than men's. Women's
hats  exemplified  conspicuous  consumption  instead  of  relaying  coded  signals
referring to social rank.”51 
In the areas studied by Crane, some kind of hat was donned by almost all men
throughout the nineteenth century as well as in the early twentieth century. Related to
the wearing of  hats  in the public  sphere she cites a study on  hat-markers in France
concerning access to certain spheres of public life guarded by the hat: “possession of a
hat was an acknowledgement of  the codes that governed admission to the particular
sphere of public life in question.”52 The same happened with the fez as its wearing was
obligatory for those men who wanted to hold a public office.  That it  was kept on at
indoor workplaces is often considered as a contrast to Western European practices, yet as
we have seen, that was not valid for the first half of the nineteenth century, at least what
Crane's findings concerns. 
The  kind  of  hats  which  were  worn  in  Europe  and  the  USA  since  the  early
nineteenth century guaranteed a great  extent of  uniformity,  as did  the fez,  and thus
supported a nationalist and in general identity-based politics. Crane recounts that less
than a dozen types of hats were in use at that time. She scrutinized when and where
certain types  of  hats—top hats,  cloth caps,  straw hats—appeared and which strata  of
society wore them. 
“The patterns of  diffusion of these types of hats were different in France and the
United States. In France, each social class used hats differently. In mid-century, the
upper and middle classes wore top hats, in the last quarter of the century, they
wore the top hat for formal occasions and the bowler for business and less formal
occasions.  By  the  end  of  the  century,  they  were  still  wearing the  top  hat  and
bowler,  along  with  felt  hats  and,  in  summer,  straw  hats,  straw  boaters,  and
panamas.”53
51 Crane, Fashion and Its Social Agendas, 83.
52 Ibid., 83.
53 Ibid., 85.
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Various  interpretations  of  the  meaning  of  the  hat  are  reviewed by  Fred  Miller
Robinson in his monograph on the bowler hat.54 All these accounts had in common a
consideration  of  the  hat  as  an  extension  of  the  mind,  an  issue  that  was  repeatedly
addressed when the European brimmed hat was introduced in Turkey in 1925. 55 It is a
view that needs to be revised as I will later show, since within the theoretical approach
that I apply to a certain extent the body-mind dichotomy becomes obsolete. Moreover I
think headgear is crucial the to the construction of the body through codes of conduct
and other disciplinary measure that come along with modern dress.
In addition, Miller mentions psychoanalytic approaches to the meaning of the hat
that are grounded on Freud's view that the hat was an extension of the genitals and was
as such gendered.  That might be a quite biologically deterministic view, yet it provides
insight  into  how  the  gendered  meaning  of  the  hat  was  perceived  and  related  to
masculinity. The hat in that regard is the visible expression of masculinity, considered as
the  possession of  male  genitals  and  expression of  male  power.  Thus  it  epitomizes  a
hierarchical  gender  order  and  male  dominance.  Yet  Miller  gives  preference  to  those
approaches which view hats as an extension of the mind. Thereby he favored C.G. Jung's
interpretation that considers the hat as an “image of the self”, the hat epitomizing the
self.56 With references to my remark above I would add that this image of the self also
encompasses the body.
Very  helpful  for  the  analysis  of  modern Ottoman headgear  is  Margrit  Pernau's
study of headgear and bourgeois identity in India, because she analyzed how headpieces
other then the top hat or other Western European types of hat became part of bourgeois
identity.57 Pernau regards headgear as a means to create as well as express identity on
both the personal  and collective levels.  She considers it  to be “a reliable indicator of
community.”58 In her study on the turban as an item of bourgeois identity, she states that
54 Fred Miller Robinson,  The Man in the Bowler Hat: His History and Iconography (Chapel Hill: Univ. of
North Carolina Press, 1993).
55 Such as in Orhan Koloğlu, ‘Şapka Devrimi Kafanın Dışına Degil, Içine Yönelikti [The Hat Revolution
aimed at the Inside of the Head not its Surface]’, Toplumsal Tarih 14, no. 83 (2000): 21–24.
56 Robinson, The Man in the Bowler Hat, 156.
57 Pernau speaks of middle classes in the plural and their sober dressing, that replaced aristocratic styles,
while she defined these classes through a group of professions. I think she does not separate clearly
between bourgeois and middle class in her English text on the subject, and does not problematize this
terminology.  See  Pernau,  ‘Shifting Globalities  -  Changing Headgear:  The  Indian Muslims  between
Turban, Hat and Fez’.
58 Ibid., 251.
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its meaning was not restricted to Islam and religion and that the Mughal turban was
rather a symbol of a “translocal and transimperial universe, based on the reference to
Persiante culture,  albeit in a strongly localized version”59 which consequently showed
that religion was not the main point of reference of the Mughal dynasty and state. Here a
parallel  can be drawn to the Ottoman case insofar,  that the fez,  as well  as the other
headpieces that appeared in my sources, such as the kalpak carried a multidimensional
meaning, that can likewise not be reduced to religion or any other marker of identity,
and were rather  part  of  the  global  phenomenon of  the  rise  and spread of  bourgeois
identity.
In  European  bourgeois  dress,  as  it  emerged  after  the  French  Revolution  in
differentiation to aristocratic styles, headgear was a basic element, since the body had to
be covered from head to toe. This further underlines the significance of the modern hat
and headgear in general as essential and outstanding part of modern bourgeois dress.
Some even questioned the doffing of the hat, considering it an anxious health danger as a
person may catch a chill  while the head was exposed.60 Beyond health concerns,  the
covering of  the  body indicated  social  hierarchy,  while  bourgeois  women emphasized
parts of their body through their dress, such as the use of crinolines, they also exposed
their bodies on special occasions, i.e. in the ballroom, while men remained covered. Men
and women of lower classes also had to reduce the layers covering their bodies in order
to be suited for work.61 The bodily practices were to a large extent compliant with ideas
of conduct and bodily display in the Ottoman Empire, that also required the body to be
covered. We will see in Chapter Five that next to the appropriation of bourgeois styles by
Ottoman men, also Ottoman women's dress adapted to these bodily practices, such as the
wearing  of  the  corset  and  the  adaptation  of  other  pieces  of  dress  to  it,  as  well  as
appearance of female hats adorned with flowers. Yet the open display of female bodies
and the common socializing of women and men was a controversial issue.
59 Ibid., 255.
60 See Ibid., 239, 240 and 152.
61 Sabina  Brändli,  ‘Der  herrlich  biedere  Mann’:  vom  Siegeszug  des  bürgerlichen  Herrenanzuges  im  19.
Jahrhundert (Zürich: Chronos, 1998), 184 and 187.
15
1 Introduction
1.2.2 Globalization of Male Attire and the Production of Modern Bodies
Structuralist approaches to dress,62 such as that by Roland Barthes, conceptualize
clothing as language and speech acts and interrogated meanings, in contrast and critique
of  costume history that  was more or  less  descriptive.63 Thus,  structuralists  helped to
reconceptualize the study of dress, yet their works are more appropriate to frame fixed
meanings. An anthropology of clothing, on the other hand, additionally scrutinizes dress
and its impact on social organization as well as social change and transformations.64 
A number of authors traced the change from a more decorative dress for men to the
tailored suit, considered as a plain sober dress, and the global dissemination of this style
of dress.65 Thereby the modern three-piece suit became the sign of male respectability. 66 I
consider Ottoman and Turkish politics of dress as part of sartorial globalization. 
Robert  Ross,  who  scrutinizes  the  globalization  of  modern  male  dress  from  the
sixteenth to the early years of the twenty-first century, assesses “that, in the long term,
the rules for external covering have to be internalized,”67 departing from the taxonomical
approach of  classical  studies of  the  history of  dress,  being rather  interested in social
history.  He  also  distances  himself  from  an  ethnographic  approach  to  dress  and  the
62 In terms of terminology fashion theory differentiates between clothes and dress, the former as the
single  items to  be  worn and  the  latter  a  more  encompassing  notion items of  clothing  worn and
combined on and with the body. See Hansen, ‘The World in Dress’.
63 See Roland Barthes,  The Fashion System, ed. Matthew Ward and Richard Howard, Vintage Classics :
Philosophy (London: Vintage, 2010). Roland Barthes points out the divergence between function and
meaning, he says that “function is reduced to the rank of artifice or alibi”, thus he proposes a method
of “reading” fashion according to its meaning not its function, in this see Palmira Brummetts reference
to Barthes in  Palmira Johnson Brummett,  Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press,
1908 - 1911 (Albany, NY: State Univ. of New York Press, 2000), 410 FN 10.
64 See Odile Blanc, ‘The Historiography of Costume: A Brief Survey’, in Ottoman Costumes : From Textile
to Identity, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi and Christoph Neumann (Istanbul: Eren, 2004), 50 and 58.
65 See on this, and on theory of dress more generally: Robert Ross, Clothing: A Global History (Cambridge
[u.a.]:  Polity,  2008);  Wilbur  Zelinsky,  ‘Globalization  Reconsidered:  The  Historical  Geography  of
Modern Western Male Attire’, Journal of Cultural Geography 22, no. 1 (2004): 83–134; Peter Corrigan,
The Dressed Society : Clothing, the Body and Some Meanings of the World (Los Angeles, Calif. [u.a.]: Sage
Publ.,  2008);  Joanne  Entwistle,  The  Fashioned  Body :  Fashion,  Dress,  and  Modern  Social  Theory
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000);  Joanne Entwistle, ‘Fashion and the Fleshy Body: Dress as Embodied
Practice’,  Fashion  Theory:  The  Journal  of  Dress,  Body  &  Culture  4,  no.  3  (2000):  323–47,
doi:10.2752/136270400778995471; Michael Carter, Fashion Classics from Carlyle to Barthes, Dress, Body,
Culture  (Oxford  u.a.:  Berg,  2003);  Hansen,  ‘The  World  in  Dress’;  Joanne  Entwistle  and  Elisabeth
Wilson, eds.,  Body Dressing  (Oxford [u.a.]: Berg, 2001);  Linda B Arthur,  Religion, Dress and the Body
(Oxford; New York: Berg, 1999); Mina Roces and Louise P. Edwards, The Politics of Dress in Asia and the
Americas, The Sussex Library of Asian Studies (Portland, Or.: Sussex Academic Press, 2007).
66 Katrina Honeyman, ‘Following Suit: Men, Masculinity and Gendered Practices in the Clothing Trade in
Leeds, England, 1890–1940’, Gender & History 14, no. 3 (2002): 426–446, doi:10.1111/1468-0424.00276, 428.
67 Ross, Clothing, 8.
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othering of its subjects.68 “The history of most [….] sartorial regimes has been the history
of struggle – class, gender-based, ethnic or national.”69 He discusses how, especially in
France and in England, “a culture of fashion and many of the  characteristic features of
later European dress”70 emerged. He concentrates in particular on a phenomenon and
period known as the “Great Masculine Renunciation”, by which male dominance in the
public sphere was signalled by sober, mainly dark clothing, and the exclusion of women
from public affairs by the brightness of their clothing, and indeed the impracticality of
much of what they wore.71
Similar to Ross, Katrina Honeyman emphasizes the modes of production and their
social and cultural context which enforced or even founded the predicaments for modern
male dress and the way it produced gendered bodies.72 Looking specifically at the inter-
war years in the early twentieth century when the modern man's suit reached its peak of
popularity,  she  argues  that  it  is  crucial  to  understand  the  relationship  between
production and consumption. She points out that the marketing of the suit, next to its
association with respectability, suggested a more egalitarian society. Yet it was sharply
contrasted  with  women's  dress,  which  became  more  elaborate  and  complicated.  She
analyzes the way men were attracted to this style of dress, i.e. through the establishment
of  a  masculine  form of  shopping environment.  She scrutinizes  the  way the  retailing
sector was structured by certain ideas of masculinity and how the shops and consumers
were constructed as male, and how buying a suit was associated with the appropriation
of a certain kind of masculinity.73
In  “The  Hidden  Consumer”  Christopher  Breward  concentrates  similarly  on  the
emergence  of  a  male  consumer  culture  which  came  along  with  department-store
marketing, retail techniques and a ready-made clothing industry between 1860 and 1914
in England and specifically London .74 He provides a profound account of men's dress and
gender in the second half of the nineteenth century. Despite a certain move towards
68 Ibid., 4 and 5.
69 Ibid., 8.
70 Ibid., 3.
71 Ibid., 9. Another author who traces the globalization of dress and masculinity is Wilbur Zelinsky. He
traces the spread of the standard suit through a “deterritorialized social space” Zelinsky, ‘Globalization
Reconsidered: The Historical Geography of Modern Western Male Attire,’ 83.
72 Honeyman, ‘Following Suit’.
73 See Ibid., 442.
74 Christopher  Breward,  The  Hidden  Consumer :  Masculinities,  Fashion  and  City  Life ;  1860  -  1914
(Manchester [u.a.]: Manchester Univ. Press, 1999).
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functionality in men's dress as commonly assessed, Breward discovers the “survival of
'elaboration'  and  'elegance'  in  masculine  models  of  physical  beauty”75 next  to  an
emphasize on middle class ideals of professionalism and respectability.76 He stresses that
dress and accessories were not merely symbolic but also the “very substance of bourgeois
confidence.”77 The dress of the working class was also regarded as uncivilized to a similar
degree as that of racialized Others of colonial discourse, even if the proletariat or peasant
at  certain  times  and  moments  provided  “a  stereotype  of  nationalistic  popular
sentiments.”78 Dress was and is a question of material as well as cultural capital which
only the middle classes, as he terms this social spectrum, could provide. Not dressing that
way was associated with immorality and a lack of discipline in the European as well as
colonial environment. Breward also elaborates on how the feminization topos of the late
nineteenth century was countered by “highly moral readings of manliness.”79 
Taken together, these accounts on the development and spread of modern Western
male attire provide important information about the relation of economic globalization,
colonialism and the formation of modern male identity which help to clarify the politics
of dress in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey.
1.3 Dress and Bourgeois Identity
A number of  studies  inspect  the emergence of  modern dress in interrelation to
bourgeois  identity  or  culture  and  its  global  dissemination,  especially  throughout  the
nineteenth century.80 That brings about the question of the definition of bourgeoisie. The
perception  of  a  common  bourgeois  culture  as  the  main  characteristic  of  a  common
bourgeois identity has been criticized because of its normative implications and focus on
the normative level  that leaves out individual experiences of bourgeois existence and
75 Ibid., 77.
76 Breward similarly to Pernau conflates the terms bourgeois and middle class, a spectrum that reached
for him from “shopkeeper to stockbroker.” Ibid., 77 and 254.
77 Ibid., 87.
78 Ibid., 89 and see also 88.
79 Ibid., 241.
80 Such as Brändli,  Der herrlich biedere Mann; Philippe Perrot,  Fashioning the Bourgeoisie: A History of
Clothing in the Nineteenth Century, 2. print., and 1. paperback print. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ.
Press,  1996);  Margrit  Pernau,  Bürger  mit  Turban.  Muslime  in  Delhi  im 19.  Jahrhundert  (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008); Zelinsky, ‘Globalization Reconsidered: The Historical Geography of
Modern Western Male Attire’.
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disregards  ambivalences.81 Nevertheless,  for  my  study,  perceptions  of  a  common
bourgeois culture are still important, since it enables a broad definition and  provides a
clue  to  the  importance  of  certain  styles  of  dress  that  express  and  enact  bourgeois
hegemony. I will focus on individual practices that attained meaning within this setting
of  burgeoning bourgeois hegemony.  My approach focuses on the reciprocal  relations
between norms and individual practices. Thus, I am interested in how a certain notion of
bourgeois culture  became hegemonic while  it  was generated in negotiations between
those who appropriated it. 
If  not defined in strictly economic terms, the distinction between  bourgeoisie,  as
those in the possession of the means of production, and middle class becomes obsolete to
a certain extent. Immanuel Wallerstein in that sense talks about “salaried bourgeoisie”:
“They are clearly bourgeois along the axis of life-style or consumption […] less along the
axis of capital or property rights.”82 One might also say that the middle classes were those
who appropriated bourgeois habitus and thus were in the possession of cultural capital, a
habitus which embodied social structure.83
My treatment of the notion of bourgeoisie and of class in general follows Pierre
Bourdieu’s  definition  of  social  class,  which  emphasizes  practice  and  the  relational
character of identities: 
“Social class is not defined by a property (not even the most determinant one, such as
the volume and composition of capital ) nor by a collection of properties (of sex,
age, social origin, ethnic origin-proportion of blacks and whites, for example, or
natives  and  immigrants-income,  educational  level  etc.),  nor  even by  a  chain  of
properties strung out from a fundamental  property (position in the relations of
production) in a relation of cause and effect, conditioner and conditioned; but by
the  structure  of  relations  between  all  the  pertinent  properties  which  gives  its
specific value to each of them and to the effects they exert on practices.”84
81 See i.e.  Rebekka Habermas,  Frauen und Männer des Bürgertums: eine Familiengeschichte (1750 - 1850),
Bürgertum : Studien Zur Zivilgesellschaft. - Göttingen : Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991- 14 (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000), 11.
82 Immanuel  Maurice  Wallerstein,  ‘Bourgeois(ie)  as  Concept  and  Reality’,  in  Race,  Nation,  Class:
Ambiguous Identities, ed. Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein and Étienne Balibar (London: Verso, 1991),
151.
83 See, Pierre Bourdieu, ‘“The Forms of Capital” (1986)’, in Cultural Theory : An Anthology, 2011, 81–93.
84 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, Reprinted. (London: Routledge,
1996), 106.
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Thus,  concerning  the  appearance  of  bourgeois  culture  and  bourgeoisie  in  the
Ottoman Empire, I follow authors such as Edhem Eldem, who include late Ottoman social
practices  and identities  in  the broader  context  of  the  global  emergence of  bourgeois
culture.85  
1.3.1 Modernity and Bourgeois Identity
Modernity,  as I  treat it,  can be understood as an intervention related to bodies,
space  and  time,  that  can  have  various  outcomes.86 I  will  refrain  from  attributing  to
modernity a fixed set of characteristics and rather view it in its ambiguities. That entails
a  consideration  of  modernity  as  a  discourse  rather  than  epoch.  Michel  Foucault
contributed  crucially  to  our  understanding  of  modernity  as  a  confluence  of  certain
techniques of power that were rather productive than repressive, producing the modern
subject  through  discourse.  The  intersection  of  power  and  knowledge  is  thereby  a
productive web that produces subjects through subjugation as well was constitution.87
The advantage of  this  view is  that  subjectivity  can be understood as  processual  and
identity as fluid rather essential or substantial. Discourse itself is thus an instrument of
power, of productive power. 
Etymologically “modern” denotes the contemporary, but beyond that, it is a mode
of social organisation that comes along with the appearance of modern socio-political
institutions such as the nation-state, school, hospitals, the military etc. These emerged in
the  context  of  European  Renaissance,  Reformation/Counter-Reformation,  and
Enlightenment, yielding a certain European self-perception associated with change and
progress, and a feeling of superiority over supposedly traditional societies. In philosophy,
a  perception  of  the  autonomous  rational  human  mind  replaced  those  of  divine
providence.  It  brought  about  a  notion of  rationality  and the  rational  organisation of
social life that sought to make civilized behavior equivalent with modernity, an equation
85 See  Edhem Eldem, ‘The Bourgeoisie of Istanbul’, in  Urban Governance Under the Ottomans: Between
Cosmopolitanism and Conflict, ed. Ulrike Freitag and Nora Lafi, SOAS / Routledge Studies on the Middle
East (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2014). Until recently it was controversial if an Ottoman (Muslim)
bourgeoisie  existed  at  all,  since  narrow  Eurocentric  definitions  made  Ottoman  bourgeois  culture
invisible.
86 See Alev Çınar, Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time (Minnesota: Univ.
of Minnesota Press, 2005)., 9.
87 See  Michel  Foucault,  Dispositive  der  Macht:  über  Sexualität,  Wissen  u.  Wahrheit,  (Internationale
Marxistische Diskussion ; 77) (Berlin [West]: Merve Verl., 1978).
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that  justified  European  claims  to  superiority  and  thus  their  colonialism.88 Hence
modernity  is  closely  related  to  the  colonial  and  imperialist  expansions  of  European
nation-states,  and  it  developed  along  with  particular  power  relations  and  newly
emergent technologies of power. 
Yet, beyond European self-perception as the cradle of modernity, the emergence of
the  discourse  of  modernity,  together  with  European colonialism and the  ambiguities
inherent  to  modern  discourse,  all  suggest  a  more  complex  approach.  I  think  it  is
important to carve out the agency of the so-called periphery versus the imperial center in
two respects: this is to consider the Ottoman Empire in the making of the West, rather
than simply as the construction as its Other and the mutually engendering relation of
central state versus subject/citizens. In my case this means scrutinizing how the politics
of dress shaped state-subject/citizen relations.
Ross explores the becoming of relationships between “clothing and discipline, and
between clothing and particular  forms of  behavior”  from the end of  the  seventeenth
century onwards.  According to Ross,  beginning in the later seventeenth century,  the
dress of soldiers was used to instill new forms of discipline.89 This went along with the
introduction of new military tactics. Rulers and states tried to expand military discipline
to the entire population by authoritarian social engineering, especially in the struggle
against its perceived “backwardness,” as a modernizing measure.90 For Ross the relation,
between dress and behavior is unidirectional; he assumes that a certain attitude leads to a
certain choice of dress. However, I argue, drawing on theories of social embodiment and
habitus, that the relationship between body and dress is rather reciprocal, and that the
body and its habitus are rather shaped by the choice of dress as is the meaning of a
certain pieces of dress.91 
Martschukat,  in  his  elaborations  on  the  history  of  masculinity  and  its
accomplishment by discourse  analysis,  comments  on the problematic  of  the  relations
between  discourse,  often  considered  as  the  level  of  the  normative,  and  individual
88 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin,  Key Concepts in Post-Colonial Studies, Key Concepts
Series (London [u.a.]: Routledge, 1998), 144-147.
89 Ross, Clothing, 104.
90 Ibid., 106.
91 On the concept of embodiment see Entwistle, ‘Fashion and the Fleshy Body;’ and Thomas J. Thomas J.
Csordas,  ‘Embodiment  as  a  Paradigm  for  Anthropology’,  Ethos 18,  no.  1  (1  March  1990):  5–47,
doi:10.2307/640395.
21
1 Introduction
experience. He points out that discourse, in contrast to how it is perceived by critics of
the notion, is rather interchangeable with what Foucault later termed as dispositiv. That
means discourse is not opposed to individual experience but is rather inseparable. They
have a reciprocal, mutually constituting relation. Discourse thus comprises, besides the
linguistic/verbal level,  also institutions, objects and procedures. Individual expressions
then are to be regarded as complex and hybrid interpretations of normative perceptions.92
An account of discourse or dispositiv that includes practices and institutions means that
discourse does not only speak about certain issues but rather fundamentally produces
them. It  enables  “historical  specific  experiences”93 that  in turn produce discourse and
attendant, historically mutable subjectivities.
For my study of discourses on headgear it is extraordinarily important to suspend
the  distinction  between  discursive  and  non-discursive  practices.  Toward  that  end,  I
follow  Wrana  and  Langer  who  convincingly  argue  that  bodily  practices  need  to  be
considered  as  speech-acts  that  gain  meaning  only  through  their  situatedness  within
discourse. In reference to Foucault, they conceptualize the analysis of discourse as praxis,
the way discourse  is  articulated through practice.94 Discourse thereby is  defined as  a
ensemble of relations, and discursive relations are equal to the relations of verbal and
non-verbal relations. The discourse itself is the border between these two, according to
Wrana.  Discourse  enables  certain  bodily  practices  that  constitute  subjects.  Discourse
analysis  in  this  regard  is  rather  a  theoretical  framework  than  a  method,  enabling  a
consideration of discursive practices in their situatedness and  interconnectedness.
It is the story of the construction and fixing of meanings on the basis of discursive
formation which produce truth in their own historical sense. Phillip Sarasin, in his study
of  historiography  and  discourse  theory,  aptly  contents  that  such  an  approach,  the
paradigmatic shift which was brought about by the linguistic turn, does not contradict or
make  historical  studies  obsolete.95 As  also  put  forward  by  other  historians,  such  as
92 Jürgen  Martschukat  and  Olaf  Stieglitz,  Geschichte  der  Männlichkeiten,  historische  Einführungen
(Frankfurt/Main: Campus-Verl., 2008), 59.
93 Ibid., 62.
94 Daniel Wrana and Antje Langer, ‘On the Edge of Discourse. Beyond the Differentiation of Discursive
and Non-discursive Practices’, Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research 8,
no. 2 (31 May 2007), http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/253, paragraph 9.
95 See Philipp Sarasin, ‘Diskurstheorie und Geschichtswissenschaft’, in Handbuch Sozialwissenschaftliche
Diskursanalyse, ed. Reiner Keller, vol. 1: Theorien und Methoden (Wiesbaden: VS,  Verl. für Sozialwiss.,
2011), 61–90.
22
1 Introduction
Hayden White, historical truth is dependent on the historian's own presumptions. 
Discourse analysis as a method of historiography to scrutinize social relations shifts
its focus from historical sources as documents of past realities to the ways they produce
meanings and reflect the discursive quality of historical phenomena,96 thereby a special
focus is put on how these phenomena were located at the intersections of power and
knowledge. Discourse theory draws on poststructuralist linguistic theory on the nature
of language in order to grasp the meanings of historical phenomena, which theorize the
relations between signs and objects, signifier and signified. The former is considered not
to  be  arbitrary  but  rather  situated  within  a  system  of  signs.  This  brings  about  the
visibility of historical situated knowledges and meanings.97 
Sarasin mentions four  characteristics of  Foucault's  method of  discourse  analysis
relevant  to  my study.  The  first  is  to  determine the location of  historical  statements,
which  is  the  historical,  social  and  cultural  vantage  point  of  a  series  of  resembling
statements, the place of legitimate speech, which instituationalization of power that has a
claim to truth.  The second characteristic  is  the determination of  similarities between
statements  to  create  a  system of  statements  in  order  to  determine  the  borders  of  a
discourse, through the determination of what is unspeakable and relations with other
discourses  through collective  symbols.  As a  third characteristic  one  needs to  discern
what constitutes the borders of  the discourse:  what is unspeakable and what are the
relations  to  other  discourses.  As  a  last  step  the  three  preceding  steps  constitute  an
archive that contains and organizes all crucial statements. It enables the scholar to trace
how discourses produce the social world in its  historical  specificity,98 which refers to
Derrida's  concept  of  difference to  the  materiality  of  discourse  and  which   defines
discourse  as  an  effort  to  fix  meanings,  a  place  “in  which  fracture,  repression  and
paradoxically spoken utterances occur.”99 
Post-Marxist discourse theory emphasizes the role of the imaginative as central to
the construction of society, in addition to the material conditions of social relations. This
view  is  crucial  to  a  concept  of  identity  that  considers  the  very  same  fragmentary,
polysemous  and  open-to-modification  nature  of  signs.  Societies  in  that  sense  are
96 See Ibid., 68.
97 See Ibid., 67.
98 See Ibid., 70.
99 Ibid., 74.
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temporary and precarious enunciations of certain social self-ascriptions.100
1.3.2 Masculinity and the History of the Body 
Taken  together,  the  above  summary  of  scholarly  works  on  fashion  and  power
indicate that a history of dress must be closely linked to the historicity of the body. Even
though dress has its own texture and materiality that is distinct from the body, a piece of
dress forms the body and can even become part of it. Dressing is a bodily act, like eating
or walking. Tony Bellantine and Antoinette Burton propose an approach of what they
call “bodies in contact.” It encompasses an attempt to re-narrate world history through
the body and the interrelation of bodies, with an emphasis on the concept of Empire,
which they define loosely as “a net of trade, knowledge, military power, and political
intervention.”101 They are interested in the way colonization and other phenomena are
part  of  empire-  building  and  its  impact  on  everyday  life  and  the  way  modernity  is
determined by these conditions. World history attempts to show connections between
areas which were thought to be distinct, i.e. by tracing pre-modern trade routes and the
cross-cultural exchanges they enabled long before the emergence of global capitalism.102
The  body  herein  is  regarded  as  an  actor.  It  makes  visible  imperial  colonial
encounters.  The  authors  recount  Mary  Louis  Pratt's  suggestion  of  the  “body  as
method.”103 In the colonial context the authors stress the importance of female bodies as
targets of colonial discourse and policy, yet they also remark on the lack of analysis of
masculinity in spite of its centrality in colonial projects, visible for example in the crisis
of  masculinity  the  colonial  endeavour  evokes  for  white  male  bodies  through  their
encounter with the non-white, colonized Other, and the feminization of colonized men,
to mention but the most well known examples.104
The history of Europe’s rise to power is going to be decentered by such accounts.
Even though Europe's rise had profound significance in world history, especially with the
expansions after 1760, European culture only constituted itself in the process of imperial
100 Ibid., 77.
101 Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette M. Burton, eds.,  Bodies in Contact: Rethinking Colonial Encounters in
World History (Durham, NC [u.a.]: Duke Univ. Press, 2005), 3.
102 Ibid., 10.
103 See Mary Louise Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (London [u.a.]:
Routledge, 1992).
104 Ballantyne and Burton, Bodies in Contact, 7.
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encounters and in interaction with many different societies on the planet.105 Despite its
hegemony, European power was always contested, and Europe itself remained the center
of power only for a very short period of time while new center like China, Japan and
others arose.106
The approach of the “body as method” was introduced by Kathleen Canning. 107 I
regard dress as practice which is part of bodily practices like walking. Canning’s model
relies  on  Foucault’s  notion  of  biopower  and  his  ideas  of  the  social  body which,  she
argues,  allows scholars  to  go beyond the notion of  the  body as  merely  a  metaphor.
Within such a framework the body can be thought as “in many ways the most intimate
colony, as well as the most unruly”108 and thus as a source of resistance. Thereby the
body becomes an agent in history to the same degree as factors like capitalism, war etc.,
being a zone of management, containment, regulation, conformity, resistance and contact
tout court.109 The analytic  task of  the  body as method,  Canning assesses,  is  to make
visible what is hidden behind the body's oxymoronic status, its treatment as a discursive
object, as ideological work and as sign and symbol.  Ballantyne and Burton call  those
hidden  qualities  of  the  body  “the  real  stories”  which  include  labor,  leisure,  family,
mobility, political economy, household, state. These “bodies as contact zones” are then a
powerful  analytic  tool  that  allow  scholars to  navigate  between  representations  and
relations of power and domination and agency.110 
In 1994 John Tosh argued that masculinity was out of the focus and considered
irrelevant  for  historical  study  because  men's  bodies  were  and  are  not  considered
gendered.111 That  is  specifically  relevant  for  my  study  of  headgear,  because  men's
headgear  is  rather  related  to  the  mind  than  to  the  body,  while  women's  headgear
explicitly marks gender and in addition makes reference to sexuality. That reflects the
fact that fezzes and hats are also donned by women, but veils and women's hats rarely by
men. An exception are the reports of the donning of women's hats after the promulgation
105 See Ibid., 10-11.
106 See Ibid., 10-11.
107 See Kathleen Canning, ‘The Body as Method? Reflections on the Place of the Body in Gender History’,
Gender & History 11, no. 3 (1999): 499–513.
108 Ballantyne and Burton, Bodies in Contact, 407.
109 See Ibid., 407.
110 A phenomenon that the authors call the “real,”  see Ibid., 409.
111 John Tosh, ‘What Should Historians Do with Masculinity? Reflections on Nineteenth-Century Britain’,
History Workshop Journal, no. 38 (1994): 179–202.
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of the hat law, but these have been rare occasions. He argued that a perception that was
elaborated during “the late Victorian heyday of scientific belief” that
“[m]en's nature was vested in their reason not their bodies. A profound dualism in
Western thought has served to keep the spotlight away from men. In the historical
record it is as though masculinity is everywhere but nowhere,”112
which even informs historiography up to the present day. The field of Masculinity
Studies also within historiography has grown substantially within the past twenty years,
so much so that it is beyond the scope of this introduction to provide an overview.113 In
their  2005  essay  on  hegemonic  masculinity,  R.W.  Connell  and  James  Messerschmidt
emphasize the importance of male embodiment. According to the authors, men's bodies
are both objects and agents of social practice while bodily processes and social structures
are linked by social practice. Wearing headgear is a social practice that produces such
gendered bodies.114 
Breward  demonstrates  how  fashion,  the  making  of  modern  male  bodies,  and
nationalism are closely connected. The marketing of men's fashion in late nineteenth-
century Europe increasingly promised “health, vitality and the palpable display of the
youthful and attractive manly body.”115 
Partha Chatterjee has studied the general predicament of postcolonial nationalism,
while its interrelationship with masculinity has been scrutinized in-depth by Mrinalinha
Sinha.116 In her study of colonial masculinity in India, she analyses how a new nationalist
elite in India simultaneously refused and relied on colonialist stereotypes. The colonialist
112 Ibid., 180.
113 See Martschukat and Stieglitz, Geschichte der Männlichkeiten.
114 See  R. W. Connell and James W. Messerschmidt, ‘Hegemonic Masculinity Rethinking the Concept’,
Gender & Society 19, no. 6 (1 December 2005): 829–59, doi:10.1177/0891243205278639;  for an overview
of possible application of this concept of hegemonic masculinities in historical studies see Tosh John,
‘Hegemonic Masculinity and the History of Gender’, in  Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering
Modern History : Gender in History, ed. Stefan Dudink, Karen Hagemann, and John Tosh (Manchester:
Manchester Univ. Press, 2004), 41–56.
115 Christopher Breward,  ‘Manliness,  Modernity and the Shaping of  Male Clothing’,  in  Body Dressing:
Dress, Body, Culture, ed. Joanne Entwistle and Elisabeth Wilson (Oxford [u.a.]: Berg, 2001), 165.
116 See Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World : A Derivative Discourse? (Tokyo: Zed
Books Ltd in Komm., 1986); and Mrinalini Sinha, Colonial Masculinity:  The ‘Manly Englishman’ and the
‘Effeminate  Bengali’  in  the  Late  Nineteenth  Century,  Studies  in  Imperialism  (Manchester  u.a.:
Manchester Univ. Press, 1995).
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discourse  contrasted  the  'manly  Englishman'  to  the  'effeminized'  Western  educated
Bengali elite. The latter rejected their stereotyping as effeminized, and engaged instead in
the re-appropriation of masculinity to consolidate power in the nation-state.
Wilson Chacko Jacob shed light on similar dynamics in modern Egypt. His study
scrutinized constructions of male identities within the context of European imperialism
and nationalism, using masculinity as an analytic perspective to demonstrate how certain
disciplinary  techniques  produced  the  heteronormative  male  citizen.  Part  of  Jacob's
argument  hinges  on  the  Egyptian  discourse  about  appropriate  headgear  for  men,  in
particular on the question of whether to wear the fez or not.117 For Jacob what is specific
about this discourse is the way it is characterized by colonialism and by the question of
national sovereignty. In contrast to Turkey, where the fez was outlawed together with
other headgear in 1925, in Egypt it became a national symbol. For Jacob the quest for
national sovereignty is connected to a quest for an identity which embodies male virtues,
especially honor.118 Arus Yumul scrutinized how discourses on male national  identity
evolved from the Early Turkish Republic to the present day through a notion of civilized
bodies.  Yumul's  study  sheds  light  on  the  impact  of  Orientalist debates  about
Westernization  on  nationalized  male  identities  and  Turkish  modernity.119 In  contrast
Deniz Kandiyoti had argued earlier to open the perspective beyond the colonial context.
Instead of attributing phenomena relating to masculinity exclusively to colonialism and
Western hegemony, it was necessary to consider dynamics of local patriarchies.120 I agree
with her to the extent that local dynamics need to be considered, which is definitely
accomplished in the studies of Sinha and Jacob, but I think one needs to be cautious to
avoid a binary perspective that equates local with traditional and external with modern.
Much  of  the  discussion  on  bourgeois  gender  relations  as  well  as  traditional
Ottoman social organization hinges on the notions of separate spheres as well as gender
segregation.  Both  notions  need  to  be  treated  with  caution,  since  they  describe  an
117 See Wilson Chacko Jacob,  Working out Egypt : Effendi Masculinity and Subject Formation in Colonial
Modernity, 1870 - 1940 (Durham, NC [u.a.]: Duke Univ. Press, 2011).
118 Ibid., 335 . 
119 See Arus Yumul, ‘Bitmemiş Bir Proje Olarak Beden’,  Toplum ve Bilim, no. 84 (2000): 37–50;  and Arus
Yumul, ‘Fashioning the Turkish Body Politic’, in  Turkey’s Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and
Change in the Twentieth Century, ed. Kerem Öktem, Celia Kerslake, and Philip Robins (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 349–69.
120 See  Deniz  Kandiyoti,  ‘The  Paradoxes  of  Masculinity’,  in  Dislocating  Masculinity:  Comparative
Ethnographies,  ed.  Andrea Cornwall  and Nancy Lindisfarne-Tapper,  1.  Publ.,  Male Orders (London:
Routledge, 1994), 197–212.
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idealized picture that in addition needs to be read against the respective conceptions of
space. Although I cannot accomplish a study on the transition of gender and space in the
course  of  the  long  nineteenth  century  in  Ottoman  Empire,  the  construction  of  the
bourgeois home and the nation state and with it the reformulation of public space and its
gendered  implications  needs  to  be  kept  in  mind  as  a  framing  discourse  for  these
developments. 
1.4 State of Research
1.4.1 Ottoman and Turkish Politics of Dress
There are a number of encyclopaedic accounts of Ottoman or Turkish dress, the
latter  more related to dynasty and state and the former tracing dress history to pre-
Ottoman times and central-Asian clothing. They provide a useful overview of what was
worn when and where and are necessary to trace the persistence and changes of forms
and patterns, yet they lack and analytic perspective on the meaning of dress. One of
these is Nureddin Sevin's book that contains many examples of early Ottoman headgear
and nineteenth and twentieth century uniforms and headgear which is very helpful to
trace the variety and development of styles.121 Another historical overview of styles of
headgear is the costume book by İzzet Kumbaracılar.122
One of the most profound and encompassing studies of Ottoman dress is the edited
volume Ottoman Costumes: From Textile to Identity by Suraiya Faroqhi and Christopher
Neumann.123 It discusses methodological tools of the study of dress as well as a number of
121 See  Reşat  Ekrem  Koçu,  Türk  Giyim,  Kuşam  ve  Süslenme  Sözlüğü,  Sümerbank  Kültür  Yayınları  1
(Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1967);  Nureddin Sevin, Onüç Asırlık Türk Kiyâfet Târihine Bir Bakış, 1. bs.,
Kültür Bakanlığı  Yayınları  /  Kültür Eserleri  Dizisi,   Türkei Kültür Bakanlığı.  -  Ankara,  1976- 1195
(Ankara:  Kültür  Bakanlığı  yayınları,  1991);  an  overview on  ancient  Turkish  dress  is  provided  by
William Alexander, Eski Türk Kiyafetleri ve Güzel Giyim Tarzları, ed. Muḥarram Faiḍī (İstanbul: Zaman,
1932); For an introduction to Turkish and Ottoman dress see also Charlotte Jirousek, ‘Historical Survey
of  Textiles  and Dress  in Turkey’,  in  Berg Encyclopedia  of  World  Dress  and Fashion 5:  Central  and
Southwest Asia, ed. Joanne B. Eicher and Gillian Vogelsang-Eastwood, Engl. ed., vol. 5 (Oxford: Berg,
2010),  113–20; and  Nancy Micklewright, ‘Ottoman Dress’,  in  Berg Encyclopedia of World Dress and
Fashion 5: Central and Southwest Asia, ed. Joanne B. Eicher and Gillian Vogelsang-Eastwood (Oxford:
Berg, 2010), 126–33;  On the modernization of dress in the Balkans see  Constanţa Vintilă-Ghiţulescu,
From Traditional Attire to Modern Dress : Modes of Identification, Modes of Recognition in the Balkans
(XVIth - XXth Centuries) (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publ., 2011).
122 İzzet Kumbaracılar, Serpuşlar ([s.l.]: Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu Yayını, 1985).
123 Suraiya Faroqhi and Christoph K. Neumann, eds., Ottoman Costumes: From Textile to Identity (Istanbul:
Eren, 2004).
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case  studies  from  the  material  aspects  of  Ottoman  dress  to  dress  regulations  and
conceptual questions such as gender and religion. The volume gives an analysis of the
pre-Mahmudian Ottoman sartorial regime as well as an account of Westernized Ottoman
dress  in  the  nineteenth  century.  Christopher  Neumann's  analysis  of  two  eighteenth
century inventories of Ottoman viziers provides evidence of the diversity of dress even of
two  persons  of  the  same  rank,  countering  the  generalizing  depictions  in  costume
books.124 A similar study has been accomplished recently for the mid-nineteenth century
by Edhem Eldem, who studied the inventory of Mehmed Cemal Bey, that covered the
years 1855-1864. In terms of headgear, the huge amount of fezzes is remarkable here, one
more indicator of the success of its implementation.125 In the same edited volume on dress
in self-narratives Elke Hartmann's contribution on Armenian Militiamen (fedayis)  and
their dress is an excellent case study on the interrelation between bourgeois dress and
national costume and the way both are used for self-fashioning in different contexts.126
Relating to nineteenth century dress reforms and their significance, an essay by
Donald Quataert provides the most important and inspiring contribution as he refers to
the socio-cultural consequences of these reforms and puts emphasize on the importance
of the Mahmudian dress reform for the restructuring of the Ottoman state and Ottoman
society.127 Charlotte  Jirousek  gives  an  account  of  the  economic  aspects  of  the
transformation of dress codes in the Ottoman Empire with the emergence of an industrial
fashion market and the introduction of a “mass fashion system” in the urban centers of
the Ottoman Empire. According to Jirousek industrialization changed the form as well as
124 Christoph K Neumann, ‘How Did a Vizier Dress in the Eighteenth Century?’, in  Ottoman Costumes :
From Textile to Identity, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi and Christoph K Neumann (Istanbul: Eren, 2004), 182–
218. 
125 See  Edhem  Eldem,  ‘An  Exercise  in  Ottoman  Sartorial  Micro  History’,  in  Fashioning  the  Self  in
Transcultural Settings: The Uses and Significance of Dress in Self Narratives ,  ed. Claudia Ulbrich and
Richard Wittmann (Würzburg: Ergon-Verl., 2015), 93–116.
126 See  Elke  Hartmann,  ‘Shaping  the  Armenian Warrior:  Clothing  and  Photographic  Self-Portraits  of
Armenian Fedayis in the Late 19th and Early 20th Century’, in  Fashioning the Self in Transcultural
Settings:  The  Uses  and  Significance  of  Dress  in  Self-Narratives ,  ed.  Claudia  Ulbrich  and  Richard
Wittmann (Würzburg: Ergon, 2015), 117–50.
127 See Quataert, ‘Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829’. John Norton also
provides a brief overview of the dress codes in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. He puts emphasize on
the  extraordinary  variety  of  Ottoman  dress  before  the  Westernization  of  dress  and  derives  the
importance  of  and  the  emphasis  on  dress  in  Turkey  until  the  present  day  from  its  historical
importance.  Left  aside  is  the  question whether this  is  a  sufficient  explanation of  modern Turkish
politics on dress; his effort to explain the extraordinary importance of dress in Ottoman and Turkish
politics  is  worth  mentioning,  even  though  I  think  it  is  better  understood  from  a  transnational
perspective. See John Norton, ‘Faith and Fashion in Turkey’, in Languages of Dress in the Middle East
(Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1997), 149–77.
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meaning of  dress.  She attests  to an accelerated change of  styles  of  dress  among the
Ottoman elite in the eighteenth century and compares the situation to industrializing
England  at  the  same  time.  Patterns  of  consumption  changed  as  more  commodities
circulated which could be afforded by more and more people. While initially forms of
dress remained unchanged, after the Mahmudian reforms and industrialization, clothing
production in Western styles were increasingly adopted by urban elites. She argues that
“[b]y the 1850's it  is possible to find portraits of Ottoman gentlemen who are clearly
being dressed by the finest European (or European-trained) tailors”128 and “[b]y the end
of the nineteenth century, the shops of Pera were providing the latest fashions in ready-
to-wear to Muslims as well  as non-Muslims.”129 Western department stores that were
located not only in Pera but also in the historical city became crucial to the distribution
of these products, as analyzed by Yavuz Köse.130
Ottoman  women  took  a  crucial  position  in  these  changing  production  and
consumption  patterns,  as  Donald  Quataert  points  out.131 Textile  production  and  the
gendered division of labor is a crucial element of the link between gender order and
clothing.  At  home  as  well  as  in  small  manufactories  women  contributed  to  the
production of yarn, cloth and clothing. Industrialization brought women into low paid
wage earning positions and thus contributed substantially to the establishment of the
global  clothing industry.  Within the Ottoman Empire a focus on women reveals that
often assumed strict divisions of labor according to gender can be questioned by a focus
on textile  production.  For  the  Ottoman example  this  means  that  women need  to  be
considered as a workforce in order to get a complete picture of changes in Ottoman
textile production due to industrialization and globalization. While the Ottoman guilds
and their participation in textile production declined sharply, it was often assumed that
128 Charlotte Jirousek, ‘The Transition to Mass Fashion System Dress in the Later Ottoman Empire’, in
Consumption Studies and the History of the Ottoman Empire, 1550 - 1922: An Introduction , ed. Donald
Quataert (Albany, NY: State Univ. of New York Press, 2000), 228.
129 See Ibid., 234. An overview on existing literature overviews and depictions of Ottoman dress before
throughout several centuries can be found in Nancy Micklewright and Yedida K. Stillman, ‘Costume in
the Middle East’, Middle East Studies Association Bulletin 26, no. 1 (1992): 13–38.
130 See  Yavuz  Köse,  ‘Vertical  Bazaars  of  Modernity:  Western  Department  Stores  and  Their  Staff  in
Istanbul’, in  Ottoman and Republican Turkish Labour History, ed. Touraj Atabaki and Gavin Brockett
(Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009), 91–114; An overview over the modernization of dress
through the nineteenth century is also provided Aysal Necdet, ‘Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Giyim ve
Kuşamda Çağdaşma Hareketleri’, Cağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırması Dergisi 10, no. 22 (2011): 3–32.
131 Donald Quataert, ‘Ottoman Women, Households, and Textile Manufacturing, 1800-1914’, in  Shifting
Boundaries: Women and Gender in Middle Eastern History, New Haven, ed. Nikki Keddie and Beth Baron
(New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1991), 161–76. 
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Ottoman textile production did the same. Instead, a shifting perspective reveals that a
shift of guild to non-guild labor took place, moving production into small households and
workshops,  where  often  women  produced  textiles  for  local  and  global  markets  and
processed European-manufactured-factory-spun yarn. According to Quataert, the socio-
economic effects of these shifts in the labour market are hard to determine. On the one
hand  the  import  of  European-spun  yarns  meant  the  loss  of  jobs  in  traditional
manufacturing, and women thus became employed at low wages in the expanding textile
sector  in  other  areas.  Thus,  the  female  workforce  replaced  formerly  guild-bound
production. Low paid as their work was, they were not able to sustain a whole family
with their wages, and their full-time work remained a supplement to the family income.
Ottoman women's dress itself was effected by changes in the modernization process
but did not hinge on spectacular legislation, like the laws introducing the fez or the hat.
Still, they were effected by these laws. They also adapted the new dress codes which
came along with the socio-economic transformations in the 19th century, and when the
hat law was issued in 1925 women's dress in the urban centers was also to a great extent
modernized.132 The  banning of  the  veil  and  the  wearing  of  the  hat  by  women were
regulated by local administrative regulations. 
Madeline Zilfi scrutinized how Ottoman sumptuary laws in the 17 th and 18th century
had been gendered in a way that women, along with Ottoman non-Muslims, had been
targets  of  clothing regulations that  served to strengthen patriarchal  solidarity among
Muslim  men  throughout  social  strata.133 Nancy  Micklewright  studied  in  depth  the
adoption of modern dress by women in Istanbul in the nineteenth century, which was a
matter of economic possibilities and availability as the latter grew steadily. She points
out that with the adoption of European dress a “completely different conception of dress
and  style”  was  adopted,  away  from  loose-fitting,  interchangeable,  layered  dress  to
132 See  i.e.  Anastasia  Falierou,  ‘Ottoman  Turkish  Women’s  Clothing  between  Trade,  Tradition  and
Modernity’, in From Traditional Attire to Modern Dress: Modes of Identification, Modes of Recognition in
the  Balkans  (XVIth  -  XXth  Centuries),  ed.  Constanţa  Vintilă-Ghiţulescu  (Newcastle  upon  Tyne:
Cambridge  Scholars  Publ.,  2011),  175–93;  Cihan  Aktaş  provides  a  broad  historical  overview over
developments in women's dress and discussions around it,  but relies on secondary literature only.
Cihan Aktaş,  Tanzimat’tan Günümüze Kılık Kıyafet ve Iktidar, Nehir Yayınları : İnceleme - Araştırma
Dizisi ;  30 5 (İstanbul: Nehir yayınları, 1989); and Cihan  Cihan Aktaş,  Tanzimat’tan 12 Mart’a Kılık-
Kıyafet ve Iktidar, 2. Basım., Kapı Yayınları ; 71 Araştırma-Inceleme 20 (İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2006)., 
133 See  Madeline  C.  Zilfi,  ‘Whose  Laws?  Gendering  the  Ottoman  Sumptuary  Regime’,  in  Ottoman
Costumes: From Textile to Identity, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi and Christoph K Neumann (Istanbul: Eren, 2004),
125–42. 
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tailored, form-fitted garments.134
The modern fashions women sported were in public covered by a çarşaf or a similar
long concealing piece of dress. These outer garments, however, were subject to change
and fashion. In that regard Reina Lewis remarks on the significance of the hat, as a piece
of outer wear, that might have had a even greater significance for women's dress than
the  alafranga inner wear.135 Lewis comments on the consequences of the adoption of
modern dress by Ottomans on the Western Orientalist gaze which thereby lost its exotic
object.136 In her work she makes visible the active contribution of Ottoman elite women
in the making of  the  West  through their  travel  and cross-cultural  dressing.  She also
points  out  how  these  women  always  walked  a  fine  line  between  subverting  and
reaffirming  these  “hegemonic  Orientalist  knowlegdes”  by  their  play  with  and
performance of identities.137  
Even though the fez is often perceived as a male item, it was quite common for
women to don it, before and after its introduction as part of civil and military uniform by
Mahmud II.138 
A recent publication by Serap Kavas uses the concept of developmental idealism to
frame Ottoman and Turkish politics of dress theoretically. Her theoretical implications
are  similar  to  mine,  taking  the  global  dimension  of  these  politics  of  dress  and  its
ideological foundations into account. She takes praxeological considerations into account
to grasp the meaning of the body in this setting, whereby she assesses that “shape and
image of the external body became an index to ascribe meaning and value to the self.” 139
134 See Nancy  Micklewright,  ‘Tracing  the  Transformation  in  Women’s  Dress  in  Nineteenth-Century
Istanbul.’,  Dress: The Journal of The Costume Society of America, no. 13 (1987);  Nancy Micklewright,
‘Late-Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Wedding Costumes as Indicators of Social Change’,  Muqarnas 6
(1989):  161,  doi:10.2307/1602288;  Nancy  Micklewright,  ‘Women’s  Dress  in  Nineteenth-Century
Istanbul:  Mirror  of  a  Changing  Society’  (University  of  Pennsylvania,  1986),
http://repository.upenn.edu/dissertations/AAI8614840/;  Onur Inal,  ‘Women’s  Fashions in Transition:
Ottoman  Borderlands  and  the  Anglo-Ottoman  Exchange  of  Costumes’,  Journal  of  World  History:
Official Journal of the World History Association 22, no. 2 (2011): 243–72.
135 See Reina Lewis, Rethinking Orientalism: Women, Travel and the Ottoman Harem (London [u.a.]: Tauris,
2004), 228.
136 Ibid., 231.
137 Reina Lewis refers to Homi Bhabha's notion of colonial mimicry and the “mimic man” in reference to
these Ottoman women's dressing practices,  which might challenge “naturalised sureties of colonial
identity,” but as well stabilize or re-inscribe them as part of a contradictory dynamic, Ibid., 232. 
138 On this see i.e. Ayşe Zeren Enis, Everyday Lives of Ottoman Muslim Women: Hanımlara Mahsûs Gazete
(Newspaper for Ladies) (1895 - 1908),  1st ed.,  Tarih Dizisi,  Libra Kitap. - İstanbul 60 (İstanbul:  Libra
Kitap, 2013).
139 Serap Kavas, ‘“Wardrobe Modernity”: Western Attire as a Tool of Modernization in Turkey’,  Middle
Eastern Studies 51, no. 4 (4 July 2015): 515–39, doi:10.1080/00263206.2014.979802.
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Yet besides a few references to the Ottoman women's journal Hanimlara mahsus gazetesi
and  quotes  from  Mustafa  Kemal  [Atatürk]'s  talks,  her  study  is  based  on  secondary
sources. And even though I agree with many of her assessments, she grounds her study
on  a  modernity-versus-tradition  dualism,  where  modernists  are  always  automatically
opposed by religious reactionaries, who counter the modernization project, not taking
into account how conservatism was not necessarily contradictory to modernization.
1.4.1.1 Ottoman Headgear
Concerning Ottoman male headgear before the introduction of the fez, the studies
of Ottoman gravestones decorated with headpieces, such as the one performed by Hans-
Peter Laqueur, need to be mentioned.140 They reveal the extraordinary importance and
variety of headgear in the Ottoman social order, even after a person's death, in the time
before  Mahmud II  new dress  codes  and after.  The importance of  headgear  and their
depiction on gravestones is also manifested through clothing practices in Sufism with its
distinct headpieces that had ritual  significance and distinguished the different orders.
There exists a whole genre that exclusively deals with the tac, the dervish hats, such as a
text by Müstaqim-zade Süleyman Sadeddin edited by Helga Anetshofer and Hakan T.
Karateke.141 In addition to the studies of the Ottoman turbans such as Rosita d'Amora's, 142
depictions of diverse headpieces throughout the centuries can be found in encyclopaedic
accounts in the form of costume books, such as the one edited by İzzet Kurumbaracılar. 143
Charlotte Jirousek provides an historical account of European and Ottoman Headgear,144
and Beverely Chico gives an overview on the turban and other pieces of male headgear
in the Middle East.145
140 See  Hans-Peter  Laqueur,  ‘Die  Kopfbedeckungen  Im  osmanischen  Reich  als  soziales
Erkennungszeichen, dargestellt anhand einiger Istanbuler Grabsteine des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts’, Der
Islam 59, no. 1 (1982): 80–92.
141 See  Helga Anetshofer and Hakan T. Karateke,  Traktat über die Derwischmützen (Risāle-i tāciyye) des
Müstaqīm-zāde Süleymān Sādeddin (st. 1788) (Leiden: Brill, 2001). 
142 See  Rosita D’Amora,  ‘Alcune Considerazioni  Sul  Valore  Simbolico del Copricapo in Ambito Turco
Ottomano’, in Scritti in Onore Di Giovanni M. D’Erme, ed. Michele Bernardini and Natalia L. Tornesello,
Università Di Napoli L’Orientale, Series Minor 68 (Napoli, 2005), 335–51.
143 Kumbaracılar, Serpuşlar.
144 See Charlotte Jirousek, ‘More than Oriental Splendor: European and Ottoman Headgear, 1380–1580’,
Dress 22, no. 1 (1 January 1995): 22–33, doi:10.1179/036121195805298172. 
145 Chico Beverly, ‘The Turban and Male Headgear’, in  Berg Encyclopedia of World Dress and Fashion 5:
Central and Southwest Asia, ed. Joanne B. Eicher and Gillian Vogelsang-Eastwood, Engl., vol. 5 (Oxford:
Berg, 2010), 477–84. 
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A study of sources related to Mahmud's reform of military dress and especially the
wearing of the fez has been conducted by İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı.146 Another study on
headgear in the Ottoman Empire is Patricia Baker's essay “The Fez in Turkey” in which
she traces the introduction of the fez and its abolishment by the hat law,147 providing an
account  of  the  ambivalent  meaning  of  the  fez  as  a  symbol  of  modernization  and
conservatism. 
Concerning the appearance of different kinds of headpieces next to the fez in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century,  Mehmet Emin Elmacı  treats the controversy of
kalpak versus fez with recourse to many different kinds of sources.148 The boycott of the fez,
proclaimed after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in October 1908, and the search for
“the national hat” associated with it has been dealt with extensively with rich use of sources
from Ottoman journals by Y. Doğan Çetinkaya.149 Cevdet Kirpik, in his study on conflicts
about fez versus hat in the late Ottoman Empire,  deals with some of the state archival
sources I will also treat in my research.150 His account is the most detailed, to my knowledge,
of the becoming popular of the hat in the Ottoman Empire. Kirpik considers the 1890s as the
decade  when  the  hat  became  increasingly  popular  among  Ottoman  Muslim  and  non-
Muslims. He suggests that hat and fez respectively embodied different ideas. That fits the
assumption uttered by quite a few authors who commented on the issue of Ottoman and
Turkish headgear, that headgear is linked to a person's attitude in terms of pro- or anti-
modern. Yet, it is a suggestion that I would view rather critically. I also do not think that the
fez symbolized necessarily a different conception of modernity, but rather that the fez-hat
conflicts expressed tensions  within modernity. Yet,  it  is often assumed that the hat was
favored by those later termed Westernizers, but this distinction is problematic, as the concept
of the “West” as a useful analytical category has to be questioned critically.
146 See İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, ‘Asâkir-i Mansure’ye Fes Giydirilmesi Hakkında Sadr-i Âzam Takriri ve
II. Mahmud’un Hatt-ı Humayunu’, Belleten 18, no. 70 (1954): 223–30.
147 Patricia  L.  Baker,  ‘The  Fez  in  Turkey:  A  Symbol  of  Modernization’,  Costume.  The  Journal  of  the
Costume Society, no. 20 (1986): 72–85.
148 See Mehmet Emin Elmacı, ‘Fes-Kalpak Mücadelesi’, Toplumsal Tarih 42 (June 1997).
149 See Y.  Doğan Çetinkaya,  1908 Osmanlı  Boykotu:  Bir  Toplumsal  Hareketin Analizi,  1.  baskı.,  İletişim
Yayınları :  Araştırma - Inceleme Dizisi 161 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004);  recent account on the hat links
changes and developments and debates about men's headgear to transformation in Turkish Ottoman
poetry: Erhan Altan, Ölçü Kaçarken: Şapka, Şarkı, Şehir ve Şiir (Istanbul: 160. Kilometre, 2012).
150 See Cevdet Kırpık, ‘Fez - Şapka Çatışması [The Fez-Hat Conflict]’, Toplumsal Tarih, no. 162 (September
2007): 14–22; see also his unpublished doctoral thesis:  Cevdet Kırpık, ‘Osmanlı Devleti’nde İşçiler ve
İşçi Hareketleri (1876-1914) [Workers and the Worker's Movement in the Ottoman State (1876-1914)]’,
(unpublished doctoral thesis, Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2004).
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1.4.2 The Turkish Hat Law
In this study I will discuss some of the implications of the Turkish hat law in the
last chapter. Thus I want to introduce the research done on the hat law that contributed
to my reflections on Ottoman and Turkish headgear.151
Even though it is often assumed that the hat law of November 1925 addressed only
men of Turkish citizenship, this is not exactly the case. Formulated gender neutrally it
outlawed all  headpieces  besides  brimmed European hats  theoretically  for  all  Turkish
citizens. The hat law was applied to women as discussions about female teachers wearing
hats and girls and women in vocation schools show, i.e. the wearing of hats in the school
for nurses in 1925.152 Yet, in accordance with a gendered notion of citizenship, it  was
more often applied to men, but Mustafa Kemal addressed women as well, as potential
wearers  of  hats,  as  well  as  administrative  orders  and  authorities  that  guarded  the
implication of the law. 
Many  accounts  of  the  hat  law  take  a  teleological  approach  and  consider  the
repressive measures that made its implication possible as unavoidable. Most of the time
they rely on contemporary sources that propagate the hat as a measure that lead “the
Turks” from the valley of barbarity to the peaks of (Western) civilization.153 One study
conducted by Ayten Sezer Arığ is worth mentioning because it includes usage of archival
material from the Turkish Republican Archive (BCA) and the archive of the Ministry of
the  Interior  (EGM)  and  depicts many  cases  that  dealt  with  conflicts  concerning  the
implementation of the hat law.154 In detail she recounts the regulations of religious garb
in  the  1930s,  their  implementation  and  reactions  to  them.  She  specifically  provides
151 On general  clothing styles during in the early republic period see:  Oya Baydar and Derya Özkan,
Cumhuriyet  Modaları:  75  Yılda  Değişen  Yaşam,  Değişen  Insan ,  Bilanço  ’98  Yayın  Dizisi  (Beşiktaş,
İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1999).
152 Ayten Sezer Arığ,  Atatürk Türkiyesi’nde Kılık Kıyafette Çağdaşlaşma (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2007),
69.  Sezer  Arığ  mentions reports  on  women  wearing  hats  published  in  the  daily  Cumhuriyet of
September 2nd,3rd ,4th and 5th, 1925, see Ibid. 59, FN 27. 
153 Some  examples  of  these  kind  of  approaches:  Tülay  Duran,  ‘Bir  Inkilab  Modeli  ’Sapka  Inkilabi’,
Belgelerle Türk Tarihi: Dün, Bugün, Yarın, Özel Sayı  44–46, no. special issue (1988);  Tülay Duran, ‘Bir
Inkilab Modeli  “Sapka Inkilabi”  II’,  Belgelerle  Türk Tarihi:  Dün,  Bugün,  Yarın,  no.  47 (1989):  14–21;
Mustafa Selim İmece, Atatürk’ün Şapka Devriminde Kastamonu ve İnebolu Seyahatleri, 1925, Türkiye
Iş Bankasi Atatürk ve Devrim Serisi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1959); Selami Kılıç, ‘Şapka
Meselesi ve Kılık Kıyafet İnkılabı’,  Atatürk Yolu 16, no. 4 (November 1995): 529–47; Mahmut Goloğlu,
Devrimler ve Tepkileri: 1924-1930  (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası,  1979);  Arığ,  Atatürk Türkiyesi’nde Kılık
Kıyafette Çağdaşlaşma.
154 See Arığ, Atatürk Türkiyesi’nde Kılık Kıyafette Çağdaşlaşma.
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insights  into  how  different  religious  communities  within  Turkey  received  these
regulations. Another approach I want to highlight, even though it by and large lacks
primary  sources,  is  İslam'da  Başlık by  Orhan  Koloğlu.155 While  he  takes  a  similar
modernist  approach  like  most  depictions  of  the  hat  law,  he  situates  it  in  a  broader
historical and international context. This enables a more differentiated perspective on the
meaning of the introduction of the hat. Koloğlu shows the meaning of the fez and hat in
the context of European imperialism and changing meaning of these headpieces under
the  influence  of  various  nationalisms.  In  addition,  he  traces  the  interdependence  of
headgear, nationalism and imperialism in other Islamicate societies and their reaction to
the hat law in Turkey.
Another analysis which draws on these interdependences is Houchang Chehabi's
comparative account of  Dresscodes for  Men in Turkey and Iran.156 By means of dress
reform for  men, especially headgear,  he compares  the modernization process in both
countries.  In  Iran  in  1927  the  “Pahlavi  hat,”  which  resembled  the  French  kepi, was
introduced, and in 1935 the “international hat” was introduced, as the brimmed hat was
called. Chehabi analyses the close interrelation between national independence in both
countries, the “liberation” from imperialist influence and the change of headgear and its
meaning.157
Critics  of  the  Turkish  hat  law  were  often  classified  as  religious  fanatics,  and
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk used the law to eliminate all his “real”, prospective or alleged,
opponents. In a recent publication on the Turkish hat law Camilla T. Nereid breaks with
this often repeated dichotomy of progress and reaction. Instead of following the Kemalist
paradigm which grants legitimacy to only one version of modernization she follows a
model of multiple modernities and traces five different versions of it.158
155 See Orhan Koloğlu, Islamda Başlık [Headgear in Islam] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1978).
156 Houchang  Chehabi,  ‘Dress  Codes  for  Men  in  Turkey  and  Iran’,  in  Men  of  Order:  Authoritarian
Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah, ed. Touraj Atabaki and Erik J. Zürcher (London: Tauris,
2004), 209–37. On the implementation of the new dress code in Iran see Bianca Devos, Kleidungspolitik
in Iran: die Durchsetzung der Kleidungsvorschriften für Männer unter Riżā Šāh, Arbeitsmaterialien zum
Orient, (Würzburg: Ergon-Verl., 2006).
157 In addition local studies on the implementation of the hat law have been conducted, such as:  Dönüş
Başarır, ‘Şapka İnkılâbının Konya Basını ve Komuoyundaki Yankıları’ (Yüksek Lisans, Selçuk, Sosyal
Bilimleri  Enstitüsü,  1995);  Gürcan  Bozkır,  ‘Şapka  Devriminin  İzmir  Basınındaki  Yankılan’,  Çağdaş
Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi/Journal of Modern Turk Turkish Studies  1,  no.  1 (1991):  109–53;
Burcu Özcan, ‘Basına Göre Şapka ve Kılık Kıyafet  İnkılabı’,  (Master  Thesis,  Marmara Üniversitesi,
2008). 
158 See  Camilla T. Nereid, ‘Kemalism on the Catwalk: The Turkish Hat Law of 1925’,  Journal of Social
History 44, no. 3 (2011): 707–28, doi:10.1353/jsh.2011.0003. Another recent publication on the Hat Law
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There  are  several  accounts  of  the  protests  against  the  hat  law which  draw on
newspaper articles, material of the Independence Tribunals and archival material from
the state archives.159 Information about and literature on the protests against the hat law
are quite scarce. We do not have accounts of the events by the protesters themselves, and
all  studies  on  the  reports  and  analysis  on  the  events  rely  on  the  heavily  censured
newspaper  articles  and information given by the Independence Courts.  Mete  Tunçay
critically studies the Kemalist one-party regime, scrutinizing also the implementation of
the hat law and pointing out the drastic measures taken against opponents of the hat law,
but offers no interpretation going beyond the modernist versus reactionary binary.160  
In the most resent monograph on early republican reforms with a focus on the
politics  of  dress,  Hale  Yilmaz  analyzes  the  interrelation  of  nation-building  and
modernization played out in the implementation of the hat law.161 Beyond a focus on
open resistance her objective is to trace this implementation as well as forms of daily
resistance through sources provided by material from the archive of the Ministry of the
Interior and the Republican state archive. In addition, she also broadens the perspective
from an analysis of men's dress to politics of dress directed to women. 
by Yasmine Doğaner provides some additional sources. Its a plain descriptive account and doesn't give
any additional information on an analytic level. See  Yasmine Doğaner, ‘The Law on Headdress and
Regulations on Dressing in the Turkish Modernization’, Bilig, no. 51 (autumn 2009): 33–54.
159 See Ergün Aybars, İstiklâl Mahkemeleri: 1923-1927, Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları 429 (Ankara:
Kültür  ve  Turizm  Bakanlığı,  1982);  Goloğlu,  Devrimler  ve  Tepkileri:  1924-1930;  Gavin  S.  Brockett,
‘Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution: Towards a Framework for the Social History of the
Atatürk  Era,  1923-38’,  in  Turkey before  and after  Atatürk:  Internal  and  External  Affairs ,  ed.  Sylvia
Kedourie, Middle Eastern Studies. - Abingdon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 1964- ; 34.1998,4, Special
Issue  (London:  Cass,  1998),  44–66;  Gavin  S.  Brockett,  ‘Revisting  the  Turkish  Revolution’,  History
Compass 4, no. 6 (2006):  1060 – 1072; Mete Tunçay,  Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin
Kurulması (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2005).
160 See  Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması.  Also Sakal Fahri goes beyond
common depictions of the hat law by drawing on archival material which provides evidence of some
difficulties concerning the implementation of the hat law, such as the question how prayer could be
performed while wearing a hat.  He draws attention to the fact that refusal of the hat was not always a
matter of reactionism or religious fundamentalism but a merely economic one. People just could not
afford to buy ready-made dress and hats imported from Europe. See  Fahri Sakal, ‘Şapka İnkılâbının
Sosyal  ve Ekonomik Yönü.  Destekler  ve Köstekler’,  Turkish Studies.  International  Periodical  for  the
Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic. 2, no. 4 (2007): 1308–18.
161 Hale  Yılmaz,  Becoming  Turkish:  Nationalist  Reforms  and  Cultural  Negotiations  in  Early  Republican
Turkey (1923–1945) (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse Univ. Press, 2013).
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1.5 Sources
“The contradictory attempt to ‘know’ the past, to become acquainted with the human
beings who made it, leads us through archival sources that refuse to yield clear
pictures. But because the archives provide unique clues about power relations, and
about the human, moral,  and philosophical quandaries faced by the people who
produced them and by the people whose shadows inhabit them, we cannot afford
to do without them.”162 
In this study I am mainly referring to sources from the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi
(The Ottoman Archives of the Prime Minister’s Office), that deal with incidents related to
male headgear. Most of the cases took place in Istanbul and its periphery, the Aegean
region and the Balkans. These incidences appeared in a period from the mid-nineteenth
century to World War I. I treat the fez boycott of 1908/1909 by means of some Ottoman
and  Turkis  journal  articles  that  discuss  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  certain
headpieces, especially fez versus kalpak, as well as discussions about the European hat in
the years before the promulgation of the hat law in 1925. For the period after World War
I  I  also  analyze  the  brief  discussions  on  headgear  that  took  place  in  the  national
assembly, as well as caricatures from the satirical magazines Aydede and Ayine. To trace
the  development  of  Ottoman  male  styles  throughout  the  nineteenth  century,  I  also
looked at photographic collections, such as that by Engin Özendes.163 In chapter three,
relating to the introduction of the fez by Mahmud II., I also draw on the work of the
Ottoman chronicler Ahmed Lütfi Efendi. 
1.6 Outline
In Chapter Two I refer to the appearance of nineteenth century bourgeois identity,
modernization  and the  introduction of  the  fez  in  the  Ottoman Empire.  I  discuss  the
application of postcolonial  theory to the study of the Ottoman Empire and how this
relates to late Ottoman politics of dress. Furthermore I introduce theories of alternative
162 Florencia  E.  Mallon,  ‘The  Promise  and  Dilemma  of  Subaltern  Studies:  Perspectives  from  Latin
American  History’,  The  American  Historical  Review  99,  no.  5  (December  1994):  1507,
doi:10.2307/2168386.
163 Engin Özendes,  Photography in the Ottoman Empire: 1839 - 1923, 1st ed., YEM Yayın / Yapı-Endüstri
Merkezi. - İstanbul, 2001- 231 (İstanbul: YEM Yayın, 2013).
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and  multiple modernities  and their relevance for an analysis  of modernization in the
Ottoman Empire. In the last part of the chapter I will analyze some sources and cases that
deal with the implication of the obligatory wearing of the fez for civil officials introduced
by Mahmud II and consider their implications. 
Chapter Three deals with conflicts that appeared around headgear during the reign
of Abdülhamid II (1876-1909).  Most archival documents I found that  address headgear,
are from that period. These Ottoman state archival documents treat incidents that took
place in the Bulgarian Ottoman borderlands and the Aegean coast, in foreign and non-
Muslims schools in the Ottoman Empire, and some other spaces. There I elaborate on the
spacial  dimension  of  identity  construction  and  the  negotiation  of  national  territory
through politics of dress  as well as negotiations between local agents and the central
state.
In Chapter Four I discuss the globalization of modern male attire and how it shaped
discussions  on  consumption  and  masculinity. I  argue  that  the  phenomenon  of  the
Ottoman dandy as a consumer of Western goods and its derision need to be considered
within a global  framework of  late nineteenth century discourse  on masculinities and
their interrelation to modernization.  It  will  become apparent that the globalization of
modern male attire and with it Ottoman politics of dress are inseparable  from Western
European colonial endeavors and its civilizing mission.
Chapter Five is concerned with the politics of dress after  the Young Turk coup
d'etat in  1908, with a focus on the fez boycott and a few other incidents.  I follow the
question if the search for a national hat, that came along with the fez boycott after the
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in fall 1908, brought about any
significant changes in the politics of dress and identity. Even though the fez, due to the
boycott other developments, became increasingly unfashionable among some individuals
and  parts of the population,  and even  had been  replaced by the kalpak in some public
offices and foremost for military ranks and police forces, its wearing was still reinforced
on  other  occasions.  Especially  the  wearing  of  the  brimmed  European  hat  was  still
opposed and repressed by Ottoman authorities, be it among employees of the railway or
by Ottoman Muslim children promenading prominent public spaces with their fathers.
As my sources show a gap during World War I, in Chapter Six I take up the threat
at  around 1920 and briefly  treat  early  Republican discussions on headgear  and some
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aspects  of  the  promulgation  of  the  hat  law.  I  refer  to  Ottoman  Turkish  satirical
periodicals of the early 1920s and their depictions of headgear and bourgeois styles of
dress to  discuss some aspects of this periods discourse of dress. Journal articles help me
to carve out continuities to earlier Ottoman debates about types of headgear as well as
the significance attributed to headgear by these authors. Concerning the  Turkish hat law
of 1925 I address the discussion of gender and the family in Turkish President Mustafa
Kemal [Atatürk]'s speeches that he held to propagate the wearing of the hat. Moreover I
elaborate  on  the  relation  of  secularism,  religion  and  modernity  and  the  polarized
discussion of the hat law, in which all its opponents are termed as Islamic anti-modern
religious reactionaries. I discuss the relation of modernity and religion with regard to the
hat law, as well as to the concept of mimicry and the modern character of religiously
founded lines of arguments against the hat law.
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This  chapter  will  link  the  nineteenth  century  Ottoman  dress  reform  to  the
emergence  of  bourgeois  identity,  and  to  the  questions  of  modernization  and
Westernization. I will show the significance of dressing for the establishment of social
order, looking at the multifaceted way modern bourgeois identity came into being on a
global  scale,  and  at  how  modernizing  'non-Western'  states  appropriated  bourgeois
cultural forms for their own purposes. Ottoman endeavors to modernize must be viewed
within its entanglement with the nation-building project, which was “dominated for a
century  or  more  […],  by  the  effort  to  form  and  politically  mobilize  a  national
bourgeoisie.”1 Politics of dress were a crucial part of these efforts.
In the  nineteenth century, Ottoman Empire existing legislation concerning dress
was replaced by regulations that prescribed  modern clothing for military and officials
with the fez as an outstanding feature. However, legislation was not the only area which
influenced  the  shift  in  dress  codes.  The  reform  had  partly  been  initiated  through
permanent and increasing transgressions of existing Ottoman prescriptions. As early as
the  eighteenth  century, Western European items including clothing have become more
common amongst the Empire's subjects. This was due to the growing trade with western
Europe  and  its  changing  patterns  as  part  of  the  economic  globalization  and  of  the
capitalist expansion of industrializing nation-states.2
My leading questions will be the following: How can Ottoman modernization be
conceptualized  through the  practice  of  dress  and  situated  within  a  global  system of
capitalist modernity? I assume that politics of dress and relating practices reveal further
information  about  the  formation  of  modern  identity  on  the  one  hand,  and  about
techniques of modernity in general on the other hand.
For this purpose, I will first discuss notions of modernization and Westernization in
1 Carter V. Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789 - 2007 (New Haven [u.a.]:
Yale Univ. Press, 2010), 13. Findley observes a continuity in these nation-building efforts from mid-19 th-
to 20th century, thus emphasizing similarities between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic
until the 1960s.
2 Since the beginning of the nineteenth century,  Britain had been and remained the main European
trading partner of  the  Ottoman economy.  Only later  in the century,  with the beginning of  direct
foreign investment in the 1880s, Britain lost out to Germany and especially France, which became the
major foreign investor with a share of 30 to 50 percent. See Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History
(London: Tauris, 1997), 85.
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their  interrelation  with colonialism,  as well  as  refer  to  social,  political  and economic
transformations  that  can  be  linked  to the  emergence  of  middle  classes  and  modern
bourgeois culture  in the Ottoman Empire.  In  the second part  of  this  chapter  I  study
conflicts  evolving around headgear and the  politics of dress in the Ottoman Empire  in
order to come  to a deeper understanding of the  meaning and implications of the dress
code introduced by Mahmud II in the 1820s. 
 2.1 Ottoman Empire and the Postcolonial Debate
One objective of my research is to situate the analysis of the Ottoman Empire in
postcolonial  politics  and theory,  since  the Ottoman Empire  even though not  directly
colonized  was  subject  to  European  colonialist  endeavors.  The  Ottoman  Empire  was
located at the near margins of the emerging industrial capitalism like other powers, such
as  Russia  and  Austria-Hungary.3 It  was  initially  much  neglected  by  the  study  of
Orientalism and subaltern studies, as an imperialist aggressor itself,  or at least not as
affected by European colonialism. Both views hinge on each other, but are not helpful to
sufficiently explain Ottoman politics and the society, as the Ottoman Empire clearly was
subject to European imperial endeavors and at least informal colonial politics. I think,
that a crucial part to understanding Ottoman modernity is its place in the colonialist
setting.  
Since the late  1990s it  has become more common to scrutinize Turkey and the
Ottoman Empire through the perspective of postcolonial studies. The field became so
extended that some review essays appeared summarizing the discussion.4
Vangelis  Kechriotis  argues  for  a  critical  application  of  the  postcolonial  agenda  to
Ottoman studies in order to make visible how “history and culture are utilized in politics
in order to forge patterns of hierarchy” for the “study of power structures across diverse
ethnic or religious boundaries.”5 In his essay on postcolonial studies and the Ottoman
3 On this location of the Ottoman Empire in the European political geography see  Brian Silverstein,
‘Sufism and Governmentality in the Late Ottoman Empire’,  Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa
and the Middle East 29, no. 2 (30 August 2013), 174.
4 See Vangelis Kechriotis, ‘Postcolonial Criticism Encounters Late Ottoman Studies’, HISTOREIN 13, no.
0 (27 May 2013): 39–46;  Fatma Müge Göçek, ‘Postcoloniality, the Ottoman Past and the Middle East
Present’,  International  Journal  of  Middle  East  Studies  44,  no.  3  (2012):  549–63,
doi:10.1017/S0020743812000529.
5 Kechriotis,  ‘Postcolonial  Criticism  Encounters  Late  Ottoman  Studies,’  43.  See  also  Reina  Lewis,
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Empire, he points out that the Empire wasn't included since it was considered as “not
effectively colonized.”6 Kechriotis considers the first endeavors to include the Ottoman
Empire into the study of colonialism and its ramifications as undertaken by historians of
the nineteenth century as one of the colonizing states rather then colonized itself, rather
critical. In “Ottoman Orientalism” Usama Makdisi  argues that “Ottomanists,  […] have
paid little attention to a notion of Ottoman imperialism”7 that Ottoman elites employed
in  the  effort  to  create  a  modern  nation-state.  To  make  his  point  Makdisi  uses  the
Ottoman perception  of  Arab lands  as  uncivilized  and  backward  by  Istanbul-centered
Ottoman reformers  who in  contrast  constructed  Ottoman modernity  as  civilized  and
progressive.  Kechriotis  opposes Makdisi's  proposition that this  Orientalist  othering of
some groups  of  Ottoman society  decisively  led to  the  formation of  Turkish  national
identity.8 Similarily, Selim Deringil argues that the Ottoman elite adopted the mindset of
its  Western  European  enemies,  a process  he  terms  “borrowed  colonialism.”9 Yet,  in
Deringil's view “within this context colonialism was a 'survival tactic' and, therefore, the
Ottoman  Empire  was  very  different  from  “the  aggressive  industrial  empires  of  the
West.”10 Indeed contributed the new dress codes also to the construction of an internal
Other  of  Ottoman  modernization  that  lacked  the  qualities  necessary  to  challenge
European claims to superiority.  This 'backwardness'  was considered as an obstacle to
challenge western European hegemony. 
Deringil emphasizes the impact of European colonialism on Ottoman self-perception. He
shows that during the Hamidian era, the reign of Abdülhamid II, the Ottomans elites
were keen about their international reputation and made efforts to counter Orientalist
Rethinking Orientalism: Women, Travel and the Ottoman Harem (London [u.a.]: Tauris, 2004), 4, on the
inclusion of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey into postcolonial studies and  Deniz Kandiyoti, ‘Some
Awkward  Questions  on  Women  and  Modernity  in  Turkey’,  in  Remaking  Women :  Feminism  and
Modernity in the Middle East, ed. Lila Abu-Lughod (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1998),
270–88;  Deniz Kandiyoti,  ‘Postcolonialism Compared: Potentials and Limitations in the Middle East
and Central Asia’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 34, no. 2 (May 2002): 279–97.
6 Kechriotis, ‘Postcolonial Criticism Encounters Late Ottoman Studies’.
7 Ibid., 40; Usama Makdisi, ‘Ottoman Orientalism’, American Historical Review, no. 107 (2002): 768–96.
8 Kechriotis,  ‘Postcolonial  Criticism  Encounters  Late  Ottoman  Studies,’  41.  I  do  not  agree  with
Kechriotis' critic of Makdisi's assessement, but believe that this kind of othering it is central, not just to
the formation of Turkish modernity, but to modernity identity in general.
9 Selim Deringil,  The Well-Protected Domains:  Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman
Empire 1876 – 1909  (Tauris, 1998), 165; and Selim Deringil,  ‘They Live in a State of Nomadism and
Savagery’: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate’, Comparative Studies in Society and
History, no. 2 (2003): 311–42.
10 Kechriotis, ‘Postcolonial Criticism Encounters Late Ottoman Studies,’ 39.
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representations in the international media. At the same time, they orientalized their own
periphery.11 Ottoman efforts to manipulate its  international  image show the impact of
colonialist discourse on the Ottoman Empire and an Ottoman understanding of colonialism
that was “[…] as complex as interesting because it is not only about soldiers and cannons
but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings.”12 These Ottoman politics
scrutinized by Deringil deal with the question of how to counter European imperialism
with  regard  to  discussions  on  the  desired  degree  of  Ottoman Westernization.  I  think
Deringil's account on Ottoman self-perception is helpful and crucial for the study of dress,
because many of the implications of his study come into effect here. Nevertheless, the
adoption of colonialist attitudes by local elites towards their respective population is not a
case of Ottoman exceptionalism, but appears in many different colonial settings, as we will
see later.13
In my own point of view, the colonialist experience deeply shaped Ottoman and
Turkish state- and identity-building, but from different dimensions. The Ottoman elites
reproduced colonialist discourse and practices. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire was not
a colonialist state in the same sense as the Western imperialist states which drew economic
surplus and other kinds of power from their colonialist dominance in the Middle East and
elsewhere.  Even though the Ottoman state tried to adopt and was partly successful in
adopting colonialist practices, the state and its inhabitants were in a deeper sense affected
by western European colonialist politics. Nevertheless, the adoption of colonial practices
by the Ottoman Empire had far-reaching consequences that can be traced to this day, be it
in the construction of  identities,  bodily practices,  everyday life,  and state-  and nation-
building. 
Kechriotis himself argues for a comparative approach and against a model of Ottoman
exceptionalism:  in  comparison  with  parameters  set  by  the  “imperial  turn”  in  historical
research,  the  Ottoman  Empire  should  be  compared  to  other  empires,14 as  should  the
11 See  Deringil,  The Well-Protected Domains,  therein especially Chapter 6 and 7 “Ottoman Self  Image
Management  and  Damage  Control”  and  “The  Ottoman Self  Portrait,”  135-165:  Ottoman diplomats
fought  popular  Orientalism,  such  as  theater  plays,  by  demanding  from  high  officials  to  stop
performances of these plays, see Ibid., 142-143.
12 Eward  Said,  Orientalism as  quoted  by Deringil,  The  Well-Protected Domains,  136.  See  also  Edward
William Said, Orientalism, Repr. with a new preface (London [u.a.]: Penguin Books, 2003).
13 This phenomenon is one of the main objectives of Partha Chatterjee's study on nationalism in India.
See  Partha Chatterjee,  The Nation and Its  Fragments:  Colonial  and Postcolonial  Histories  (Princeton:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1993).
14 That entailed questions such as: Was contempt towards Balkan peoples similar or same as European
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perspective that was provided by the presence of other empires in the Ottoman Empire taken
into account, such as the impact of the capitulations or status of extraterritoriality for many
individuals.15 Loss  of  ground  in  the  international  power  balance  led  to  the  use  of  the
capitulations  for  interventions  in  Ottoman domestic  affairs.  Non-Muslim subjects  could
profit from the presence of colonial powers. In Kechrioti's view, “this describes a picture
where  the  ruler  and  the  ruled,  the  colonizer  and  the  colonized,  the  dominant  and  the
subaltern, were continuously changing roles.”16 That also concerns Ottoman politics of dress
where these power relations were negotiated through the question of headgear.
Moreover, the Christian middle class' sense of superiority and its  mission civilisatrice
within their vision of Ottoman society beyond nationalist and separatist passions lead to
fissions between ethnically distinct elites.  This led to rivalry between ethnically-marked
middle classes and their claims to Ottomanism and concerns that the Young Turk version of
Ottomanism would bring competing concepts of it to extinction.17 These different concepts
of Ottomanism became for instance negotiated in the conflicts between proponents of the
hat and those of the fez or other pieces of headgear. Furthermore Kechriotis asks whether
the debate about colonialist overtones in Ottoman discourse can be extended from the 19th
century to the period after 1908, with its critique of Tanzimat reform endeavors, and a new
kind of bureaucratic and military elite. He also asks if  the emergence of a new middle class
which sought to take over control of lower classes, and the new hegemony established by
these middle classes had the quality of internal colonialism. I think that its definitely worth
to extent Kechriotis considerations on the colonialist mind set of Ottoman elites to the Young
Turk period.18 In  terms of  politics  of  dress  and the question of  headgear  this  becomes
especially apparent in the  promulgation of the Turkish hat law in 1925 and its orientalist
othering of those who did not comply to these kind of social etiquette.
colonial attitude? What were the economic dimensions of Ottoman imperial structures? See Kechriotis,
‘Postcolonial Criticism Encounters Late Ottoman Studies’.
15 On the capitulations see  Mübahat Kütükoğlu, ‘The Ottoman-British Commercial Treaty of 1838’, in
Four Centuries of Turco-British-Relations.  Studies  in Diplomatic,  Economic and Cultural Affairs , ed. Ali
İhsan Bağış  and William M. Hale  (Beverley:  Eothen Pr,  1884);  and  Elias H.  Tuma, ‘The Economic
Impact of the Capitulations: The Middle East and Europe: A Reinterpretation’,  Journal of European
Economic History 18, no. 3 (1989): 663–82.
16 Kechriotis, ‘Postcolonial Criticism Encounters Late Ottoman Studies,’ 42.
17 Ibid., 43.
18 The Young Turk period here defined as the period from 1908 till the end of the one party regime in
Turkey in 1950. See Zürcher, Turkey; and Erik J. Zürcher, ‘Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish
Nationalists: Identity Politics, 1908-1938’, in  Ottoman Past and Today’s Turkey, ed. Kemal H. Karpat
(Leiden: Brill, 2000), 151–179.
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Fatma Müge Göçek emphasizes as well the strength of a postcolonial approach that
concentrates on power relations in order to dismantle them by analysis of power-knowledge
relations. At the same time she questions postcolonial theorie's ability to fully grasp Ottoman
modernity.19 The aim of postcolonial theory was  “destabilizing the detrimental impact of
18th- and 19th-century western European modernity on the rest of the world,” deconstruct
Western hegemony, and challenge and question its impact.20 Thereby, it enabled to depict the
fluidity  and  flexibility  of  social  boundaries,  and  it  challenged  “Eurocentric,  Orientalist
formulations that had reified differences and divides, anachronistically mapping onto the
empire  binarisms introduced much later  by European colonial  rule.”21 She assesses  that
sometimes it was difficult to differentiate between Western and domestic practices, and thus
the local content of European colonial impact remained unclear. Moreover would a focus on
Ottoman formal political power neglect how different groups negotiated power and relations
between them. Erroneously, the motor of change in the Ottoman realm, she argues, was
often located in Europe. An issue that was as also criticized by Isa Blumi in his various
studies, that I will later refer to.22 Yet Göçek in this essay criticizes Blumi for constructing a
monolithic West opposed to the Ottoman Empire. I would rather suggest that the problem is
that Göçek in contrast to Blumi conceptualizes the Ottoman Empire as something apart from
the West. Whereas I consider the West as created by various dynamics within the Empire
itself or within global dynamics in which the Ottoman Empire participated.23 Yet she rightly
points out and my studies also later will show, that 
“the nature of the interaction between the Ottoman state and its officials on the one
side and the local populace on the other was complex, in that it significantly varied
not only from one province to the next but also over time.”24 
19 Göçek, ‘Postcoloniality, the Ottoman Past and the Middle East Present’.
20 Ibid., 550.
21 Ibid., 552.
22 See Isa  Blumi,  Rethinking  the  Late  Ottoman Empire:  A  Comparative  Social  and  Political  History  of
Albania and Yemen,  1878 -  1918,  1.  ed.,  Analecta Isisiana 67 (Istanbul:  Isis  Press,  2003);  Isa  Blumi,
Foundations of Modernity: Human Agency and the Imperial State, Routledge Studies in Modern History 9
(New York [u.a.]: Routledge, 2012); Isa Blumi, Reinstating the Ottomans: Alternative Balkan Modernities,
1800-1912, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
23 See Göçek, ‘Postcoloniality, the Ottoman Past and the Middle East Present,’ 555.
24 Ibid., 555.
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She negates the usefulness of a postcolonial approach to grasp these dynamics, and
argues that “Blumi dismisses provincial variation in regard to relations with Western
actors.” On the other hand I think that Isa Blumi's studies simply focused on local agency
in relation to the central  state's  and Western dominance, various appropriations,  and
resistance to modern forms and practices. These were really helpful to think through my
own cases which deal  with center-periphery relations.  Albeit,  Göçek, similarly in my
opinion to Blumi whom she actually criticizes, takes a critical stance towards the term
modernization and its  application to all  different phenomena of Ottoman governance
appearing in  the period  considered  as  modernization of  the  Empire.  This  provides  a
special challenge to the analysis of phenomenons of modernization, because they are just
too easily considered from a Eurocentric analytical point of view as emanating from and
resulting in Western dominance of which the Ottoman Empire was excluded per se. And
yet,  hegemonic  power  structures  indeed  went  along  not  only  with  the  East-West
dichotomy  but  as  well  traverse.  Thus,  the  complexity  of  the  Ottoman  concept  of
governance is quite compatible with postcolonial theory rather than beyond its scope, as
Göçek argues.25
Recent scholarship elaborated the colonial context of Ottoman modernization. This
is not to neglect Ottoman agency and self-interest in the modernization project, but to
pay attention to historical, cultural, social, and economic conditions under which they
took place. This leads to the question in which way postcolonial and subaltern studies
dealing with directly colonized territories might be applied to the informal colonialism
exercised on the Ottoman state and its population. In his essay, Boğac Ergene asks what a
postcolonial critique of subaltern studies may have to teach Ottoman historiography. 26
He concluds that the methodological contributions made especially by Gyan Prakash and
Gayatri Spivak opened up opportunities to reread Ottoman sources and overcome their
limited scope to make the heterogeneity of discourses visible. He is especially interested
in the question of how to read subaltern voices from (state) archival documents. To put it
in more general terms: how to make subaltern voices visible, and in that context, how to
conceptualize relations between different strata in society and what that implicates on
25 See Ibid., 557.
26 Bogac A Ergene,  ‘Maduniyet  Okulu,  Post-Kolonyal  Elestiri  ve  Tarihte  Bilgi-Özne Sorunu:  Osmanli
Tarihciligi için Yeni Dersler Mi? [Subaltern Studies, Postcolonial Critic and the Subject-Object Problem
in History: New Lessons for Ottoman Historiographie]’, Toplum ve Bilim, no. 83 (Atumn  /2000 1999).
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the historian's relation to the subject of history and to knowledge. These questions refer
to the matter of if subaltern subjects have the ability to speak at all, which are related to
points Gayatri Spivak put forward in her discussion of  sati.27 Another question touches
subaltern-elite relations and the permeability of cultural and socio-economic boundaries.
This includes an approach which regards the category of subaltern not as a homogeneous
entity,  but  as  undetermined,  hybrid,  and fluid.  These questions also  become relevant
when  looking  at  incidences  related  to  headgear  that  are  recorded  in  state  archival
documents:  How  was  the  wider  population  concerned  with  the  spread  of  modern
bourgeois dress and manners?  How did this play out in the interrelation between the
state and its populations? 
In terms of subaltern-elite relations, Ergene refers to Stuart Hall's concept which
stresses interaction and dialog and the crucially “mimic” character of these relations. He
also  drew  on  Florencia  Mallon's  approach  on  the  reading  of  subaltern  voices  from
archival sources by applying a postmodern literary analysis rather then trying to extract
the  truth from  these  materials.  This  kind  of  approach  creates  a  dialogical  relation
between the historian, his subject, and the sources. The quest is making subaltern voices
visible, and that aims at countering colonial and nationalist history which ignored them.
This comes along with some specificities as to where to find the voices of the subalterns
if no documents exist, and poses the question of if “the rebel always speaks the language
of the oppressor.”28 Thus there is  a need for the application of methods which make
visible the “subaltern hidden transcript” through revealing “blind spots,  ruptures,  and
silences” in hegemonic discourses.
In historiography about the Ottoman Empire, leftist historians in the 1960s to 1980s
struggled with countering the existing narration which idealized Ottoman social relations
in terms of social cleavages. They analyzed Ottoman society with a historical materialist
approach  and  its  focus  on  modes  of  production.  That  enabled  them  to  make  social
struggles  visible,  yet  it  neglected  non-economic  factors  of  social  structure  and  the
religious and cultural diversity of Ottoman society.29 The latter is also the case in  my
27 See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Rosalind C. Morris, eds., Can the Subaltern Speak?: Reflections on
the History of an Idea (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
28 Ergene, ‘Maduniyet Okulu, Post-Kolonyal Elestiri ve Tarihte Bilgi-Özne Sorunu: Osmanli Tarihciligi
Icin Yeni Dersler Mi? [Subaltern Studies, Postcolonial Critic and the Subject-Object Problem in History:
New Lessons for Ottoman Historiographie],’ 34.
29 Ibid., 44.
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analysis,  that  shows how cultural  symbols  like  headgear attained  meaning  within  a
complex and diverse social system, without disregarding the economic conditions behind
their spread and appropriation as well their proscription.
The neglect of culture and religion by the leftist historiography left the impact of
Islam and its language as a variable in social struggles, as Ergene put it, to conservative
and nationalist  academics.  In  the 1990s  different  approaches  emerged,  such as  Linda
Darling's, that shed a light on Islam as a legitimating factor of the dynasty and the state.
These authors pointed out that Islam and its customs functioned to unite the state and its
subjects,  and  achieve  social  peace  expressed  in  the  notion  of  the  “just  and  genuine
Muslim state.”30 Ergene  yet  suspects  another  problem here,  which was the lack of  a
critical approach. This led, amongst others, the interpretation of the lack of insurrections
during certain Ottoman periods as social harmony, and was not able to spot conflicts in
state-subject relations and sources of conflict or suppression.31 These approaches were
not able to make the social differences visible that were oppressed by the legitimizing
structures, when the alleged well-being of the populace was just an instrument of power
to  keep social  peace.  These  also  encompassed overlooking alternative  conceptions  of
justice, and the conflicts they provoked finally lead to struggles of the central state with
local power holders. This lead Ergene back to the postcolonial epistemological approach
and its attempt to read archival sources according to their silences and absences. Thus
this  puts  the  historian  into  dialogue  with  these  sources.  Through  them,  her  or  his
historical subjects'  aim is to make fault lines, silences and suppressions visible. Thus,
what  is  needed,  Ergene  concluded,  is  a  combination  of  “critical  orientation  with
sensitivity  to  the  cultural,  religious  and  discursive  peculiarities  of  Ottoman  social
structure.”32 
Over  the  past  twelve  years  since  Ergene  posed  his  question,  quite  some
contributions have been made to prove his hypothesis true, some of which I want to
introduce here. One approach to re-situate the Ottoman Empire in the colonial context is
a  reference  to  Dipesh  Chakrarbaty's  project  of  Provincializing  Europe.33 Especially
30 “Adil ve hakiki Islam devleti.” See Ibid., 46.
31 It did not become absolutely clear to me what differences Ergene considered between these recent and
older approaches of the 1940s and 50s that idealized Islam. See Ibid., 44-46.
32 Ibid. 42.
33 Dipesh Chakrabarty,  Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference  (Princeton:
Princeton Univ. Press, 2000).
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discourses  on Westernization implying essentialized notions of  the  West  and Europe
leading  to  constructions  of  a  'backward  Orient'  versus  'the  modern,  civilized  and
progressive West', an issue very relevant for the study of the modernization of dress,
necessitate the questioning of the conceptualization of these notions and their usefulness
as  analytical  categories.  Andrew  Davison  applies  Chakrabarty's  concepts  to  Ziya
Gökalp's  theories,  who was  one  of  the  main  ideologues  of  Turkish  nationalism,  and
situates him within this anti-colonial framework. In his opinion, Gökalp's thoughts can
be  interpreted  within  Chakrabarty's  term  of  the  subaltern  split,  where  European
categories  become  adopted  by  colonized  subjects  who  at  the  same  time  reject  its
dominance. This would lead to what Chakrabarty designated as the  Provincializing of
Europe.34 Davison's  insights  transferred  to  the  study of  dress draws attention to  the
relation  of  the  colonialist  discourse  to  Ottoman/Turkish  nationalism, which  in  this
context cannot be considered isolated.
Likewise, the Ottoman author Ahmet Midhat's and the Young Turk Ahmed Rıza's
thoughts  were  scrutinized  though  the  lense  of  postcolonial  theory.35 Ömer  Turan
suggests  to  count  Ahmed  Rıza  among  the  Ottoman  intellectuals  who  took  a  stance
towards  colonialism,  and  thus  to  considers  Riza's  book  Bati'nin  Dogu  Politikasinin
Ahlaken  İflası36 from  a  postcolonial  perspective.  Turan  criticizes  the  absence  of  the
Ottoman Empire from postcolonial studies due to Edward Said's argument in Orientalism
that the Ottoman Empire was an imperialist state itself. He also argues that postcolonial
studies  focused  on  a  specific  kind  of  colonialism  that  doesn't  include  informal
colonialism. He consideres Ahmet Midhat as a very important figure for the analysis of
late  nineteenth  century  discourses  on  Westernization.  Mehmet  Saraçoğlu37 examines
34 Andrew Davison, ‘Ziya Gökalp and Provincializing Europe’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa
and the Middle East 26, no. 3 (2006): 377–90.
35 Ömer  Turan,  ‘Oryantalizm,  Sömürgecilik  Eleştirisi  ve  Ahmed  Rıza:  Batı’nın  Doğu  Politikasının
Ahlâken İflâsı’nı Yeniden Okumak [The Critique of Orientalism, Colonialism and the Rereading of
Ahmed Rıza: The Moral Failure of the West's Eastern Politics]’, Toplum ve Bilim, no. 115 (2009): 6–45.
36 The Moral Failure of the West's Eastern Politics
37 Mehmet Safa Saraçoğlu, ‘Reality with a Moral Twist: Ahmet Midhat’s Müşahedat  as an Image of an
Ideal Ottoman Society’, Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 15, no. 1 (spring 2006): 29–47. Another
genre suitable for analyzing Ottoman constructions of the West are Ottoman subjects travelogues from
Europe:  i.e.  Okay  Bensoy,  ‘Geç  Osmanlı  Döneminde  Oksidentalizm:  Ahmet  Ihsan,  Paris’te  sadece
Istanbul’da “Olmayan”ı mı gördü [Occidentalism in the Young Ottoman Era: Did Ahmet Ihsan Notice
Paris  only  Things  That  “Did  Not  Exist”  in  Istanbul?]’,  Tarih  ve  Toplum  Yeni  Yaklasimlar,  no.  6
(fall/winter  /2008 2007): 143–66; and Carter V. Findley, ‘An Ottoman Occidentalist in Europe: Ahmed
Midhat Meets Madame Gülnar’, The American Historical Review, 103, no. 1 (February 1998): 15–49. 
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Midhat's utopian book Müşahedat as a response to Orientalism on both a thematic level
as well  the  problematic level  of Orientalism.38 Midhat engages in a theoretical  debate
about the differences of late Ottoman Islamic and modern-Western world views. In his
delineation of an ideal Ottoman society, Midhat constructed a world which is modern
and Ottoman. Saraçoğlu proposes that Ahmet Midhat represented a “non-nationalist side
of  the  Ottoman experience  with  modernity,”39 which  had  later  disappeared  with  the
emergence of the Young Turk thought. Albeit, Midhat, he argues, had already focused on
issues relating to the confrontation of the Ottoman Empire with the West, a perspective
that had later been translated into exclusionist Turkish nationalist visions.
Turan argued that next to the study of center-periphery relations as accomplished
by Deringil, a way to open a postcolonial perspective on the Ottoman Empire was to add
Ottoman  intellectuals'  reaction  to  European  hegemony  to  postcolonial  critique  and
analysis. I think that beyond intellectual history, it is necessary to consider cultural and
political phenomenons in light of the imperialist impact, and combine these two levels of
analysis.  Individual  statements need to be considered within the larger framework of
state- and nation-building and shifting relations of power and domination between the
Ottoman and other states and within the Ottoman Empire. This opens up the possibility
to consider phenomenons other then explicitly anti-colonial statements, and to analyze
shifting relations of power and domination within Ottoman society.
It  is  therefore  necessary  to  transcend  the  sharp  distinction  between  Islamic
civilization and the modern West, which has been perpetuated by the historian Bernard
Lewis40 amongst others,  and include  Islamist critics of  the West into the postcolonial
paradigm.41 Even though this distinction is “no longer endorsed in established scholarly
38 See Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World : A Derivative Discourse? (Tokyo: Zed
Books Ltd in Komm., 1986): The distinction between thematic and problematic is employed by Partha
Chatterjee in his analysis of postcolonial nationalism. He differentiates between the claims made by
postcolonial nationalism (problematic) and its justifying structures (thematic). While on the level of the
problematic of nationalism Orientalist assumptions of a non-active, non-autonomous, non-sovereign
Oriental  subject  are  refused,  the  thematic  of  nationalism  on  the  other  hand  adopts  essentialized
conceptions of East versus West.
39 Saraçoğlu, ‘Reality with a Moral Twist: Ahmet Midhat’s Müşahedat  as an Image of an Ideal Ottoman
Society,’ 46.
40 See Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East (New
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002).
41 See  Cemil  Aydın,  ‘Between  Occidentalism and  the  Global  Left:  Islamist  Critiques  of  the  West  in
Turkey’,  Comparative Studies In South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East: Special Issue on Sex, Gender,
and Family Structure 26, no. 3 (2006): 446–61.
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literature on the Middle East [...] it has been reproduced in Turkish intellectual history
and has been embraced by various Islamist and secular thinkers [...]”42.  This has been
taken  into  account  when  scrutinizing  the  critics  of  the  West.  To  understand  the
developments during the Republican period, it is necessary to consider the characteristics
of  anti-Western critiques  of  the  Late  Ottoman Period,  of  which Cemil  Aydin gave a
detailed account from various perspectives, which help me in considering my sources.43 
Selim  Deringil  offers  a  comparative  approach  to  the  analysis  of  the  intellectual
encounters  with  the  West  between  the  Ottoman Empire  and  Japan.44 Beyond  certain
differences,  the  Ottoman Empire  being part  of  the  European state  system since  early
modern times and Japan's distinct policy of isolation, intriguing similarities provide him
grounds for comparison. According to Deringil, for both states a perceived threat from the
West led to an encompassing modernization process triggered by war: in the case of Japan
the Opium War in China in 1840-42,  and in the Ottoman case  the European powers'
intervention  against  the  invasion  of  Anatolia  by  Muhammed  Ali  of  Egypt.  Both
modernization projects were seeking “a place in the world” for their state, and questioned
the degree to which reform was imposed by the West or result of internal impetus. In the
end, the Ottoman Empire, together with Japan, had become the only non-western powers
not  being  colonized  and  furthermore  recognized  as  Great  Power.  Deringil  encourages
further  comparative  study  on  intellectual  encounters  and  their  way  of  constructing
modernity in order to answer questions on the relation between them and state politics
towards western imperialism. A different aspect of the comparison between Japan and
Ottoman polity was stressed by Binnaz Toprak who scrutinized economic developments in
relation to cultural transformation.45 She concludes that Japan's success in modernization
relied on its interpretation of modernization as industrialization while republican Turkey
concentrated on cultural  transformation.  Even though I  doubt  that  this  is  a  sufficient
explanation for economical  “success” or “failure,”  her study is  nevertheless relevant in
regards to a comparison of various discourses on Westernization and modernization.
42 Ibid., 441.
43 Aydın's study is complemented by Ahmet Kuyas' essay on anti-imperialist thought from the Young
Turk Period to the 1930s. See Ahmet Kuyas, ‘Yeni Osmanlilar’dan 1930’lara Antiimperialist Düsünce’,
in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düsünce, ed. Ahmet Insel (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004).
44 Selim  Deringil,  ‘Intellectual  Encounters  with  the  West:  The  Cases  of  Turkey  and  Japan’,  New
Perspectives on Turkey, no. 35 (2006): 65–83.
45 Binnaz  Toprak,  ‘Economic  Development  versus Cultural  Transformation:  Projects  of  Modernity  in
Japan and Turkey’, New Perspectives on Turkey, no. 35 (2006): 85–127.
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In  order  to  grasp  emerging  and  possibly  competing  concepts  of  the  West  and
modernity in the Ottoman Empire, it is necessary not to restrict the scope to Ottoman
Muslims but to take views and experiences of Ottoman non-Muslims into account.  A
comparison between Greek and Turkish nationalism concerning East-West dichotomies
and  the  notion  of  tradition  is  accomplished  by  Haris  Exertzoğlu.46 Despite  their
differences,  he  assesses  that  Greek  nationalist  and  Islamic  agendas  made  similar
references to tradition while at the same time appropriating Western knowledge. Views
towards the West of the rum (Greek-Orthodox) population of the Ottoman Empire were
often as ambivalent as those of Muslims even though a greater affinity to the West and
modernity  was  imputed  on  them.  The  promotion  of  Greek  nationalism  contained  a
distancing  from  the  West  and  Western  dominance  even  though  it  enjoyed  great
popularity and support among the dominant European nations.
Haris Exertoğlu studied how Christian Orthodox intellectuals in their thoughts on
modernization  conceptualized  the  East-West  dichomtomy  in  relation  to  the  Greek
nationalist project.47 His study provides important insight into the  social complexity of
existing relations to the West within the Ottoman Empire. In the center of the discourse
on the West was Western power, and in relation to nationalism, its power to “corrupt”
the Other in  its cultural  authenticity:  At  the same  as  time Ottoman state  authorities
treated  certain  groups  such  as  nomads  as  non-modern  and  uncivilized,  and  thus
legitimized their subjection,  among  Ottoman Greeks the question that was discussed if
Turks were  unable to civilize  and barbaric,  or as the other side of the coin could be
regarded as noble savages. Thus, the the East-West dichotomy formed relations between
the different Ottoman communities.
Yet within Ottoman communities views on the West and images of the West were
not uniform. What can be generalized is the widespread symbolic use of the East-West
dichotomy  and  the  construction  of  meaning  through  it.  According  to  Exertoğlu,
personified images of the West as “archetyped characters of Western penetration […]
generated discourses about community and the self.”48 Even if the discourse on the West
46 Haris Exertzoğlu, ‘Metaphors of Change: “Tradition” and the East/West Discourse in the Late Ottoman
Empire’,  in  Ways  to  Modernity  in  Greece  and  Turkey:  Encounters  with  Europe  1850-1950,  ed.  Anna
Frangoudaki and Çağlar Keyder (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007), 43–57.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., 45.
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carried  different  and  competing  meanings,  reference  to  the  West  and  the  unequal
relations to the West were inherent in these interpretations and appropriations.  This
encompassed the internalization of the fundamental polarities of Western discourse such
as East-West, civilization-barbarity, modern-tradition. These dualities were at play and
structured the imagination, even when utterances were meant as a distancing from and a
critique of the West.
What constituted a difference from a complete adoption of Western hegemony was
the perception of the West as a threat that questioned the universality of the Western
discourse. This became apparent with the rise of Greek orthodox educational institutions
and  curricular,  as  Exertoğlu  depicts,  and  their  ambivalent  relation  of  tradition  and
modernization.  The  Greek-speaking  urban  elite  who  established  these  institutions
emphasized references to Greek tradition and attributed it a central role in legitimizing
the nationalist project. They promoted “indigenous” religious, national, and moral values.
Reference here was not  made to Western culture,  but  to a notion of  the  East and a
renaissance of Eastern Greek Orthodox identity, explicitly distinct from modernity. Still,
this was, Exertoğlu states, not a conservative reaction, but part of a modernist discourse
located within modern educational institutions and intended as a measure to keep pace
with the modernizing process. In that,  Rum  reformers and intellectuals denounced the
“aping” of European manners and adoption of Western ways and constructed the West as
the other of Eastern identity. The self was to be recovered and civilized through Eastern
values.  Greek nationalists  regarded the   East as the  location of  tradition and culture
which had to be restored.49 Thus foreign/Western Christian missions were considered as
a threat. Affiliations of the East with Islam were not considered by Rum reformers, rather
they  associated  the  East  with  Hellenization  as  a  means  to  enter  modernity  without
imitation.50 This ambivalent relation to the West was shared by many Greek-speaking
intellectuals and as we will later see is inherent to the discourse of modernity itself.51 
Exertzoğlu's investigation enables to grasp the complexities of Ottoman society that
cannot be understood by simple binary divisions between East and West or Islam and
Christianity.  The  ubiquitousness  of  references  to  tradition  and  to  modern  bourgeois
49 See Ibid., 52-53.
50 Ibid., 53.
51 Exertzoğlu  situates  Greek  nationalist  discourse  and  its  stance  towards  the  West  within  Partha
Chatterjee's analysis of postcolonial nationalism. See Ibid.
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culture  is  something  that  will  keep  reappearing  in  the  discourse  on  headgear  and
throughout this study.
 2.2 Concepts of the West and Multiple Modernities
It  already  became  clear  that  one  area  of  study  of  the  influence  of  hegemonic
European or modern paradigms is the topos of Westernization.52 The concept of the West
was central to the efforts of Ottoman modernization. Viewed from the perspective of
international relations the Ottoman state stood in manifold and contradictory relations to
the West. On the one hand, it was a part of the West as s part of the Concert of Europe.
On the other hand, Orientalist fantasies kept constructing the Ottoman Empire as the
other of the West or of Europe. The West is not meant as a fixed geographical entity but
as a concept which contains many aspects of modernity, and in a certain (Eurocentric)
understanding is even congruent with the latter. The concept of the West emerged with
modernity. It is an imagined space within which modernity was located. The Ottoman
Empire actively contributed to the making of the West as much as  “available perceptions
of the West were integral part of the way individual subjects and social groups made
sense of the World and themselves.”53
Linked to the postcolonial approach are the question of modernity, the relation of
the Ottoman state to modernity, and the notion of modernity when trying to locate what
was modern and what isn't. Is it useful to draw on approaches that work with notions of
alternative  or  multiple  modernities  instead  of  drawing  on  a  monolithic  notion  of
modernity that's inevitably linked to that of Western civilization? Or is it rather useful to
extend the concept of Western modernity to global dimensions?54
One of the questions asked is when did modernity appear in the Ottoman Empire,
52 An essay by Engin Deniz Akarlı, dealing with changing relations of center and periphery in the era of
European imperialism, traces the entanglement of Ottoman politics, European imperial domination and
threat,  changing  attitudes  towards  Westernization,  and  the  changes  brought  about  by  the
establishment  of  the  Turkish  Republic;  see  Engin  Deniz  Akarlı,  ‘The Tangled Ends  of  an  Empire:
Ottoman Encounters  with  the  West  and  Problems  of  Westernization--an  Overview’,  Comparative
Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 26, no. 3 (2006): 353–66.
53 Exertzoğlu,  ‘Metaphors  of  Change:  “Tradition”  and  the  East/West  Discourse  in  the  Late  Ottoman
Empire,’ 45.
54 I  have already mentioned Arif  Dirlik's  substantial  critic  of  approaches of  alternative  and multiple
modernities;  see  Arif  Dirlik,  ‘Thinking  Modernity  Historically:  Is  “Alternative  Modernity”  the
Answer?’,  Asian  Review  of  World  Histories  1,  no.  1  (January  2013):  5–44,
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.12773/arwh.2013.1.1.005.
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or when the Ottoman Empire became modern. Additionally, to what extent is modernity
connected with industrialized capitalism, state organization and subject-state relations,
and the creation of citizenship and bourgeois society? Şerif Mardin claims that modernity
in the Ottoman Empire can be traced back to the 16th century if  “understood as the
development of pragmatic rationality in administrative practices and diversion from the
Islamic code.”55 Alev Çınar argues that one should talk rather of “creative adaptation” of
modernity in non-Western contexts than of servile imitation or an inorganic imposition
from outside or above.56 By opening the view to multiple modernities, one would avoid
disregarding forms of modernity which weren't common or existent in Europe and aren't
recognized. 
“The claim that modernity is an exclusively European product becomes a self-fulfilling
hypothesis, because other forms of modernity that do not comply with European
norms either are conveniently categorized as belonging to the realm of the pre-
modern or traditional or are simply disregarded as anomalies altogether.”57 
In addition to a definition of modernity for this study beyond modernist terms, it is
also important to critically scrutinize Ottoman and Turkish definitions of modernity and
what they included and excluded.
İbrahim Kaya criticizes perspectives that equal modernization to Westernization in
non-Western societies, thus denying an option of non-Western modernities. Therefore he
develops from the Turkish case  a  notion of  modernity  which contains  a  plurality  of
modernities.58 In his study of the ideas of İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, M. Özervarlı discusses
alternative approaches to modernity next to materialist perspectives in the late Ottoman
Empire. He analyses how modernity was discussed in religious circles.59 He also shows
that tradition was rather a part of modernity than its opposite.
Ottoman  modernization  discourse  functions  within  the  narrow  framework  of
55 Alev Çınar, Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time (Minnesota: Univ. of
Minnesota Press, 2005)., 4.
56 See Ibid., 2.
57 Ibid., 3.
58 Ibrahim Kaya, Social Theory and Later Modernities: The Turkish Experience (Liverpool Univ. Press, 2004).
59 M. Özervarli,  ‘Alternative Approaches to Modernization in the Late Ottoman Period:  Izmirli  Ismail
Hakki’s Religious Thought against Materialist Scientism’, Peace Research Abstracts Journal / Canadian
Peace Research Institute 44, no. 6 (2007): 77–78.
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thought of the “the West and the Rest,60” a premise still valid for contemporary Turkish
society.  My interest  here is  twofold:  I  want to scrutinize  both how Ottoman politics
contributed to the construction of this dichotomous concept and the consequences of this
dichotomy for  Ottoman society.  And maybe also a third point:  What  existed beyond
bipolar  constructions:  “alternative  modernities  or  alternatives  to  modernization?”61
Which kinds of conceptions of difference appeared? And how were concepts of the West
and modernity employed to construct a national bourgeoisie?
I will draw on Stuart Hall's thoughts on the emergence of the West as a historical
concept with the wake of European colonialism. According to Hall, the idea of the West
appeared with European expansion in the  fifteenth century and was deeply entangled
with colonialism. Western societies came to be regarded as modern societies. The West
became  the  space  of  modernity,  and  understood  as  advanced,  developed,  industrial,
capitalist and secular. In addition, the idea of Europe as the first center of the West was
tightly infused with Christianity. The West as a historical construct became the category
used to measure and classify societies along the standards of a certain type of modern
society, which saw the West as the exclusive retainer of modernity, set against all “the
Rest.” Hall states that while  this type of society first emerged in Western Europe, the
West  is  not  located  exclusively  there.  By  now,  any  society  acquiring  certain
characteristics could become a Western society. In Europe such processes took place with
the brake from feudalism, and at many different levels:62 economical, social, political and
cultural. The West functioned as a value system similar to an ideology. Yet in order to
fully grasp the meaning of the West and its power, Hall suggests to treat it as a discourse,
a system of representation, that can be analyzed by looking at the discursive strategies
which produce it.63 It  is  then a  coherent  entity  which incorporates  the self-image of
Western societies. Opposing to its Other by idealization and degradation  and through
fantasies of  desire,  it  fails  to recognize  and respect  difference and imposes  European
60 See Stuart Hall, ‘The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power’, in Formations of Modernity, ed. Stuart
Hall and Bram Gieben (Cambridge UK: Polity Press in association with the Open University Press,
1992), 275–320.
61 Phrase  taken  from  Bruce  M.  Knauft,  ed.,  Critically  Modern:  Alternatives,  Alterities,  Anthropologies
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002).
62 Exactly  when,  where,  which  and  how changes  took  place  could  be  further  differentiated  from a
historical  point  of  view  to  prevent  teleological  and  homogenizing  tendencies  of  an  analysis  of
modernity. That includes the historiziation of such notions as capitalism and feudalism.
63 Hall, ‘The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power,’ 215.
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categories and norms on societies regarded as different. The Rest became essential to the
construction of the West, which constituted itself through the colonization of the Other,
while  the  Other  -  or  the  Rest  -  was  already  an  active  part  of  this  process  through
strategies  of  resistance  and  appropriation.  The  appearance  of  modernity  in  western
Europe  (and  then  in  the  West)  was  conditioned  by  interrelations  with  what  was
considered the Other, as regards to these parts of Europe.  At the same time, Western
hegemony became more and more established and it remained the model, the prototype,
and the measure of social progress: “It was Western progress, civilization, rationality, and
development that were celebrated.”64 A last point I want to stress is the significance of
the discourse of the West and the Rest 
“as formative for the West and 'modern societies' as were the secular state, capitalist
economies, the modern class, race, and gender systems, and modern, individualist,
secular culture - the four main 'processes' of our formation story.”65 
For my own study, I will focus on how the subject of the West and the Rest were
negotiated  through the politics  of  dress  and on the  importance  and visibility  of  this
discourse.
Headgear was a crucial means in forming first Ottoman and later Turkish modern
identity, and a crucial means in expressing and negotiating relations to the West. It was a
marker of difference and equality. The concept of the West versus the Rest assumes that
there is only one model of and one road to modernity that is congruent to a certain
notion of the West. Anti-colonial movements and theories argue that modernity does not
necessarily  need  to  be  Western.  This  is  where  concepts  of  multiple  and  alternative
modernities come into play. The example of headgear shows the complexity of processes
of  identification  and  the  difficulty  to  produce  unequivocal  and  distinct  meanings  of
certain symbols and practices. According to Bill Ashcroft, 
“alternative,  or  non-Western  modernities  emerge  either  by  the  development  of
hybridized cultural forms through the appropriation of those of Western modernity
or by the introduction of innovative, and thus truly alternative forms of modernity.”66
64 Ibid., 225.
65 Ibid., 225.       
66 Bill Ashcroft, ‘Alternative Modernities: Globalization and the Post-Colonial,'  ARIEL 40, no. 1 (January
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Yet  he  emphasizes  that  “neither  of  these  forms has  emerged  out  of  thin  air.”67
Theories of alternative or multiple modernities put emphasis on the dynamic relationship
between Western and colonized or non-Western societies, between those states regarded
the cradle of Western modernity and the Rest.68 A key thought of this framework relates
to  the  reciprocal  character  of  these  relationships,  in  contrast  to  the  modernization
paradigm  which  regards  modernization  as  a  process  of  diffusion  from  a  flow  of
knowledge, techniques, forms of government, institutions, and practices from the West
to the East. Instead, Ashcroft points out, it was important to note that many postcolonial
researchers  and  activists  considered  Western  modernity  as  an  outcome  of  the
interrelations between colonial centers and peripheries. Later modernizing states had not
depended on a  Western European model  that  they were  more  or  less  keen to  copy.
Rather, Ashcroft assesses, multiple forms of modernity did emerge during the process of
modernization, not just as alternatives to Western modernity, but also within the West.
In  fact,  from  the  beginning  different  forms  of  modernization  existed  and  developed
within  global  dynamics.69 Thus  one  of  my  research  questions  is  whether  the
conceptualization  of  Ottoman  modernity  is  rather  an  alternative  model  to  Western
modernity, a copy of Western modernity, a part of Western modernity in a way that it
was subsumed under Western hegemony, or rather an active contributor to the making
of the West?
Bill  Ashcroft  talks  about  the way global  modernities  appropriated,  adapted  and
transformed modernity while he stresses that modernity was much more adapted rather
then adopted,  a  process  which  contains  a  (re-)creation  of  modernity.70 The  fact  that
2009), 83.
67 Ibid., 83.
68 See Ibid.
69 Taking the example of the modern novel as a cultural form usually perceived as Western, Keya Anjaria
argues that actually all forms of modernity are alternative, altering from an idealized norm, which
makes a differentiation between center and periphery dispensable. She quotes Moretti's Conjectures on
World Literature where he comments on the inadequacy of the East-West divide: “And actually more
than that: it had completely reversed the received historical explanation of these matters: because if the
compromise between the foreign form and the local is so ubiquitous, then those independent paths that
are usually taken to be the rule of the rise of the novel [ ... ]—well, they’re not the rule at all, they’re
the exception.” Moretti, Franco. ‘Conjectures on World Literature’, New Left Review (January-February
2000), 58 as quoted in Keja Anjaria, ‘The Dandy and the Coup: Politics of Literature in the Post-1980
Turkish  Novel,  Üç  Beş  Kişi’,  Middle  Eastern  Literatures  17,  no.  3  (2014):  263–82,
doi:10.1080/1475262X.2014.997575. Still these novels reflect the East-West dichotomy by dealing with
the struggle over meanings between local and foreign interests. Ibid., 265.
70 See Ashcroft, ‘Alternative Modernities: Globalization and the Post-Colonial,’ 84.
59
2 Ottoman Modernity and Bourgeois Culture: The Era of the Fez
modernity consists of a multiplicity of characteristics and different kind of modernities
which put emphasis on its different traits was often overlooked. Thus modernity should
not  be  reduced  to  things  such  as  a  capitalist  economy,  even  though  that  was  an
important feature of it. In her study on modernity and Islam, Alev Çınar also emphasizes
that the notion of modernity contains multiple dimensions as constitutive parts of social,
political and economical life.71 An analysis of (non-Western) modernities thus needs to
consider which of the elements of modernity are addressed on one hand, and needs to be
careful not to overemphasize certain characteristics as ultimate measures of (Western)
modernity on the other hand.
Within these lines, Ashcraft draws on Charles Taylor's differentiation between a
cultural and a-cultural notions of modernity. The former was a teleological concept that
considered  a  certain  form  of  economical  progress  and  structure  as  inevitable  and
neglected that its becoming was related to a certain cultural milieu.
“The inevitable effect of this was that globalization came to be seen a-culturally so
that  the  diffusion  of  capital,  industrialization,  urbanization  and  the  spread  of
education implied a unified world and a homogeneous program of development
available to all.”72
In a similar manner, Dipesh Chakrabarty assesses that modernity was often viewed
from a political perspective, encompassing state, bureaucracy and capitalist enterprise,
disregarding “certain categories and concepts, the genealogies of which go deep into the
intellectual  and  even  theological  traditions  of  Europe.”73 Thus,  as  Ashcroft  remarks,
modernity  takes the form of  both particular  conditions as  well  as  a certain mode of
representation.
The notion  of  multiple  modernities  was  introduced  by  Samuel  Eisenstadt.74 His
concept was directed against classical theories of modernity such as Marx's, Durkheim's
and, to a great extent, Weber, who assumed that modernity as a cultural program and its
basic  institutional  constellations  would  spread  with  modernization  completely
71 Such  as  discourse,  culture,  historical  epoch,  lifestyle,  movement,  project  mindset,  constitutionalism,
secularism capitalism, industrialization, democracy. See Çınar, Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey.
72 Ashcroft, ‘Alternative Modernities: Globalization and the Post-Colonial,’ 89.
73 Chakrabarty,  Provincializing Europe. as cited in Ashcroft, ‘Alternative Modernities: Globalization and
the Post-Colonial,’ 85.
74 Samuel N. Eisenstadt, ‘Multiple Modernities’, Daedalus 129, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 1–29.
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throughout  societies.  In  contrast,  Eisenstadt  notes,  modernizing  societies  refuted
homogenizing and hegemonic characteristics of the “Western program of modernity”,
and gave rise to multiple ideological patterns which were still distinctly modern.75 These
multiple forms of modernity evolved under the influence of respective local conditions
and experiences. Joint anti-Western and anti-modern themes did not make their modern
character  extinct.  Likewise  it  didn't  abolish Western  modernity  as  a  crucial  and
ambivalent reference point.
To Eisenstadt an important point of understanding multiple modernities was to
distinguish  modernization  from  Westernization,  as  he  considered  both  as  maybe
intersecting  but  not  identical.  A  view that  I  would  consider  critically,  and contrasts
Eisenstadt's account to such as Ashcroft's or Stuart Hall's. Eisenstadt regards Western
patterns thereby as an authentic precedent amongst others and as a reference point.76 The
question arising here was if there was a common core of modernity in its multiple forms.
An answer might be found in Eisenstadt's definition of the history of modernity or of
modernity  itself.  He  describes  it  as  a  “continual  constitution and reconstitution  of  a
multiplicity of cultural programs,”77 where multiple actors on different levels of society
and kinds of institutions produce unique expressions of modernity.
Modernity as it emerged in Western and Central Europe, according to Eisenstadt,
had  as  its  cultural  and  political  program “distinct  ideological  as  well  as  institutional
premises”78 such as shifts in the conception of human agency, and the questioning of
social, ontological, and political orders. Additionally, modernities respond to these same
problematics, and in their answers they also remained within the very same. Another
crucial element of  modernity was the construction of boundaries of collectivities and
collective  identities.  Thus  modernity  in  that  sense  can  be  defined  as  a  permanent
negotiation between the  general  and the  particular,  between equality  and difference.
Eisenstadt  also  notes that  internal  antinomies  in  general  are  a  characteristic  of
modernity, such as between freedom and control, or autonomy and restriction, individual
and collective, constructional or primordial definitions of collective identities, or modern
and traditional.  These clashes between different conceptions of  state and society and
75 Ibid., 2.
76 See Ibid., 3.
77 Ibid., 2.
78 See Ibid., 5. 
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conflicts arising from that were crucial to societies' self-perception as modern.79
Meltem Ahıska  offers  the  term Occidentalism to  provide  a  fresh  framework  of
analysis of Ottoman and Turkish modernity.80 She argues that the East/West dichotomy
and a certain perception was constitutive of both Turkish modernity (which for her also
encompasses  Ottoman modernization)  and  its  historiography.  Therefore,  accounts  on
Ottoman and Turkish modernity very much concentrated on the framework of either the
success or failure which also takes reference to a Western model perceived as original.
This is because both models and Turkish modernity itself are based on temporal and
spacial  imaginations  relying  on  backward  versus  progress  and  East  versus  West
dichotomies. While modernization theory prescribed a linear progression of modernity, it
at the same time essentialized space. Thus the above approaches to Turkish modernity
remained  “within  the  problematic  of  imitation,”81 where  modernity  moves  from  the
Western  centers  to  the  margins,  neglecting  the  complexity  and  crisis  of  (Western)
modernity  itself.  In  order  to  re-conceptualize  the  analyses  of  Ottoman  and  Turkish
modernity, it was required to ask how notions like impact, influences or imitation can be
conceived. Ahıska also suggests the application of hitherto neglected tools of postcolonial
theory to dismantle dichotomous constructions of progress and tradition, West and East,
and a historical representation of self and other along these lines. Albeit, Ahıska is also
critical of concepts of alternative of multiple modernities because of their dismissal of the
power  of  Western  hegemony.82 Therefore,  she  proposes  the  use  of  the  notion  of
Occidentalism, which on the one hand included Western powers, and on the other hand
took agency of the postcolonial  subjectivity of the  Other into account. In addition, the
concept enabled to make visible the contribution of the Other to the construction of the
West and the multiplicity of notions of the West. In contrast to approaches of alternative
and multiple modernities, Ahıska argued, Occidentalism acknowledged the inscription of
Western  dichotomies  into  the  project  of  modernity  and  thus  of  alternative  modern
identities.83 With regard to Turkish nationalism, she makes the important remark that
79 See Ibid., 10.
80 Meltem Ahıska, ‘Occidentalism: The Historical Fantasy of the Modern’,  The South Atlantic Quarterly
2/3, no. 102 (2003): 351–79.
81 Ibid., 357.
82 Even though as we have seen above this is not the case. Ashcroft as well as Eisenstadt take Western
hegemony in serious consideration. See Ashcroft, ‘Alternative Modernities: Globalization and the Post-
Colonial’. and Eisenstadt, ‘Multiple Modernities’.
83 Although that is exactly what Eisenstadt does, see Eisenstadt, ‘Multiple Modernities’.
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within Turkish nationalism different notions of the West existed once at the same time,
and  through an Occidentalist  perspective  these  can be  made  visible.  In  addition,  the
concept enabled to consider the unequal power relations implied into the concept of the
West, and how postcolonial elites used it to achieve hegemony in their respective nation-
states. 
2.3 The Making of Bourgeois Identity and Modernization in the 
Ottoman Empire and Beyond 
In  order  to  decenter  the  western  European  modern  experience  and  European
agency  in  the  modernization  process,  it  is  crucial  to  take  care  of  internal  Ottoman
dynamics  of  change and transformation.84 Modernization of  dress and conflicts  about
modern headgear in the Ottoman Empire appear in a different light when situated within
and related to Ottoman dynamics of change. Kemal Karpat argues for a broad analytical
framework in order to analyze changes in the social and political structure of Middle
Eastern  society.85 His  study  traces  how  in  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  century,
responses  to  outside  stimuli  were  conditioned  by  internal  Ottoman  dynamics.  His
analysis starts at the end of sixteenth and the early seventeenth century, a period long
before the acceleration of European influence, when social dislocations in the Ottoman
Empire triggered processes of  change of  the social  structure.86 The rise of  communal
leaders brought up a new social  force which broke up traditional  arrangements.  The
dynamics  developing  from  there  were  for  Karpat  a  starting  point  to  study,  from  a
historical functional view, patterns of social stratification and structural change in the
Ottoman realm, stretching from the Balkans to North Africa. He has a special focus on
how  these  social  structures  were  conditioned  by  economic  forces,  the  industrial
revolution, and Western free market economy. Furthermore, he traced the rise of a new
political cadre within these settings and the differentiation of the political system, and
84 That does not mean these changes took place isolated from inter- and transnational dynamics. Yet
looking at Ottoman internal structures provides a different perspective on the modernization process,
and a deeper understanding of its specificities.
85 Kemal H. Karpat, ‘Transformation of the Ottoman State’, in  The Politics of Modern Turkey :  Critical
Issues in Modern Politics, ed. Ali Çarkoğlu and William M. Hale, vol. 1 (London u.a.: Routledge, 2008),
56–95.
86 See  also  Rifaʿat  ʿA Abou-El-Haj,  Formation of  the  Modern State:  The  Ottoman Empire,  Sixteenth  to
Eighteenth Centuries, SUNY Series in the Social and Economic History of the Middle East (Albany, NY:
State Univ. of New York Press, 1991).
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how  both  were  related  to  social  differentiation.  The  latter  encompassed  changes  in
occupation,  ownership  patterns,  income  levels,  and  cultural  political  values.87 Karpat
defines as the basic problem of the Ottoman state conflicts between ruler and ruled or
government and society.
Economically the period was characterized by changes in Ottoman trade patterns.
Following wars with Russia, the Ottomans had lost hegemony in the Black Sea trade. In
addition, integration into capitalist world economy changed Ottoman trade balance from
export  to  import,  as  Karpat  enphasizes. Formerly being an exporter  of  manufactured
goods, now the Empire increasingly sold raw materials and foodstuff on the international
market  while  trade  with  the  West  increased  significantly  in  the  eighteenth and
nineteenth century. Integration into capitalist world economy also led to a disruption of
internal trade. In the Balkans, the emergence of new social groups which were merchants
or manufacturers, nationalist intellectuals and popular leaders within that process led to
a nationalist  uprising.  Out  of  these  developments  Karpat  concludes that  it  would  be
reductionist to explain these occurrences, meaning the rise of Balkan nationalisms simply
as “cultural antagonisms,” even when they had been used for mass mobilization. Instead,
they should be considered as 
“antagonisms  between  de  facto  bourgeois  land-ownership,  a  capitalist  system  of
production with capitalist investment and hired labor at the social level, a feudal
type of authority at the government level.”88 
Changing  trade  and  consumption  patterns  made  imported  looks,  created  from
imported  European-produced  clothing,  became  symbols  of  wealth  and  status.  These
transformations  and  the  spread  of  modern  European  fashions  can  be  considered  as
crucial  as  the  state  imposed  modern  dress  codes  in  the  1820s  and  their  subsequent
dissemination  among  an  emerging  Ottoman  bourgeoisie  and  middle  classes.  Their
appearance  is  related  to  Ottoman  socio-political  and  economic  structures  and  their
transformations as well.
Social structure in the Ottoman Empire before modernization, according to Şerif
Mardin, was often characterized by an idealized model of an autocratic monarchy with
87 See Karpat, ‘Transformation of the Ottoman State’.
88 Ibid., 61.
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the ruling class on one side and the ruled on the other, but could also be considered from
the perspective of a more diversified stratification of the population that was confronted
with  competing  elite  groups.89 In  differentiation  to  European  feudal  states,  social
scientists have often remarked that the Ottoman  state, due to its system of  'slaves' as
executives  in  the  government,  lacked  a  hereditary  aristocracy.  Yet  even  though  this
system  and  other  measures  stabilized  the  Ottoman  state  and  dynasty,  numerous
exceptions to this ideal existed. The same is valid for the non-hereditary character of
fiefs. For example, Muslim Turcic Princes and Byzantine barons and other vassal states
had privileges of their own, and often fief holders' sons could keep their fathers' land.
There were also a number of exceptions to the ideal of Ottoman landownership which
theoretically  kept  all  agricultural  land as  miri,  and which did  not  prevent  influential
persons from claiming property rights. The lower strata was composed of merchants and
artisans on the one hand, and peasants on the other. Even though officially not equipped
with a huge amount of power,  they exercised influence to a certain amount through
organization  in  guilds,  village  councils,  and  tribes,  and  enjoyed  through  them  far-
reaching autonomy.90 Hence, the often attested lack of an Ottoman (Muslim) middle class
needs to be objected and revised. 
The emergence of  an Ottoman Muslim middle  class  stood in correlation to  the
central state's struggle with local authorities, the ayan and newly emerging local powers,
and the so called  derebeys,  as Karpat argues. During Mahmud II's reign, their land was
seized and redistributed. The property group emerging from this redistribution formed “a
sort  of  a  new middle  class”  who “set  the  tone  of  the  political  developments  of  the
country.”91 In  addition to  economy,  a reorganization of  bureaucracy took place.  New
offices were introduced and officers trained in a newly established school, and with its
differentiating  and  extensive  competences  bureaucracy  strengthened.  This  further
contributed  to  the  establishment  of  a  modern  capitalist  order  as  “ideas  of  Western
economic  liberalism  penetrated  bureaucratic  thought.”92 In  the  light  of  these
89 See Şerif  Mardin,  ‘Historical Thresholds and Stratification:  Social Class and Class Consciousness’,  in
Religion, Society, and Modernity in Turkey, ed. Şerif Mardin (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Univ. Press, 2006), 1–
23. See also Halil Inalcik, ‘The Nature of Traditional Society’, in The Politics of Modern Turkey : Critical
Issues in Modern Politics, ed. Ali Çarkoğlu and William M. Hale (London: Routledge, 2008), 17–35.
90 Mardin, ‘Historical Thresholds and Stratification: Social Class and Class Consciousnes,’ 9.
91 Karpat, ‘Transformation of the Ottoman State,’ 66.
92 Ibid., 70.
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developments, economic as well as inner-state structures, the Tanzimat decree of 1839
was an edict which “merely expanded upon and crystallized ideas and policies developed
and implemented in the past.”93 
The  imperial  rescript  of  1856  however,  according  to  Karpat,  marked  a  turn  in
Ottoman modernization politics from a statist policy of voluntary modernization to the
imposition  of  the  will  of  outsiders,  namely  the  European  Great  Powers,  on  the
transformation process. The release of the edict coincided with the end of the Crimean
War,  the Paris Treaty  of  1856 and  admittance  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  in  to  the
community of nations. Thus “after the middle of the nineteenth century the Ottoman
Empire gradually became subjected to a policy of semi-colonialism.”94 Meanwhile its own
elites,  educated  in  the  newly  established  facilities  such  as  the  Galatasaray Lise
appropriated colonial power techniques and developed colonialist attitudes towards their
'own'  population.  This  new  phase  of  Ottoman  modernization  was  accompanied  and
shaped by new means of communication and transportation established after 1860, such
as the telegraph (set up 1855-64), railways (from 1866), and the modern press.95
Expressions of the newly emerging Ottoman Muslim middle-class were intellectuals
such as Ibrahim Şinasi (1826-71), Ziya Paşa (1825-80), Namık Kemal (1840-1888) or Ahmet
Midhat.  They  were  the  first  to  theoretically  justify  and  develop  an  ideology  for
modernizing  measures  of  the  state  on  the  institutional  level.96 They  argued  for  the
implementation  of  a  constitutional  order  and  representative  structures,  criticized  the
propertied  and  agrarian  commercial  Muslim  and  non-Muslim  groups  and  the  order
established through the capitulations. In this context new dress was especially stressed
by Ziya Paşa as a devastating factor for the local industry. Another concern of the Young
Ottoman thinkers referred to the politics of identity which they regarded important in
order to secure loyalty of the subjects to the government. Through the concepts of vatan
(homeland) and citizenship, ethnic, religious, and local divisions should be superseded.
Eisenstadt  considers the  far-reaching  and  substantial  implications  military  and
economic imperialism and colonialism had for the formation of modernity. In colonial
and  semi-colonial  societies,  these  implications  often  led  to  the  adoption  of  modern
93 Ibid., 70.
94 Ibid., 71.
95 Ceride-i Havadis and Tercüman-i Ahval established 1860. see Ibid., 70. 
96 Ibid., 73.
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representative,  legal  and  administrative  institutions,  and  the  construction  of  modern
nation-states. European expansion had undermined local structures in many areas and
especially  colonial  elites  attempted  to  appropriate  modern  institutions  in  order  to
“participate  in  the  modern  universal  (albeit  initially  Western)  tradition.”97 Eisenstadt
argues that while these  elites and societies also rejected certain aspects of modernity,
“Western formulations” were hegemonic in the “cultural program of modernity.”98 Yet
Eisenstadt points out that processes of appropriation were, amongst others, accelerated
and motivated by th endeavor to redefine center-periphery relations.99 Thus from these
appropriations of modernity, its reinterpretations and reformulations “new cultural and
political  programs”  emerged  which  incorporated  the  tension  of  being  a  part  of  the
modern world, yet with ambivalent attitudes towards modernity and the West. 
Fatma  Müge  Göçek  analyzed  the  link  between  consumption  of  modern  goods,
Westernization in general, and the emergence of the bourgeoisie as a new social group. 100
The vantage  point  of  her  study is  the  widespread  assumption  that  social  change  in
modernizing societies is linked to the bourgeoisie as a main agent in these processes.
Thus, when scholars analyzed non-Western societies they attested the lack of a group
carrying the characteristics of western European bourgeoisie. Then they often concluded
that there was also a lack of social dynamics and change. Without completely dismissing
existing theories on the function of the bourgeoisie in social change, Göçek critically
applies  them  to  the  study  of  Ottoman  social  change,  tracing  the  emergence  of  an
Ottoman bourgeoisie without neglecting internal Ottoman dynamics.101
In  England  and  France,  the  bourgeoisie  had  gained  control  over  developments
contained in the rise of capitalism and related state-making while establishing itself as a
new social group. They became equipped with new social and political resources which
gave them the power to shape a new image of society through a new material culture.
This culture, according to Göçek, was established in the areas of civilization, space, and
97 Eisenstadt, ‘Multiple Modernities,’ 14.
98 Ibid., 14.
99 Ibid., 15.
100 Fatma Müge  Göçek,  Rise  of  the  Bourgeoisie,  Demise  of  Empire:  Ottoman  Westernization  and  Social
Change (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996).
101 Her  main  argument,  that  has  been  criticized  and  refuted, is  that  the  segmentation  of  Ottoman
bourgeoisie  into  commercial  and bureaucratic  was  one of  the  main  factors  for  the  decline  of  the
Empire. Her argument of the strict division of the Ottoman bourgeoisie along religious lines cannot be
maintained since a Muslim commercial elite existed as well when internal trade is considered. On her
line of argument see Ibid.
67
2 Ottoman Modernity and Bourgeois Culture: The Era of the Fez
fashion.  Domestic  space  was  functionally  reorganized  along  the  lines  of  private  and
public, and decorated with ever-changing fashions of new equipment, the rapid change
of which symbolized and embodied progress. This new lifestyle required a new code of
behavior and definitions of good manners. Bourgeois lifestyle came along with a newly
emerging concepts of the West and Europe which diffused throughout big parts of the
globe by the means of political, economic and military power.102 What is interesting here
is not just the diffusion of the very same, but its interconnectivity to dynamics within the
Ottoman society in order to be sensitive to Ottoman factors of social change that were
beyond western  European influences. Thus,  it  was necessary  to  let  go  of  ahistorical
models of social change which generalize from Western European experiences. Göçek
started out from Weberian and Marxist models going beyond their generalizations and
restrictions  regarding  non-Western  societies,  regarding  them  as  despotic  and  thus
socially stagnant. In studies based on Weber as well as Marx, the state often replaced the
bourgeoisie  as  an  agent  of  social  change,  next  to  the  interaction  with  the  Western
Europe.  Yet  Göçek  derives from these  assumptions three  elements  to  analyze  social
change in the Ottoman Empire. These are households, sultan and the state, and war and
commerce with the West.  Fatma M. Göçek  defined Westernization on the one hand as
“the  adoption  of  goods,  institutions,  and  ideas”,  but  puts  special  emphasis  on  its
interaction with Ottoman social structure and its effects on the agency of social groups.103
Thus Göçek's approach  provides a basic vantage point for my study since she frames
Westernization as dynamic process which focuses on the agency of local subjects.
Göçek understands Westernization, in the beginning, first of all as the consumption
of goods from Western Europe when those became items of luxury in the 18 th century,
and their import sharply increased.104 The Ottoman government's initial reaction was to
restrict  the  spread  of  these  goods  through  sumptuary  laws  and  inhibit  their  use  to
transgress social boundaries. Yet these strategies proved ineffective and Ottoman upper
class households went into competition and tried to enhance their social position by the
consumption  of  these  new  products  from  Western  Europe.  Thus  products  from
102 She argues that  these  concepts  began to form with European overseas  discoveries  and coincident
Muslim attacks on Europe. Europe became a replacement for Christendom or Christianity, while the
West was the term used to designate European powers from the outside. See Ibid., 5.
103 Ibid., 157, FN 62.
104 Ibid., 37-38.
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industrializing Europe became a means to both reinforce or undermine social boundaries
used by different social groups.
Regarding the introduction of Western material, cultural conduct, and the way it
was reorganized along the lines of private and public, Selçuk Esenbel compares Ottoman
and Japanese approaches to the use of Western cultural forms and their spread. 105 While
concentrating on elites, she assumes those set the parameters for Westernization as it
was approached by these societies and later adopted by the middle classes. She stated
that their decisions shaped top-down processes of modernization of the general public.
In terms of a notion of Westernization, she claims to provide a “history of Western
culture beyond its  borders”,  hence in accordance with a view that incorporated non-
Western  societies  into  the  production  of  the  West.  As  for  the  Ottoman Empire  she
concentrated on Muslim elites, leaving non-Muslims out of her scope. In order to better
understand Westernization, she proposes to look at culture and the private instead of the
state and its institutions. Also, she claims to apply an alternative analytical account of
Westernization to the “presumption of similarities and difference”106, and focus on what
she called eclectic cultural environments. Her endeavor was to make out the meaning of
Western culture when it was incorporated in the areas of attire, household environments,
and  manners.  My  own  study  considers  both:  state  induced  dress  codes  and  the
appropriation of modern headgear by the (male) population, in accordance or in contrast
to the state's measures; I view both mostly through the perspective of the state, as it is
recorded in state archival  documents and the correspondence between different state
offices.  Esenbel reminded of the ambivalent and manifold meanings of cultural forms;
something that I am also going to show in the meanings of headgear. She provides the
mecelle as an example of such cultural forms. These were introduced in 1876 as an Islamic
civil  code  that  could  be  counted  as  an  example  of  invented  tradition,  as  they  were
modernizing legal reforms in Islamic garb. For Esenbel, they exemplify the fluid nature of
what is  Western or modern,  and possible  shifts  in  meaning inherent to modernizing
measures.  The  social  and  political  meaning of  Western  culture  and  its  use  thus  lies
beyond  practicality,  personal  taste,  and  symbolism,  and  must  rather  be  regarded  in
105 Selçuk  Esenbel,  ‘The  Anguish  of  Civilized  Behavior:  The  Use  of  Western  Cultural  Forms  in  the
Everyday Lives of the Meiji Japanese and the Ottoman Turks During the Nineteenth Century’, Japan
Review, no. 5 (1 January 1994): 145–85.
106 Ibid., 146.
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accordance  to  Nobert  Elias  as  “reorganizing the  cultural  content  of  the  rational  and
emotional aspects of the individuals and society in immediate terms.”107 Hence it is of
importance how these elites conceptualized Western culture and the civilizing venture. 
Esenbel also refers to headgear and considers it as the location of traditional culture
and authenticity. Next to the  wide spread of Western goods and manners into private
Ottoman homes and  she attests  an emphasis on the strengthening of “the Empire in its
own  indigenous  character”108 which  was expressed,  as  she  noted,  especially  in  an
“obsession” with headgear, as she puts it, male and female, or male headgear and female
veil, as sensitive areas.109 Concerning the characterizing of the appropriation of Western
dress, Esenbel terms its “eclectic combination” which nevertheless was strictly regulated in
its form in the public sphere.110 I will show that the significance of headgear  was  more
diverse then she indicated, that references and adaptations were made to the traditional as
well as the modern, and that meanings shifted and intersected in between these two ends.
Göçek uses  Ottoman inheritance registers  in order  to trace  the consumption of
Western goods in the Ottoman Empire and their distribution among the elites, and the
newly  emerging  bourgeoisie  between  1700-1820.  Those  enable  her  to  show  that
“Ottoman Westernization was a phenomenon that did not remain limited to the elites in
the empire but also emerged among the populace at large.”111 Through the same sources,
she reads that increasing consumption of Western goods took place among the emerging
Ottoman bourgeoisie specifically in contrast to stagnant consumption patterns of older
elites. Thus the rising social status of the newly emerging elites was indicated by the
rising consumption of Western goods. Among those goods consumed textiles ranged on
the third rank, behind clocks and watches, and thereafter pistols and muskets. During the
period analyzed, the possession of Western goods rose to the highest decree amongst the
107 Ibid., 156.
108 Ibid., 161.
109 I am quite skeptical of whether Esenbel fulfills her claim to go beyond an approach to similarities and
differences of Ottoman and Western culture since what she does in the end is to count which cultural
forms,  manners  and  items had  been adopted  in which  social  spaces.  This  attributes  quite  a  fixed
meaning to the respective things and forms of behavior. I do not see ambivalent and fluid meanings
here besides the example of the mecelle she provides in the beginning. Eventually she renders it more
explicitly in the Japanese case, i.e. women's  hairstyle in Japan, which were  first  Eduardian but  later
returned to local traditional styles. But she does not point to the ambivalent meaning of  the  fez for
instance. See Ibid.
110 Ibid., 161.
111 Göçek, Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire, 97-98.
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populace. Göçek regards this as an indicator of a rising commercial bourgeoisie.112
I demonstrated that together with social, political and economic transformations,
the spread of items of modern bourgeois culture in the Ottoman Empire preceded the
official  introduction  of  modern  dress.  Now  I  will  turn  the  attention  towards  the
emergence of the fez as newly appearing marker of Ottoman modern identity.
2.4 The Fez and Modernization of Dress
The introduction of a new dress code by Mahmud II needs to be viewed behind this
background of already far reaching social and economic transformations that brought
about the adaptation of modern cultural forms and Western European items. Both, social
transformations and the reforms implemented by the state, took place behind an ongoing
discourse on the West and the Rest where the Ottoman State aimed at positioning itself
through a number of modernizing measures. One of these was the introduction of a new
dress code, first as part of military reform but then as a more encompassing endeavor to
reorganize state-subject relations.
Official introduction of modern European dress began shortly after the abolition of
the  Janissary  military  order  and  the  subsequent  establishment  of  a  new army called
“Mohammedan Victorious Soldiers,” found on June 17th, 1826 (11 Zilkade 1241). A code of
regulations including dress-codes for the new army was released the following year.113 As
headgear the şubara114 combined with a Turban was introduced at first, worn until 1827,
combined by some ranks with a turban, to be worn in its place by others. It had been the
former headgear of the Bostanciyan, the “Imperial Gardeners”, who guarded the Imperial
Palaces and the seafront along the Bosporus.115 It was then replaced by the fez. 
Often-repeated narrations of the origin of the fez or inspirations which led to the
introduction  of  the  fez  as  part  of  official  dress  are  presumably  a  reverberation  of
112 Ibid., 107.
113 On a summary of developments, in the period from the reforms of Selim I And Mahmud II until the
reign of Abdülhamid II. see Carter Vaughn Findley, ‘The Ottoman Lands to the Post-First World War
Settlement’,  in  The  New Cambridge History of  Islam,  ed.  Francis  Robinson (Cambridge:  Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 29–78.
114 A sort of a felt cap.
115 In Ottoman archival documents the discussion of the şubara appears in a letter of the grand vizier to
the sultan, where he reports that it was not resistant against sun and rain and of no good quality in
general. See BOA Hatt-i Hümayun (HAT) 50810.
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contemporary historical accounts such as that of the Ottoman official chronicler Ahmed
Lütfi.  He attributes the initial  use of the fez as a part of a military uniform to Koca
Husrev Paşa, a marine captain. Yet the use of the fez was quite common in the Ottoman
Empire  already  for  centuries,  especially  amongst  sailors.  What  was  new  is  that  it
replaced  most  other  kinds  of  headpieces  throughout  the  nineteenth  century,  thus
becoming a means of homogenization and Ottoman identity-building.116 
First of all, the introduction of a new dress code in the army is striking and tells about
the character of Ottoman dress reform. Along with the reform of military education, it led
to a new quality of the seizure of the state on its subjects' bodies, and lead to the altering of
practices, not just appearance. A remark by a contemporary observer depicts the scope of
the new uniforms. Adolphus Slade, a British officer, quoted by Bernard Lewis in his famous
“Emergence  of  Modern  Turkey”,  comments  on  the  changing  practices  of  the  cavalry
through dress and accompanying altered riding techniques and equipment.  He expounds
the disadvantages of the new clothing and stresses the significant consequences this kind
of dress had on established daily practices.117 
The second step was a law issued by Mahmud II in 1829 which, by the introduction
of  modern  dress  for  civil  officials,  “sought  to  replace  ancient  community  and
occupational  signs  of  differentiation  by  dress.”118 The  law  meticulously  described  a
variety of different forms of dress for men, yet it specified only one single headgear: the
fez, a conical red felt hat.119  
116 It had come along with the introduction of French education for the new army, also inspired by Husrev
Paşa.  Before  that,  military  training  took  place  according  to  Prussian  manners.  See  İsmail  Hakkı
Uzunçarşılı, ‘Asâkir-i Mansure’ye Fes Giydirilmesi Hakkında Sadr-ı Âzam Takriri ve II. Mahmud’un
Hatt-ı Humayunu’, Belleten 18, no. 70 (1954): 223–30; Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey,
2nd ed., Oxford Paperbacks. - London [u.a.] : Oxford Univ. Press, 1960- 135 (London [u.a.]: Oxford Univ.
Pr.,  1968), 99-103.  Another  impression  of  the  contemporary  perception  of  the  fez  in  terms of  its
multiple  origins,  which  was  perpetuated  throughout  the  following  century,  provides  an  imperial
degree of  issued in spring 1835. The specification of the kind of fez provided for the new army was as
follows: “The fez for the victorious army might a from Tunis, Egypt or Europe [...].” line 6. 7, BOA
HAT 489/23976. A civil servant was told to order one sample each in order to decide which ones would
be chosen (line 7).
117 See Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 112, FN 40.
118 Donald Quataert, ‘Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829’, International
Journal of Middle East Studies : IJMES 403, no. 425 (1997). This code was introduced for all officials, with
the exception of those in religious ranks. In contrast to the Westernization of men's clothes, existing
regulations  for  women's  dress  were  reinforced  by  Mahmud  II.  See  Cihan  Aktaş,  Tanzimat’tan
Günümüze Kılık Kıyafet ve Iktidar, Nehir Yayınları: İnceleme - Araştırma Dizisi ; 30 5 (İstanbul: Nehir
yayınları, 1989), 63. On the implementation of the new dress code amongst civil officials see Stanford J.
Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808 - 1975 , 1.
publ. (Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977), 49.
119 See Quataert, ‘Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829’, 412 and Patricia
72
2 Ottoman Modernity and Bourgeois Culture: The Era of the Fez
“This 1829 regulation, whose drama actually matches that of the destruction of the
janissaries, pushed aside a centuries-old Ottoman tradition in which headgear had
provided the crucial and central marker of identity, status, and rank.”120
In his study on the fez, Donald Quataert states that clothing regulations had been
powerful  tools  to  reshape  state  and  society,  no  less  then  bureaucratic  reform,  fiscal
centralization, and military action.121 The old elites' dress codes were suspended in favor
of an uprising bureaucratic and military elite.122 In addition, the measures introduced by
Mahmud II deleted visible differences between Muslims and non-Muslims. The new dress
code including the fez quickly spread among well-off Muslims and non-Muslims in the
urban  centers.  Concerning  the  kind  of  clothes  that  were  adopted  by  the  Ottoman
officials, in his account on the history of Turkish dress, Nureddin Sevin resembled the
Ottoman style of the late 1820s and 1830s to those of contemporary military officers in
Europe with slim trousers, single-breasted and a frock coat.123 
The imperial decree which regulated the new dress code reasons the reordering of
official  garments with several  elements:  the permanent and growing transgression of
accepted standards, and the move away from legal (Islamic) requirements by ordinary
people's, officials' dress, as well as by members of the Ottoman court. According to the
decree, until now Islamic dress had been sufficient as a protection of the body. However,
it did not meet contemporary needs of embellishment and pomp brought about by the
“passage of time and the victory over the dangers of nature.”124 Hence as reasons for the
new dress code, the document adduces on the one hand the appearance of ostentation,
and on the other hand the transgression of various prescriptions. Thus the decree gives
in to what it  labels  as adornment and luxury. This seems to have been the apparent
spread of  modern European dress, yet at the same time the sultan claims to restrict its
L. Baker, ‘The Fez in Turkey: A Symbol of Modernization’, Costume. The Journal of the Costume Society,
no.  20 (1986):  72–85. The text of the decree can be found in: Ahmet Lütfi,  Vakanüvis Ahmed Lütfi
Efendi  Tarihi,  ed.  Ahmet  Hezarfen  and  Nuri  Akbayar,  1.  baskı.,  vol.  2/3,  Tarih  Vakfı-Yapı  Kredi
Yayınları : Eski Yazıdan Yeni Yazıya (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı-Yapı Kredi yayınları, 1999), 268-273 (volume)
2, Appendix 18).
120 Quataert, ‘Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829,’ 412.
121 Ibid., 403.
122 See Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700 - 1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), 65.
123 See  Nureddin Sevin,  Onüç Asırlık Türk Kiyâfet Târihine Bir Bakış, 1. bs., Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları /
Kültür  Eserleri  Dizisi,   Türkei  Kültür  Bakanlığı.  -  Ankara,  1976-  1195  (Ankara:  Kültür  Bakanlığı
yayınları, 1991), 123-124. 
124 Lütfi, Vakanüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi, 268-273, (Volume 2, Appendix 18).
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use and forms through the introduction of the very same.125
Mahmud II displays the change of dress as a return to the simplicity and purity of
the  early  days  of  Islam  as  expressed  in  the  appearance  of  prophet  Mohammed's
descendants, as well as in pious or religious dress in general. Hence the modernization of
dress is displayed as a return to Islam's roots. Is that just a legitimizing strategy or a way
of integrating Islam and modernization? I  think it  is  on the one hand a legitimizing
strategy,  but  it  also  links  Islam  to  modernity,  modern  dress  displayed  as  being  in
accordance  with  the  essence  of  Islam.  Extravagance  and  pomp  were  unacceptable,
Mahmud II  states,  while  “shine  and  brightness”  produced  by  pious  dress  was  to  be
preferred from a reasonable and canonical  religious point of view. In addition it  was
beneficial for the financial and physical well-being.126 
In the imperial decree, the words Europe, European, modern or Western are not
mentioned. Neither do the names of the pieces of dress, such as trousers, skirt, or coat
appear, just the fez is mentioned explicitly. The other pieces of dress are only specified in
terms of cloth, color and kind of decorations. That may have several reasons: First, it
probably enhanced the acceptability of the new dress code. But could it also be that terms
such as Western, European, and so on were only attributed in retrospect to these kind of
measures during the following decades when the Orientalist and imperialist othering of
the Ottoman Empire took different qualities, and this kind of dress also took a different
meaning.
Styles introduced by the decree developed throughout the century, and influenced
by fashions and modes of production in Europe and Ottoman preferences. The fez also
varied its shape and color, from a more decorated, embroidered and voluminous style to a
purer, narrower form and light to dark red or even black.127 Carter Findley in his account
on civil officialdom describes the adoption of the new dress as follows:
125 In his study of the modernization of male dress and the appearance of bourgeois styles Christopher
Forth presents an example of the British aristocracy's demands for more sober styles. See Christopher
E. Forth, Masculinity in the Modern West: Gender, Civilization and the Body (Basingstoke [u.a.]: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008), 50.
126 Mahmud II does not mention about whose physical and financial well-being he is concerned. While
elaborating  on  restrictions  of  extravagance  of  his  state  officials,  Mahmud  II  stresses  that  travel
expenses for officials to obligatory participation in religious and political events would continue to be
met, probably in order to anticipate concerns that cutback of expenses would touch other spheres as
well. Lütfi, Vakanüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi, 268-273,  (Volume 2, Appendix 18).
127 For the different shapes and colors of the fez and their special names see  Reşat Ekrem Koçu,  Türk
Giyim,  Kuşam  ve  Süslenme  Sözlüğü,  Sümerbank  Kültür  Yayınları  1  (Ankara:  Başnur  Matbaası,
1967),115-116.
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“During the Tanzimat, the normal civil official costume became the combination of
fez, the modified frock coat known as istanbulin, and trousers, an ensemble familiar
in portraits  of the period. The istanbulin combined the knee-length skirt of the
European frock coat with a closed front and standup collar, supposedly adopted to
spare elderly officials the torments of starched shirtfronts and neckties.” 128
The  abolishment  of  long-established  headgear  by  Mahmud  II's  legislation  is
depicted by Chronicler Lütfi Efendi as a relief or liberation from “the weight of huge and
small  kavuks.”129 Minds,  Lütfi  Efendi  states,  were  now  with  the  abolishment  of  the
janissary  order,  untroubled  by  them.  He  interprets  the  1829  dress  decree  as  an
intervention to  counter  disorder  in  terms of  headgear  which  had  appeared  after  the
destruction of  the  Janissary order.130 He contradicts  however  his  own remark by his
utterance that given the lack of regulations regarding headgear, some began to put on
headpieces  even  more  voluminous  then  the  previously  worn  kavuk.131 After  the
128 Carter V. Findley,  Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History  (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Pr., 1989),
213. Different versions and the development of this style can be found in Sevin,  Onüç Asırlık Türk
Kiyâfet Târihine Bir Bakış, 123-124.  On Ottoman officials' dress before the dress reform see  Findley,
Ottoman Civil Officialdom, 68. See also Mehmet Lale, ‘Sultan Mahmud II and the Fez Revolution’, in
The  Great  Ottoman-Turkish  Civilisation,  ed.  Kemal  Çiçek,  Philosophy,  Science  and  Institutions  3
(Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2000), 91–95. Koçu, Türk Giyim, Kuşam ve Süslenme Sözlüğü, 113-14, FN 64. In
the name of the new military unit, Victorious Muslim Soldiers, the sultan appealed for the loyalty of
his  Muslim  subjects,  while  his  1829  law  threatened  to  jeopardize  their  status.  For  some  of  the
regulations of military attire see imperial decrees BOA HAT 17584,  17614,  17647,  17890,18446 and
18671; and Lütfi, Vakanüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi, 148 and 269-73, (Volume 2).
129 According to the  Encyclopaedia of Islam “Turkish  ḳavuḳ indicates a rather high, variously-shaped cap,
with a headband, sarık , wound round it” […] “Such caps of varying shape and color according to rank
were worn by officers of the Janissaries […] Other professions too had their own special ḳavuḳ, such as
vezir, molla, katib, paşalık kavuğu, some with specific names: kavalli, korasani, mücevveze, selimi, örf.” W.
Björkman, ‘Ḳawuḳlu - Brill Reference’, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman et al.,
accessed  14  April  2016,  http://referenceworks.brillonline.com.549439870two.erf.sbb.spk-
berlin.de/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/kawuklu-SIM_4044?
s.num=0&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopaedia-of-islam-2&s.q=kavuk. See  also  Mahmud  Şevket  Paşa,
Osmanli Teşkilât ve Kiyafet-i Askeriyesi  [Organization and Uniforms of the Ottoman Army] (Ankara:
Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2014); “sarık sarılan başlık” in  Mehmet A. Ağakay, ed., Türkçe Sözlük, (Ankara: Bilgi
Basımevi, 1974; and Emin Cenkmen, Osmanlı Sarayı ve Kıyafetleri (İstanbul: Türiye Yayınevi, 1948).
130 A lack of popularity of the  kavuk as minister's headgear had obviously existed before as a series of
documents of the year 1815 show: A number of state ministers had been wandering around with a şal
(wollen shawl which could be worn as scarf, girdle, waistband, sash or turban on their hat. In several
imperial decrees they were admonished not to do so and told to wear a kavuk at any time and place,
and not to walk around with garments that did not suit a minister's glory and were unsuitable for
certain weather conditions. See i.e. BOA Hatt-ı Hümayun 718/34228. According to Reşat Ekrem Koçu
the şal had become fashionable at the turn of the 18th to the 19th century, especially among young men.
Koçu assesses that it was an ancient headgear of marine soldiers and in 1811 Mahmud II restricted the
wearing of a şal to them. See entry şal in Koçu, Türk Giyim, Kuşam ve Süslenme Sözlüğü, 214.
131 “kavukdan büyük kocabaşları” Lütfi,  Vakanüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi,  147-148 (Volume 2). The
kind of turbans called kavuk could reach the size of three or four times of a human head. The sultan's
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introduction of the fez, which followed this short period of disorderly appropriation of
headpieces  among  civil  servants,  a  certain  leveling  of  hierarchies  expressed  through
appearance took place. Lüfti Efendi also comments on it and states that it then was not
possible anymore to distinguish between different civil  officials.  What became visible
instead  were  differences  between  these  civil  servants  and  religious  scholars  (ulema)
which were thus regulated by a new dress code. Does Lütfi Efendi suggest that the new
regulation  had  been  made  to  differentiate  between  civil  servants  and  religious
functionaries? Does he take the result as the origin here? The new law indeed created the
ulema  as  a  religious  class  which  until  then  had  just  “been  only  one  among  several
medieval orders”132 due to the absence of a clergy in Islam. Now, however, it had become
singled out as such. Similar to civil servants, the different ranks within the ulema became
less visible through the simplification and assimilation of their dress.133
The function of the fez as a means to diminish some internal borders was contested
on several levels. I want to provide two examples to show by whom and by which means
contestation was conducted. During the first decades after its introduction, only a few
conflicts  around  the  wearing  of  the  fez  appear  in  archival  documents.  All  these
incidences deal with the manner of how the fez could and should be worn, and were no
questioning or refusal of the fez in general.
In 1835 several cases appear. In one, people were exhorted not to wind a turban
around the fez, in another case servants were urged to wear a fez in order to differentiate
them from their turban-wearing ulema masters.134 In another discussion in state offices,
the sultan negotiates if ministers and some other officials were allowed to attach jewels
to their fezzes.135 Finally in 1844 precautions are made by the state against those who
oppose the wearing of a badge on his fez by an Armenian notable, which he got awarded
for his loyalty to the Ottoman state.136
In the first decade of the new dress regulation, it was still discussed if the wearing
of the fez could be combined with a turban, of which an imperial edict of 1835 provides
kavuk's were the largest, created of fabrics longer than 60 meters. See Chico Beverly, ‘The Turban and
Male Headgear’, in  Berg Encyclopedia of World Dress and Fashion 5: Central and Southwest Asia , ed.
Joanne B. Eicher and Gillian Vogelsang-Eastwood, Engl., vol. 5 (Oxford: Berg, 2010), 477–84. 479. 
132 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill, 1964), 124.
133 Ibid., 124.
134 BOA HAT 465/22800.
135 BOA HAT 697/33640, BOA HAT 330/19079;  BOA HAT 697/33640.
136 BOA HR.MKT. 7/34 (ca. 1844).
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evidence.137 Directed to all high ranking officials such as the minister of finance, scribes
in the imperial offices, advisors of the imperial mint, and high military officials, it treats
the question of if civil servants and others could wear turbans over their fezzes. The copy
of  an  imperial  edict  was  sent  to  the  local  administrations  and  all  imams  as  well  as
military officers in order to warn and inform them on the current regulations “so that
this impolite behavior and disapproved line of conduct does occur”138 anymore. The edict
sent reaffirms for whom the dress codes are valid. Who should wear a fez without a
turban is not specified in this decree. 
Another imperial decree issued in 1835 expressed outrage about the bridging of a
social gap by wearing a turban instead of a fez.139 It states that servants of the  ulema
should wear a fez, not a turban, in order to differentiate  efendi from hizmetkar (master
from servant). In this regard an order should be released to counter this “deceitful wish
(murād-ı  mekkār)”  which  was  assumed  behind  the  wearing  of  the  turban,  without
specifying what this wish was.
Instead of leveling social differences, in this case the fez is used to preserve or build
up difference and, as mentioned above, help to build up the ulema as a distinct religious
class with turbans and long robes.140 The document emphasizes that the fez functions to
pertain a visible difference between  efendi and servant: “in order to differentiate them
from their masters each one wears a fez [...].”141 The rest of their outfit was not altered. Of
what kind this clothes were, isn't mentioned. I suppose it was the same as those of the
ulema they served, otherwise it would not been mentioned: “Their dress will remain as it
has  been  previously  and  not  touching  any  of  their  garments  […].” 142 In  further
proceeding, the grand vizier (vekaletpenahi)  and minister of war (serʿasker paşa) were
assigned  to  negotiate  the  matter  and  inform  the  şeyhülislâm (fetvapenah)  about  the
results. 
Due to their close ties and involvement with the Ottoman court, most of the higher
ranks of the ulema had a supportive stance towards Mahmud II's reforms, since it secured
137 People wrapped a cotton cloth called yemeni around their fezzes. BOA HAT 755/35654.
138 “ḥarekāt-ı bi edebāne ve evzāʿ-yı nāmerziye vukūʿa getirilmemek üzere,”  BOA HAT 755/35654.
139 BOA HAT 465/22800. 
140 Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey; Uriel Heyd, ‘The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization
in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud I’, in Studies in Islamic History and Civilization, ed. Uriel Heyd,
vol. IX, Scripta Hierosolymitana (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1964), 63–96.
141 “başlarına birer fes giyub efendilerinden farḳ olunmaḳ ṣūreti […],” BOA HAT 465/22800.
142 “elbīseleri yine evvelki elbise olmaḳ ve elbīselerini ḫīç bir şey değilmeyerek […],” BOA (HAT) 465/22800.
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their positions.143 And as becomes apparent in the presented case, the reform in dress
could be used by them to mark a socially distinct position, being the only Ottoman group
which could keep their turbans.
In the same year some high officials in Istanbul as well as the provinces - including
the grand vizier and the governor of Bosnia - demanded to attach a jewel or jewels to
their fez.  Accordingly that was not very welcomed by the Sultan Mahmud II.  He did
however give permission that this kind of fez could be worn on holidays but definitely
not on other occasions, as some imperial decrees note.144 I am referring to this incident
because it connects the wearing of the fez to premodern politics of dress in the context of
sumptuary laws and their restrictions of display of luxury as a means to maintain social
boundaries.  In  addition,  it  provides  an  idea  how  the  fez  was  used  to  create  social
distinction and display status and rank, discussion that faded in later archival documents
and discussions.145
Three different documents provide information on this affair.146 For me, it  is an
example  of  the shift  from old to the new order.  Exquisite  dress  in the documents  is
discussed as a privilege granted to meritorious officials in the Ottoman government. The
first document, sent by the governor of Bosnia, named Vecih, to the  ketḫüdā-yi bāb147
with the request to wear the jewel-decorated fez also poses the question of to whom else
the privilege might be granted, and on which occasions other then holidays might it be
worn. Accordingly, Vecih Pasa suggests who else might be awarded the honor to wear
143 Uriel  Heyd, ‘The Ottoman Ulama and Westernization in the Time of Selim III  and Mahmud I’,  in
Studies in Islamic History and  Civilization, ed. Uriel Heyd, vol. IX, Scripta Hierosolymitana (Jerusalem:
Hebrew University, 1964), 63–96.
144 Dispute about ministers attaching jewels to their fezzes: BOA HAT 697/33640, BOA HAT 330/19079;
BOA HAT 697/33640, and some other documents from the year 1835.
145 See Ross on sumptuary laws and their objective to prevent decadence and maintain social order Robert
Ross, Clothing: A Global History (Cambridge [u.a.]: Polity, 2008), 20-21. On the significance of European
premodern sumptuary laws and references to the vast literature on the subject see also  Madeline C.
Zilfi, ‘Whose Laws? Gendering the Ottoman Sumptuary Regime’, in Ottoman Costumes: From Textile to
Identity, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi and Christoph K Neumann (Istanbul: Eren, 2004), 125–42. On late Ottoman
discourses on consumption practices in the light of sumptuary regulation see Haris Exertzoglou, ‘The
Cultural Uses of Consumption: Negotiating Class, Gender and Nation in the Ottoman Urban Centers
During  the  19th  Century’,  International  Journal  of  Middle  East  Studies,  35,  no.  1  (2003):  77–101,
doi:10.1017.S0020743803000047. Ahmed Rasım provides in his 1908 article on the fez a description of
jewelled  fezzes,  taken from a number  of  Takvim-i  Vekayi  of  1831.  Ahmed Rasım,  ‘Fes  Hakkında’,
İstişare, no. 7 (Teşrin-i Evvel 1324 [October/November 1908]): 316–20.
146 It  seems the affair  had been initiated with a letter  send by Vecih Paşa,  Vali  of  Bosnia,  where he
requested if he and other “sincere persons (muḫlis)” could be honored by wearing the aforementioned
jeweled fez.
147 The official agent for business with the Ottoman government.
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this kind of fez. He explicitly links this kind of a fez to the matter of honor and pride, and
thus puts forward a certain concept of honor linked to the old order. The example shows
that for a short while and on certain occasions, the fez functioned within the old order of
power, of privilege, and sumptuary laws where luxury in dress was granted as a favor by
the sultan.
The  affair  had  been  initiated  by  the  fact  that  the  grand  vizier  donned  a  fez
decorated with jewels. How did the message spread to the provinces? Actually, this kind
of fez was to be reserved for ministers, but Vecih Bey wants to know if its use could be
extended to other “sincere persons (muḫliṣ).”148 In addition he asks if this fez could be
worn not just on holidays but also at meetings with “officials of foreign countries,”149 a
request that the sultan denied. However, the governor asks the kethüda to urge the grand
vizier to inquire regarding the sultan's opinion on the matter. Another one of his requests
is the reimbursement of the expenses spent for these fezzes. In his response, the sultan
agrees to that. The affair then ends with a letter by Vecih Paşa who praises the sultan for
admitting the wearing of the fez by certain officials on holidays.
Even if an example like this exists, the fez also functioned as a means to diminish
aristocratic  privileges.  It  can  be  related  to  the  birth  of  constitutionalist  ideas  in  the
Ottoman Empire, even though that might not have been the intention of an autocratic
'inventor.' As I will show later, the fez and the development of its form towards sobriety
and  simplicity  fitted  quite  well  into  notions  of  bourgeois  respectability  and  late
nineteenth conceptions of masculinity. As such, the fez helped to build up a new class
and a new structure of society. Subjects became related to each other and constituted
differently through the fez.
The mentioned, disputes about what could be attached to the fez and how the fez
was to be worn conditioned discussions in the first decades after the promulgation of the
new  dress  code.  After  that,  these  conflicts  about  jeweled  fezzes  and  these  fezzes
themselves disappeared. As far as the archival material that I have examined, the fez was
not explicitly the subject in conflicts about excessive consumption anymore, nor did it
imply  social  distinction.  It  was  instead  merely  used  to  negotiate  ethno-religious
distinctions and/or national identity.
148 BOA HAT 697/33640.
149 BOA HAT 697/33640.
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2.4.1 Resistance against the Fez?
In the archival  records I found no cases of  open resistance  or protest against the fez.
Other  authors  also  remarked  that  apparently  the  new  dress  code  including  the  fez
introduced by Mahmud II did not provoke a lot of open resistance. It was widely accepted
especially among the upper classes. Yet some opposed the new headgear.150 
Donald Quataert argues against the common assumption that rejection of the fez was
merely  religiously  motivated.151 Instead  he  locates  its  refusal  primarily  among  the
Ottoman  working  class  and  assesses  this  resistance  as  a  manifestation  of  a  distinct
working class culture, Muslim as well as non-Muslim.152 Quataert agrees that the popular
classes might have rejected the blurring of religious difference by the fez, but still offers
another explanation which regards opposition to the fez as a reaction towards Mahmud
II's free-trade economic politics. Worn by “Muslim and non-muslim bureaucrats and by
the non-Muslim merchants,”153 the fez represented by these politics expressed itself in
measures such as the attack on monopolistic privileges of the guilts and the signing of
the Anglo-Turkish Convention in 1838. According to Quataert, resistance against the fez
appeared in Istanbul as well as in the provinces.154 Quataert attributes the abandoning of
Mahmud II's plans to apply the new dress code to the wider populace to the success of
the popular resistance.155 Victoria Aksan depicts the situation quite differently when she
150 The statement  about  the absence of  resistance was made by Niyazi  Berkes as  noted by  Quataert,
‘Clothing  Laws,  State,  and  Society  in  the  Ottoman  Empire,  1720–1829,’ FN  75;  and  Berkes,  The
Development of Secularism in Turkey. 124-125. Quataert argues on the basis of either resistance to or
voluntary adoption of the fez. It would be interesting to scrutinize how during the reign of Mehmed II.
The fez reform was implemented, given that any sources existed to answer this question. See Quataert,
‘Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829,’ 404.
151 Quataert names Niyazi Berkes and İsmael Kara as advocates of this position. I rather understood Kara's
account as an analysis of the ulema's attitude towards the Hamidian regime and not as argument for
the  religious  character  of  their  political  attitudes  or  as  pure  anti-Westerization,  see  Berkes,  The
Development of Secularism in Turkey, 124; Ismael Kara, ‘Turban and Fez: Ulema as Opposition’, in Late
Ottoman Society -The Intellectual Legacy, ed. Elisabeth Özdalga, SOAS RoutledgeCurzon Studies on the
Middle East; 3 (London [u.a.]: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 162–200.
152 Quataert, ‘Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829,’ 414. On the abolition
of the janissaries and its anti-working class dimensions see Ibid., 404.
153 Quataert, ‘Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829,’ 414.
154 Ibid.,  416.  Quataert refers to Ömer Demirel and Adolphos Slade as a references for the existence of
resistance against the fez, see  Ömer Demirel, II. Mahmud Döneminde Sivas’ta Esnaf Teşkilâtı ve Üretim-
Tüketim Ilişkileri, Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları ; Kültür Eserleri Dizisi, 107. 136 (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı,
1989). 57, 89 and 81; and Adolphus Slade, Records of Travels in Turkey, Greece, [et]c. and of a Cruise in the
Black Sea, with the Capitan Pasha, in the Years 1829, 1830, and 1831 (London: Saunders and Otley, 1833).
155 On remarks regarding the wrapping of the fez see Koçu, Türk Giyim, Kuşam ve Süslenme Sözlüğü, 114;
he states that acceptance of the fez among lower classes rose when they were allowed to wrap the fez
with a cloth, while the military from then on just put on a plain fez. Does his remark contradict the
80
2 Ottoman Modernity and Bourgeois Culture: The Era of the Fez
assesses that the introduction of Western dress in the army was a “contested topic and
resisted on every level.”156 
2.4.2 The Fez and Ottoman Non-Muslims
The modernization of dress in the Ottoman Empire also meant a step towards the
transformation or dissolution of the Ottoman millet system as an important component of
Ottoman  social  and  political  organization.  Thus  questions  of  dress  were  also  a
negotiation of boundaries along religion and ethnicity.
The social organization of the Ottoman Empire is often referred to as the so-called
millet  system,  roughly  meaning  that  non-Muslim  religious  communities  exercised  a
certain autonomy in their social and political organization. This was more of a set of
arrangements rather then fixed administrative rules or structures. The term millet, which
can indicate religion, religious community or nation, had come to designate non-Muslim
Ottoman communities, mainly Christian-Orthodox, Armenian and Jewish, even though it
could also denote Christians outside of the Ottoman Empire or, as was sometimes after
the initiation of the nineteenth century reform period, also applied to Muslims.157
Christians and Jews within the Ottoman realm were regarded as “people of the book
(ehl-i kitap)” and therefore gained specific protection and social status within the Ottoman
Muslim order. They were granted protection by the Islamic authority and were able to deal
autonomous  in  civil  issues.  That  encompassed  education,  marriage,  divorce  and
inheritance, which were regarded as religious matters. The heads of the Ottoman non-
Muslim communities were the heads of their respective churches, such as in the instance of
the Orthodox patriarch, and the whole administration was done by church clergy.158 
supposition that Mahmud II's politics just aimed at the military and bureaucracy? Quataert also refers
to  Kocu's  statement:  “By  wearing  fezes  wrapped  in  a  wide  variety  of  fabrics,  workers  aimed  to
differentiate themselves from the Ottoman official classes, international merchants, and other laissez-
faire advocates who had so quickly adopted the plain fez. They spurned the path of emulation and
pursued that of identity solidarity. And as photographs of Ottoman workers make clear (Figures 4 and
5), many continued to do so for the remainder of the 19th century. These photographs also seem to
show that the headgear for Muslims and non-Muslims was the same; […].” Quataert, ‘Clothing Laws,
State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829,’ 417.
156 Virginia H. Aksan, ‘Who was an Ottoman? Reflections on “Wearing Hats” and ’Turning Turk’,  in
Europa und die Türkei im 18. Jahrhundert/ Europe and Turkey in the Eighteenth Century , ed. Barbara
Schmidt-Haberkamp (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, Bonn University Press, 2011), 305–18.
157 Ursinus,  M.O.H.,  ‘Millet’,  in  Encyclopaedia  of  Islam,  Second  Edition.,  ed.  Bearman,  Bianquis,  and
Bosworth, 2014.
158 Selçuk  Akşin  Somel,  ‘Christian  Community  Schools  during  the  Ottoman Reform  Period’,  in  Late
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In  the  Ottoman  Empire  dress  codes  had  been  an  important  instrument  of
differentiation along ethno-religious lines. Among other things, special emphasis was put
on the differentiation of Muslims and non-Muslims in their outward appearance along
color, forms of dress, and other features.159 Fatma Müge Göçek mentions a decree issued
in  1729  which  discusses  the  use  of  Jewish versus  Muslims turbans.  The  authorities
expressed concern on the wearing of so called Jewish turbans by Muslims and prohibited
this practice. The Ottoman government thus used turbans to keep up divisions between
religious groups and took care that these were not undermined by everyday practices.160
The decree directly addresses the producers of these turbans “'who have invented turbans
which  look,  Allah  forbid,  like  turbans  of  the  Jews  and  have  caused  sin  and  evil
consequences to many Muslims by mistake from making such turbans.”161 
Up until 1826 the Ottoman authorities demanded adherence to existing dress codes.
A document provided with  the  seal  of  a  person called Mustafa  […]162 requested  that
Ottoman non-Muslims163 would not wear colors, headpieces, and dress “peculiar to the
Muslim population,”164 such as putting on a “large kalpak (büyük ḳalpaḳ)” and wearing
the color black.165 If people did not follow these instructions they would be punished, and
an  imperial  decree  was  to  be  delivered  to  the  rum and  Armenian  patriarchies.  The
discussion about dress codes in the document is very closely related to submission of
non-Muslim subjects to Ottoman Muslims, and the adoption of Muslim dress is regarded
as  disrespectful.  The 1829 imperial  regulation abrogated this  old  order  of  established
dress codes and backed it up by new clothing regulations.
Ottoman Society -The Intellectual Legacy, ed. Elisabeth Özdalga (London: Routledge, 2005), 258.
159 For the development of Ottoman clothing laws before Mahmud II, their contents and their political and
social functions see Quataert, ‘Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829’. 
160 A distinct  Jewish headpiece  for  men in  the Ottoman Empire  was  called  boneta:  “this  was  a  dark
cylindrical hat widening slightly at the top; around its lower part was a small turban crossed above the
forehead.”  Esther Juhasz, ‘Jewish Dress in Central and Southwestern Asia and the Diaspora’, in Berg
Encyclopedia of World Dress and Fashion 5: Central and Southwest Asia, ed. Joanne B. Eicher and Gillian
Vogelsang-Eastwood,  vol.  5  (Oxford:  Berg,  2010), 39.  The  wearing  of  the  boneta ceased  with  the
introduction of the fez. Before Mahmud II's dress reform the  boneta was the main characteristic of
differentiation, since Ottoman Jewish dress in general resembled local varieties and otherwise “tended
to follow Ottoman urban dress styles,” besides specific colors and shoes. See Ibid., 47.
161 Taken from  Aḥmad Aḥmad Rafīq,  Hicrî on Ikinci Asırda Istanbul Hayatı <1100-1200> ;  Ahmet Refik,
Türk Tarih Encümeni Külliyatı / Türk Tarih Encümeni. - İstanbul, 1925 17 (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası,
1930), 86-88, 103-4 as cited in Göçek, Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire, 39.
162 The rest of the name illegible, see BOA Cevdet Dahiliye (C.DH.) 206/10290. 
163 “ehl-i ẕimmet reʿāyā ṭā'ifası, BOA C.DH. 206/10290. 
164 “ehl-i islāma maḫṣūṣ,” BOA C.DH. 206/10290. 
165 BOA C.DH. 206/10290.
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A document from 1844 indicates that the fez became an important yet controversial
element  in  the  relations  between  Ottoman  communities.166 In  the  central  Anatolian
district of Kayseri, a person denoted as an Armenian kocabaşı,167 a non-Muslim (zimmī)
member of the district council called Azerioğlu Serkiz, was honored for his achievements
with a special badge to be attached to his fez, to be manufactured in the imperial mint.
That  incidence  provides  hints  to  the  spread  of  the  fez  and  its  use  in  the  Ottoman
provinces  by  local  administrators.  In  this  case  it  not  only marked  a  certain equality
among different  Ottoman groups,  but  also emphasized special  merits  achieved by an
Armenian subject. Yet a conflict seems to have risen around this matter. There obviously
had been worries that complaints against this  decoration or even attacks against the
kocabaşı might appear, especially from among the other members of the local council.
The Armenian patriarch had expressed worries about attacks against Azerioğlu Serkiz as
becomes apparent from the letter sent by the grand vizier to the head of the district of
Kayseri (ḳā’immaḳām). There the grand vizier demanded protection for Azerioğlu Serkiz
from the ḳā’immaḳām.
The significance of the Azerioğlu Serkiz decoration might have been part of a more
general effort to win over local notables on one hand, and to constrain their power by
state centralization on the other hand, for instance through the establishment of local
administrative councils.
A similar case of contradictions between central state orders and reactions of local
population regarding dress codes and the equality of Ottoman Muslims and non-Muslims
appeared in 1853 in the provincial district of Gördes, a part of the province of Manisa in
Western Anatalia.168 The case is documented in two different letters: One is a petition in
the  Greek  language  and  letters  sent  by  the  Greek  Orthodox  community  to  a  Greek
Orthodox religious authority.169 The other document carries the seal of the ecumenical
166 BOA HR.MKT. 7/34.
167 Kocabaşı before the  Tanzimat reforms meant  muhtar [municipal administrator] and also carries the
meaning of “millet başı [community leader],” see entry 'Kocabaşı' in  Mehmet Zeki Pakalın,  Osmanlı
Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü, [2. basılış]. (Istanbul: Millî Eğitim Basımevi, 1971), 285; and Kemal
H. Karpat, ‘Millets and Nationality:  The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-
Ottoman Period’, in Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays, ed.
Kemal H. Karpat, Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 618.
168 diocese of Philadelphia
169 Thanks a lot to Paris Papamichos Chronakis for providing me with a summary of the Greek text of the
petition included in the documents of  BOA MVL 261/39.
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Patriarch in Istanbul  Germanus IV (1852–1853),170 sent by him to the Supreme Council
(meclis-i vala)171 at the Ottoman court,  written on the behalf of the local Christians and
their complaints.
A group of Greek Orthodox families had sent the petition in Greek language, dated
July 22nd, 1853, to complain about the violation of their rights by Muslim inhabitants of
Gördes.172 They had been exposed to cruel attacks by the Muslims, were asked by them
why they wore a fez and why they still celebrated Christian holidays. The Greek Orthodox
inhabitants complained that their “Ottoman neighbors”173 have for the past two months
been  harassing  them.  The  Muslims,  they  complain,  had  called  them  “cuckolds”,
“pezevekides” and “infidels (giaour)”.174 The Muslim Ottomans had also occasionally beaten
up Greek Orthodox persons at the market. Several other incidents are mentioned. All this
took place, the petitioners remark, while the Sultan issued favorable and positive orders for
the  Greek  Orthodox.  How  can  we,  they  wonder,  respect  the  royal  orders  when  our
Ottoman neighbors harass us, asking “why do you infidels wear a fez?”175 The petition
concludes by requesting the religious authority and the Holy Synod to intervene. 
This case and the case of Azerioğlu Serkiz show that the adoption of the fez by
Ottoman  non-Muslims  was  supported  by  the  central  government,  yet  it  provoked
sometimes resistance by the local population, in the streets as well as among members of
administrative bodies. While the Greek Orthodox in Gördes were willing to wear the fez,
they did not consider themselves Ottoman, denoting only the Muslims which attacked
them as such. In his letter to the Supreme Council, the Patriarch does not adopt the terms
used by the Greek Orthodox authors of the petition and speaks of the Muslim population
(ahāli-yi  İslām)  and  the  reʿāyā (flock),  a  term  often  applied  to  non-Muslim  Ottoman
subjects. Since the Patriach is located in Istanbul, I want to suggest that he speaks the
language of the center which has somewhat different concepts of identity. At that time
they  attempted  to  include  non-Muslims  into  the  meaning  of  Ottoman,  which  the
population in Gördüs - Muslim as well as Greek-Orthodox - obviously did not, even though
170 “Germanos patrik-i millet-i rum(dur(?)) ve Istanbul ve memālik-i maḥrūse.” BOA MVL 261/39.
171 A legislative council established in 1839, located at Ottoman court. See Stanford J. Shaw, ‘The Central
Legislative Councils in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Reform Movement Before 1876’, International
Journal of Middle East Studies 1, no. 1 (January 1970): 51–84, doi:10.1017/S0020743800023904.
172 BOA MVL 261/39.
173 BOA MVL 261/39.
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid. 
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the rum claimed this identity through wearing of the fez.
This is similar to the case of Azerioğlu Serkiz, who was awarded by the central state
for his merits in the service of the state. Similar to the eucomenical, this time the Armenian
Patriarch had to intervene in order to protect a ẕimmī from reactions to a measure of the
central government, that had granted him a privilege related to the wearing of the fez. The
granting of this decoration might have be linked to the emergence of a new middle class, as
assessed  by  Karpat;  the  Armenian  kocabaşı, as an equivalent  to  the  newly  emerging
Muslim local powers that he referred to.176 
Here we can see how modernization measures such as the wearing of the fez and the
reorganization of provincial administration interacted with each other as well as with the
complex relations between different Ottoman social groups. The fez here added completely
new dimensions to these relations, as a sign of reconstitution of state-subject relations as
well  as  relations  among  the  population  itself.  Notions  such  as  Westernization  or
Europeanization are not able to grasp this situation, because this concerns modernization
in a more general  way,  as  a new form of  power,  rather  then the adoption of  certain
practices and items from western Europe. The fez as it is used in this way is also not an
item  of  Ottoman  traditional  culture  but  used  very  differently,  namely  to  reorganize
Ottoman society. Important here is that the fez functions as a reference to the national as
well  as to the modern at  the same time, that is  why it was particularly contested,  in
contrast to other modern items of dress that do not appear in the sources at all. That leads
me back to my introductory remarks on postcolonial study, because the relevance of the
fez can only be understood in relation to the global ramifications of European colonialism
and postcolonial  nationalism,  such as  Ottomanism,  that  resulted  from it.  The fez  also
attained its specific meaning within this colonial setting, but again, not just as an item of
Ottoman particularity, but also of global modernity.
176 See Karpat, ‘Transformation of the Ottoman State,’ 66.
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In 1876 the first Ottoman constitution was introduced and a parliament established.
This is regarded as the accomplishment of Young Ottoman intellectuals and state elites,
who were motivated by their resentment against the Tanzimat reform edicts of 1839 and
1856.1 These  thinkers  argued  that  the  reforms  were  only  introduced  due  to  foreign
pressure.  At  the same time,  they propagated reforms that  – in their  eyes  – were to
protect Ottoman interests. This first constitutional period did not last long. Already in
February 1878 Sultan Abdülhamid II suspended the constitution and the parliament to
establish an autocratic regime. 
The  period of the reign of Abdülhamid II. (1876-1909), saw massive economic and
social  change,  and  was  politically  marked  by  the  Ottoman-Russian  war  of  1877/78,
followed by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 where peace conditions were set. 2 As a result of
the war, the Ottoman Empire lost most of its European possessions and a large portion of
its Christian population. Serbia, Montenegro and Romania became independent states.
The conference in Berlin was a demonstration of European power, where the drawing of
borders and the creation of states were decided upon. In 1876 the Ottoman state had
declared  bankruptcy,  which  was  followed  by  the  installation  of  the  Public  Debt
Administration in 1881. Ottoman financial autonomy was thereby handed to foreign debt
holders  who administered from then on Ottoman state revenues.  In  general,  the last
decades of the nineteenth century were a period of administrative, cultural, and financial
reorganization, which saw the Ottoman Empire lose most of its European possessions as
well as its financial autonomy.3
As a consequence of the political situation, the politics of dress during that period
attempted to reinforce the integrity of the Empire. I am going to show how the political
1 See  Şerif  Mardin,  The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish
Political Ideas (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1962).
2 See Carter V. Findley,  Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789 – 2007 (New Haven
[u.a.]: Yale Univ. Press, 2010).
3 The Treaty of Berlin reversed some of the condition set in the San Stefano Treaty of March 3, 1878
restricting Russian advances, see  Isa Blumi,  Reinstating the Ottomans: Alternative Balkan Modernities,
1800-1912,  1st  ed.  (New  York:  Palgrave  Macmillan,  2011),  95-97; “Ottoman  reform  and  European
imperialism,  1839–1907”  in  Joel  Beinin,  Workers  and  Peasants  in  the  Modern  Middle  East,  The
Contemporary  Middle  East.  -  Cambridge  [u.a.] :  Cambridge  Univ.  Press,  2001-  2  (Cambridge  [u.a.]:
Cambridge  Univ.  Press,  2001), 44-70;  Murat  Birdal,  The  Political  Economy of  Ottoman Public  Debt:
Insolvency  and  European  Financial  Control  in  the  Late  Nineteenth  Century  (London  [et  al.]:  Tauris
Academic  Studies,  2010); 'The  Reign  of  Abdülhamid'  in  Findley,  Turkey,  Islam,  Nationalism,  and
Modernity, 33-191.
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situation reflected on the level of the politics of dress.  A well-known example is the
Hamidian government's attempts to prevent Ottoman subjects who stayed abroad from
wearing hats.  Sometimes used as  a disguise from Ottoman spies, it  was in generally
judged as an act of disloyalty to the Hamidian regime. Thus in the 1880s  several attempts
were made to prevent Ottoman subjects from wearing hats when they stayed abroad.4 
1889 and onwards saw the foundation and rise of the constitutionalist Young Turk
movement in opposition to Abdülhamid II's reign, as successors of the first generation of
Young  Ottoman  reformers.5 In  contrast  to  the  promotion  of  Ottoman  multi-ethnic
identities during this period  by  the central state and other actors, emphasis  of political
movements  partly  shifted to ethnic  nationalism.  The influence of  ethnic nationalism,
however, should not be overrated and a-historically projected backwards. In spite of the
independence of a number of Balkan states, the impact of ethnic nationalism among the
Ottoman elite was still limited. Isa Blumi treats the generation of the Young Ottomans as
characteristic of this late Ottoman phenomenon: “This would prove especially true with
the rise of the Young Ottoman generation, a cohort at once loyal to their communities or
origin and to the Ottoman state in which these communities participated.6” In his view,
the newly founded states in the Balkans were much more intermingled with the Ottoman
experience and policy as was commonly admitted. 
According to Selim Deringil's study, one of the main characteristics of the period
was the culmination of a legitimacy crisis which had begun with the reign of Mahmud II.7
Deringil points to the critical aspects the period had for the legitimation of power, and he
describes it as both “formative and disruptive, both creative and destructive.”8 Formative
in the sense that different forms of infrastructure - from educational to industrial - were
established during the era, as well as a normative order disruptive of the former “fabric of
society.” Deringil claims that passive obedience was replaced by a claim of conformity to
this normative order. I think the phenomena I am tackling with in this chapter are an
4 BOA  İ.HUS 27/1312M-102; BOA Y.A.RES. 71/27; BOA İ.DH. 979/77308. On the case see also  Cevdet
Kırpık, ‘Fez - Şapka Çatışması’, Toplumsal Tarih, no. 162 (September 2007), 14.
5 See  Mehmed  Şükrü  Hanioğlu,  A  Brief  History  of  the  Late  Ottoman  Empire  (Princeton,  NJ  [u.a.]:
Princeton Univ. Press, 2008), 109– 118; see also  Erik J.  Zürcher,  Turkey: A Modern History  (London:
Tauris, 1997), 85-90.
6 Isa  Blumi,  Foundations  of  Modernity:  Human  Agency  and  the  Imperial  State,  Routledge  Studies  in
Modern History 9 (New York [u.a.]: Routledge, 2012), 44.
7 See Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman
Empire 1876 - 1909 (London: Tauris, 1998), 8.
8 Ibid., 11.
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expression of these endeavors.
Among other things the Ottoman government and administration countered the
precarious situation on the Ottoman borders and of the Ottoman state's sovereignty and
its own crisis of legitimacy by measures to strengthen Ottoman identity. In the following
I analyze a number of cases of Ottoman politics of dress, or more specifically headgear,
and  demonstrate how these where applied to  construct identities  and draw borders  by
negotiating  both  interdependently. The  first  case indicates  how  these  politics  were
carried out  it  in  agreements  with foreign companies  which invested in the Ottoman
Empire and regulated their employment politics. 
My  analysis  is  guided  by  the  following  questions:  what  kind  of  identities  and
subjectivities these interventions seek to produce? What kind of activities of its subjects
the Ottoman provincial or central administration regarded as problematic? and finally -
what kind of interests and agency become visible on side of the individuals or subjects
who are targeted by these state interventions?
3.1 Headgear of Employees of Foreign Companies in the Ottoman 
Empire
In  September  1887  (1303)  the  Ottoman  state  reorganized  the  granting  of
concessions to foreign companies concerning dress and citizenship of their employees.9
These  regulations  coincided  with  the  first  wave  of  direct  foreign  investment  in  the
Ottoman  Empire,  which  occurred  between  1888-1896.10 The  government  requested  a
survey on the kind of dress worn by employees of these companies, since such reports
would  not  exist  yet.  The  companies  specifically  targeted,  were  the  Rumeli Railway
company and the company for the supply of water in Istanbul.11 It had been observed that
all of their employees donned hats.12 Both companies, as proceeds from the minutes  of
9 BOA MV. 24/36; BOA DH.MKT. 1451/63.
10 Zürcher, Turkey, 84-85.
11 Two thirds of this investment of foreign capital was in railways, see Ibid., 85.
12 This situation is nicely documented in a photograph taken 1891 at the construction site of the railway
from Istanbul to Ankara, constructed by the Ottoman Anatolian Railway Company, which had been
established by the Deutsche Bank.  Students  of  the  Military  Academia visit  the  sites.  Many of  the
workers depicted wore hats, most of them brimmed felt hats, some also peeked caps (on the margins of
the  picture  some persons'  crumbled  fezzes  and turbans  appear,  it  isn't  clear  if  they were  railway
workers, too), see  Engin Özendes,  Photography in the Ottoman Empire: 1839 - 1923, 1st ed., (İstanbul:
YEM Yayın, 2013), 230-231.
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the Council  of  Ministers,13 had mostly foreign employees and in addition many non-
Muslim Ottoman employees. The practice of wearing hats would lower the chance for
Ottoman Muslims to get employed and earn a living. Thus the Ottoman state wanted to
link the granting of concessions to foreign companies to the preservation of the Ottoman
dress code and imposed the wearing of the fez obligatory for all employees of foreign
companies, regardless if they were Ottoman citizens or not. The contract of the water
supplier  was  to  be  reworked  according  to  the  new measures.14 Exempted  from both
prescriptions, Ottoman citizenship and the wearing of the fez, were  memurin-i feniyye,
foreign engineers, and experts employed by the Ottoman government, who secured the
transfer and implementation of imported technologies from European countries.15
As Cevdet Kırpık, who dealt with these cases in his study on labour in the Ottoman
Empire, shows that the decision made by the Council of Ministers was implemented in
the following years.16 Concessions granted to foreign companies now contained clauses
that  stated  that  besides  engineers,  experts  and  management,  all  workers  had  to  be
Ottoman citizens, even though the implementation of these restrictions wasn't always
achieved.17 Kırpık remarked that next to purpose of securing employment opportunities
for Ottoman Muslim workers,18 another dimension of the obligatory wearing of the fez
was to secure national sovereignty on a symbolic level.
The Ottoman government attempted to regain or preserve economic and political
control  through  this  intervention  in  the  politics  of  dress.  Concessions  to  foreign
companies  were  only  granted  if  they respected this  symbol  of Ottoman sovereignty.
Their economic activity on Ottoman territory should not give them political power. If
employees of the respective companies wore the hat, they would be shifted to European
control. They were on a certain level no longer Ottoman subjects and citizens but under
the authority of the states to which the companies belonged
This is also an example which allows us to elaborate on the meaning of the hat
which  carries here the dimension of foreign investment and the Ottomans' ambivalent
13 The principle executive and legislative council of the Ottoman Empire introduced by Mahmud II.
14 BOA DH.MKT. 1451/63.
15 See Cevdet Kırpık, ‘Osmanlı Devleti’nde İşçiler ve İşçi Hareketleri (1876-1914)’, (unpublished doctoral
thesis, Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2004), 48.
16 Ibid., 48.
17 In some concessions this was further restricted to just engineers; on the obligation to wear the fez see
Ibid., 65-69; and on clauses regulating the employment of Ottoman workers Ibid., 166.
18 Kırpık, ‘Osmanlı Devleti’nde İşçiler ve İşçi Hareketleri (1876-1914),’ 65.
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attitude towards it.19 It  also becomes apparent that the religious dimension cannot be
separated from it. Thus the restriction of Ottoman sovereignty and its economic power is
symbolized by the wearing of the hat of the employees of foreign companies who are
mostly Christians.20 While the Ottoman state was not interested in preventing foreign
investment, quite the opposite, it sought to set the conditions.21 But the European hat was
thereby not just a symbol of the intrusion of European capital but also its counterpart,
the European workers movement.
Besides  the  creation  of  employment  opportunities  for  the  Ottoman workforces,
apparently  the  Ottoman authorities  feared  the  spread  of  socialist  ideas  by  European
anarchist  workers.22 Thus the employment of  Ottoman workers  was also meant  as  a
measure to prevent strikes and other forms of workers' resistance. Hence in regards to
Westernization,  what  the  Ottoman  state  supported  was  the  import  of  European
technologies of power for its own purpose, and the conscious and active fight against
ideas that question authority and which could be of use to the Ottoman population. The
same  question  also  delimited  equal  treatment  of  Ottoman  Muslim  and  non-Muslim
workers.  Non-Muslim  Ottoman  workers  seem  to  have  been  more  active  in  union
activities together with foreign workers, and on that account have been dismissed from
their workplaces. 
The wearing of the hat by engineers was not regarded as dangerous as it was for
the workers. It shows that from the Ottoman perspective, one hat was not like the other.
On one hand, the hat of the engineers and other experts was tolerated because of the
need  and  desire  of  the  transfer  of  technology  and  knowledge,  which  the  Ottomans
deemed necessary. On the other hand, the hat of the workers and their radical/critical
ideas had to be kept out. It depends on which kind of hat and who wears it, because it
19 While  the  Ottoman  government  favored  foreign  investment,  its  terms  were  set  to  Ottoman
disadvantage;  see  Findley,  Turkey,  Islam, Nationalism,  and Modernity,  139;  and  Şevket Pamuk,  The
Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987).
20 Foreign  investment  came  along  with  a  colonialist  division  labor,  where  companies  were  run  by
Europeans, the middle management consisted of Europeans and Ottoman Christians, and most of the
laborers were Muslim Ottomans, see Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity, 168.
21 Yet, that was a difficult task because due to the capitulations Europeans in the Ottoman Empire were
exempted from Ottoman Law. See  Ibid.,  139.  In addition,  European companies  negotiated in these
concessions for extremely favorable conditions for themselves. One example of such was the building
of railways, where a kilometer guarantee payment was granted to them, thereby eliminating almost all
risks for the investors. See Zürcher, Turkey, 85. 
22 See Kırpık, ‘Osmanlı Devleti’nde İşçiler ve İşçi Hareketleri (1876-1914),’ 70 and Findley, Turkey, Islam,
Nationalism, and Modernity, 168.
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can be assumed that the workers' hats were not the same as those of the engineers. 
Thus  the  rift  constructed  by  the  hat  was  not  just  along  religious  lines;  it  also
pointed at  the question of  class.  The hat  was regarded a threat not  only to national
sovereignty but  also as  a  threat  from the lower classes who questioned the claim to
power/privileges of the ruling class.23
3.2 Fez-Wearing Obligation for Ottoman Christians
The next case I am going to treat took place in 1894. It is significant because the
documents on this incident contain an imperial decree which regulated the headgear of
all Ottoman Christians no matter of their official function.24 It is an effort to include the
wider population  beyond official  ranks  into  legislation on headgear.  Thus it  provides
evidence of the effort of the Hamidian government to make the fez obligatory for the
entire Ottoman population.
The affair appears first on July 14th, 1894 via an imperial decree signed by the chief
clerk (serkātib)  of  the  imperial  scribal  office.  It  contains  a  report that some Ottoman
Christian subjects donned a hat, which was declared unacceptable because the fez was
the  common  attire  of  all  Ottomans.  Via  this  order  Abdülhamid  II  requests  that  the
Council of Minister's released a “serious decision”25 to order all Christians belonging to
the Ottoman citizenry to wear the fez “under any circumstances.”26 
This  request  was  implemented  two weeks  later  when the  Council  of  Ministers
issued a decision on the case which reveals more details on the issue.27 The ministers
confirm that the fez was the “official distinguished sign of all subjects of the sublime
23 Mahmud  Muin  mentions  the  granting  of  concessions  to  foreign  companies  that  contained  the
condition that their employers wore the fez in his 1908 article in Donanma 'Our national headpiece and
Fezzes.' I analyze this article in Chapter Five. See Mahmud Muin, 'Serpūş-ı Millimiz ve Fesler [Our
National Hat and the Fezzes],' Donanma (1 Temmuz 1326 (July 14th, 1910), 396-402.
24 BOA Y.A.RES 27/7 consist of two documents, one issued by the Council of Ministers, the other by the
Grand Vizier;  BOA İrade Hususi  (İ.HUS.)  1312/M-102/27,  July  6 th,  1894.  For  this  genre  of  imperial
decrees  (irade)  see  Yusuf  Sarınay  and  Yusuf  İhsan  Genç,  Başbakanlık  Osmanlı  Arşivi  Rehberi,
genişletilmiş  3.  baskı.,  Osmanlı  Arşivi  Daire  Başkanlığı   (İstanbul:  T.  C.  Başkanlık  Devlet  Arşivleri
Genel Müdürlüğü, 2010), 300. 
25 “ciddī bir ḳarār”,  BOA İ.HUS. 1312/M-102/27, July 6th, 1894.
26 “tābiʿyyetlerini-i  ossmāniyyeyi hā'iz olan bi'l-cümle hiristiyanlarin dahi bi'eyyi  ḥāl fes iktisā eylemeleri
żımnında,”  İrade Hususi, BOA İ.HUS. 1312/M-102/27, July 6th, 1894.
27 The same file contains a letter by the Grand Vizier which presents the template of the imperial decree
drafted by the council to the sultan, see BOA Y.A.RES 27/71.
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state.”28 The ministers claim that “the necessity for all Ottoman subjects to wear the fez is
caused by servility  and loyalty  [...]),29 and specifically for  its  Christian members “the
Christian subjects who know their duties which consist of an oath of fidelity, significant
parts of the population, adorn their servility always with the fez.”30 The fez was a sign of
those who those were proud to belong to the citizenry of the Ottoman Empire. 
The decree, however, is not confined to the Ottoman citizenry and is addressed in
the next step to Christian state officials who donned the brimmed hat, and the same time
to foreign state officials who resided in the Ottoman Empire.  Both groups received an
admonishments to wear the fez instead, and were threatened to be expelled from their
positions if they would not follow this request. Another group that was addressed were
Ottoman merchants who wore a hat. The document claims that they should wear the fez
when they applied to the state departments. This would be judged as a demonstration of
their devotion to the Ottoman state, and be favored and supported by the ministers they
applied to. 
These documents show that the Ottoman government undertook efforts to force all
Ottoman subjects,  and specifically  Christians,  to wear the fez.  In these  endeavors all
Ottoman  Christians  in  general  are  addressed,  i.e.  there  is  no  distinction  between
Armenians and Greek Orthodox. Yet as the second part of the document indicates, the
government addresses some groups - the mentioned state officials and merchants - more
explicitly. Still, there is no further information in the documents on the identity of these
people and what prompted the sultan to initiate such a decree at that moment.
From the perspective of the Ottoman government,  the fez was not an exclusive
(Ottoman) Muslim garment, as usually perceived by outsiders. It seems that the fez had a
twofold meaning. As it was embraced and adopted by many Ottoman Christians, it might
have had the meaning of participation and citizenship. We do not know to which extent
its refusal can be related to a defiance of Ottoman identity and state or protest against
Muslim hegemony.
What might have been the political background of this legislation on the fez?
1894 was the year of the beginning of the Armenian crisis, with several Armenian
28 ”umūm tebaʿa-i devlet-i ʿaliyye içün alāmet-i fāriḳa,” BOA Y.A.RES 27/71, document a) line 1-2.
29 “tebaʿa  ossmāniyyenin ʿumūmiyetle fez giymeleri levāzım ʿubūdiyyet ve  ṣadāḳātdan olması  […],”  BOA
Y.A.RES 27/71, document a) line 4.
30 ”tebaʿa hiristiyaniyyeden ʿuhde-yi  ṣadaḳata terettüb eden vezā'if-i maḫṣūṣeyi bilen bir çoḳ ḥalḳ mefāriḳ
ʿubūdiyyetini hemīşe fes ile tezyin etmekde olub,” BOA Y.A.RES 27/71, document a) line 4-5.
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uprisings and massacres against the Armenian population.31 The Hamidian regime felt
threatened from within and without. It was unpopular within and outside the Ottoman
Empire.  Even though Abdülhamid  II.  received  backing by  great  parts  of  the  Muslim
population, he was opposed by the relevant parts of the Ottoman elite. Thus opposition
was rising in the following years,  and it  attempted a coup d'etat  in September  1896,
which was thwarted before its accomplishment.32 The decree which is introduced above
probably stood in relation to the tense internal situation which tragically culminated in
the Armenian massacres between 1894-1896. It  appears that Abdülhamid II  sought to
secure the loyalty of his subjects through the conformity of dress and  compensate the
crisis  of  legitimacy,  as  it  was  analyzed  by  Selim  Deringil,  amongst  other  measures,
through the affirmation of common identity of all Ottoman citizens.33
3.3 Outlawed Variations of the Fez
Although Ottoman policies advocated and sometimes enforced the wearing of the
fez by Ottoman Christians,  contrary positions existed as well  and interventions were
made to prevent them from doing so.34 Yet the proponents of such an agenda remain
unclear. In spring 1899 (1315) unknown authors claimed that the fez was a Muslim item
and complained  about  Ottoman Christians  using it.  More  precisely,  they  complained
about the way Ottoman non-Muslim appropriated or used the fez. The author accused
locals Christians and especially Armenians of wrapping a slim veil (tül) around their fez
as a sign of grief, and some of them of even wearing a black fez with a short and slim veil
wrapped around it as sign of community affiliation. They argue that the original shape
and appearance of the fez must not be changed because it was Muslim, meaning it should
not be changed by non-Muslims. At the same time the author(s) of the document criticize
the similar appearance (müşabehat) of Muslims and non-Muslims, and request a decree
which outlawed the described style of fezzes. Providing more details about the mentioned
31 See  Findley,  Turkey,  Islam,  Nationalism,  and  Modernity,  142;  and  Zürcher,  Turkey,  94.  In  1896  an
Armenian group seized the headquarters of the European owned Ottoman Bank, threatening to blow it
up. Thus unleashed reprisals on the Armenian population in Istanbul, where up to 8000 Armenians
were massacred.
32 Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity, 144.
33 See Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains.
34 BOA Y.PRK.BŞK 56/81; the exact dating of the document is uncertain. The year 1889 is provided by the
archival classification but not on the document itself. 
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fez, they contend that people had begun to wear this kind of fez in the last days of Sultan
Abdülaziz's  reign  (1861-1876),  and  that  it  had  been  outlawed  already  back  then.
Nevertheless people continued to wear it  and thus they claim that  the  banning of  it
should be reinforced. This would designate the people wearing the fezzes as merchants
(carşılı). Even though the document does not carry a date, a recipient, or a signature, it
can be attributed to the reign of  Abdülhamid II  because it  belongs to a collection of
documents which had been presented to him or his scribes.35 
There is no further information about if the case was treated or any decision taken.
Still,  it is an interesting and revealing case about the adoption of the fez by different
groups within Ottoman society as well as the surveillance executed about the proper use
of  the  fez.  As  in  other  cases,  it  is  obvious  that  the  fez  was  treated  differently  in
accordance with the situation. While Ottoman authorities desired the adoption of the fez
by Ottoman  Christians, they also set the terms,  as the banning of the wrapped fez by
Abdülaziz I and the claim for its renewal treated show. 
The following year, in April 1899, another kind of black fez appeared as a target of
state  interventions.36 At  the  time artisans produced  a  kind  of  fez,  as  a  report  of  the
Ministry of  Interior says, that did “not suit those wearing it.”37 It was a black fez lined
with a silken cloth and a short tassel and it resembled, the report continues, and as kind
of headpiece that resembled those “some foreigners use in their bedrooms and lounges
[or recreation rooms],”38 its use was not compatible with Islamic customs. The Ministry
of Interior informs the security forces of the city of Istanbul and the Ministry of Police
that the production and wearing of the mentioned fez was prohibited. It says that all
provinces and state offices will  be informed about the prohibition of this fez and the
security forces were instructed undertake necessary measures. 
The last two examples show that efforts were undertaken to produce a uniform
appearance of  all  Ottoman citizens through the fez.  It  was therefore  not just  a local
matter, but one of the whole Empire as an effort to create unity, even though it can be
doubted how far reaching these measures were.
35 Yıldız Perakende Evrakı, Sarınay and Genç, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi, 342.
36 BOA DH.MKT. 2192/36, 2 Nişan 1315 (April 18th, 1899).
37 “iktisā edenlerin simālarına yakışmamak,” BOA DH.MKT. 2192/36, line 2.
38 “baʿzı ecānibi yatak otalarında ve teneffüs maḥallerinda istimāl eyledikleri,”  BOA DH.MKT. 2192/36.
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3.4 Sanctions against Unauthorized Muslim Dress
A rare case of state intervention in the wearing of Islamic dress appeared in June
1893.39 The  cook  (başaşcısı)  of  the  Austrian  embassy,  called  Bokayis,  presumably  a
Christian, was seen in the streets wearing a white turban, a long antari and a vest (hırka).
He had walked, dressed like this, through the market in Büyükdere, a quarter in Istanbul,
visiting stores and pubs. Employers of the municipality saw him like this and prohibited
this kind of appearance, and made him to remove his turban. According to the records of
the municipality, he was not allowed to wear these clothes, as they were  reserved for
Muslims. Even though Bokayis religious affiliation is not mentioned, it is obvious that he
was non-Muslim, since the reasoning to ban his wearing of these clothes was grounded
on this.40 The municipality  of Istanbul blames  him  of exposing himself to public view
with a dress that is specific to Islam.41 The incident is reported through a document sent
by the municipality to the imperial scribal office at the  Yıldız Palace, the residence of
Abdülhamid II.
3.5 Hats On- and Off-Stage
Besides the Ottoman government's and administration's endeavors to prevent the
use and spread of the brimmed hat by powers perceived as foreign, Ottoman subjects
adopted the hat voluntarily. Thus they became the target of repressive measures on the
sides  of  the  state.  An  early  case  appears  in  august  1889  and  documents  a  stage
performance.42 The records of the Ministry of the Interior contain a report sent to the
Ministry of Police consisting of a complaint about Muslim actors' style of beard (“half
beard (yarım sakal)”) and the wearing of hats in the theater. The report says that the
authorities  in  charge  were  informed  about  the  ban  of  this  practice  which  had  been
enacted, because wearing the hat was illegal in Islam. The wearing of the hats on stage,
according to the author of the document, had received attention among the population
39 BOA Y.PRK.ŞH 4/41. 2 Haziran 1309 (Juni 14th, 1893).
40 The documents  to not  mention if  Bokayis  was an Ottoman or  Austrian citizen.  In earlier  periods
visitors to the Ottoman Empire from Europe or elsewhere had to retain their dress worn at home, only
when they traveled they could done Muslim dress for protection. Since the appearance of modern dress
in the Ottoman Empire, that did not matter anymore.
41 “Islāma maḫṣūṣ bir kiyāfetle kendisini teşhīrde”, BOA Y.PRK.ŞH 4/41, line 3.
42 BOA DH.MKT. 1648/134, 5 Ağustos 1305 (August 17th, 1889).
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and rumors  about  the  actor's  courage  to  do such  a  thing had  began to  spread.  The
municipality  of  Istanbul  also had been informed,  and it  ascribed quite  an amount of
importance to the matter, according to the author.43 During the entire description of the
affair neither the location or name of theater nor the name of the play performed on
stage  are  mentioned.  From  that  I  conclude  that  neither  the  play  nor  the  stage
performance or the theater as an institution became attacked, only the appearance of the
mentioned  actors.  A  reference  to  Ottoman identity  is  missing in  the  document.  The
actors are just denoted as Muslim, and the frame of reference of the critique of their
appearance is also Islam.
I  will  continue with another  document,  also from the Hamidian Era but  issued
almost two decades later. In this case, the hat is not on stage but donned by a person in
the audience of a play staged in a hostel.
3.5.1 The Case of Ezine Orman Katibi Mehmed Efendi
In June 1907, after he had been reported of donning a hat while watching a theater
play, an Ottoman official, Mehmed Efendi, a scribe at the state forestry administration
(orman katibi)  got into trouble.  Subsequently  he got  arrested and dismissed from his
office.44 The case took place in the district  Ezine in the Marmara region,  part  of  the
historical  Province  of  the  Archipelago  (Vilâyet-i  Cezair-i  Bahr-i  Sefid) and  the
contemporary province of Çanakkale. It is recorded in an exchange of letters between the
Grand Vizier  and the ministry of the Interior,  as well  as the interrogation records of
witnesses who had been questioned on the case.  Mehmed Efendi had filed a petition in
order to retain his office, and the whole procedure had been passed on by the head of the
district (kā’immakām) to the central government for them to decide if the matter should
be entrusted to a court or rather dealt with administration internally.45 
The scene took place at the hostel where Mehmed Efendi lived and at he same time
the theater play was staged.46 The men interrogated on the case were Rasım bin Mustafa
43 On the tasks and composition of the Istanbul municipality see  Kemal H. Karpat,  Studies on Turkish
Politics and Society: Selected Articles and Essays,  Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle
East. - Leiden : Brill, 1971- 94 (Leiden [u.a.]: Brill, 2004), 286-287.
44 BOA BEO 3109/233116.
45 BOA BEO 3109/233116, June 4th, 1907. The seal is illegible.
46 According to the records reporting on the case the owner of the ḫān was Arslan Efendi, son of Yaşar
Aġa, others say the owner was Yaşar Aġa himself.
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Efendi,47 a reserve head sergeant (redif serçavuşu), Arslan Efendi, son of of the owner of
the hostel, a person called Ibrahim,  then Aşıkzade Rüşdi Efendi, officer  at the financial
administration, Süleyman Efendi, son in law of financial inspector Osman Nuri, and the
kahveci (coffee maker) İsmael Çavuş (sergeant).
Rasım bin Mustafa Efendi, when asked to describe the scene and if he saw Mehmed
Efendi wearing a hat, he testifies that he had seen Mehmed Efendi wearing a night gown
and the mentioned hat.48 He desginated the mentioned hat as “rum şapkası”, literally an
Ottoman Greek Orthodox hat. During the play, that he watched with his friends, he had
heard people say, that Mehmed Efendi donned a hat so, he, Rasım Efendi, had turned
around to look at him. He states that he saw him - first holding the hat in his hand, then
putting it on his head, walking around with it among the crowd while taking it off and
putting it back on frequently. After a while the financial director's son in law, Süleyman
Efendi had approached Mehmed Efendi and asked him: “What are you doing? The crowd
is watching you!  Aren't you ashamed?49 Mehmed Efendi  had not reacted and remained
silent, however, and turned away, as did Süleyman Efendi. 
Arslan Efendi, son of of the owner of the hostel, testified he had talked to Mehmed
Efendi  and  asked  him  “don't  you  feel  ashamed  to  wear  a  hat  just  like  that,  is this
compatible with Islam?50” whereupon Mehmed Efendi had replied: “It is.”51 Arslan Efendi
claims, that this hat, had not been not Mehmed's own, but that of merchant Alexander that
he had borrowed. After being approached by Arslan Efendi, Mehmed had returned the hat
to Alexander. But later, Arslan Efendi had heard, that Mehmed donned the hat again.52 
In his second interrogation Rasım Efendi expounds that the crowd's attention arose
when Mehmed Efendi had entered the room and that he obviously did not bother about
it. The interrogators asked him, what the hat was made of: “was it felt or straw or not?53
They asked what colour it was, and what might have been the reasons of Mehmed Efendi
47 Rasım Efendi  was interrogated two times:  On June 2nd,  1907 and June 5th,  1907.  It  seems that  the
interrogation was conducted  by different  persons  because  questions  and answers  are  similar.  The
second interview provides a few more details.
48 The following witnesses confirm this information: Rüşdi Efendi, scribe at the financial administration
(mali  kalemi  mülazimlerinden),  Hüseyin  Efendi,  assistant  head  secretary  of  the  district  governor
(tahrirat  katibi  muavini),  Süleyman  Efendi,  reserve  head  sergeant  (redif  serçavuşu),  and  another
Süleyman Efendi, son in law of the financial inspector (mali müdiri).
49 ”Ne yapıyorsun ahāli sana baḳıyor ʿayb değilmidir?” BOA BEO 3109/233116.
50 “Utanmazmısınız böyle şabka giymekten, islām'a yakışıyor mu?” BOA BEO 3109/233116.
51 “Olur!” BOA BEO 3109/233116, page 4, line 12-13.
52 He said he had heard it from an official called Hassan Fehmi and adjutant Hüsni Efendi.
53 “Ürme, ḥasir midir değilmirdir?” BOA BEO 3109/233116.
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wearing it.54 Rasım Efendi replies that the hat was of black colour, that he had also heard
it  was  merchant  Alexander's  hat,  and  that  he  had  no  idea  of  Mehmed  Efendi's
motivations. Asked what he new about Alexander,  Rasım said he just knew he was a
merchant and also stayed at the hostel. 
The next witness is the financial officer Aşıkzade Rüşdi Efendi, who, like all other
witnesses,  affirms he had no enmity with Mehmed Efendi  and knew him because he
came to his office once in a while. He also describes the hat as black, but claims he did
not recognize of what material or shape it was.
Another witness, Süleyman Efendi, son in law of financial inspector Osman Nuri,
narrates his encounter with Mehmed Efendi that evening as follows: 
“I  was watching the play, leaning against the railing on the upper floor.  Mehmed
Efendi came and stood by my side, wearing his  antari, his night gown,  55 and hat
and watched the play. When he turned to me, I realized he was wearing a hat. I
asked him: 'what is it on your head, aren't you ashamed?' He said nothing, turned
his head away, and continued watching the play.”56
Finally, Mehmed Efendi is interviewed himself.57 The interrogators first asked him
where he generally was spending his evenings. Whereupon he replies that ususally his
stayed in his room in Arslan Efendi's hostel. The interrogator then want to know from
him if he usually changed his dress immediately when he came home in the evenings or
later when he went to bed. In reply Mehmed Efendi declared that he sometimes changed
when coming home and sometimes when he went to bed. Then they want to know if he
commonly put on a fez when he got changed. He answered that sometimes he put on a
fez and other times the kalpak of the people of Kaşgar.58 
On the respective evening he had put on the mentioned kalpak. He was asked to
show this headpiece, which he did and confirmed that it was the one he had worn that
54 “Ne maḳṣada buni giymiş?”  BOA BEO 3109/233116.
55 Loose robe, in this case probably a kind of night gown.
56 “ḫānin  üst  katında  ki  gezinti  maḥallinde  parmakliğa  dayanarak  oyun seyrediyorum Meḥmed  efendi
gecelik antarisiyle ve başında şabka olduġu ḥālde yanıma geldi ve oyuna bakıyor idi, kendisine toğru
cevirerek diḳḳat eyittiğimde başında şabka olduğunu gördüm. Ona başındaki nedir ʿayb değilmidir diye
su'āl eyitdim sükūt ederek ve başını çevirerek seyre devām eyitdi.”  BOA BEO 3109/233116
57 According to the record his age was 28.
58 Kashgar is the westernmost city in China, located near the borders of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
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night.59 Upon this Süleyman Efendi is interrogated a second time in order to confirm that
the  mentioned  kalpak was  the  headpiece  worn  by  Mehmed  Efendi  he  saw,  which
Süleyman  denies. He says the concerned headpiece had been of grey color and not black
as the one he was shown now. When asked if the mentioned headpiece had a brim he
provides a closer discription, that is as follows:
“Its crown was indent,  the material of the fringe put outwards,  and its brim roled
up.”60 
Also the other witnesses do not recognized the kaşgar kalpak as the piece donned
by Mehmed Efendi that evening. According to the witness İsmael:
“The mentioned hat was somewhat dark-colored with a brim. I realized that it was
timber merchant Alexander's hat when I saw him the other day.61 
The kind of hat described by the witnesses might have been a homburg or fedora
hat, both having “a central crease on the top and a slightly turned brim.”62 While the
homburg is made of stiffened felt, the fedora's material is softer. Both types had become
popular in the late nineteenth century. 
The fedora emerged in 1880s, and according to Beverly Chico, in her encyclopedic
account  on  hats  and  headwear, represents  a  shift  in  the  spread  of  headwear  styles.
Instead  of  adopting  aristocratic  and  royal  styles,  expanding middle  classes  embraced
fashions which were made popular by stage productions and actors.63 It inhabited a niche
between formal and casual headwear and won out as a the more comfortable alternative
over the bowler hat. Along with the growing popularity and acceptance amongst higher
classes of cloth caps, Beverely Chico regards the popularity of the fedora as a demise of
Victorian rigidity.
59 I could not find a depiction or description of a Kaşgar/Kasghar kalpak, but I imagine it was similar to
what is known as  Khirgiz  kalpak, since it has a brim and thus could be confused with a  European
brimmed hat.
60 “Tepesi çıḳur kenarları da'ir madda ḫārice toġri koyuverilmiş ve şemssiper ḫaddını ḳıvırcuḳ ṣūretde idi.”
BOA BEO 3109/233116 page 6, line 10-11.
61 “Mezkūr şabḳa kenarlı sıyāhi gibi bir şey' olub ağac tüccarı Aleksanderinin giydiği şabḳa olduğunu ertesi
güni gördüğümde anladım.” BOA BEO 3109/233116, page 7, line 10-11. 
62 Beverly Chico, Hats and Headwear around the World: A Cultural Encyclopedia: A Cultural Encyclopedia
(Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2013), 245.
63 Ibid., 163-165. 
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In contrast, the homburg64 was made popular through its adoption by the later King
Edward, then Prince of Wales, after his stay in Bad Homburg and by that turned into an
expression of elite status by those who wanted to display wealth and class. Even though
the top hat was the most prestigious expression of a high social status, the homburg
became an accepted compromise between stiff uncomfortable headwear and the softer,
more  informal  fedora.  The  spread  of  the  homburg  shows  that  the  spread  of  styles
through rulers and kings did not cease to exist entirely.
Back to Mehmed Efendi's case: confronted with all those witnesses who declared
that he had been wearing a brimmed hat, Mehmed Efendi still insisted that he had worn
the  kaşgar kalpak instead. He blamed people's perception of him donning a hat on the
darkness inside the hostel. By no means, he contends, had he held merchant Aleksander's
hat  in his  hand nor  put  it  on  his  head.  Furthermore,  he  assesses that  he  had  many
witnesses to attest to it, but could not remember their names right now. 
In the end the ministry of the Inner decided that it had been inappropriate to arrest
Mehmed Efendi and that the matter should be dealt with administration internally.
This is in an example of the negotiation of identities and production of modern
subjects in and through spaces such as the modern state and the theater.  Performances
on stage and the theater as a public space are of  considerable significance here.  The
intervention  against the hats on-stage  might have taken place because of the play the
actors performed, but the document does not mention the name of the play or anything
which makes it possible to indicate the contents of the play.
In  her  analysis  of  Ottoman cartoons,  Palmira  Brummett  notes  that  the  theater
amongst  other forms of art had been a key symbol for social change.65 That made it a
vulnerable place for the construction of Ottoman identity in the tension between self and
other. The theater, according to Brummett, had a special fascination in Ottoman society
amongst  Western arts that became popular in the Ottoman empire, and she explains it
with the long history and tradition of Ottoman theater. She considers it a space for the
constitution of Ottoman identity, also in respect of gender relations, since it was a space
where men and women mixed. In post-revolutionary cartoons, Brummet notes that the
64 Named after the German spa Bad Homburg.
65 See Palmira Johnson Brummett, Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908 - 1911
(Albany, NY: State Univ. of New York Press, 2000), 205.
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theater stage appeared as a metaphor for the Ottoman Empire, which was situated in a
period of transition between real and unreal, past and present.66 It was a symbol of the
modern, celebrated by Westernized elites, especially after 1908, when it was freed from
the restriction (allegedly) imposed on it by Abdülhamid II. Yet the satire magazines also
voiced  critique  of  the  elite  and  exclusive  character  of  the  modern  theater  and  its
adherents, who ignored the needs of other strata of the population.
The history of the modern theater can be dated back to the turn of the 19 th century,
under Selim III. The first theater was constructed with active support of the sultan. Two
more  were  built  during the reign of  Mahmud II.  They held regular  performances  of
European troupes, and from the mid-century on plays written by Ottoman authors were
also brought on stage. In 1860 the Ottoman theater, also known as Gedik Paşa theater,
was built in Istanbul. This too took place with the approval of the sultan, who regularly
visited the performances.67
Suraiya Faroqhi treats the Ottoman theater as a part of luxury consumption as it
was a space that confirmed the social status through the display of people's wealth.68 She
argues that while Ottoman play writers aimed to educate their audience, the public itself
rather enjoyed the entertainment and thus made the visiting of a theater a social event.
She also asserts that the theater was a space encountered by a highly heterogeneous
crowd in terms of gender and ethno-religious background, which makes it important on
the grounds of identity-building. Thus the theater became a space of affirmation of social
status through interaction of the audience amongst each other and the actors and stage.
In that regard it  was also a space of social  control as the provided cases indicate.  In
Faroqhis words: “Socio-political hierarchy is indicated by the goods which a given group
was or was not permitted to wear.” 
What does, however, the banning of the hat for Muslim off- and on-stage indicate? It
was the distinction of  a  distinct  Ottoman bourgeois  style,  and  in this  special  case  an
Ottoman  Muslim  style.  In  neither  case  -  be  it  the  ownership  of  a  hat  by  merchant
Alexander or the wearing of hats on stage by Ottoman non-Muslims – did the Ottoman
66 See Ibid., 205.
67 See Ibid., 206.
68 Suraiya Faroqhi, ‘Consumption and Elite Status in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century’, in Stories
of Ottoman Men and Women: Establishing Status, Establishing Control (Istanbul: Eren, 2002), 50-51.
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authorities render the wearing of hats by Ottoman non-Muslims problematic. Accordingly,
this  incident  provides  another  example  of  the  selective  and  somehow  arbitrary
implementation of modern Ottoman dress codes, where divides along national and ethnic
identity became relevant or stressed in varying degrees and for various purposes.
3.6 Headgear and Citizenship: Reji Kolcusu Şükrü 
A couple of years earlier, in march 1903 another case of the sanctioned donning of a
hat  by  an  Ottoman  Muslim  appeared.69 Şükrü  Efendi,  an  inspector  of  the  tobacco
monopoly (reji)70 declared he would wear a hat and leave Ottoman citizenship because of
a conflict between him and the law scribe Cemal Efendi. The reports on the incident,
which took place in Ayaş in the province of Ankara, do not elucidate the background of
the  dispute  between  the  two  of  them.  The  report  of  the  incidence  consists  of  two
documents. One is a report of the district governor of Ayaş (kā’immakām) and a member
of the financial administration  to the Grand Vizier, the other is a draft issued by the
scribal office of the ministry of Interior, to be sent to the governor of the province of
Ankara. The central government, after being informed about the case, did not take action
itself, but passed the case on to the administration of the province of Ankara. The report
to the Grand Vizier described the incidence as follows: judicial court scribe Cemal Efendi
visited the district governor Ismaʿil Hakkı Bey at home to report on a dispute he had with
reji inspector  Şükrü Efendi.  The report  mentions the  presence of  a  number  of  other
people  at  Cemal  Efendi's:  a  hoca,  a  person  called  Mehmed  Aġa, and  his  son  in  law
lieutenant (mülāzim) Osman Efendi - who were presumably counted as witnesses. The
next  day  they  had  met  again  with  the  district  governor  and  other  witnesses  at  a
government building (da'ire-i hükumet) to discuss the issue. The governor declared that
they could pass a sentence on him on that occasion, since Şükrü Efendi by declaring that
he “will abandon Ottoman citizenship and put on the hat of another state,”71 had exerted
ungratefulness towards the sultan and now needed to apologize in order to gain mercy.
69 BOA DH.MKT. 681/8 (16 Mart 1319 (March 28th , 1903)).
70 Regié de  Tabacs,  founded  in  1884.  A  European  capital,  mostly  French  as  one  of  the  “European
economic bastions inside the Ottoman Empire,” next to the Ottoman imperial bank and the Public debt
administration.  Its  profits  were  divided  among  the  PDA,  Regié shareholder's  and  the  Ottoman
government, see Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity, 139.
71 “terk-i tābiʿyyetler”
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 All  this  had  taken  place  two  months  before  this  document  was  written.  The
documents do not provide more information about the underlying conflict  and Şükrü
Efendi's motivation to wear a hat. For me it's worthwhile to note that the case seemed
important enough for the local authorities to report to the central government, yet the
Sublime Porte was not willing to deal with the case and passed it on to the provincial
government. The wearing of the hat is not explicitly linked to religion but to citizenship,
thus identity in relation to the state was constructed through this notion, rather than
religion.  Putting  on  a  hat  here  meant  change  of  nationality  and  not  apostasy,  even
though that might have been implied. Whether or not the conflict had anything to do
with the tobacco monopoly and its revenues which directly went to foreign debt holders
via the Public Debt administration isn't clear. It's also remarkable that it isn't the wearing
of the hat itself, but just the intention to do so in combination with the announcement to
abandon Ottoman citizenship provoked the interference of authorities.
After  providing  these  scattered  examples  of  state  interventions  concerning  its
subjects' headgear, which I think help in drawing a sketch of the politics of the dress of
the Hamidian period, I will continue showing a number of sources which display the
negotiation of identities in borderlands and the constitution of the borderline as a space
itself.
3.7   Territoriality and Dress
Eisenstadt mentioned the interrelated negotiation of national territory and identity
as an intrinsic modern feature. He assesses, that the construction of political and cultural
boundaries are closely interconnected and thus the construction of space and identity.
Yet the drawing of boundaries and the negotiation of identity took place in a field of
tension  between  inclusive  and  more  universalistic  terms  and  thus  were  never
unequivocal in their meaning. Hence an emphasis on territorial and other boundaries
was always confronted with the very same questions.72 A sample of documents from the
Hamidian period exemplify the close interconnectivity of the politics of dress as a means
for the  construction of identity and the negotiation of borders on different levels. The
72 See Samuel N. Eisenstadt, ‘Multiple Modernities’, Daedalus 129, no. 1 (Winter 2000), 7.
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respective  state's  claims  to  territory  were  made  through  the  bodies  of  its
subjects/citizens.73 
3.7.1 Eastern Rumelia
The province of Eastern Rumelia, located south of the Balkan mountains, came into
being with the Berlin Treaty of July 13, 1878. The whole region was known as Northern
Trace and is today's Southern Bulgaria. The name Eastern Rumelia was a creation of the
participants of the Berlin Conference. Once the heartland of Ottoman state-building it
was now shifting to the periphery of  Ottoman influence.74 Its  capital  was Plovdiv in
today's Bulgaria. The new Ottoman province exercised certain administrative autonomy,
but  remained  under  Ottoman  political  and  military  jurisdiction.  The  province  was
governed  by  a  Governor-General  appointed  by  the  Sublime  Porte.  It  remained
autonomous until  1885 when it was incorporated by a coup d'etat into the Bulgarian
kingdom  which  was  still  nominally  but  not  factually  under  Ottoman  suzerainty.
Therefore the region was still an Ottoman province de jure until 1908, when Bulgaria
proclaimed  independence  officially.  In  this  setting,  the  contested  status  of  Eastern
Rumelia  reflected  a  number  of  conflicts  about  dress  fought  out  between  the  central
government and different provincial agents.
Aleko Paşa
On the evening of May 25th, 1879 (13 Mayis 1295), a case which provoked quite an
amount of disturbance involved the recently appointed first Govenor-General of Eastern
Rumelia. The question at hand was what he would wear for his inauguration whereas he
wanted to leave Istanbul the next day.75 Different central state offices interfered when
73 As Isa Blumi has pointed out, negotiation of identity in the Ottoman Empire did not necessarily take
place within the framework of modernity, but involved local agents who might have acted beyond
eurocentric imaginations. Thus it would also be important to consider the present cases not just within
the narrow framework of modern national identity,  but as expressions of  local  involvements with
modernity which are not necessarily modern. This is unfortunately a task I am not able to accomplish
here. See Isa Blumi, Rethinking the Late Ottoman Empire: A Comparative Social and Political History
of Albania and Yemen, 1878 - 1918, 1. ed., Analecta Isisiana 67 (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2003).  On Ottoman
borderlands see  also  Olga Dēmētriu,  Capricious Borders:  Minority,  Population,  and Counter-Conduct
between Greece and Turkey (New York [u.a.]: Berghahn, 2013).
74 The province Rumelia had been part of the Ottoman Empire already since the fourteenth century.
75 BOA Y.A.HUS. 161/22.
 104
3 Politics of Identity during the Hamidian Period
rumors emerged that he intended to go without “Ottoman dress” including the fez.
The officers  at  the  Sublime  Porte suggested  that  the  Aleko  Paşa  would  not  be
receive  a  friendly  welcome  in  Rumeli  Sarki  in  that  kind  of  dress.76 Thus  under  the
initiative of  the  central  government,  a  telegraph was issued to stop the departure of
Aleko Paşa to Eastern Rumelia on the following day. More information about the futures
Vali's intentions regarding dress were demanded immediately. The central state expected
Aleko Paşa to reconsider his decision and to make declaration that he will wear the fez
and  Ottoman  dress,  otherwise  his  journey  was  to  be  postponed.  They  expected
disturbances from the populace if he appeared without “Ottoman dress” and fez. The
correspondence on the case displays excitement on side of the state officers involved. The
sultan had also expressed worries about the situation and attributed high importance to
the issue.  He expected a  statement  by Aleko Paşa regarding which kind of  dress  he
intended to wear. State officials -  amongst them the Minister of War - discussed whether
he should be allowed to depart the next day before the issue of his dress was resolved: “If
he considers to go without a fez, it seems appropriate to postpone his departure .”77 and in
another document: “If he eventually considers going without wearing Ottoman dress and
fez, he puts forward that it is appropriate to postpone his departure.”78 Aleko is asked to
issue  a  statement  regarding  which  kind  of  dress  he  intends  to  wear  in  his  official
capacity.  The decision of  allowing him to  travel  to  his  inauguration depends on his
answer.
There is no mention in the documents of what kind of dress he intended to wear
instead.  The  kind  of  dress  regarded  as  proper  Ottoman  dress  is  described  in  the
following, though no details of which pieces it consisted and how they looked like were
provided: “[...]  if he wears clothes which officers of the sublime state wear”79 and “[dress
which] belongs to the office of the governor and is an attribute of [his] citizenship.”80 
According to the regulations, the governor of Eastern Rumelia had to be Christian.81
76 Also known als Vogoridis Paşa, see Sinan Kuneralp, Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkân ve Ricali: (1839 - 1922) :
Prosopografik Rehber (Beylerbeyi, İstanbul: İsis, 2003), 125. 
77 “şayed fes ile gidemeyeceğini dermiyān eder ise  ʿazīmetinin te'ḫīr buyrulmasını münāsib gibi görüyor,”
BOA  Y.A.HUS.  161/22. A  document  with  unspecified  sender  and  recipient  probably  sent  within
different offices of the Sublime Porte.
78 “ve şāyed fes ve elbise-yi ossmāniyye iktisāsıyla gidemeyeceğini yine dermiyān edecek olur ise ʿazīmetinin
te'ḫīr olunması münāsib olacaġı irād eylemesi,” BOA Y.A.HUS. 161/22.
79 “libās-i me'mūriyet-i devlet-i aliyye'yi lābis olduġu ḥālde,” BOA Y.A.HUS. 161/22.
80 “vālīğe ve sıfāt-i tābiʿyyete ʿā'id,” BOA Y.A.HUS. 161/22.
81 See article 13, Berlin Treaty.
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Aleko Paşa (5  April  1822-  17  July 1910),  respectively Aleksandr  Stefanov Bogoridi  or
Aleko Vogorides, was governor of Eastern Rumelia from May 1879 until May 1884. Like
his father Aleko Paşa himself was an experienced Ottoman statesman.82 Born in Istanbul
in 1822 he went to several  middle European countries for education. In the Ottoman
Empire he held different high ranking positions such as member of the state council and
minister of public works, post and telegraph. As to one source he was an activist of the
Bulgarian renaissance.83 His  biography suggests  a  pro-Ottomanist  stance and I  found
some hints  that  he  suppressed  separatist  movements  during his  post  as  governor  in
Eastern Rumelia. That might even be the reason why he did not continue his post after
1884. Still he was loyal to the Bulgarian state which is underlined by his candidacy to the
Bulgarian throne in 1886. On a photograph which was taken during his time as governor
he is wearing a kalpak which was at that time still more an item of Bulgarian identity
than of  Ottoman identity.  A hint  to  Aleko  Paşa's  relation  with  the  Ottoman central
government is provided by a New York Times article from October 21, 1879, one and a
half year after his inauguration. A short note announced that Aleko Pasa had refused to
visit the capital even though he had promised to come there twice a year to report on the
situation in Eastern Rumelia. His refusal had caused displeasure among the officials at
the Sublime Porte.
The  case  is  further  enlightened  by  the  details  provided  on  Aleko  Paşa's
appointment by the account of Henry A. Layard, who was British ambassador from 1877
to 1880. Layard considered Aleko Paşa as unfit for the post, because of he imputes him a
pro-Russian attitude.84 He also reported on conflicts with the Grand Vizier Edhem Paşa
due Aleko  Paşa's conduct as ambassador in Vienna.  That led to his recall,  whereupon
Aleko  Paşa  went to Paris  instead where he, according to Layard's  knowledge, “wrote
violent and offensive articles against Turkey in the public journals.”85 Concerning the
incidence itself, which for Layard proves that Aleko Paşa“ would be completely under the
82 His father Stefan Bogoridi already had been a high ranking Ottoman statesmen. According to one
lexicon  article  he  even  had  been one  of  the  most  influential  Ottoman politicians.  Amongst  other
positions he had been a member of the Tanzimat council and the first Christian Orthodox governor of
the island of Samos. 
83 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Bogoridi. I could not find this confirmed, but do not want
to leave it unmentioned.
84 Austen  Henry  Layard,  The  Queen’s  Ambassador  to  the  Sultan:  Memoirs  of  Sir  Henry  A.  Layard’s
Constantinople Embassy, 1877 - 1880, ed. Sinan Kuneralp, 1st ed. (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2009).
85 Ibid., 558.
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control  of  the  Bulgarian's  and  the  Russian  party,”86 he  reports  that  Aleko  Paşa  had
replaced the fez by a kalpak as soon as he reached the Bulgarian frontier.  Yet initially,
and here Layard also provides more information of the kind of dress that was designated
as Ottoman in the documents mentioned above, Aleko  Paşa  had intended to wear the
“usual uniform of the provincial governor and Turkish functionary.”87 Before that the
Russian commander of Eastern Rumelia seems to have approached and advised him to
don a European hat upon is arrival, as the wearing of the fez would provoke protest and
even unrest among  the  Bulgarian  population  in  Eastern  Rumelia.  Upon  this  Russian
intervention the Ottoman sultan even appealed to the Layard as the British ambassador
to stress the importance the wearing of Ottoman dress by Aleko Paşa had for him.88
The case of Aleko Paşa is a rare case where other clothing, and especially Ottoman
official's  dress, together  with headgear  is  discussed  and  given  importance  for  the
construction of Ottoman identity and the transgression of dress codes. The denotation of
a certain style of dress as Ottoman is also singular to this incident. Through his journey
with  “Ottoman”  dress  to  the  autonomous  province,  the  central  government  expected
Aleko Paşa to strengthen the affiliation of Eastern Rumelia with the Ottoman state. His
case reminds of Isa Blumi's depiction of the Ottoman bureaucratic elite, their sometimes-
ambivalent position towards the Ottoman state, and their respective communities which
make them appear both as agents of Ottoman state policies and supporters of newly
founded nation-states on former Ottoman territories.89
Disputes about Headgear of Eastern Rumelian Militia and Gendarmes
In March 1881 authorities in Eastern Rumelia turned to the central government in
Istanbul and complained that attempts were made to force Muslim gendarmes and militia
in Eastern Rumelia to give up established greeting practices they designated as Islamic.90
This form of greeting of called temennā ( انمت) involved kissing of the fingers of the right
86 Ibid., 559.
87 Ibid., 559.
88 See Ibid., 559-560.
89 See Blumi,  Foundations of  Modernity,  44-45;  Blumi,  Reinstating the Ottomans,  98; Kemal H. Karpat,
‘Millets and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Period’,
in  Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays , ed. Kemal H. Karpat,
Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 633.
90 Muslim soldiers in Rumeli Şarki were forced to wear hats and Muslim gendarme are supposed to salute
instead of temennā, by doffing their kalpak. BOA ŞD. 1999/32.
 107
3 Politics of Identity during the Hamidian Period
hand and then tipping of the forehead with these fingers.91 Gendarmes and militia were
expected to take off their headpiece for greeting instead of saluting by temennā, while the
headpiece in question was a kalpak.92 According to the Treaty of Berlin, the gendarmes
and local militia in Eastern Rumelia had to be composed proportionally to the religion of
its inhabitants.93 Their task was to keep internal order in the province. In the present
discussion only the Muslim gendarmes and militia were addressed. Besides the abolition
of temennā, the introduction of peaked caps for the these police forces is mentioned. The
administrator in Eastern Rumelia who sent a letter to the central government in Istanbul
to  picture  the  problem did  not  mention who wanted  to  introduce  the  raising of  the
headpiece for salute. They put forward that the matter actually had already been solved
in  internal  regulations,  issued  also  in  1881,  which  dealt  with  military  strategy  and
esteemed dress code and conduct in the Eastern Rumelia as part of “internal regulations
on Eastern Rumelia (Rumeli Sarki Nizamname-i Dahiliyyesi)” issued by the Grand Vizier.94
Communication on the issue took place between prime ministry and ministry of war.95
Taking off one's headgear when greeting another person is considered as a sign of
deference and respect in many parts the Western world, but was not common in Islamic
91 I could not find further information on the temennā ( انمت) and its supposed Islamic character, i.e. if it
was  exclusively  used  by  Muslims.  The  spread  of  the  term which  does  not  exist  in  any  relevant
references. Furthermore the notion only exists in Turkish, not in Arabic as far as I could see. Yet it
seems to be existing in Urdu, carrying a similar meaning.
92 An author  of  a  document  issued  by the prime ministry  suggested that  raising  of  the  kalpak was
introduced during the stationing of Russian soldiers in the region, BOA ŞD. 1999/32, line 9.
93 See  Berlin  Treaty,  Article  15:  “Die  innere  Ordnung  in  Ost-Rumelien  wird  durch  eine,  von  einer
Ortsmiliz unterstützte Gendarmerie aufrechterhalten.  Bezüglich der Zusammensetzung dieser beiden
Korps,  deren Offiziere vom Sultan ernannt werden,  soll,  je  nach der Oertlichkeit,  der Religion der
Einwohner Rechnung getragen werden.” 
http://de.wikisource.org/wiki/Vertrag_zwischen_Deutschland,_%C3%96sterreich-
Ungarn,_Frankreich,_Gro%C3%9Fbritannien,_Italien,_Ru%C3%9Fland_und_der_T%C3%Bcrkei._
%28Berliner_Vertrag%29;  “Internal  order  shall  be  maintained  in  Eastern  Roumelia  by  a  native
gendarmerie, assisted by a local militia. In the composition of these two corps, whose officers shall be
named by the Sultan, account will be taken, according to locality, of the religion of the inhabitants.”
According to an 1884 census about 20 percent of the population of Eastern Rumelia were Turks (used
as synonym for Muslims), and about 70 percent were considered as Bulgarians. See Kemal H. Karpat,
Ottoman Population 1830 - 1914, 1. print., Turkish and Ottoman Studies (Madison, Wis. [u.a.]: Univ. of
Wisconsin Pr., 1985);  or  Kemal H. Karpat, Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected
Articles and Essays, Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East. - Leiden : Brill, 1971- 81
(Leiden [u.a.]:  Brill,  2002), 370: “The Muslim population (Turks,  Pomaks, Albanians,  Circassians) of
Eastern Rumelia before the war, according to a British report, consisted of about 290,000 people as
against 450,000 non-Muslims, mostly Bulgarians. In a matter of two years the Muslim population was
reduced to about 120,000 people or by roughly 60 percent).” 
94 “Twelfth  appendix  of  Paragraph  66  of  the  internal  regulation  of  Eastern  Rumelia  (Rumeli  Şarḳī
nizāmnāme-i dāḫiliyyesinden onikinci numeru ẕeylinden altmış altinci māddesi).” BOA ŞD. 1999/32 (line
10-11).
95 BOA ŞD. 1999/32.
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contexts.96 But Muslim practice is just  one aspect that was used to argue against the
raising of  the  hat.  Several  references  are  made in the  documents,  i.e.:  “This  issue is
profoundly  unacceptable  because  together  with  it  being  irreconcilable  with  military
practice,  it  is  contrary  to  the  Muslim  confession  […].”97 Local  and  central  state
administrators  adduced  arguments  against  the  introduction  of  the  raising  of  one's
headpiece for salute on the level of military practices, religious and local customs, and
national  consciousness.  A subject  invoked repeatedly is  religious freedom98.  On those
grounds the administrators demanded an exception for Muslim soldiers from the hat-
raising practice. In addition to religious freedom, the authors say that it was a matter of
local  customs  and  everyday  Muslim  practices,99 national  consciousness,100 and  the
temperament or constitution of the people. They contend that therefore the issue went
beyond military matters, and one should bear in mind what was custom and esteemed in
the  region  of  Eastern  Rumelia.  The  reference  made  to  national  consciousness  is  not
defined further. It remains open as to what kind of identity millet refers to in this case.
And yet it is given an extra emphasis, stating that “beyond being [a matter of the] law
this concerns national consciousness.” 101
In their discussion of what was common military practice, state officials include the
practicability and convenience of taking off one's headgear in military praxis, specifically
concerning members of armed military. According to the authors of the documents, it is
not common in European armies to take off one's headgear during military activities,
meaning that soldiers just practice saluting with a hat when they were unarmed and
inside of a military barrack. Thus they are strengthening their argument by pointing out
that it is not always common in Europe to take off the hat.
This  controversy  again  depicts  Rumeli  sarki  as  a  contested  border  land  to  be
defended by the establishment or  perpetuation of  dress  codes.  The opponents  of  the
abolition  of  the  temennā for  Muslim militia  and  gendarmes  make  no  reference  to  a
common Ottoman identity but instead to religion via Islam. It is not clear if they open up
96 See  Ign.  Goldziher,  ‘Die  Entblößung  des  Hauptes.’,  Der  Islam  6,  no.  4  (1915),
doi:10.1515/islm.1915.6.4.301.
97 “şu vażʿiyyet uṣūl-i ʿaskeriyye'ye muvāfiḳ olmamaġla beraber meẕheb-i islāma muġayreti cihetle esāsen
ġayr-i cā'iz olduġundan [...],” BOA ŞD. 1999/32 (line 2).
98 “ḥürriyet-i meẕhebiye,” BOA ŞD. 1999/32.
99 “gündelik ʿādāt-i islāmiyye,” BOA ŞD. 1999/32.
100 “aḫlāḳ-i milliye,” BOA ŞD. 1999/32.
101 “kanūn olmaḳdan ziyāde aḫlāḳ-i milliye münāsebeti anlaşılmaḳta,” BOA ŞD. 1999/32.
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a broader scope when they talk about local populace and their customs, including non-
Muslims: 
“Because it is self-evident that local customs and habits of the populace are something
to be  applied,  and that  among the Muslim segment  of  the  population it  is  not
common to open the head [raise one's headgear], there is therefore no chance to
raise the kalpak or [any other] headpiece anyway. By the internal regulation four
hundred, paragraph one, it will be made explicit that members of the militia will
attain freedom to perform the duties of their confession.”102
Even though both sides of the local and central administration refer to religion to
legitimize their argument to keep up the practice of  temennā, they emphasis the other
points mentioned to a similar degree. In this case arguments pro or against a certain
practice  of  dress  were  grounded  on  many different  levels,  as  well  as  local  practices
related to international (European) standards. Reference to European military practice,
local customs and national consciousness might have been included to strengthen the
argument in favor of the maintenance of  temennā beyond a religious framework. Local
customs might have been included to pay tribute to the autonomous status of Eastern
Rumelia. In contrast to other conflicts which had more of an internal Ottoman character,
the level of international politics was included here directly which made it insufficient to
argue exclusively on the level  of  national  or religious identity.  This is  the  only case
analyzed that contains a reference to religious freedom. That must have been related to
the codification of it in the Berlin Treaty, which was used by Ottoman officials to argue
against the raising of the police forces' hats.103 
The other issue which had provoked unease, the claim that Muslim soldiers should
wear peaked caps, was obviously resolved through an instruction that the peaks of the
hats shall be destroyed while the raising of the kalpak remained an open question. In
Eastern Rumelia a special regulation was in preparation to introduce the lifting of the
102 “ʿĀdāt-ı maḥalliye  ve  mizāc-i  ahāliye  taṭbīḳ edilmiş  bir  şey  olduġu bedihiyātdan  bulunduğundan ve
he'yet-i  islāmiyye beyninde  ẕāten başını  açmaḳ ʿādeti  ẕāten olmadıġından şu  ḥālde  ḳalpaḳ ve  serpūş
çıkarmaġa imkān olmayacaġı gibi nizāmnāme-i dāḫilinin dört yüz elli birinci māddesinde milis efrādı
veẓā'if-i meẕhebiyyelerinin icrāsınca her yer hürriyete nā'il olacaḳlari.” BOA ŞD. 1999/32.
103 On religious freedom see article 61 Berliner Treaty 
(http://de.wikisource.org/wiki/Vertrag_zwischen_Deutschland,_%C3%96sterreich-
Ungarn,_Frankreich,_Gro%C3%9Fbritannien,_Italien,_Ru%C3%9Fland_und_der_T%C3%BCrkei._
%28Berliner_Vertrag%29).
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kalpak. At the same time, the Prime Ministry released an order that the raising of the
kalpak  would  be  banned  temporarily  according  to  the  above-mentioned  internal
regulation until  the  final  decision was  being made  through a  military  regulation for
Eastern Rumelia.104 Until  then signs of respect would be payed through a hand-sign in
accordance  with  local  customs  and  habits  in  order  to  preserve  confessional
requirements.105 The state authorities postulate that future military regulations had to be
phrased according to these prerequisites.
On September  1883 the government in Istanbul  and the local  administration of
Eastern  Rumelia  continued  their  discussion  about  the  gendarmes'  and  militias'
headgear.106 This time the conflict about greeting by lifting the kalpak was no longer
mentioned. Instead, the matter of peaked caps or brimmed hats turned up again.  The
administration  of  the  province  Edirne  in  Eastern  Thrace  informed  the  central
government that Muslim gendarme officers were about to resign because all gendarmes
and militia in Eastern Rumelia now had to wear a “hat (şapka) during summertime and
the kalpak only during the winter. The administration designated the newly-introduced
hat to be Russian while the kalpak, they said, could be regarded as national: 
“In the province of Eastern Rumelia the kalpak, worn by gendarmes and militia and
designated as national will now be replaced with a hat which is known to be special
to Russian soldiers.”107 
According to the telegram sent by the Edirne administration to Istanbul, the whole
matter so far was just a rumor and they were waiting for clarification from the Eastern
Rumelia within a month. There is not further information on the outcome in the file. 
The information about  the  kalpak -  and in contrast  to it  a  headpiece  worn by
Russian soldiers - is confusing, since actually in 1881, Alexander III introduced a new
104 BOA ŞD. 1999/32 (line 18-1).
105 “Vaẓā'if-i meẕhebiyyelerinin icrāsinca ḳalpaḳ çıḳardırılmak uṣūlundan men ile ʿādāt ve aḫlāḳ-ı maḥalliye
tevfīḳen işāret-i iḥtirāmiyyenin el ile icrā eyitdirilmis. [According to confessional duties will the doffing
of the kalpak be prohibited and in accordance with local principles will signs of respect be conducted
with the hand].”  BOA ŞD. 1999/32 (line 19-2).
106 BOA Y.PRK.UM 6/10  (September 10th, 1883).
107 “Rumeli  Şarḳī vilāyetinde jandarma ve milislere giydirilmiş olan ve milli  ʿad olunan ḳalpaḳlar bu defʿa
rusya ʿaskerlerinin maḫṣūṣi bilen şapḳaya taḥvīl olunmuş.” BOA Y.PRK.UM 6/10.
 111
3 Politics of Identity during the Hamidian Period
nationalist army uniform with a variation of the kalpak as headpiece.108
In both cases the term Ottoman is not mentioned. I  found Muslim and local  or
national without further specification as identity categories set in contrast to Russian.
The term Europe is used here as a point of reference to argue for similarity, not for
difference.  Thus the central  state regards Russia here as the main threat to Ottoman
integrity. 
Konstantin Atnarof Rotkof and his Christian Hat
On November 1886 in the Ottoman-Bulgarian borderlands, in the district of Ropçoz,
now Devin in Bulgaria, a quarrel around a hat which carried a depiction of a crucifix
appeared.  A  letter  from  the  Ministry  of  Interior  informed  the  administration  of  the
province of Edirne that a person named Konstantin Atnarof Rotkof ,  who lived in the
village Pavlasko,109 arrested by the police on his way to the market-place, and was being
accused of wearing a hat with a crucifix attached to it.110 It says “the reason for his arrest
is [...] that he had a crucifix depicted on his hat while he went to the market which is
located within our borders.”  111 Obviously Rotkof visited a market on Ottoman territory
and  there  drew  the  attention  of  the  local  police  because  of  his  hat.  The  official
representatives of the provincial governors of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia in Istanbul
(kapıkethüdalığı) had requested his release from the Grand Vizier. 
In this case, the often-drawn link between the brimmed hat and Christianity is openly
displayed. It is further linked to Bulgarian identity and received as an offense and a threat to
Ottoman territorial integrity on the sides of the intervening police. The explosive nature and
symbolic content of the incident is better understood by the fact that it is connected to the
contested unstable situation at the Bulgarian Ottoman boundary with the recent annexation
of Eastern Rumelia. The market place was somewhere close to or in the territory of it.112 
108 In Russian the kalpak was called papakha. The kalpak was a common headgear of people, Christian as
well as Muslim, in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Thus its symbolism quite flexible. See  Christine
Ruane, The Empire’s New Clothes: A History of the Russian Fashion Industry, 1700 - 1917 (New Haven
[u.a.]: Yale Univ. Press, 2009), 159-160.
109 وقسلواپ, BOA DH.MKT. 1380/65.
110 BOA DH.MKT. 1380/65.
111 “bizim  ḥudūd dāḫilinde  bulunan  [….]  pazarına  giderken  polis  ṭarafından  tevkīf  olunarak  […]  ve
merkūmun sebeb-i tefkīvi ise şapḳası üzerinde bir  ḫac resmi bulunmasından  ʿibāret olduġundan.” BOA
DH.MKT. 1380/65.
112 I cannot read the name of the market place properly, something as Istov, Astov or Ustov.
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Eastern Rumelia had been occupied by Bulgaria the year before and the status quo
officially recognized by the Ottoman government in January 1886.  The district or town
Ropçoz, where the hat-wearing person lived, had been part of a region whose Pomak
(Bulgarian Muslim) inhabitants had refused to be part  of  the newly created province
Eastern Rumelia (1878) and instead remained a part of the Ottoman Empire, forming the
unrecognized autonomous region of Tamrash.113 
Why Ottoman officials who wrote the document put emphasis on the obvious fact,
that  the  mentioned  market  place  was  within  Ottoman  borders,  remains  somewhat
unclear.  Rotkof  lived  on  Ottoman  territory  anyway,  since  the  former  unrecognized
Republic  of  Tamrash  was  incorporated  into  the  Ottoman  Empire  again  in  1886.  In
addition,  it  may  have  been  difficult  for  Ottoman  policemen  to  arrest  someone  on
Bulgarian territory, let alone be able to move around. Probably it was emphasized to
draw a link between the questioning of Ottoman sovereignty and the hat. At that time it
was not uncommon in the Ottoman Empire, especially for Christians, to wear hats. Was
the hat a problem or the crucifix? Probably both in combination at that time and place,
shortly after the annexation of Eastern Rumelia.  
Varna
In 1888 another incident in the Bulgarian Ottoman borderland took place, this time
at the Black Sea town Varna in the principality of Bulgaria, which also came into being
with the Berlin Treaty.114 A local Ottoman commercial agent (tüccar vekili) reports to the
Foreign Ministry that local Bulgarians had urged Ottoman subjects to wear a “Bulgarian
kalpak” at “places of worship and schools.”115 All three persons involved in the conflict
are designated as “three Jews belonging to the subjects of  the sublime State and the
inhabitants of Istanbul [...]).116 The mentioned persons might have been merchants as the
commercial agent deals with the case. It remains an open question as to why the “local
Bulgarians” who are not specified further demanded the wearing of the kalpak. Maybe
they expected an adaption to local habits and probably they perceived the open display of
113 See Dēmētriu, Capricious Borders, 92.
114 BOA Y.PRK.HR. 11/36 ( June 1888).
115 “maʿābed ve mekātib,” BOA Y.PRK.HR. 11/36 ( June 1888).
116 “devlet-i  ʿaliyye tebaʿasından ve dersaʿādet  ahālīsinden üç Musevi  [...],”  BOA Y.PRK.HR..  11/36 (June
1888).
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Ottoman identity as an offense. The  Jewish identity remains in the background even
though it was important enough to be mentioned. Yet the case is another indication that
Ottoman identity was not necessarily reduced to being Muslim, both from internal, the
Ottoman-Jewish, as well as the Bulgarian perspective, and that the fez was its signifier.
Cevdet  Kırpık,  who  also  mentions  the  case, annotates  that  the  mentioned  Ottoman
subjects made a claim on the fez and did not submit to the demand that they should wear
a kalpak instead.117
Cuma-i Bala and Bulgarian Identity
On 1903 a quarrel took place regarding “Bulgarians” who supposedly exchanged
their kalpaks in favor of the fez.118 In the following correspondence, the governor of the
province of Salonika and the Grand Vizier discussed if the they had been forced to do so
or if they donned the fez deliberately. On January 3,  1903 (27 teşrin-i evvel 1318) the
governor of Salonika in a dispatch to the Grand Vizier suggested that the mentioned
Bulgarians did not wear the fez because of their devotion to the Ottoman state: “That
they took off the kalpak and donned the fez was not motivated by fidelity.” 119 Instead the
regiment of Üsküb (Skopje) had forced them and continued to do so after the troops left
again for Üsküp. The governor declared that it was not a proper thing to force them to
take off the kalpak, since it was their national dress. 
The Grand Vizier in contrast had claimed, in a letter written on January 4 th, 1903,
that it was their free will to wear the fez.120 He assessed that the wearing of the fez by the
Bulgarians in Cuma-i Bala, initiated by Tolgar Efendi, commander of the ninth army unit,
was a sign of “renewal of [their] fidelity and servility.”121 Nevertheless the Grand Vizier
expressed  that  he  was willing  to  recognize  that  those  Bulgarians  affected  by  these
measures had brought forth objections and to acknowledge the “sheep-skin kalpak [as]
national  dress  of  all  Bulgarians.”122 Even  though  the  fez  was  obligatory  to  wear
117 Kırpık, ‘Fez - Şapka Çatışması,’  21, FN 18.
118 BOA Y.A.HUS. 437/51, document a) (27 Teşrin-i Evvel 1318 (November 9 th  1902)) , document b) BOA
Y.A.HUS.  437/51  (30  Teşrin-i  Evvel  1318  (November  12th 1902));  BOA  İ.HUS.  1320/Ş-28/100;  BEO
1951/146299 (2 Teşrin-i Sani 1318 (November 15th 1902)).
119 “ḳalpaḳlarını çıḳarub fes iksā etmeleri sāʿika-yi ṣadāḳat olmayub,” BOA Y.A.HUS. 437/51, document a)
120 See BOA Y.A.HUS. 437/51, document b).
121 “tecdīd-i ṣadāḳat ve ʿubūdiyet etmekde olduḳları,” BOA Y.A.HUS. 437/51, document b), line 1-2.
122 “ḳuzu derisi ḳalpaḳ Bulgar kisve-i milliyesi cümlesinden olub,”  BOA Y.A.HUS. 437/51, document b), line 3.
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disapproval  of  it  by  the Bulgarians  would  eventually  be  contemplated,  he  continues.
These are quite reserved concessions and the Grand Viziers remarks are not without
jugdement and thus he declares: “it is contemplated if their [the Bulgarians] desperate
and selfish objections are worth to be considered.”123 
Moreover,  the  Grand Vizier  proclaimed that  he  had drawn the attention of  the
authorities in the province Salonika on the issue and ordered inquiries to find out the if
fez had been worn by the Bulgarians, and if it had been taken off after the regiment left.
The Grand Vizier  presumably referred to the same letter  (işʿarat-i  mahalliyye – local
dispatch) as the governor  of  Salonika in the document dated two days earlier  which
contained the information that  the  aforementioned Bulgarians  replaced the fez  again
with the kalpak. This letter of the Grand Vizier seems to be a direct reply to the letter
written by the governor. 
The Grand Vizierate issued another dispatch on the case to the Ministry of Interior
and the General Staff (seraskeriyye), stating that it was improper to prohibit the wearing
of the fez by the “Bulgarians” because they were doing it according to their own will.
The location where the incident took place, Cumi-i Bala, is today's Blagoevgrad in
Bulgaria. It remained under Ottoman rule from the end of the 14th until the Balkan Wars
of 1912/13. Under Ottoman rule the town had a Muslim majority.124 
That's  how  I  think  the  incident  occurred:  The  governor  of  the  vilayet  Selanik
intervened because he assumed the mentioned Bulgarians were forced to wear a fez, but the
central government concluded after investigations that it was their free will to take off the
kalpak, an assumption which the government underlined by the fact that they were Ottoman
citizens/subjects. While the Grand Vizier in hiwas reply to the report from the governor of
Selanik concludes that such an act of enforcing the fez was unacceptable and should not take
place again, later documents, such as the draft from the Grand Vizier's scribal office, assess
that the Bulgarians were Ottoman subjects and wore the fez voluntarily.125
Remarkably here the headgear was negotiated on the basis  of national  identity,
namely Bulgarian - the counterpart of which was Ottoman. Unfortunately we do not
123 “şimdi fes  iktisāsıyla  mecbūr  ṭutılıyor  ise  me'yūsiyyet  ve  ġarāzkārlarının  iʿtirāzātını istilzām  edub
etmeyeceği (even though it is now obligatory to wear the fez, and because it will be contemplated if
their  desperate  and  selfish  objections  are  worthy  of  being  considered),”  BOA  Y.A.HUS.  437/51,
document b), line 3-4.
124 See Karpat, Ottoman Population 1830 - 1914.
125 BOA BEO 1951/146299, line 3-4. 
 115
3 Politics of Identity during the Hamidian Period
learn anything more about  the people  designated as  Bulgarian here.  What  was their
social position? Were they state officials or army officers or was the entire population of
the region targeted by this intervention?
In relation to this case another interesting incident appeared that dealt with the
military uniform of Muslims in the Bulgarian army. The question posed, in a short note
by an officer at of the palace126 to a military commander of Salonika127 Hüseyin […] Paşa,
was if they should donned the Bulgarian uniform and cap or rather Ottoman military
dress. The further proceedings of this incidence are unknown.128
Bulgarian Identity
In that regard let me provide some remarks on Bulgarian identity and its meaning.
This  and other  Balkan identities  need to be  treated with caution,  since  as  Isa  Blumi
pointed out in his analysis, their meaning in great parts was constructed retroactively by
a nationalist discourse.129 Officially recognized non-Muslim communities, until 1830 they
were Greek Orthodox, Armenians and Jews. The multi-ethnic character of these groups
remained  up  until  the  twentieth  century.  Greek  Orthodox,  i.e.,  comprised  of  ethnic
Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbian, Albanian, Romanian, Turkish and Arabic-speaking natives.
The  production  of  a  separate  Bulgarian  ethnic  consciousness  was  linked  Hellenising
efforts of the Greek Orthodox. The influence of evangelical missionary schools finally led
to  the  establishment  of  the  Bulgarian  Orthodox  Church,  known  as  the  Bulgarian
Exarchate,  in  1870.  That  went  along  with  the  official  recognition of  Bulgarians  as  a
separate  ethnic  group  by  the  Sublime  Porte.130 This  further  contributed  to  the
development  of  a  new  ethnically-based  Bulgarian  community.  The  Bulgarians  and
Orthodox Albanians resisted against the hegemonic tendencies of the Greek Orthodox.
126 The name is illegible.
127 The title is partly illegible, too.
128 BOA Y.PRK.SRN. 4/21, 17 Nisan 1309 (April 29th, 1893).
129 Isa  Blumi suggests  that  being Bulgarian prior  to  1912 was something very different  than what  it
became afterwords, see  Blumi, Reinstating the Ottomans, 6. In addition he argues that solidarity with
the Ottoman state prevailed much longer then depicted in most (nationalist) narratives, see Ibid., 5.
130 See “Bulgarians” in  Selçuk Akşin Somel,  Historical Dictionary of the Ottoman Empire  (Lanham, Md.
[u.a.]: Scarecrow Press, 2012), 46. According to Somel, the Ottoman state took an ambivalent stance
towards  the  exarchate,  supporting  it  against  the  Ecumenical  Patriarchate  on  the  one  hand,  and
endeavored  to  limit  its  pan-Slavic  activities  on  the  other.  See  Selçuk  Akşin  Somel,  ‘Christian
Community Schools  during the Ottoman Reform Period’,  in  Late  Ottoman Society -The Intellectual
Legacy, ed. Elisabeth Özdalga (London: Routledge, 2005), 264-265 .
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The establishment of the Exarchate went along with the establishment of educational
activities  independent  from  the  Eucumenical  Patriarchate.131 The  Foundation  of  an
autonomous  principality  of  Bulgaria  in  1878  was  closely  linked  to  a  Bulgarian
insurrection in 1876, which led to the Russo-Ottoman War (1877-1878).  In 1908 Bulgaria
became a sovereign monarchy.
National Territory and Hats in the Aegean and Marmara Sea
Similar to the case discussed above which took place in Devin in 1886, in the same
year  another  hat  with a special  feature appeared on the Greek-Ottoman border132.  In
contrast  to  the  religious  symbol  which  appeared  in  Northern  Thrace,  this  time  the
appliqué  was  directly  linked  to  the  claim  of  national  territory:  The  hat  of  a  Greek
national was confiscated when he wanted leave Turkey for Greece from Izmir. A map
attached to its lining depicted some Aegean islands and places on the Aegean coastline.
Dated November 1, 1886, a document sent by the Ministry of Interior to the Grand Vizier
discussed the incident.133 The Ministry of Interior remarks that the appearance of such a
hat could negatively influence Ottoman-Greek relations. The import of the hat would not
be permitted because the Greek claim on Asia minor was a source of permanent conflict
between  Greece  and  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Ottoman  ambassadors  in  Europe  and
especially  in  Greece  should  find  out,  the  ministry  claimed,  where  this  hat  had  been
manufactured and how widespread its use was. The authors expressed confidence that
the matter would be solved in such a way that its import to the Ottoman Empire would
be stopped. In addition, the Ottoman government expected a letter of apology from the
Greek government, even though they did not regard them as initiators of the affair.
They  emphasized  that  no  diplomatic  consequences  should  be  drawn  from  the
appearance of the aforementioned hat. It was solely the responsibility of the factory that
such  a  hat,  which  had  attached  the  map  as  an  embellishment,  was  produced  and
distributed.  According to the main police station in Aydin, the shops there and on the
131 See Somel, ‘Christian Community Schools during the Ottoman Reform Period,’ 258; see also the article
in  Encyclopaedia of  Islam  on  millet: Ursinus,  M.O.H.,  ‘Millet’,  in  Encyclopaedia  of  Islam,  Second
Edition., ed. Bearman, Bianquis, and Bosworth, 2014;  and Halil İnalcık, Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi
(Beyoğlu, İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık ve Kitapçılık, 1992); and Karpat, ‘Millets and Nationality: The Roots
of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Period’.
132 BOA DH.MKT. 1383/105, 15 Teşrin-i Evvel 1302 (October 27th,, 1886), document b).
133 BOA DH.MKT. 1375/55, 20 Teşrin-i Evvel 1302  (November 1st , 1886).
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peninsula  Aynaroz (Mount Athos) in today's Greece, which potentially sold these hats
had been searched, but no other hats of the kind were found. The State called for the
most  suitable  intervention  in  that  case.  On  a  diplomatic  level,  no  results  could  be
obtained concerning the banning of the production of this hat.134
Lesbos
In 1895 a conflict concerning local administrative councils in the Island of Lesbos 135
reflected concerns among government officials over headgear and male national identity.
The  conflict  revolved  around  the  issue  of  irredentist  Greek  nationalism  among  the
population  of  Lesbos,  and  tensions  between  Christians  and  Muslims  in  local
administrative councils. Christian members of the councils had appeared with hats in the
councils meetings instead of the fez. Corresponding with the administrators of the island,
the Ministry of Interior was concerned about the nationalist leanings of some Christian
council  members,  as  well  as  about  having  a  Christian  majority  in  the  council.  In  a
measure  that  was  intended  to  reestablish  the  authority  of  the  Ottoman Empire,  the
central government forced Christian administrators to wear the fez if they wanted to
keep their political mandate.136
The local administrative councils set up  by the 1864 provincial regulations  were
part of the bureaucratic reorganization of the Ottoman Empire, and became an arena in
which the local population and the Ottoman state negotiated ethnic, religious, national as
well  as  gendered identities.137 M.  Safa  Saraçoglu  in  his  analysis of  Ottoman
governmentality refers to Michel Foucault's definition of governmentality which implies
the analysis of a complex form of power directed towards the population. His unique
134 My question here is if the two incidences (hac resim  and  harita) can be related to each other even
though one is connected to the delineation of national territory, and the other to religion.
135 The island of Lesbos was a part of the Ottoman Empire from from 1462 to 1912.
136 BOA DH.MKT 11/17.
137 During the Tanzimat,  before the Reform edict  of 1856 secured equal access to official posts,  these
councils were the first institutions of state administration where non-Muslims participated on a regular
basis, even though as Carter V. Findley points out, these were not actual official ranks and far beyond a
step toward legal equality of Ottoman non-Muslims. See Carter V. Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom:
A Social History (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Pr., 1989), 33. On the aspect of governmentality in regard
to the function of these councils see: M. Safa Saraçoğlu, ‘Some Aspects of Ottoman Governmentality at
the Local Level: The Judicio-Administrative Sphere of the Vidin County in the 1860s and 1870s.’,  Ab
Imperio, no. 2 (2008): 1–32. On the local councils see also  Stanford J. Shaw, ‘The Central Legislative
Councils in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Reform Movement Before 1876’, International Journal of
Middle East Studies 1, no. 1 (January 1970): 51–84, doi:10.1017/S0020743800023904.
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study  on  late  Ottoman  governmentality  allows  to  evaluate  Ottoman  bureaucratic
transformation in a different light and in contrast to conventional historiography grants
agency  to  members  of  society  in  relation  to  the  state.  He argued that  in  the  late
nineteenth century Ottoman Empire at the local level a “judicio-administrative sphere”138
emerged that local agents could utilize. The local administration councils, which were in
the  focus  of  Saraçoglu's  study became a  space  were  identity  was  contested  and
constituted  especially  between  competing  nationalist  projects  and  between  state  and
society.  The case  of  Lesbos  is  an  example  of this reorganization of  state  power  and
demonstrates how headgear was employed to negotiate this very interrelationship. At
the same time it shows how the state directed its measures of modernization toward the
male  body  in  the  service  of  nation-building,  although  these  actions  initially  focused
mostly on political elites.139
The unequal distribution of seats in the council of Lesbos amongst the communities
was mentioned in these documents as seats had to actually be distributed evenly among
Ottoman Muslims and non-Muslims.140 Exceptions could only be made when not enough
Muslims would meet the required standards of wealth. The situation on Lesbos reflected
some major lines of conflict emerging in Ottoman society during the nineteenth century.
Tuning with European domination, some members of  the Christian communities had
acquired higher status and wealth through trade activities. The economic gap between
Muslims and Mon-Muslims had widened with the integration of the Ottoman Empire
into  world  economy  and  the  legal  protection  that  some  Ottoman  Christians  gained
through the capitulations.141 Therefore, with the introduction of local councils and the
consequent question of who was to represent the Ottoman state, the Christian majority
in  Lesbos  acquired  a  new  weight.142 In  this  documented  incident,  state  officials
differentiate Ottoman men along ethno-religious and class lines. Christian members of
the local councils are asked to conform to modernized Ottoman identity symbolized by
the  fez,  because  by  wearing  the  hat  they  would  disassociate  themselves  and  their
138 Saraçoğlu, ‘Some Aspects of Ottoman Governmentality at the Local Level’.
139 See Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700 - 1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), 109.
140 Members of the councils were elected by and amongst the local notables in a complicated procedure,
Saraçoğlu, ‘Some Aspects of Ottoman Governmentality at the Local Level’. 19-22.
141 See: Beinin, Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East, 44.
142 İdris Bostan, Ege Adaları’nın İdari, Mali ve Sosyal Yapısı, Stratejik Araştırma ve Etüdler Milli Komitesi
(SAEMK) Araştırma Projeleri  Dizisi,  2/2003 (Ankara:  Stratejik Araştırma ve Etüdler Milli  Komitesi,
2003), 355-362.
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respective  community  from  the  Ottoman  state.  The  case  also  demonstrates  how an
eventually new class of merchants and manufacturers gained a formal voice in political
decisions.143
Büyükada 
Already in August 1893 (1309) the wearing of the hat on another coastal island
arose displeasure within the Ottoman government, this time on Büyükada in the Sea of
Marmara.144 Once again, the treatment of the case involved presumable the relation of
Ottoman Christians to the Ottoman state, though not explicitly mentioned. In a letter by
the ministry of Interior to the Municipality of Istanbul two cases were treated in relation
to each other.145 The major part of the dispatch dealt with the spread of bad smells on
Büyükada,  and  a  smaller  part  referred  to  the  mayor  and  the  administrators  of  the
municipality of the island walking the streets with their hats. The hat-walking incident
was linked to spread of a bad smell in the area of the beach. Even though no reference is
made to the mayor's identity, and neither his name nor ethnic or religious identity or any
other  description  were  mentioned,  I  assume  that  issues  of  citizenship  and  national
belonging are negotiated here. Inhabited by in the majority by Ottoman Greek Orthodox,
the Prince Islands appeared as a  location in the struggle for nation-building and the
construction of national identity, and the mayor and his staff probably were Ottoman
Christians, too.146 Otherwise, if they would had been Muslim, reference to the violation of
religious codes would have been mentioned, I suggest.
The Ministry of Interior gave attention to the matter because Büyük Ada was “an
important place,”147 and thus it was unacceptable that such a condition, meaning the bad
smell  and  its  unmentioned  cause,  would  continue.  It  was  seen  as  “dangerous  and
143 See Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700 – 1922, 109.
144 Büyükada is the largest of the Prince's islands in the Sea of Marmara close to Istanbul, administratively
they belonged and still belong to the municipality of the Istanbul province as a separate district.
145 BOA DH.MKT. 120/11, (14 Ağustos 1309 (26 August  26th, 1893)).
146 Population numbers are only available since the Ottoman population census carried out in 1914. Before
then the Prince Islands were not listed separately. There the population of all nine islands together is
listed as a total number of 11,087, among them 1,586 Muslims, 8,725 Greeks, 569 Armenians, 79 Jews, 5
Greek catholics, 56 Armenian Catholics, 6 Protestants, 8 Latins, 5 Suryani and 21 Serbians. See Karpat,
Ottoman Population 1830 – 1914, 170-171.
147 “mühim bir mahalle,” BOA DH.MKT. 120/11.
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harmful” and “a violation of refinement.”148 Even though the district governor had asked
the mayor to take action, he had remained idle in this matter and the discomfort of the
population caused by the smell continued, the document says. While urgent action was
required, the mayor and his administrative staff preferred to walk around idly with their
hats. They were thus represented by the ministry as some kind of a dandy prototype and
urban flâneurs who were not capable of fulfilling their ascribed tasks while the populace
suffered under their vanity.
3.8 Clothing and National Belonging in Ottoman Non-Muslim and
Foreign Mission Schools
Schools  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  became  another  space  to  negotiate  Ottoman
sovereignty by the means of  dress.  Education was a contested terrain since Ottoman
efforts to modernize education competed with foreign states' missionary endeavors and
Ottoman non-Muslim schools. Hamidian politics put enormous efforts into the expansion
and transformation of the Ottoman education system. More than 10,000 schools were
founded during Abdülhamid II's reign. These educational endeavors formed a conscious
effort to confine and counter the ambitions of other agents who wanted to gain influence
on these grounds within the Ottoman realm.149 Nation-building and the establishment of
a notion of citizenship went along with the growing accessibility to education.150
I will introduce a couple of cases which took place between 1895 (1311) and 1901
(1317)  and  that  dealt  with  school  uniforms  and  more  specifically  with  appropriate
headgear at schools. The first of these took place in 1896 (1311) in a Christian (Bulgarian
Orthodox?) school in the Thracian village Tarfa where the Ministry of Education accused
a  teacher  from the  local  school  of  wearing  a  hat.151 On  the  same  year  central  state
interventions targeted the Armenian school in Istanbul where a teacher had invited his
students  to  wear  a  hat  while  state  authorities  insisted  on  a  return  to  the  fez. 152
148 “muhill-i nezaket,”  BOA DH.MKT. 120/11.
149 See Benjamin C. Fortna, Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire ,
1. publ (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002), 45-48.
150 On the establishment of an Ottoman education system see also Selçuk Akşin Somel, The Modernization
of Public  Education in the Ottoman Empire 1839 - 1908:  Islamization,  Autocracy,  and Discipline ,  The
Ottoman Empire  and  Its  Heritage :  Politics,  Society  and  Economy.  -  Leiden  [U.a.] :  Brill,  1994-  22
(Leiden [u.a.]: Brill, 2001).
151 BOA MF.MKT.  302/43.
152 BOA DH.TMIK.M. 5/44; BOA MF.MKT 323/22; BOA DH.TMIK.M. 70/9.
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Additionally, in 1896 the French school in Bursa stood at the focus of inquiries on its
clothing practices.  According to  a  report  issued  again  by  officials  of  the  Ministry of
Education the  school  administration had  induced  their  students  to  don some sort  of
uniform hats.153 In 1898 (1313) authorities, this time in Beirut, again dealt with a French
school.  They  interfered  in  the  wearing  of  caps  with  an  inscription  saying “Le  petit
Français.”154 The last case in this  series took place in 1900 (1315) and interfered with
school uniforms of the Romanian Trade School in Salonika.155
The relation of the Ottoman state to Christian community schools was determined
by the Reform edict of 1856. Before that, no well-defined policy of the Ottoman state
concerning these  school  existed.  In the edict  the  “sincere  bond of  citizenship”156 was
verbalized, including a right to create schools for every non-Muslim community. These
had to be supervised by the state. A legal framework for these schools was provided in
1869 with the Regulations for Public Education (Maarif-i Umumiyye Nizamnamesi).157 It
differentiated between public and private schools: the former were government schools,
and the latter were set up by individuals and initiatives. The Ministry of Education or the
provincial  educational  administration  examined  the  curriculum  and  approved  course
contents to see if they were in accordance with public morality and state policies. This
was necessary to receive the official permit.158 
On the provincial level, the application of these regulations took some time and
only  in  the  Hamidian  period  a  more  efficient  control  was  established  through  the
expansion of a provincial-level educational administration. In 1896, a regulation on the
duties of provincial educational directors came into force with structural shortcomings
which restricted the implication of that regulation. The Ottoman State had difficulties to
finance the growing provincial  bureaucracy and hence to provide enough officers  to
fulfill these tasks. Finding persons with the abilities needed for these posts who had the
knowledge of the different languages in which classes were held in these schools and in
153 BOA A.}MKT.MHM. 655/29.
154 BOA MF.MKT. 383/11 (3 and 4 Kanun-i Sani 1313 (January 15th  and 16th 1898)).
155 BOA MF.MKT 550/28. Later, between 1905-1910 a view more cases that dealt with school uniforms and
hats  appeared,  but  these  took  place  in  a  different  context.  See  BOA MF.MKT.  825/70;  BOA BEO
3510/263239;  DH.MUİ. 35/-1/15; MF.MKT 1154/15 ; DH.MUİ.  101/62.
156 “revābit-i ḳalbiye-i vatandaş,” BOA MF:MKT 550/28
157 See Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill, 1964), 179-180.
158 Ruhsat-i resmiyye,  see BOA MF.MKT 550/28; and  Somel,  ‘Christian Community Schools during the
Ottoman Reform Period,’ 270-272.
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which the schoolbooks were written, posed another problem.159 Most of the affairs I am
dealing with in this chapter took place with the involvement these educational directors
introduced in 1896.
Selçuk  A.  Somel  writes about  an extreme politicization of  Christian community
schools in the last quarter of the nineteenth century which became expressed in Balkan
irredentism.  In  reaction  to  that  he  argues,  the  Ottoman  state  violated  the  official
regulations by the measures it took towards these schools. That was especially the case
when the state played out different communities against one another, as in the example
of  the  Bulgarian  and  Greek  Orthodox.  The  government's  support  for  their  schools
changed according to the political situation and strategy of the central administration.
Christian community schools became a means of “manipulation of competing interests
for the sake of imperial territorial integrity.”160 
The school in the Bulgarian Village Tarfa in Eastern Thrace
At  the  end  of  the  year  1895  local  authorities  launched  an  inquiry  regarding  a
teacher of the Christian middle school in Tarfa in Eastern Thrace.161 He had appeared in
school wearing a hat and thus was summoned to the muhtar (local administrator), where
he  did  not  appear  for  an  investigation  of  his  citizenship  and  an examination  of  his
papers.162 Subsequently the director of Middle Schools of Çatalça (Çatalça iʿdādi müdīri)
transferred the case to the Ministry of Education, as the police and the Prime Minister
(neẓāretpenāh) had ordered him to do.163 
The case starts out with the discussion of new regulations concerning Christian
schools in the Ottoman Empire. According to the school inspectorate, those regulations
which had recently been issued had not yet been implemented as it informs the governor
159 Somel  states  that  these  deficiencies  caused  the  frequent  employement  of  supporters  of  separatist
organization as teachers at these schools. Ibid., 270-272.
160 Ibid., 272.
161 BOA MF.MKT.  302/43;  Tarfa in the district Terkos,  is located in Eastern Thrace, close to Istanbul. It
was a village in the sancak Çatalça. Today Çatalça is part of the municipality of Istanbul.
162 Middle (iʿdadi)  schools were a sensitive issue in the Ottoman education system because they were a
missing link between Ottoman primary schools and higher education, see Fortna, Imperial Classroom, 57.
163 BOA MF.MKT. 302/43  (11 Kanun-i Evvel 1311 (Dezember  23rd 1895)). On the struggle for spheres of
influence and national identity between the Ottoman and its neighboring states in border regions in
Rumelia carried out through schools see Ibid., 70-71.
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(müteṣarrıf) of the sancak (subdivision of a province).164 Moreover, the inspectorate linked
the prevalence of languages other than Turkish in class to the wearing of some kind of
cap, called ḳapela.165 
First of all, the director of the middle school administration declared that there was
a misunderstanding concerning the implementation of Turkish as a medium of teaching
at village schools, such as in Tarfa, next to the above mentioned case of the hat-wearing
teacher.  In  both  cases  he  awaits  instructions  on  how  to  proceed.  Thereupon  the
Inspection des Ecoles non Muslumane et Etranger of the Ministry of Education intervened,
declaring, as instruction to the school administration, that the mentioned teacher had to
wear the fez, because it was a “marker of citizenship (ʿalāmet-i tābiʿyyet),”166 if it turned
out  that  he  actually  was  an  Ottoman citizen.167 In  addition,  the  inspection  mentions
another point which was the application of a “harmful program and books”168 in class.
The teaching of  these  programs and the use of  these books,  whose contents  are  not
specified further, was to be prevented, and teachers, male or female, without a diploma
/certificate (şehadetname) should not be kept.169 A couple of weeks later a final dispatch,
dated January 20th,  1896 (8 Kanun-i Evvel 1311) on the affair appears, is issued by the
Ministry of Education, and is addressed to the middle school administration of Çatalca. It
confirms the decision made by the Inspection des Ecoles non Muslumane et Etranger.170
The teacher's religious identity is not at question here. The permit for him to wear
a brimmed hat or not and his duty to wear a fez are exclusively linked to the question if
he  was  an  Ottoman  citizen  or  not.  Nevertheless  religious  identity  is  also  of  some
importance here since the affair is discussed in relation to regulations concerning non-
164 BOA MF.MKT.  302/43, document a) (7 Kanun-i Evvel 1311 (December 19 th, 1895) ; School inspector to
governor (mütesarrıf) of the  sancak (subdivision of a province);  document b) 8 Kanun-i Evvel 1311
(December 20th,  1895);  School inspector to unknown recipient; document c) 11 Kanun-i Evvel 1311
(December 23rd,  1895),  director  of  middle  schools  of  Çatalça  (Çatalça  iʿdadi  müdiri)  to Ministry  of
Education;  document  d)  28  Kanun-i  Evvel  1311 (January 9 th,  1896),  from  Inspection des  Ecoles  non
Muslumane et Etranger to unknown recipient; document e) 1 Kanun-i  Sani 1311 (January 13 th, 1896),
Ministry of Education to director of Middle Schools of Çatalça (Çatalça iʿdadi müdiri).
165 The  inspectorate  does  not  mention  other  language(s)  that  might  have  been  used  in  class.  BOA
MF.MKT.  302/43 (11 Kanun-i Evvel 1311 (November 23rd, 1895).
166 BOA MF.MKT.  302/43.
167 BOA MF.MKT.  302/43: document d) 11 Kanun-i Evvel 1311 (December 23rd, 1895).
168 “mużirr program ve kitāb,” BOA MF.MKT.  302/43.
169 According  to  the  “Regulations  for  Public  Education  (Maarif-i  Umumiyye  Nizamnamesi)”  of  1869,
instructors  at  private  schools  needed  a  work  permit  called  şehadetname,  see  Somel,  ‘Christian
Community Schools during the Ottoman Reform Period,’ 270.
170 BOA MF.MKT.  302/43: document e) 1  Kanun-i Sani 1311 (January 13th, 1896).
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Muslims Ottoman schools and dealt with by, amongst others, the  Inspection des Ecoles
non  Muslumane  et  Etranger.  As  an  ethno-national  category,  Bulgarian  identity  is
mentioned by the officials since they designated Tarfa as a Bulgarian village, yet this is
not  further  discussed.  By  the  reference  to  the  decree  that  regulates  the  teaching  in
Ottoman Muslim and Christian schools, the discussion about the teacher's headgear is
linked to a broader discourse on the status of non-Muslim schools specifically, and the
status of the Ottoman non-Muslims in general.  The document combines the fields of
dress,  citizenship  and  nation-building  and  provides  an  example  of  its  interwoven
negotiation.
The Armenian School in Yenikapı, Istanbul
Another incident in this series took place at  the Armenian school in Yenikapı, a
quarter in Istanbul located on the Marmara sea, on the southern shore of the peninsula of
the historical city center.171 The school's name was Mosediciyan or Mosdiciyan ( نايجيدسوم),
and was located in the neighborhood Sanduk Beruni ( ينورب قودنص). Dated May 21, 1896 (9
Mayıs 1312), the Minister of Police (Zabtiye Nazarı) issued the first document on the case
appearing in the records which was addressed to the ministry of education.172 The Police
Ministry accused the school's teacher Kigork ( قروغيك) of telling his students to shun the fez
and to wear a hat in its place while arguing that the school was not an Ottoman but a
European  one.  Kirgok  himself  was  designated  as  Romanian  citizen.  The  minister
considered Kirgork's behavior a “malicious act (bedahane)” and an indicator that he was a
“mischief maker (erbab-ı fesad).”173 On May 28, 1896 (16 Mayıs 1312) the Ministry of  Police
had also informed the Ministry of Interior of the case, whom in turn also addressed the
Ministry  of  education  and notified  the  Commission  of  Accelerated  Procedure  (Tesriʿ-i
Muʿamelat Komisyonu), who was entrusted with the case.174 The following step was having
171 BOA DH.TMIK.M. 5/44, Dahiliye Tesriʿ-i Muʿamelat Komisyonu: document a)  9 Mayıs 1312 (May 21st,
1896); document b) 16 Mayıs 1312 (May 28th, 1896); MF.MKT 323/22, document a) 16 Mayıs 1312 (May
28th, 1896); document b): 27 Mayıs 1312  (June 8th, 1896); document c) 28 Mayıs 1312 (June 9th, 1896);
document 22 Hazıran 1312 (July 4th, 1896); DH.TMIK.M.  70/9: document a) 22 Hazıran 1312 (July 4th,
1896); document b) 29 Hazıran 1312 (July 11th, 1896).
172 BOA DH.TMIK.M.. 5/44: document a) 9 Mayıs 1312 (May 21 st, 1896) and document b) 16 Mayıs 1312
(May 28th, 1896):  these two documents are identical, one is a draft and the other a fair copy.
173 BOA DH.TMIK.M. 5/44: a) 9 Mayıs 1312 (May 21st, 1896), line 5.
174 This commission had been established to implement several administrative reforms urged by England,
France and Russia which also dealt with Armenian political participation. According to Nadir Özbek's
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an inspector sent to the school. A document issued by him on June 8, 1896 (27 Mayıs 1312)
provides more details about the school itself.175 First of all,  he spelled the name of the
school different then in the other documents of the case.176 The inspector's  spelling is
Moşedudciyan or Moşdudciyan ( نايخدودشم) which, according to him, was at the same time
the name of the Romanian citizen who managed the school. The school had about seventy
students, male and female. Some of whom had Russian ancestors while some had Ottoman
ancestors. Ten of them, he assesses, had always worn a fez, while others put on their own
fezzes after he issued a warning. The remaining students who did not posses a fez were
told to procure one for themselves within five to ten days. The principal assured that until
then all  students  would wear a fez.  He does  not  mention the teacher who was made
responsible  for  the  wearing of  hats  in  the  other  dispatches  nor  does  he mention  the
wearing of hats at all. Furthermore, the inspector declares he could not find harmful books
or similar material which were against the regulations.
The  next  day,  on  June  9th,  1896 (28  Mayıs  1312)  the  Inspection  des  Ecoles  non-
Musulmane & Etranger issued an urgent letter to the school inspection with a statement
on the affair, declaring that the wearing of hats had to be avoided because “it will violate
the  students'  attributes  and  qualities  of  citizenship.”177 Instead,  “by  any  means,  a
manifestation of the submission to the regulations of the state”178 was required. Hence
the  teacher  had  been  warned  “in  appropriate  language,  that  the  students  would  not
confuse and violate the citizens'/subjects' ideas and minds with harmful suggestions.” 179
Moreover,  the  document  contains  the  information  already  provided  by  the  school
inspector himself in his report. The documents available in the files of the Ministry of
Education suggest that they closed the case with a report to the Ministry of Interior
account, these reforms had already been set in the Berlin Treaty of 1878 but not been realized yet.
Nadir Özbek, ‘“Anadolu Islahatı”, “Ermeni Sorunu” ve Vergi Tahsildarlığı, 1895-1908’, Tarih ve Toplum
Yeni Yaklaşımlar, no. 9 (2009): 58–85; and MF.MKT 323/22 (16 Mayıs 1312 (May 28th, 1896)), issued by
the Commission of Accelerated Procedure (Tesriʿ-i Muʿamelat Komisyonu) of the Ministry of Interior to
Ministry of Education.
175 Unfortunately some of the writing is faded, and thus difficult to read: MF.MKT 323/22: document b) 27
Mayıs 1312  (June 8th, 1896).
176 I could not find any other information on the school and the way its name might be spelled. 
177 “ṭālebenin sıfāt-ı tābiʿyyetlerini ihlāl edecek,”  BOA MF.MKT 323/22: document c) 28 Mayıs 1312 (June
9th, 1896), line 4.
178 “niẓāmāt-ı devlete her vechile iẓḥār-ı inḳıyād,” BOA MF.MKT 323/22: document c) 28 Mayıs 1312 (June
9th, 1896), line 5.
179 ”iṭfāl tebaʿanın efkār ve eẕhānını teşvīş ve telkīnāt-ı muẕırrde bulunmaması lisān-ı münāsible  [kendisine]
tenbīh),” BOA MF.MKT 323/22: document c) 28 Mayıs 1312 (June 9th, 1896), line 6, 7.
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which repeated information and statements provided above.180 A couple of days later, in
conclusion of the affair, the Commission of Accelerated Procedure of the Ministry also
sent a copy of this letter to the Ministry of the Police.181
Armenian Schools in the Ottoman Empire
The incident at the  Mosediciyan Armenian school needs to be considered against
the background of the situation of Armenian schools in the Ottoman Empire, and the
repressions  against  the  Armenian  population  between  1894  and  1896.  According  to
Somel, prior to the nineteenth century a considerable educational network of Ottoman
Armenian schools did not exist besides a few monastic and other schools.182 Similar to
other religious communities in the Ottoman Empire, Armenians were not a linguistically
homogeneous group. Armenian was just spoken by a number of well-educated members
of the community while around 1870, about half of the community spoke Turkish while
the other half spoke various mixtures of Turkish, Kurdish and Armenian. Turkish was
used for religious as well as daily purposes. The great majority of Armenians belonged to
the  Armenian  Apostolic  church,  which  was  officially  recognized  by  the  Ottoman
authorities under the reign of Mahmud II (1415-1481). Prior to the 1860s the Armenian
community was administered by a coalition of clergy and bankers with close relations to
the Sublime Porte. Similar to the Greek Orthodox community, the rise of a merchant
class within the community led to the strengthening of this Armenian middle class's role
in community affairs  which introduced different and new political  ideals  inspired by
constitutionalism and liberalism.183 
The gap in Armenian schooling was filled by American Protestant missionaries in
Anatolia. Armenian schooling was triggered in an effort to counter these activities, and
especially the newly emerging middle  classes  put  emphasis on the development of  a
schooling  network.  The  curricula  of  these  schools  contained  criticism  of  religious
fundamentalism and were critical of the Armenian clergy and old community structures.
180 The Ministry of Education justifies the police investigations on the case with a directive issued by the
Grand Vizier on the supervision of non-Muslim and foreign schools on April 28, 1896: BOA MF.MKT
323/22: document d) 22 Hazıran 1312 (July 4th, 1896), line 4. The content of the directive is not mentioned.
181 BOA DH.TMIK.M. 70/9: document b) 29 Hazıran 1312 (July 11th, 1896).
182 Somel, ‘Christian Community Schools during the Ottoman Reform Period,’ 267-270.
183 In 1863 an Armenian constitution was introduced (Nizamname-i Ermeniyan) which was approved by
the Porte, Ibid., 268.
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Somel also states that they contained anti-Ottoman and anti-Muslim propaganda, thus
provoking  the  attention  of  Ottoman  authorities  in  the  Hamidian  period  leading  to
repressions  against  these  schools.  Classes  on  “the  history  of  the  Armenians  and  the
Armenian church” were banned. That ban was avoided by teaching these classes orally.
In 1893 the Union of Armenian schools was abolished.184 
Repressions against the Armenian population culminated in the massacres of 1894-
96.  Schools  were hit  the  hardest  among the community institutions  by these  events.
Many teachers had been involved or were said to be involved in Armenian revolutionary
activities,  Somel  argues,  and  thus  the  schools  weakened  by  their  arrest  or  death.
Generally the Armenian schools suffered of a shortage of teachers all the time. Catholic
and Protestant missionary schools welcomed the weakening of the Armenian schools and
happily filled the gap.185
The French School in Bursa
The next case which was extensively discussed by several ministries took place at
the French  Ḫocaʿalīzāde school in Bursa, which belonged to the catholic Assumptionist
congregation  (Esompisyon Ruhani Şirketi).186 Informed by a letter of the Administration
of the Bursa province and received on November 4th,  1896 (23 Teşrin-i Evvel 1312), the
Ministry of Education took action against the wearing of hats by all students. According
to  the  ministry,  the  students  were  mostly  Greek  Orthodox  (rum),  Armenian,  and
Armenian- Catholic Ottomans.187 In a dispatch to the Grand Vizier dated November 10th,
184 Ibid., 269.
185 As a result foreign missionary activities, Catholic Armenians were recognized already in 1830 and in
1850 Protestants were also officially been recognized. Ibid., 258; and Ursinus, M.O.H, ‘Millet’. 
186 It was named after and probably also located at the Ḫocaʿalīzāde quarter in the historical town center
of Bursa. The origins of missionary schools can be traced back to the 15th century. They were first
established by a catholic order in the Kosovo region and Shkoder in the Balkans, in Izmir, Kayseri,
Sivas and Trabzon in Anatolia and at Mount Lebanon, in Palestine,  and Nothern Iraq in the Arab
Provinces. Somel, ‘Christian Community Schools during the Ottoman Reform Period,’ 258. 
187 BOA A.}MKT.MHM. 655/29), chronological order: document a) 29 Teşrin-i Evvel 1312 (November 10 th,
1896): Education Minister to Grand Vizier; document b) 3 Teşrin-i Sani 1312 (November 15 th, 1896):
Grand Vizierate to Foreign Ministry; document c) 7 Teşrin-i Sani 1312 (November 19 th, 1896): Ministry
of Interior to Grand Vizier; document d) 7 Teşrin-i Sani 1312,  Grand Vizier to Bursa vilayeti; document
e) 7 Teşrin-i Sani 1312 November 19th, 1896), Bursa Valisi to Grand Vizier; 26 Teşrin-i Sani 1312/ 3
Receb 1314, Grand Vizier to Foreign ministry; document f) 4 Kanun-i Evvel (Dezember 16 th,   1896),
Foreign Minister to Grand Vizier; document g) 4 Kanun-i Evvel 1312 (Dezember 16 th, 1896),  Grand
Vizierate  to  Foreign  Ministry;  document  h)  9  Kanun-i  Evvel  1312   (Dezember  21 th,  1896),  Grand
Vizierate  to  Ministry  of  Interior;  document  i)  9  Kanun-i  Evvel  1312 (Dezember  21 th,  1896),  Grand
Vizierate to the Ministry of Education.
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1896 (29 Teşrin-i Evvel 1312), the ministry also criticized the regular raising of the flag, the
arms drill (nişān taʿlimi) and music classes with a trumpet or a horn (boru).188 The head of
the school was an archpriest (baş papası) named Monsieur Marie Xavier. The Ministry of
Education had issued him a final warning, but he remained relentless. Thus the ministry
called for his dismissal and suggested that the parents of Ottoman students should be
given the “necessary advice, officially or unofficially, to send their children to national
schools.189”  To  prevent  the  wearing  of  this  “unconventional  cap”190 the  Ministry  of
Education had informed the heads of the respective religious communities. Thereupon,
the ministry continues, measures to stop this practice had already been implemented but
the music lessons, flag raising and arms drill continued. Which kind of measures were
these is not mentioned. The ministry assesses the situation as “something to be avoided,
now  and  in  the  future”191 without  mentioning  explicitly  what  they  considered
problematic about it.  Furthermore, the ministry did attest that such incidents had not
occurred before at that school and only began with the employment of above mentioned
head priest Monsieur Marie Xavier who had been transferred recently from the town of
Izmit because of similar reasons.192 
Finally  the minister  of  education calls  the  Ottoman government  to  take  urgent
measures against these missionary activities as he calls them, expressing that he fears
unrest among the students. Moreover, he says, the government should send a letter to the
embassy telling them to stop the improper practices mentioned above, as it was apparent
that Monsieur Marie Xavier's ideas were “harmful and fanatic.”193
A  couple  of  weeks  later,  on  November  15th,  1896  (3  Teşrin-i  Sani  1312)  and
November 19th, 1896 (7 Teşrin-i Sani 1312) Grand Vizierate passed the information on to
the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Interior, emphasizing that the school did not
experience  nor  tolerate  such  practices  previously  and  thus  they  were  just  related  to
Monsieur Marie Xavier's appearance.194 Moreover also on November 19, 1896, the Grand
188 I could not find out what was problematic about this item (boru).
189 “[…] iṭfālının mükātib millilerine naḳl żımnında velilerine icābına göre resmen veya ġayri resmen vesāyā-
yı lāzime  […]).” BOA A.}MKT.MHM. 655/29, 29 Teşrin-i Evvel 1312 (November 10th, 1896), line 5.
190 “ḫilāf-i ʿadāt kasket.“BOA A.}MKT.MHM. 655/29, 29 Teşrin-i Evvel 1312 (November 10th, 1896), line 6.
191 “ḥālen ve  istiḳbālen  muḥāẕīr,” BOA  A.}MKT.MHM. 655/29,  29  Teşrin-i  Evvel  1312 (November  10th,
1896), line 9.
192 Izmit is located about 100 km northeast of Bursa at the very east corner of the Sea of Marmara.
193 “mużırr ve müfrit,”  BOA A.}MKT.MHM. 655/29, 29 Teşrin-i Evvel 1312 (November 10th, 1896), line 16.
194 See BOA A.}MKT.MHM. 655/29, 3 Teşrin-i Sani 1312 (November 15th, 1896) Grand Vizierate to Foreign
Ministry, BOA A.}MKT.MHM 655/29, line 5. 655/29, 7 Teşrin-i Sani 1312 (November 19th, 1896) Grand
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Vizier  requested  information  regarding  several  cases  from  the  administration  of  the
province of Bursa via telegram: the illegal confinement of some innocent Armenians, the
ban for Armenian children to visit foreign schools, and the arrest of two Protestants. 195
The governor of the province Bursa provided a reply on the same day claiming that such
illegal confinement had not taken place, and that there was no ban for Armenian children
to  visit  foreign  schools.  He  added  that  the  arrest  of  the  two  Protestants  had  been
communicated duly to the Ministry of Interior.196 Yet he also commented on the above
mentioned occurrences at “a foreign school” whose name he does not mentioned here.
He provided further details  of the case,  claiming that the students dared to walk the
streets with their caps and would not stop doing so. Parents of the students who were
Ottoman citizens, he continued, had been advised by the Ministry of Interior “officially
and  unofficially”  to  send  their  children  to  “national  schools”.  Parents  of  Ottoman
Orthodox-Greek, Armenian, and Armenian-Catholic students had been told in addition
by “appropriate means”197 that if  the wearing of the hats would not be avoided, they
would receive the necessary warnings.198
On  December  16th,  1896  (4  Kanun-i  Evvel  1312)  the  Foreign  Ministry  issued  a
response to the letter sent by the Grand Vizierate with the information it had received
from the French Embassy.199 The officials of the embassy downplayed the incidents by
assessing  that  “this  kind  of  dress  and  caps,  as  those  of  the  students,  was  worn
everywhere and especially even in Istanbul.”200 Moreover the music lessons were a part of
the school curriculum, but only those students who wished to would participate. And
since the above-mentioned  students consisted of local Greek-Orthodox and Armenians,
those who did not want to wear those clothes were free to do so. Concerning the arms
drill, it was true that it existed as “an old pillar”201 which had been used as a target for
projectiles, but now was not in use anymore. Students would definitely not receive an
Vizierate to Ministry of the Interior.
195 See BOA  A.}MKT.MHM. 655/29,  3 Teşrin-i Sani 1312 (November 15th,  1896)  Grand Vizierate to the
provincal administration of Bursa.
196 See BOA A.}MKT.MHM. 655/29, 3 Teşrin-i Sani 1312 (November 15th, 1896), governor of Bursa to Grand Vizier.
197 “vāsıṭa-yı münāṣibe”   BOA A.}MKT.MHM. 655/29.
198 BOA A.}MKT.MHM. 655/29, 3 Teşrin-i Sani 1312 (November 15th, 1896), line 5-7.
199 BOA A.}MKT.MHM. 655/29,  4  Kanun-i  Evvel  1312 (January 16th,  1897),  Foreign Minister  to Grand
Vizier, reply to BOA A.}MKT.MHM. 655/29, 3 Teşrin-i Sani 1312 (November 15th, 1896) Grand Vizierate
to Foreign Ministry.
200 “şakīrdānın her yerde ve  ʿilā'h-ḫuṣūṣī  dersaʿādet'de bile  o yolda elbīse ve  kasket  giydikleri  [...]” BOA
A.}MKT.MHM 655/29, 4 Kanun-i Evvel 1312  (December 16th, 1896).
201 “eski bir direk” BOA  A.}MKT.MHM. 655/29, 4 Kanun-i Evvel 1312 (January 16th, 1897 ),  line 10.
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arms drill.  Accordingly,  the accusations against the mentioned priest  were untenable.
After that, the case was closed. The Grand Vizierate issued three more letters: to the
Foreign Ministry, to the Ministry of Interior, and to the Education Ministry respectively.
Final reports on the case repeated the information provided by the French embassy. The
wearing of the dress and the hat was not obligatory and thus not problematic, and the
participation in music classes was voluntary. The Grand Vizier continued that the raising
of the flag was performed on Sundays by members of the French community in Bursa
and thus was not directly related to the school and the classes. The target was intended
for the exclusive use of the teachers, but at the moment was not even used by them.
Saying this,  the Grand Vizierate largely refuted the charges made by the Ministry of
Education and the other offices involved which asked for its intervention and for the
dismissal of the principal.
The French School in Beirut
The next inquiry concerning clothing at schools appeared roughly a year later. In
January 1898 (1313)  another  French school  was affected by inquiries  of  the  Ottoman
authorities. The authorities took offense to the wearing of hats with the inscription “Le
petit Français” by students of the French school in Beirut.202 Two documents exist of the
case, both issued on January 15th, 1898 (3 Kanun-i Sani 1313) by the Ministry of Education.
One of the them is addressed to the Grand Vizier, signed by a member of the Encüman-i
Teftiş  ve  Muayene  (Council  of  Inspection and Examination)  Mustafa  Reşid  Şihab,  the
other  to  the  education  director (müdir)  of  the  Beirut  vilayeti.203 Mustafa  Reşid  Şihab
criticizes that the school administration accepted the wearing of the mentioned hat as a
202 The school was known by the name Ferir: BOA MF.MKT. 383/11, 3 Kanun-i Sani 1313 (January 15th,
1898), a) Encümen-i Teftiş ve Muayene of the Ministry of Education to the Grand Vizier, b) Ministry of
Education to the education director (müdir) of the Beirut province. There were four French and four
British schools in the province of Beirut in 1888 as well as a good number of missionary schools. Of all
the students of the foreign and non-Muslim schools in the province, approximately a third to a half
were Ottoman subjects  (even though the governor  of  Beirut  talks  of  about  90 percent).  On these
numbers and Ottoman efforts to counter the establishment of foreign schools in Beirut and prevent
their attendance by Ottoman students see Fortna, Imperial Classroom, 51-54. 
203 Introduced in 1886, the Encüman-i Teftiş ve Muayene (Council of Inspection and Examination) was part
of the Ministry of Education and dealt predominantly the with supervision and censorship of foreign-
language publications and, as becomes evident in this case, the inspection of foreign schools. See Ali
Akyıldız, ‘Maarif-I Umumiyye Nezareti’, in  Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi, ed. İlyas Üzüm
and Mustafa Çağrıcı, vol. 27 (Ankara, 2003), 273–74.
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distinguished feature of all students. This was evidently undesired and attracted attention
from a religious and political point of view, he argued, because among the students were
Ottoman citizens and residents of Beirut. In the first document the Grand Vizier is called
to investigate  the degree of  conformity and loyalty  to  the Ottoman state  among the
students. In the other document, the director of education in the province of Beirut is
called to undertake measures and ban the practice. Whether these measures were taken
and investigations took place is not noted in the records.
Romanian Trade School in Salonika
The last  case  I  am going to  treat  on this  matter  took place  in  Salonika. 204 The
incidence initially appeared in the records in spring 1900 (1315), and was picked up again
in August 1901 (1317). The authorities were busy with the illegal opening of trade schools
in Salonika, one denoted as Romanian, the other French.
On March  12th,  1900  (28  Şubat  1315)  the  director  of  education  of  the  Province
Salonika issued a letter to the Ministry of Education in order to obtain information and
instructions  on  proceedings  related  to  the  Romanian  Trade  School  Romanya  Ticaret
mektebi  (Romanya Ticaret  mektebi),  which  had  recently  opened  in  Salonika  without
possessing the necessary permit.205 According to the director, the school had attracted
attention when its students appeared in uniform dress, which was a garb made of dark
blue broadcloth, its collars embroidered with yellow and white flowers on both sides.
This  embroidery  the director  stated,  resembled  that  of  police  uniforms.  This  kind of
clothing  was  combined  with  a  cap  (kasket)  which  was  bordered  with  a  ribbon  and
decorated with some sort of emblems.206 By and large, the inspector sums up, the students
who were dressed in this  garb resembled foreign captains  (shipmasters)  and for  this
204 BOA MF.MKT 500/28: chronological order: a)  28 Şubat 1315 (March 12th,  1900),  Education Director
(müdir) of the Province Salonika to Ministry of Education; b)25 Mart 1316 (April 7 th, 1900) Inspection
des  Ecoles  non-Musulmanes  et  Etranges  to  unknown  recipient;  c)  5  Nisan  1316  (April  18 th,  1900)
Education Ministry to provincial administration of the Salonika; d) 14 Ağustos 1317 (August 27th, 1901)
Governor of Province Salonika to the Ministry of Education.
205 The opening of foreign schools without permission was a common practice. According to a report
issued in 1893 by the Ministry of Education, 341 of the 392 Protestant and American Schools in the
Empire  had  no  such  permit.  See  Fortna,  Imperial  Classroom, 77-78.  According  to  the  Educational
Regulation of 1869, the Ottoman government could close down nearly every private school, although it
rarely made use of it. See Ibid., 128.  
206 The writing does not provide further description of which kind or whose emblems this was. It might
have been the school's emblem.
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reason attracted the attention of the people in town. He adds that a similar practice also
appeared in another recently- opened school, the French trade school. The account of the
director provides insight into the landscape of foreign schools in Salonika. To compare
and evaluate the practice at the school, the director refers to clothing practices at other
schools in Salonika, stating that at the Italian, French, German and English schools the
students did not wear any kind of uniform dress, in contrast to the Bulgarian School and
the  Military  Academy.  Those  students'  dress  was  bordered  with  either  red  or  blue
ribbons, but they did not don peaked caps but a fez. In addition, their attire was not
embroidered, unlike that of the Romanian school's students.
Upon  the  request  of  the  education  director,  the  Inspection  des  Ecoles  Non-
Musulmanes et Etranges207 issued a report on the affair, adding the remark that Ottoman
students attended these schools and thus rendered these clothing practices problematic.208
Furthermore,  the inspectorate suggested that the adoption of these designs should be
corrected and explained:
“The  students  attending  the  aforementioned  school  are  Ottoman  subjects,  it  is
therefore  improper  for  them  to  wear  clothes  that  may  make  them  look  like
foreigners, and the matter should be corrected and explained. The exception to this
are uniforms worn by students of foreign and non-Muslim schools.”209 
Following this, the Ministry of Education forwarded the report to the Governor of
Salonika and charged him with the affair.210
The case was picked up again a year later. In August 1901 (1317), the Governor of
the province Salonika issued a letter to the Ministry of Education where he reported that
the dress of two students of the Romanian Trade School had recently provoked public
attention.211 Their  dress,  he  declares,  was  not  the  uniform  of  non-Muslim  schools,
combined with a hat.212 Whether it was about it not being the official school uniform but
207 Mekatib-i Gayri Müslime ve Ecnebiyye Müfettişlik.
208 BOA MF.MKT 500/28: document b).  The Inspection des ecoles non-musulmanes et etranges was part of
the Ministry of Education see Akyıldız, ‘Maarif-i Umumiyye Nezareti,’ 273-274.
209 “Meẕkūr mektebe devām eden ṭalebe devlet-i ʿaliyye tebaʿasından oldukları  ḥālde diğer ecnebī ve tebaʿa
mekteblerini ṭalebesinin ziyy ve kıyāfetleri ḫāricinde ve bir ecnebi tebaʿası şekīl ve tārzinda gösterilmesi
münāsib olmayup bunun ḥüsn-i ṣūretle tebdili esbābının istifsār buyrulması […]).” BOA MF.MKT 500/28,
b) line 6-8.
210 BOA MF.MKT 500/28, c) line 14.
211 BOA MF.MKT 500/28, d).
212 If not why was it problematic? See BOA MF.MKT 500/28, d) line 2.
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another kind of dress that was problematic is not specified here. Both were told that they
had to wear a fez while staying in their hometown Bitola (Manastır),  which was also
communicated  to  the  governor  of  same  province,  in  order  to  check  their  behavior.
Moreover,  the  school  should be  urged to  finally  implement the rearrangement  of  its
uniforms, as was decided in April 1900 (1316). 
Thus the Ottoman government was not able nor willing to implement the change of
dress  on  the  Romanian  Trade  School,  nor  did  it  take  any  action  against  its  illegal
establishment.  The  government  might  have  not  had  the  means  or  interest  in  taking
serious action against the school, while still surveying closely the behavior of Ottoman
students at these schools.
3.8.1 Non-Muslim Ottoman Schools and Missionary Schools 
The cases analyzed above must be considered in the light of the modernization of
education  in  the  Ottoman Empire  and  its  relation  to  the  establishment  of  Christian
missionary  schools.  In  his  book  on  education  in  the  late  Ottoman  Empire,  Fortna
analyzed the tensions between Ottoman endeavors to transform its system of education
and the presence of  foreign missionary and non-Muslim schools.213 This  is  especially
valid for the 1880s and 1890s, when the number of the latter grew significantly. Fortna
regards  this  competitive  context  as  crucial  to  the  understanding  the  Ottoman
undertaking.  Education  was  regarded  as  one  of  the  most  important  means  of  social
change on one hand, while it also enabled to control its pace and undesired effects such
as the feared loss of culture or morality on the other hand.214 Thus schools could function
as intermediaries between binary oppositions such as progress and tradition. 
Beyond these perceived threats, Fortna stresses that Ottomans/ the Ottoman state
also  experienced  more  immediate  threats  such  as  “foreign  banks,  battleships  and
commanders.”215 Fortna suggests that those influences on the Ottoman education system
have  hardly  been  considered,  specifically  the  function  of  the  educational  system  to
recapture Ottoman agency in that regard. The development of the educational system in
the late nineteenth century was unique because of the conditions provided. On the other
213 See Fortna, Imperial Classroom.
214 See Ibid., 43-44.
215 Ibid., 44.
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hand it  was still a part of a global phenomenon where many states undertook endeavors
to create national systems of education which did not exist before. 
In this new level of state intervention in people's lives, the function of education
was partly taken away from the family - which seemed no longer fit for this task - and
transferred  to  state  institutions.  Thoughts  on  this  were  lent  by  the  likes  of  Émile
Durkheim, whose ideas had significant influence on Ottoman reformers, and who talked
about the failure of the family and its replacement by schools.216 
In the competitive Ottoman field of education, Western missionary schools were
the most obvious protagonist. They increasingly attracted Ottoman subjects and were
thus hard to ignore for Ottoman officials.217 As the examples provided above show, they
attempted to minimize the influence of these schools on their subjects/citizens. Fortna
counts three groups of competitors in the educational field, while ranking members of
non-Muslim groups and neighboring countries such as Greece or Bulgaria as second and
third in the list behind missionary schools. All three of them appeared in the examples
concerning dress. The Ottoman officials' stance towards them was ambiguous, the feeling
of threat countered by their efforts to emulate them served as an example, as they were
the first modern schools in the provinces. 
That the incidences at the schools dealt with here took place in a period where
Ottoman authorities put special emphasis on education. They also manifest themselves in
the appearance of the first Ottoman education yearbook in 1898.218 Compared to Ottoman
schools,  the  foreign  schools  were  exceptionally  well-financed,  which  additionally
attracted students through reduced fees or no fees at all. This whole situation produced
an inclination on side of the Ottoman students towards the respective states who found
these  schools.  Thus  the  question  of  dress  and  identity  became  intertwined  with  the
question of loyalty to the respective state, and thus French schools for example produced
French citizens, not Ottoman. In many provinces students did not have a choice other
than attending foreign schools, because Ottoman ones plainly did not exist.219 That was
also  a  predicament  for  Ottoman  authorities  who  aspired  for  the  education  of  their
subjects. 
216 See Ibid., 46-47.
217 See Ibid., 49.
218 See Ibid., 53.
219 See Ibid., 57.
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According  to  Somel,  Christian  community  schools  gained  importance  with  the
spread  of  the  ideas  of  European  Enlightenment  among  non-Muslim  literati,  which
implied the growing influence of notions of progress and individualism.220 At the same
time, an expansion of Evangelical mission activities took place, along with the foundation
of schools. Those schools offered instruction in a local vernacular which was welcomed
by local  populations  who did  not  know the  liturgical  language  of  the  church.  Their
diffusions of pragmatism and focus on natural sciences, Somel argues, was conditioned
by the diffusion of Evangelical Christianity. These schools strengthened or produced a
certain consciousness of ethnic belonging indicated by language. Moreover, their offering
of classes in modern Western languages contributed to the emergence of a generation of
Ottoman non-Muslims which grew up in a different cultural milieu, and who became
critical of their own communities and clerical administration. The old elite as well as the
Sublime Port were concerned about these disturbances of the old order and undertook
measures to curb missionary activities in the Ottoman Empire.221 These restrictive politics
were short-lived for the time being, and ended by the Reform Edict of 1856. It provided
full freedom for all non-Muslim communities to open schools. Somel attributes this step
to the diplomatic support offered by the great powers to the Ottoman Empire against the
expansionist aspirations of the Russian Empire, and military support in the Crimean War
(1853-1856). In the face of separatist movements and the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877/78,
the Hamidian government tightened control over foreign and community schools in the
1870s  and  applied  a  kind  of  politics  which  for  the  first  time  created  a  competitive
environment amongst the different Ottoman communities.222 This change in politics to
Christian  community  schools  and  foreign  schools  provides  the  background  of  the
incidences depicted above. They appeared in an environment where these schools were
under surveillance and regarded as spaces for the growth of separatist movements under
the influence of foreign imperialist powers.
220 In some cases it  came along with nationalist thought in non-Muslim communities, first among the
Greek Orthodox who undertook efforts to Hellenize non-Greek Orthodox people in schools attached to
the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Before that, according to Somel, instruction, just like in Ottoman Quranic
schools, was dominated by religious subjects and their educational level, and can be compared to as
well.  The  language of  education was mostly  the  same as  the  liturgical  language of  the  churches.
Schools were administrated by the clergy and instructors which were also mainly from the clergy. See
Somel, ‘Christian Community Schools during the Ottoman Reform Period,’ 258.
221 See Ibid., 259.
222 See Ibid., 259.
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In the Bulgarian case, Pan-Slavic activities were triggered by the aftermaths of the
Ottoman-Russian War in 1877-1878. The treaty of San Stefano secured an autonomous
greater Bulgaria, and vast regions of the Balkans were also secured. Even though the
treaty was revised at the Berlin Congress, Bulgaria became an autonomous principality.
In these contexts, Bulgarian schools were used as an instrument to establish Bulgarian
cultural hegemony in these territories, and to broaden the influence of the Exarchate
which  led  to  bloody  confrontations  between  their  supporters  and  supporters  of  the
ecumenical patriarchate. In this civil war, similar conditions in Balkan schools became a
means to acquire cultural hegemony.223
The struggle  for  dress  in schools  underlines  how crucial  education was for  the
establishment of national  identity.  Through its  lack of  domestic  schools the Ottoman
state feared to miss the opportunity to educate loyal citizens.
For the Ottoman government, the establishment of foreign schools was not a minor
threat. Thus the occurrences of foreign missionary and Ottoman non-Muslim educational
advances were taken very seriously by Ottoman officialdom and regarded as a peril to
the state's sovereignty.224 The occurrences referred to in this chapter have to be viewed
within that framework.
In the five cases treated above, Ottoman students' citizenship as it is constructed
through  dress  was  discussed.  In  all  these  cases  Muslim  identity  is  not  explicitly
mentioned and Ottoman citizenship put in the foreground. In one of the cases, the French
school in Bursa, Ottoman students are designated as either Greek-Orthodox, Armenian
or Armenian-Catholic. The students of the Armenian school in Yenikapı are identified
through  their  ancestors  as  either  Russian  or  Ottoman,  but  no  further  attributes  are
provided. Meanwhile, for the French School in Beirut and the Romanian Trade School in
Salonika the marker 'Ottoman' was held sufficient. I assume that at least in the latter of
two cases, Ottoman Muslim students also attended these schools and were addressed by
Ottoman state intervention. This is due to the fact that Ottoman state schools were still
too rare to provide education for a broad populace. In one case, the school in Tarfa, only
he  teacher  is  engaged  in  the  affair,  but  again  authorities  only  inquire  about  his
citizenship, not his religion, which is not mentioned at all. The emphasis on Ottoman
223 See Ibid., 264.
224 See Fortna, Imperial Classroom, 41.
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cititzenship  might  have  resulted  from  the  fact  that  in  most  of  the  cases  the  state's
intervention refers to Ottoman non-Muslims. Yet it also demonstrates the interrelation of
modern education, nation-building and Ottomanism that took effect here in its endeavor
to educate loyal  citizens regardless of religion. In all  cases, the wearing of the hat is
problematized and more or less in the center of the investigations. Other pieces of dress
are of no concern, except the case of the Romanian Trade School. Besides the mentioning
that in Beirut male and female students attended the school, more information about
students' identity, like their age, are not provided. It is striking that all the cases dealing
with non-Muslim and Armenian schools took place in the aftermaths of the Armenian
crisis and cease afterwards.
3.9 Concluding Remarks on Territoriality and Borderlands
State officials, local agents, the central state and its officials all negotiated national
territory.  Isa  Blumi stresses  that  there  isn't  necessarily a difference between a state's
subjects and state officials. This approach, he insists, includes agents who move beyond
the modernization paradigm and thus helps  to  avoid eurocentric  views which depict
change as always imposed and initiated by Europe or the West. Even though to a certain
point borders were drawn on maps and fought out by wars, they nevertheless have been
before and in between negotiated in everyday life, and in encounters by different agents
moving on different levels and with different agendas.
Throughout this chapter I traced  the negotiation of national territory in Ottoman
border  lands.  To  understand  the  significance  of  this  space,  it  helps  to  view  these
borderlines as on the cusp between becoming nation-states and competing empires and
nationalisms; not just as demarcation lines, but as spaces themselves.225 This makes their
entangled history,  which is the common and reciprocal history of center and periphery,
visible. The spacial dimension of identity construction and subjectization in these borders
lands de-essentializes identity and integrates histories of 'the West and the rest' within
transnational spaces.226 These spaces contain different concepts of culture and identity
within and beyond the modern framework. Meanwhile, nationalist imaginations overlap
225 See Stephan Günzel and Franziska Kümmerling, eds., Raum: Ein interdisziplinäres Handbuch (Stuttgart
[u.a.]: Metzler, 2010), 187.
226 See Ibid., 181.
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with imagined but powerful cultural dichotomies, local conditions and interests of local
agents, as well as capitalist and imperialist activities. 
Homi Bhabha locates the production of culture within border areas or borderlines,
conceptualized as spaces in-between or third spaces.227 The transfer of his framework of
analysis from the context of literary production and art,  transnational migration, and
hybrid  postcolonial  identities  to  Ottoman border  lands entails  that  the  production of
national identities are inseparable from the “territoriality of the global citizen” and their
post-national,  trans-national  and  de-national  identity,  as  Günzel  phrases  it. 228 What  I
want to suggest is that the parallel and interdependent construction of the national and
the transnational are set at the same time and space through conditions set by war, global
capitalism and discourses on modernity, colonialism and imperialism. Thus interactions
between  the  Ottoman  government,  provincial  state  officials,  local  agents,  central
European and local powers demonstrate and prove the inseparability of histories of the
West and the rest.229
The fluid meaning of cultural or religious symbols such as clothes and headgear,
and  apparent  efforts  to  fix  their  content  challenge  the  rigid  concepts  of  cultural
difference. I consider the cases presented above as negotiations of representation which
can be used to demonstrate the invented character of essentialized national identities and
founding myths. These identities are virtually worked out on the margins of national
spaces.  Borderlines  therefore  function as  powerful  discursive  formations,  both in  the
metaphorical sense and as a phenomenon.230
Mary Louise Pratt's notion of contact zones and transculturation might be helpful
to grasp Ottoman encounters with Western clothing.231 She uses these notion to analyze
contacts between European colonialists with societies which did not have contact before.
This  is  not  the  case  with  the  Ottoman  state  because  of  its  manifold  relations  and
geographical proximity to central Europe. Still, it might be helpful to apply these notions
227 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, Reprint. (London [u.a.]: Routledge, 1994), 217-218.
228 Günzel and Kümmerling, Raum, 181.
229 On territoriality see Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social
Theory,  [Nachdr.],  Radical  Thinkers  (London  [u.a.]:  Verso,  2011), 150-151.  On  the  borders  in  the
Balkans and the production of space see also Blumi, Foundations of Modernity, 58-59; Blumi, Reinstating
the Ottomans, 98.
230 See Günzel and Kümmerling, Raum, 181.
231 See Mary Louise Pratt,  Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation  (London [u.a.]: Routledge,
1992), 4-5.
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to characterize the processes commonly referred to as modernization or Westernization
in order to get away from the presumed centrality of modernity and the West, and the
one-sidedness of the processes of transfer. This can be done in order to point out that the
metropolis was determined by the periphery to the same degree as the periphery by the
metropolis. That might also be the case of Istanbul as the center of the Ottoman Empire
with its periphery as was demonstrated by the given examples. The attitudes of Creole
elites and their appropriation of and subjection to colonialist power techniques bare great
resemblances with Ottoman elites.232 
The incidences  in the Ottoman borderlands and other  contested spaces  such as
schools  depicted  throughout  this  chapter  display  dynamics  between different  agents,
such as the Ottoman central government, provincial administrators, other local actors
and the European great powers. Even though all this took place under the influence of a
certain Western hegemony, I think that in order to provide a better understanding of
these interactions it is important to highlight the agency of all these actors. 
Isa Blumi, in his comparative account of processes of transformations in the Arabic
Peninsula and the Balkans throughout the nineteenth century, stresses the part of local
powers “who shaped the region's  relations with the outside world.”233 For the Arabic
peninsula,  this  also implicates that within a comparative imperial  history the British,
French, and Ottoman were all imperial agents busied with centralizing reforms as basis
for future imperial state expansion. He suggests a “different geographical centering” in
order to understand power dynamics before Britain achieved imperial hegemony in the
Gulf region. 
In the case of the Balkans, this shift in perspective mainly affects the construction
of national identities and their reification in nationalist historiography after San Stefano
and the Berlin Treaty (1878). More than by the realties on ground, they were determined
by European interests against Russia's expansion. These were specifically the interests of
European banks who owned lands in the regions and the redemption of Ottoman debts.
At the same time, maps depicting the newly drawn borders were “disguised ontological
fiction[s]”.  These  borderlines  “naturalize  a  spacial  order”  that  was  dictated  by  these
232 See Ibid., 175-176.  The spaces in between cultural communities, the relation between encounters of
national independence and space are gendered. See  Partha Chatterjee,  Nationalist  Thought and the
Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? (Tokyo: Zed Books Ltd in Komm., 1986).
233 Blumi, Foundations of Modernity, 36.
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interests  rather  than  by  the  “ethnic  realities”  as  such  they  were  read.234 The  cases
depicted about are examples of the negotiation of this spacial order between local agents,
European powers and the central state. In reference to borderline studies, Blumi regards
these maps as spaces of authority used to interpret the past and fix existing humans
contingencies on the basis of which the state still interacted with its subjects. To make
these contingencies visible, borders need to be conceptualized as a social process and
“broad  zonal  institutions”  rather  than  markers  of  separation  and  difference,  which
“helped to create new forms of social interaction.”235 
Yet measures were implied to consolidate the separating character of the Ottoman
state and its  north-western neighbors.  International  treaties comprising of measures of
state expansion attempted to transform conditions in favor of Western capitalist interests,
thus managing economic productivity more effectively. These state-building measures also
involved the tightening of border controls. Especially after 1878, newly drawn borders in
the Balkans with the Berlin Treaty, emphasis was put on (re-)territorialization through i.e.
more rigid surveillance of the taxing of cross-border trade. In contrast to the Ottoman-
Greek border, after  1878 those in the Balkans became more conventional in character.
Nonetheless, their character as markers of state sovereignty has to be handled with care
considering  the  failure  to  control  local  economies  and  the  considerable  resistance  of
communities which led to a “crisis in the marking of boundaries”236 in the region. Local
agents' interventions brought about renegotiation and the redraw of boundaries. Blumi
proposes, in reference to Homi Bhabha and Edward Soja, the application of the term “third
space”  in  order  to  analytically  grasp  the  situation  and  challenge  the  monolithic
functionality of the modern border land.237 
Blumi  claims  that  ethno-religious  categories  and  politics  involved  in  these
234 See Ibid., 51.
235 See Ibid., 53. Blumi uses the “blurred character” of the Ottoman-Greek border as an example which
enforced the interaction between Greek and Ottoman officials, and at least in the first place reinforced
their corporation rather than separated them. Thus the border created institutions of mutual exchange
rather then discrete entities.  On a broad range of studies,  geographically and historically,  see also
Kemal  H.  Karpat  and  Rober  W.  Zens,  eds.,  Ottoman Borderlands:  Issues,  Personalities  and  Political
Changes,  Publications  of  the  Center  of  Turkish  Studies/The  University  of  Wisconsin ;  ZDB-ID:
21609834 2 (Madison, Wis.: The Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 2003).
236 Blumi, Foundations of Modernity, 54.
237 Ibid., 55. Blumi refers to “The Third Space: Interview with Homi K. Bhabha.” in Jonathan Rutherford,
ed.,  Identity:  Community,  Culture,  Difference  (London:  Lawrence  &  Wishart,  1990),   207-221;  and
Edward W. Soja,  Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places (Cambridge,
Mass. [u.a.]: Blackwell, 1996).
 141
3 Politics of Identity during the Hamidian Period
monolithic understandings of the border are insufficient to explain resistance against the
boundaries drawn after 1878. Beyond being nationalist, it had comprised a “multiplicity
of  local  concerns”  and  turned  against  the  subjugation  of  “previously  autonomous
communities.”238 Rather  then  in  favor  of  the  newly  found  nation-states,  these
communities fought to remain within the Ottoman Empire. Maps which manifested these
borders  in this  respect  were tools  of  the  state  which defined the modern world and
dominated by the West. Thus the production of space through maps and formal treaties
naturalized and normalized identities  through a spacial  order that  “distinguished one
territory from another.”239 Yet this tool to define the modern world dominated by the
West  did  not  occur  without  resistance  and  contingencies.  It  is  thus  necessary  to
reconsider this order of difference and power which “separates the world into bounded
units on the maps.”240
Carter  Findley  identifies  two  currents  of  change  for  the  Hamidian  period:  a
secularist,  which  expressed  itself  through the  modern press,  and  its  institutions  and
religious movements. Both of which, while competing with each other, also intermingled
and converged to epitomize Ottoman modernity.241 They formed the two wings of an
Ottoman Muslim middle class which I will trace in the following chapters.242
238 Blumi, Foundations of Modernity, 58.
239 Ibid., 61.
240 Ibid., 77.
241 Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity, 181.
242 Did the 1896 attempted coup d'etat trigger investigations on the hat (many school issues take place in
1896), or were the school cases just related to Armenian crisis? See Zürcher on actions against the
opposition following the Armenian crisis, which led to the sending into internal exile of all known
Young Turks to Tripolitana. Albeit, shortly thereafter many of them returned and accepted posts in the
Hamidian government and administration, see Zürcher, Turkey, 87.
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Military uniforms have been used as a means to produce modern, civilized bodies
and to formally display equality among a nation’s (male) inhabitants. At the same time in
the civil  realm, the three-piece suit  became an equivalent garment in the creation of
modern male identity. In the Ottoman Empire official westernization of dress began in
the military and was then extended to civil officials. The uniform became one means to
produce civilized bodies, however, everyone did not conform to these new standards. The
following example provides a clue as to the limits of Ottoman military reform and the
fears which accompanied the public appearance of those who resisted the disciplining
measures.
In 1897 Laz members of the navy were dismissed because of their (inappropriate)
behavior  and clothing.1 In  a  letter  to the sultan's  scribal  office  the navy commander
Hasan Rami Paşa reported the unkempt appearance and undisciplined behavior of some
marine  volunteers,  who  had  been  sent  from  Istanbul.2 After  a  couple  of  Laz  navy
volunteers appeared wearing uniformed or military dress, but with their bandolier and
water-bottles  around  their  waists  and  each  of  them  wearing  a  turban  in  a  way
incompatible with “imperial military dress,”3 they roamed the streets of Istanbul, “with
their armed and wild dress,”4 drawing the attention and disapproval of foreign embassies
and local residents. Their and some other's dismissal had been requested.5 One or two of
them attacked one of the Sultan's adjutants and navy Kolağası (Senior Captain) Naim Bey
and attempted to tear of his clothes. Thereupon, for the sake of the soldier's “holy honor
(şeref-i  muḳaddes)”  and “military order and morals on the imperial  navy”6 they were
dismissed from the navy and sent back to their homeland.
It is not evident if these marines had resided in Istanbul before joining the military,
but it is known that the central government undertook measures to send Laz migrants
back to their homeland.7 Laz identity in the Ottoman Empire is rather elusive, either
1 BOA PRK.ASK 126/8 (1897).
2 On Hasan Rami Paşa (1842-1923) see  Sinan Kuneralp,  Son Dönem Osmanlı  Erkân ve Ricali:  (1839 -
1922) : Prosopografik Rehber (Beylerbeyi, İstanbul: İsis, 2003), 77. He became naval minister in 1906 but
was dismissed after the Young Turk seizure of power.
3 “ḳıyāfet-i celīle-i ʿaskeriyye,” BOA PRK.ASK 126/8 (1897).
4 “müsellaḥ ve vaḥşīyāne ḳıyāfetleriyle,” BOA PRK.ASK 126/8 (1897).
5 Hasan Rami Paşa does not mention who requested their dismissal.
6 “süfün-i şāhānede ki ādāb ve intiẓāmāt-ı ʿaskeriyye,“  BOA PRK.ASK 126/8 (1897).
7 Ryan Gingeras, ‘Beyond Istanbul’s “Laz Underworld”: Ottoman Paramilitarism and the Rise of Turkish
Organised Crime, 1908–1950’, Contemporary European History 19, Special Issue 03 (August 2010): 215–
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comprising the Laz-speaking population of  the south-eastern Black Sea coast  or  in a
broader  sense  comprising  roughly  all  Muslims  from that  region.8 The  Laz  had  been
incorporated into the Ottoman Empire in the mid-fifteenth century, and many of them
migrated into Istanbul in the early modern period. Unlike other social groups members of
the Laz population did  not  hold many important  political,  economic  or  social  highly
valued  positions.  The  male  migrants  to  Istanbul  were  often  employed  as  boatman,
lighterman and dockworkers. Laz settlement in Istanbul fundamentally changed with the
outbreak of the Ottoman-Russian war in 1877, which brought many Laz refugees into the
city. Lack of employment increased their marginalized positions.9 As outsiders to high
official  circles,  the Lazi  population of the Ottoman Empire provided an image of the
uncivilized  other  to  the  modern  Ottoman  bureaucrat.  Nevertheless,  they  had  an
ambivalent position that also becomes apparent by this incident. Meeker remarks, that
the Laz people were still insiders to the imperial system and comprised a considerable
Ottomanist  population  with  palpable  influence.10 Also  local  Lazi  elites  were  able  to
defend their interests towards Istanbul. In popular culture, such as the Karagöz shadow
plays, Lazi people were commonly depicted as “slow-witted rustics.” Politically the Lazi
derebeys,  provincial lords, enjoyed feudal independence until the beginning of the 19th
century. Both their political independence and the geographic remoteness of the eastern
Pontic  mountains  formed  a  suitable  image  of  the  Laz  as  unruly  and  backwards.
The given example of the expelled Laz marines reflects their ambivalent position.
While their voluntary accession to the army displays some degree of inclination to the
Ottoman state they were not willing to subdue to certain imposed requirements. Or the
other way round: Ottoman elites did not appreciate the way the Laz marines wanted to
contribute to Ottoman military endeavors and therefore relinquished them their service.11
30, doi:http://dx.doi.org.595713270.erf.sbb.spk-berlin.de/10.1017/S0960777310000135 (About DOI).
8 The Laz Language is close to Mingrelian, a sister language of Georgian. See Minorsky, V.; Lang, D.M..
"Laz."  Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E.
van  Donzel,  W.P.  Heinrichs.  Brill  Online,  2015.  Reference.  Staatsbibliothek  zu  Berlin  Preuss.
Kulturbesitz.  07  July  2015  <>http://referenceworks.brillonline.com.549439870two.erf.sbb.spk-
berlin.de/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/laz-COM_0578
9 Gingeras,  ‘Beyond  Istanbul’s  “Laz  Underworld”:  Ottoman  Paramilitarism  and  the  Rise  of  Turkish
Organised Crime, 1908–1950,’ 216-217.
10 Michael E. Meeker,  A Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity  (Berkeley [u.a.]:
Univ. of California Press, 2002), 187.
11 Where  Ottoman non-Muslims  feared  because  of  their  far  reaching Europeanization  while  Muslim
'minorities' such as Laz and Kurds were feared because of their backwardness?
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 4.1 Modern Masculinity and Dress
While the Laz sailors were dismissed for the behavior that disturbed military discipline as
well  as  'civilized'  urban  culture  and  the  Ottoman's  international  reputation,
modernization  brought  about  another  urban dweller.  This  figure,  the  late  nineteenth
century dandy, was considered anything but uncivilized,  and yet he also embodied a
certain lack of discipline and 'honor.' The dandy’s surplus of modern existence involved a
lack  of  manliness,  his  figure  revealing  a  tense  relation  between  modernity  and
masculinity.
In order to understand Ottoman endeavors to alter and thus modernize clothing
habits and its interrelation with discourses on masculinity it is necessary to look at the
production and spread of Western European textiles and the growing commodity culture
which accompanied them. The latter, and its supposedly effeminizing impact,  as it was
expressed in discourse on the dandy, was a similarly prominent issue in Ottoman public
debates about male fashion and national identity in the late nineteenth century, as it was
in central Europe at that time.12 In late Ottoman novels and satirical press urban upper
class  men  were  frequently  ridiculed  because  of  their  predilection  for  Western
commodities, especially clothes. This critique was part and parcel of heated debates about
Westernization and its relationship to national identity.13 In their novels, authors like
Recaizade  Mahmud  Ekrem  and  Ahmed  Midhat  present  the  urban  dandies'  supposed
subjection to European imperialism as a loss of masculinity.14 Şerif Mardin depicts the
figure Bihruz Bey in the novel  Araba Sevdasi (Love for Carriages) by Recaizade Ekrem
(1846-1913) as archetypical of the super-Westernized dandy, a man with an inclination
for  clothing  who  followed  the  latest  fashions,  proudly  wearing  them  in  his  urban
environments.
In his ground-breaking analysis of the 'Bihruz-Bey syndrom', Şerif Mardin paved
the way for an understanding of the modernization of Ottoman masculinities using one
of the late nineteenth century Ottoman literary dandies as a prototype of an expression
12 Christopher Breward,  ‘Manliness,  Modernity and the Shaping of  Male Clothing’,  in  Body Dressing:
Dress, Body, Culture, ed. Joanne Entwistle and Elisabeth Wilson (Oxford [u.a.]: Berg, 2001), 165–81.
13 See  Şerif  Mardin,  ‘Superwesternization  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  in  the  Last  Quarter  of  the  19th
Century’, in Turkey: Geography and Social Perspectives, ed. Peter Benedict and Erol Tümertekin (Leiden:
Brill, 1974), 403.
14 See ibid., 406-407.
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of undesirable  modernization.15 In  Ottoman novels  he traced the phenomenon of  the
derogatory  depiction  of  so-called  super-Westernized  Ottoman  men  and  identified
Ottoman  women's  emancipation  and  men's  Westernization  as  two  recurring  topoi.
Mardin suggested that men's consumption of Western goods and adoption of habits was
observed even more suspiciously than women's. 
While Mardin offers an analysis immanent to Ottoman society I will show here that
the  Ottoman  dandy  as  an  overtly  modernized  type  was  rather  part  of  a  global
phenomenon discussed broadly by contemporaries and scholars.16 The Ottoman dandy
was not a singular figure but appeared throughout the 19 th century in modern urban
contexts around the globe. In the following I will scrutinize how the practice of dressing
and the consumption of clothes were related to modern masculinity.17 
Throughout the nineteenth century, following the development of a mass fashion
system, consumerism became associated with femininity, which stood in distinction to
developments  in  men's  fashion and the broadening market  of  male  attire.  Therefore,
bourgeois identity and its ideals of restrain and repudiation had to be reconciled with
15 In Ottoman and modern Turkish the term for dandy is  züppe. According to Nurdan Gürbilek it also
encompasses the meaning of snob, which in my understanding as well as hers, is very similar to the
general definition of dandy. That means dandy might be a “blatant imitation and the state of openly
seeking  association  with  the  “superior”  other  and  rebuffing  those  regarded  inferior”  as  well  as  “
exaggerated attention to personal appearance.” Nurdan Gürbilek, ‘Dandies and Originals: Authenticity,
Belatedness, and the Turkish Novel’, The South Atlantic Quarterly 102, no. 2 (2003), FN 18.
16 A more recent attempt by Brittany Hynes to explain the despise of the Ottoman dandy/ the negative
depiction  of  the  Ottoman  dandy  by  Ottoman  authors  draws  on  the  modernization   and
heteronormalization of sexuality in the Ottoman Empire and wider Middle East and thereby likens the
Ottoman dandy to the premodern figure of the  amrad and the practice of love and desire for these
young beautiful beardless males, as analyzed by Afsaneh Najmabadi. Brittany Haynes, ‘Transforming
Masculinity and Male  Sexuality in Modernity from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic’,
Lights 2, no. 3 (Spring 2013),  62; and  Afsaneh Najmabadi,  Women with Mustaches and Men without
Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity  (Berkeley, Calif.  [u.a.]: Univ. of California
Press,  2005). The  despise  of  the  dandy,  Brittany  argues,  went  along  with  the  silencing  of  this
homoerotic  practices  by orientalist  modernizations discourse.  I  think,  while  heteronormativity and
sexuality are central to the analyses of the modern dandy, he is not just a premodern remnant of the
amrad but  a  genuinely  modern  phenomenon  as  its  appearance  and  problematization  in  Western
Europe show.  On sexuality and modernization in the Ottoman Empire see  Dror Ze’evi,  Producing
Desire: Changing Sexual Discourse in the Ottoman Middle East, 1500 - 1900 (Berkeley: Univ. of California
Press, 2006). On the treatment of same sex/ passionate relations between men in the late nineteenth
century Ottoman Empire ee Selim S. Kuru, ‘Yaşanan, Söylenen ve Yazılan: Erkekler Arasından Tutkusal
İlişkiler’, Cogito, no. 66–65 (2011): 263–77.
17 An  excellent  study  on  the  discourse  of  modernity  and  consumption  within  the  Ottoman  Greek
Orthodox Community and beyond has been conducted by  Haris Exertzoglou, ‘The Cultural Uses of
Consumption: Negotiating Class, Gender and Nation in the Ottoman Urban Centers During the 19th
Century’,  International  Journal  of  Middle  East  Studies,  35,  no.  1  (2003):  77–101,
doi:10.1017.S0020743803000047.
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what was going on in the fashion market.18 As a number of studies show, European fin-
de-siècle discourse on masculinity was busy with a (re-)affirmation of masculinity.19 As
Christopher  Breward  suggests  in  his  study  of  male  consumer  culture  in  the  late
nineteenth century, the fear of emasculation was linked to questions of fashion and dress.
The sense of crisis of masculinity at the end of the century, he argues, led to the use of a
certain  muscular  manliness  from  the  past  as  a  sartorial  template  combined  with
“masculine  fashionable  identities”  of  the  future  and  their  formal  values.20 These
references to the past and future formed, according to Breward, the principles of male
dress of the period. Studies of dress and modern masculinity are replete with what Flügel
has called the “great masculine renunciation”,21 which comprises the shift of men's styles
away from splendor, flamboyance and lavishness towards an expression of masculinity
through  hardness  and  austerity  materialized  by  stiff,  hard  and  tight  dress  with
unobtrusive colors. 
“A gentleman could no longer be recognized by the splendour of  his  apparel,  but
rather by the quality of the clothe he wore, the skill of its tailoring, and also by his
posture and general mien.”22
Brändli  characterizes  transformations  of  male  appearance  throughout  the
nineteenth  century  as  a  development  “vom  grazilen  Biedermeierpüppchen  zum
Röhrenmenschen.”23 The tube-like shape of the late nineteenth century dress had already
been noticed by contemporaries. The cut of men's clothes became less and less form-
fitting. The tail-coat, once combined with tight fitting trousers, remained a basic garment
throughout  the  nineteenth  century  but,  in  contrast  to  the  late  eighteenth  and  early
nineteenth centuries, was later combined with loose trouser and often gave way to the
18 On the relation of femininity to consumerism see  Rita Felski,  The Gender of Modernity  (Cambridge,
Mass. [u.a.]: Harvard Univ. Press, 1995), 61-90. On the development of bourgeois styles (predominantly
in Paris) see Philippe Perrot, Fashioning the Bourgeoisie: A History of Clothing in the Nineteenth Century ,
2. print., and 1. paperback print. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1996).
19 See i.e.  George L. Mosse,  The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity  (New York: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1996).
20 Christopher  Breward,  The  Hidden  Consumer :  Masculinities,  Fashion  and  City  Life ;  1860  -  1914
(Manchester [u.a.]: Manchester Univ. Press, 1999).
21 Robert Ross, Clothing: A Global History (Cambridge [u.a.]: Polity, 2008), 36.
22 Ibid., 50.
23 Sabina  Brändli,  ‘Der  herrlich  biedere  Mann’:  Vom Siegeszug  des  bürgerlichen  Herrenanzuges  im 19.
Jahrhundert (Zürich: Chronos, 1998), 147.
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frock-coat, which covered more parts of the underwear, which was to be hidden as far as
possible.  At  that  time it  was unacceptable  to  take off  the  coat  and display the shirt
beneath, as it was considered part of the underwear. In addition in the 1870s the sack
coat  appeared  and  spread.  Overcoats  were  cut  amply  and  angularly.  The  waist-coat,
which was initially held in bright colors and heavily ornamented, became much more
unobtrusive and invisible.24
The new kind of dress was meant to compensate the flaws brought about by the
perceived crisis of masculinity attending modernity. Dress, thereby, attained the function
of a second skin and second nature. From the point of view of many contemporaries
modernity had deprived the male body of its natural strength and vigor, and dress was
therefore to compensate for that loss. Dress obtained the function to both conceal and
display the body at the same time. Its form replaced the features of the body and no
longer  accentuated  them,  as  lavish  dress  had  done  before.  According to  Christopher
Forth, a modern critique of extravagant aristocratic styles appeared in the seventeenth
century, emerging with the renunciation of aristocratic styles which was characteristic of
the newly emerging social classes.25 
The space male bodies inhabited was thus extended to incorporate their dress in
order  to  express  masculinity  while  male  interest  in  fashion  was  at  the  same  time
criticized as emasculating. This brought about a paradoxical relation of masculinity to
fashion  and  consumerism  in  which  the  latter  were  simultaneously  restoral  and
threatening for the former. Through these politics of dress the relation of the male body
to masculinity was redefined.  Ottoman politics of dress took part in this redefinition. 
 4.1.1 Uniformity and Bourgeois Dress
The  uniformity  of  the  standard  suit  which  increased  towards  the  fin-de-siècle
correlates  with  a  militarization  of  men's  appearance  and  male  identity.  Katrina
Honeyman terms the men's suit the uniform of respectability, crucial to hegemonic male
24 Ibid., 144–146.
25 In  Britain  contemporary  observers,  also  from  within  the  nobility,  criticized  men's  relation  to
extravagance  and  preferred  sober  styles  and  also  Rousseau  commented  on  clothing  “offering  the
appearance of a well-built body instead of bodily vigor itself.” Christopher E. Forth, Masculinity in the
Modern West: Gender, Civilization and the Body (Basingstoke [u.a.]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). On the
increasingly plain styles of men's dress see also  Ross, Clothing, 32 – 36.
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identity.26 New ways of the production of dress permitted such a look of uniformity. A
standardization  that  appeared  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century,  it  promised
egalitarian structures  and democracy even though it  actually  produced new kinds of
hierarchical order and social distinctions.27 The promotion of equality was used by the
producers  of  these  kinds  of  dress,  who  suggested  that  a  respectable  look  was  now
affordable for lower classes  as well,   albeit  social  distinctions were not  expressed by
splendor and lavishness but rather refined cloth and expensive qualities which could only
be afforded by a minority of men.
Sabina Brändli en détail follows the transformation from more elaborate forms of
male dress, which also accentuated the male body (such as the display of the calves or the
penis and testicles through close-fitting cuts and paddings and an accentuated waist) to a
body- concealing style common in the late nineteenth century.28 
In reference to Brändli I want to remark in more detail about the development of
styles of dress throughout the nineteenth century that make clear its characteristics and
how  it  evolved.  Characteristic  of  this  process  is  a  gradual  shift  from aristocratic  to
bourgeois styles, reflecting social hegemonies in transformation. These changes of style
were enabled and supported by new means of production and distribution. They began
with the emergence of the three-piece suit after the French revolution, which comprised
a  tail-coat,  long  trousers  and  a  short  waistcoat.  In  the  beginning  this  suit  did  not
resemble  very  much what  is  today known as  standard  men's  suit;  its  cut  was  quite
different, as was the embroidered, patterned and multi-colored fabrics and adornments
used for it. According to Brändli, in the German-speaking world, the plain, dark colored
style  characteristic  of  the  bourgeoisie  established  after  1830.29 Newer  symbols  of
bourgeois hegemony, such as the top hat, first had to be established. As such the top hat
could first even arouse public disdain, and in the late eighteenth century the wearing of it
26 Katrina Honeyman, ‘Following Suit: Men, Masculinity and Gendered Practices in the Clothing Trade in
Leeds, England, 1890–1940’, Gender & History 14, no. 3 (2002): 426–446, doi:10.1111/1468-0424.00276, 428.
27 On the deconstruction of this myth see Brändli,  Der herrlich biedere Mann. What was promoted as a
democratization of dress was actually part of a an ongoing social differentiation.  That contrasts to
Crane's approach who views the democratization thesis in a more affirmative mode. See Diana Crane,
Fashion and Its Social Agendas: Class, Gender, and Identity in Clothing  (Chicago [u.a.]:  University of
Chicago Press, 2000).
28 Brändli, Der herrlich biedere Mann, 180.
29 For a long term survey on the meaning of colors in textile production and the significance of black and
dark colors in Christian Europe see Jane Schneider, ‘Peacocks and Penguins: The Political Economy of
European Cloth and Colors’, American Ethnologist 5, no. 3 (1 August 1978): 413–47.
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even  led  to  arrests  in  some  cases.30 Brändli  argues  that  the  increasingly  dominant,
unobtrusive  appearances,  color  and  styles,  including  headgear  and  beard,  retained  a
political meaning and significant distinctions.31 
In  the  German-speaking  realm  late  nineteenth  century  plain  dress  was
accompanied  by  a  trend  for  bearded  faces,  mustaches,  whiskers,  as  full  beards
increasingly replaced formerly shaved faces. This trend helped to reinforce the trend to
display certain male values in appearance and stressed male authority while it hid facial
features  and  expressions,  thusly  disguising  men's  sensibility.  Waxed  mustaches
additionally  underlined  military  discipline,  which  encompassed  an  always  upright
posture, reinforced in civil dress by heavily starched clothes.32 In the Ottoman Empire a
similar  fashion  appeared.  Ottoman  examples  of  waxed  beards,  militaristic  odor  and
underlining  of  an  upright  posture  can  be  found  on  carte-de-visit  of  an  Ottoman
lieutenant from 1890 and a portrait of an artilleryman named Ahmed Selahaddin, which
dates to 1896. Both depictions also provide an impression how well the cylindrical shape
of the Fez fit into the picture of the “Röhrenmensch,” at the time hegemonic in central
Europe.33 Generally  the  beard  fashion  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  corresponded  to  that
assessed  by  Brändli  for  the  German speaking world,  as  many photographs  suggests.
Generally mustaches prevailed, sometimes full beards, especially by older men.34 Yet, in
the Ottoman photographs whiskers hardly appear. Brändli  dates the beginning of the
trend for beards in the 1850s and its decline after WW I.
Next to the promotion of equality in the trading of the standard suit, Honeyman
attests  to a desire  for  conformity among men by the early twentieth century.  In the
Ottoman situation, this trend for conformity or uniformity finds its expression in the
disappearance of cases referring to sumptuary restrictions. While there are still incidents
and discussions on the attachment of jewels to the fez, regarded as a sign of flamboyance,
30 Brändli, Der herrlich biedere Mann, 136.
31 The development towards sober male styles and the association of fashion with femininity culminated
in the disappearance altogether of depictions of male styles from the fashion magazines in the 1870s,
where Brändli traced the development of clothing styles. Ibid., 143.
32 Ibid., 182.
33 Engin Özendes,  Photography in the Ottoman Empire: 1839 - 1923, 1st ed., YEM Yayın / Yapı-Endüstri
Merkezi.  -  İstanbul,  2001-  231 (İstanbul:  YEM Yayın,  2013),  49,  151 and 186.  On photography as a
historical source in the study of dress, see “Photography, Pleasure and Cross-Cultural Dressing” in
Reina Lewis,  Rethinking Orientalism: Women, Travel and the Ottoman Harem  (London [u.a.]: Tauris,
2004), 206-222.
34 For examples of the predominance of the mustache see Özendes, Photography in the Ottoman Empire,
229, 230 and 231.
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in  mid-nineteenth  century  onwards  there  are  no  such  cases  about  extravagant
appearances appearing in archival documents. Maybe with exception to the wearing of
the  hat  by  some  individuals,  but  might  that  be  a  move  towards  another  kind  of
conformity rather than towards extravagance!? The standard suit as a means to express
conformity,  for  Honeyman,  was  a  symbol  of  a  stereotypical  masculine  identity.
Divergence from that appearance and its identity were regarded with derision. It needs to
be stressed that this, however, was only valid and possible for those that could effort
bourgeois clothes and lifestyles.
Producers  themselves,  as  Honeyman  documents  for  Leeds,  a  leader  in  the
production of suits, were keen to promote suits as a means of leveling social differences.35
In contrast to the actual function of modern bourgeois dress as a sign of distinction, they
saw their activities drawn by a commitment to social justice. Their verbalized aim was to
“enable the man of limited means to 'dress like a gentleman',”36 and they saw dress as an
means  of  democratization.  Honeyman  argues  that  instead  of  democratization  taking
place, social distinctions rather became invisible. She states that “Leeds multiples ensured
that most men could effort a tailored dress of reasonable quality,” but this only in the
period after WWI, as only then was mass production established to such an extent. This
fact is also interesting to keep in mind for a consideration of Turkish Republican politics
of dress  in the 1920s,  where a new clothing regulation  correlates with these enhanced
means of mass production.
That in turn means throughout the long nineteenth century, even in the centers of
modern mass production, it was hard for men of lower classes to attain an appearance of
a higher social standing. In terms of masculinity, Honeyman argues that the standard suit
provided men “with a sense of place” in modernity.37 As such modernity can be thought
of as a space and a certain attire; the standard suit, provided access to this kind of space.
Wearing this  suit,  Honeyman argues,  represented  collective,  idealized  male  behavior.
Hence, a different kind of dress means a transgression of social norms. The importance of
dress, and its symbolic validity in that sense, stem from the social requirement to adopt a
distinctly masculine identity, regardless of the social position otherwise.38 
35 As Robert Ross has pointed out, English production was leading in the spread of modern male attire.
Ross, Clothing.
36 Honeyman, ‘Following Suit,’ 429.
37 Ibid., 430.
38 Ibid., 441. Analytically I think it is problematic to attribute gender a priority before class, both for me
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Brändli  argues  that  late  nineteenth  century  sober  dress  produced  sharp  social
distinctions, i.e. against women, racialized Others and lower social classes—despite the
democratic pretext. The material means to reach the seemingly simple bourgeois male
style were quite high and could not be afforded by many. To appear orderly and clean
not only assumed financial means, (men complained about the costs of cleaning, which
had to be calculated thoroughly) but also an acquired, composed habitus of bourgeois
understatement. Those who lacked these requirements, but aspired to acquire bourgeois
reputation, were entrusted to the formerly aristocratic realm of representation: bourgeois
women with their lavish dress and men regarded as socially or racially Other. While they
remained within the dictates of fashion with its rapid changes, bourgeois men's dress was
subtly nuanced.39 Dress codes were elaborate and differed from occasions. To imitate the
simple male style was not easy at all. 
While  lower  class  men's  efforts  were  relegated  to  the  realm  of  representation,
bourgeois culture became a sign of power which those possessing it defended against
outsiders. Bourgeois culture was essentially male; in terms of dress its female part did not
refer to the same values, such as reason and moderation, but became the measure for
non-bourgeois existence. Thus throughout the nineteenth century polarisation of gender
difference  in  dress  also  became  a  characteristic  of  bourgeois  identity  and  bourgeois
gender order. Dress reform movements aimed at the leveling of these differences were
opposed fiercely.40
It  is  within this logic  that the  Ottoman dandy must be situated.  Not  (only)  his
consumerism,  nor  only  his  lavish  appearance,  but  also  his  aspirations  for  social
enhancement  were  at  stake.  The  measure  was  if  he  was  suited  to  enter  respectable
society be part of the ruling elite. However, were there any differences between dandy
figures  in  Western  Europe  and  colonial  societies?  What  influence  had  discourses  of
Westernization and modernization made to the construction of the dandy? 
Comparison with Western European countries show that the Ottoman discourse on
the  dandy  was  far  from  unique  but  rather  came  along  as  a  inherent  companion  to
modernization. Western European countries and also inhabitants of their settler colonies
in the Americas were competing amongst each other for the masculinity of men via the
seem similarly important.
39 Brändli, Der herrlich biedere Mann, 252-253.
40 See Ibid., 262-263.
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repudiation of effeminacy. Sartorial reform in favor of an expression of austerity was a
common measure.41
'Degenerated' aristocratic masculinity characterized by both luxury and squander as
well as lavishness and extravagant styles were to be replaced by the styles of the rising
bourgeoisie.  Thus  a  discourse  on  clothing  and  consumption  was  pivotal  to  the
construction  of  modern  masculinity.  While  elaborated  styles  of  bourgeois  identity
became crucial for the construction of modern identity as such, too much emphasis on
dress  and  style  were  read  as  effeminacy.  Forth  regards  this  ambivalent  function  of
material  culture  as  a  source  of  resistance  to  gender  norms  and  rebellion  against  a
dominant middle class culture created by these men themselves.42 To him, the tensions
within the middle classes and between different perceptions of masculinity reveal that
there was more to the definition of modern hegemonic masculinity than just discipline
and respectability, which he terms as a “right to comfort.”43 
Therefore,  the  question  is  which  position  the  late  nineteenth  century  dandy
inhabited, if he subverted hegemonic class and gender norms or if he was an expression
or personification of bourgeois male identity and dominance. Forth considers the dandy
not as an expression of bourgeois power but as some sort of classless figure: 
“The dandy represented himself as declassé and thus not bound to any particular class,
a  posture  that  could  render  him suspect  in  an  age  when  the  bourgeoisie  was
consolidating its political and cultural identity.”44 
The question thus follows: did the Ottoman dandy also entail a critique of middle
class respectability?
In the course of the nineteenth century and the transformation of men's fashion the
dandy took on different positions, as Brändli chronicles.45 While at the beginning of the
nineteenth  century,  as  trend-setters  dandies  pushed  developments  towards  a  society
dominated by bourgeois values, paradoxically at the same time they fashioned themselves
as aristocrats and were insulted as such. Concerning female fashion, Brändli shows how
41 Ross, Clothing, 32.
42 Forth, Masculinity in the Modern West, 55.
43 Ibid., 59.
44 Ibid., 55.
45 Brändli, Der herrlich biedere Mann, 128.
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bourgeois styles developed in close correspondence with older aristocratic ones while at
the same time dissociated from them. As such, the dandy developed from a trend-setter of
male fashion, derided but not despised, to a counter figure of the sober bourgeois male
subject of the late nineteenth century, that called male uniformity into question.46
A  look  at  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  century  discourses  on  health  and
masculinity helps to illuminate the phenomenon of the dandy and modern masculinity.
According to Forth's study, the ideal male body was imagined as of good health, meaning
physically fit, muscular, always held in an upright posture. These physical and aesthetic
traits were linked to moral integrity. Good health and a disciplined and self-contained
body were identified with growth, development and agency.47 This bodily ideal entailed a
preoccupation with boundaries and bodily closure unique to modernity. Somatic integrity
was regarded as a prerequisite for firm ego boundaries, opposed to female bodies, which
were conceptualized as porous and leaky.48 
Forth shows how the ideal of an athletically trained male body came along with
“lamentations about the physical  weakness of modern men”49 on the one hand and a
valorization of weakness and illness within middle and upper class circles on the other: 50
“  […] health  problems could be  embraced as  a proof  of  man's  willingness  to endure
physical distress in the name of some higher ideal.”51 Health problems resulting from an
inactive lifestyle were literally celebrated, with men flaunting their diseases regarding
their “civilization illnesses” proudly as an indicator of their elite status. Paradoxically
scorned males bodies, such as those of workers and racialized others, figured contrasting
ideals of modern middle class masculinity, producing a disjunction between elite and
popular  bodies.52 Thus,  contrary to the ideal  of  a  muscular  male  body,  the  civilizing
process  and  modernization  were  perceived  as  effeminization  as  civilized  society  was
diagnosed with a lack of masculinity.  Modernization became associated with physical
46 Ibid., 148-149.
47 Forth, Masculinity in the Modern West, 67.
48 See Ibid., 72.
49 Ibid., 74.
50 See Ibid., 77.
51 Ibid., 81.
52 While haunted by the “diseases of civilization” these privileged bodies had privileged access to medical
care  and “did  not  suffer  epidemic diseases and other health issues to the same extent  as  popular
classes.” Ibid., 77.
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degeneration and nervous, weak bodies. In the colonial setting, within this paradoxical
discourse of civilization, the weak modern man was opposed to the “strong savage” to
the same extent as the Other was depicted as effeminate.53
Thus pleasure and ease which allegedly caused moral effeminacy were countered
by a glorification of pain. “The ability to endure and invite pain” 54 became a yardstick of
civilization and masculinity. Bodies useful for the emerging concept of the nation needed
to be exposed and endure exertion, aggression and violence. These bodies were needed in
order to “forge the nation through warfare.”55 The establishment of personal boundaries
through the ritual of dual, which became central to the construction of eighteenth and
nineteenth  century  masculinity,  became  transferred  to  the  political  level  and  the
construction  of  the  construction  of  the  body  politic  through  warfare.  In  this
psychosomatic identification with the nation, affronts to the latter were experienced as
attacks on an individual man's body. Central to both the defense of the personal and the
collective body was the concept of male honor, both of which were central to emerging
nationalism.  Nationalism itself became a means to cure an assumed loss of masculinity
during the civilizing process. 
These concepts of bodily boundaries and identification with the collective body of
the nation are central to the formation of modern subjects. Forth emphasizes that modern
concepts  of  individual  freedom cannot  be  detached  from warfare  as  a  techniques  of
civilization. Docile bodies, produced by modern military discipline, according to Forth,
were closely related to the freedom of the individual, or in the words of a contemporary:
“[...] the autonomy of each person constitutes the measure of his obedience.”56
In terms of dress, that entailed the introduction of the military uniform or in civic
life the three piece suit. Both drew attention away from dress itself to the body and made
“nation-building  and  man-building  coextensive  processes.”57 The  French  revolution
explicitly aimed at reforming manhood by invoking classical images of the male bodies in
contrast  to  the  impotent  and  bloated  bodies  of  the  aristocracy.  The  mayor  of  Paris
53 Ibid., 85.
54 Ibid., 115.
55 Ibid., 122.
56 Ibid.,  123.  See  also  Christian  Jansen,  Der  Bürger  als  Soldat:  die  Militarisierung  europäischer
Gesellschaften im langen 19.  Jahrhundert:  Ein internationaler  Vergleich  ;,  1st  ed.,  Frieden Und Krieg :
Beiträge zur historischen Friedensforschung. - Essen : Klartext, 2002- 3 (Essen: Klartext-Verl., 2004).
57 Forth, Masculinity in the Modern West, 126.
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proclaimed  in  1789:  “The  men  of  the  free  nation  will  be  physically  larger,  more
handsome, more courageous; morally they will be more virtuous and better.”58 Next to
the  classical  ideas,  nationalist  reformers  praised  the  bodily  constitution  of  idealized
ancestors and promoted a return to these. In Prussia, too, the state came to be seen as a
biopolitical  entity where the nation was figured in the male body as  opposed to the
personification  of  the  kingdom or  empire  in  the  person  of  the  ruler,  and  the  initial
emphasis of German reformers on  Bildung instead of martial prowess was replaced by
the idea of “regeneration through violence.”59 The introduction of compulsory military
service in 1813 served these purposes to form equal citizens in combat.60
One of the feared consequences of physical weakness was the diminution of gender
differences. Modern biology and the insights gained by Darwinism suggested that highly
developed sexual dimorphism was a sign of a high level of civilization, progress evident
in man becoming more masculine and women more feminine. “Degeneration discourse
implied  that  the  conditions  of  modern  civilization  created  obstacles  to  the  ‘natural’
differentiation  of  the  sexes  that  evolutionary  theory  promised.”61 Discourses  on
masculinity received feminist claims to gender equality thereby as a threat to progress,
the reduction of gender differences and the altering of gender relations were perceived as
a harm to the male body.62  Thus, for an understanding of the relation between modern
dress and gender it is crucial to note that progress was understood as the polarization of
gender binaries.63 In the hegemonic discourse of the time, a questioning of this gender
dichotomy was perceived as a threat to modernity and progress, whether the feminist
movement claiming equal rights or men transgressing the prescribed sober styles or even
people from the “non-West.” 
Another threat to bourgeois male hegemony became the rise of a lower middle
class, often in the figure of the office clerk, the white-collar workers. Denigrated as weak,
unhealthy, nervous and dubious these sought to enhance their “low degree of status and
autonomy”64 by the means of consumption. While proper dress was “a crucial means to
58 Ibid., 128.
59 Ibid., 131.
60 See Ibid., 131.
61 Ibid., 146.
62 See Ibid., 148.
63 See Ibid., 143.
64 Ibid., 154.
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achieve status  and respectability”65 this  “store-bought”  version of  it  generated doubts
about these men's authentic masculinity. The educated middle-classes viewed this kind of
consumerism as a mark of effeminacy, associated with a “soft” consumer lifestyle of this
new urban middle class. German nationalists  criticized this lifestyle as un-German. 
New urban middle class men countered these claims with various strategies. On the
one  hand,  they  proudly  presented  their  increased  status  by  displaying  fashionable
appearance confidently: 
“In Victorian London it was not uncommon for single clerks and shop workers to
compensate their grey working lives with flamboyant displays of colour in their
clothing,  and  in  their  free  time  many  manifested  an  effete  sartorial  style  as
fashionable ‘gents’ and ‘mashers’ at music halls or even aspiring ‘bohemians’ in the
drinking halls of Soho.”66
This  strategy  was  combined  with  countering  the  blame  of  effeminacy  with  an
orientation towards proletarian masculinity or proletarian male bodies and the display of
naked muscular bodies, which became very popular around 1900. This bodily culture was
simultaneously an affront towards bourgeois bodily practices as well as a return to the
blame of muscular degradation and effeminacy.
In  reference  to  Flügel's  paradigmatic  utterance  of  the  “great  masculine
renunciation”  Christopher  Breward assesses  the  late  nineteenth century discourse  on
dandyism as dealing with the fact that, at least for certain men, the matter of dress was
not just characterized by renunciation. Instead, he puts forth that for men, fashionability
played a more important role than often admitted and therefore, cannot be reduced to
women's  dress.67 Men's  fashion itself  became an instrument  to  counter  the supposed
effeminizing  effects  of  commodity  culture  and  bodily  decline.  In  terms  of  clothing
production,  according  to  Breward,  this  effort  to  reconstruct  a  perceived  loss  of
masculinity went along with a sartorial shift from bespoke to ready-made clothes, which
took place during the same period.68 Breward goes on to show that the production of
ready-made  clothing  and  the  new  tailoring  system  enabling  it,  came  along  with  an
65 Ibid., 157.
66 Ibid., 156. On music halls, masculinity and fashion see also Breward, The Hidden Consumer.
67 See Breward, ‘Manliness, Modernity and the Shaping of Male Clothing,' 165.
68 See Ibid., 166.
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renewed interest  in the body,  the  studying of  its  anatomy and geometry,69 providing
“maps for the navigation of ideal fashionable body.”70 All these concerns about the body,
masculinity and fashion in Western Europe have to be taken into consideration when
analyzing Ottoman modernization of politics of dress.
 4.2 The Globalization of Modern Male Attire and European Colonialism
The  advent  of  European  economic  domination  is  closely  related  with  cloth
production: It came along with the shift to an export of dyed and finished cloth from,
especially, England to world regions, like South East Asia, which formerly produced its
own  precious  textiles  that  were  now  replaced  by  imports.71 Before  the  seventeenth
century these regions, the Middle and Far East and Southern Europe, had been producers
of  brightly  dyed cloth.  A shift  in  economic  and social  patterns  occurred when these
dyeing techniques were adopted in Northern Europe.
British economic interests played a great part in the forging of sartorial strategies.
Since the late eighteenth century Britain exported mechanically produced cotton textiles
to India, and the sale of these textiles required the wearing of these styles by people in
India.72 In addition it  provided the British colonialists  with a certain control  of  what
people would wear, i.e., Manchester saris instead of full Western dress. Indian styles were
carefully scrutinized and textiles were produced specifically for the Indian market, such
as codified in John Forbes Watson's The Textile Manufacturers and Costumes of the People
of India, published in 1866.73
 4.2.1 The Emergence and Spread of the Three-Piece Suit
Ottoman politics of dress need to be considered in relation to the global spread of
modern,  mass-produced clothing.  Robert  Ross  locates  the first  steps  towards  modern
male attire, the three-piece suit, in 1666 with Charles II.74 From there, he traced shifts
69 See Ibid., 167.
70 Ibid., 166.
71 See Schneider, ‘Peacocks and Penguins’.
72 See Emma Tarlo, Clothing Matters: Dress and Identity in India (London: Hurst, 1996).
73 See Ibid., 40.
74 Jirousek assumes two paradigmatic shifts in “Western dress: A first shift to modern men's suit in the
midth-seventeenth century, and another at the end of the eighteenth with the move to more modest,
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towards  modern  dress  in  Britain  and  France,  showing  how  early  European  colonial
encounters influenced these material practices. Charles II. declared his shift in clothing
practices explicitly as an effort to demarcate his appearance against French styles, in
order to reject French hegemony.75 He read his new dress as an adoption of “Eastern
fashions” which demonstrated the arbitrary designation of assumed origins of cultural
goods and practices, especially in the demarcation of Orient versus Occident. Still, even if
this designation was arbitrary, it was not random, and Ross suggested that it was also a
move to promote Indian cotton, in light of the first commercial encounters of the East
India company, while at the same time the former came to be perceived as a competitor
to  British  wool.76 These  labels  of  clothing  styles  and  the  economic  and  political
considerations accompanying Charles II.'s decision to change his styles of dress provide a
window to the global dimensions of the production and consumption of modern dress.
Another aspect of the global development of clothing styles appears in Charlotte
Jirousek's study of Ottoman influences in Western dress.  While in earlier  studies she
argued  for  essential  differences  in  the  principles  of  Western  in  Eastern  dress,  her
research on the topic revealed that apparently basic forms of modern men's suit had been
adopted from the East. These were bifurcated trousers, the shirt, the vest and the outer
coat, all of which were made suitable and adapted by European tailoring and tastes.77
To  begin  with,  trousers,  as  Jirousek  argued,  had  been  essential  garments  to
Ottoman dress, for men as well as women, while in Europe, according to her, bifurcated
trousers or pantalons only appeared first in the sixteenth century among sailors, who
wore  a  so-called  'mellon  hose',  constructed  very  similarly  to  the  shalwar.78 Another
garment  long  in  use  in  the  'East'  were  front-opening  coats.  Those  first  appeared  in
Europe during the First  Crusade, and also showed the “hanging sleeve effects” known
from  the  Ottomans,  as  well  as  fur-lined  coats.79 During  the  fourteenth  to  fifteenth
centuries, coats became a common repertoire of European fashion. Vests, too, are an item
of  clothing  with  Eastern  origin,  becoming  widespread  in  Europe  with  the  first  step
plain, sober styles.  Charlotte Jirousek, ‘Ottoman Influences in Western Dress’, in Ottoman Costumes:
From Textile to Identity, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi and Christoph Neumann (Istanbul: Eren, 2004), 241-242.
75 See Ross, Clothing, 30.
76 See Ibid., 30.
77 See Jirousek, ‘Ottoman Influences in Western Dress,’ 242.
78 See Ibid., 241.
79 See Ibid., 239.
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towards  modern  man's  suit  in  the  seventeenth  century,  when  the  ensemble  of
trousers/breeches, shirt, vest or waistcoat, outer coat and cravat was first introduced. It
replaced the doublet or tunic combined with a hose and still differed distinctly from the
modern standard suit as it appeared at the end of the eighteenth century. Jirousek clearly
detected an “oriental influence” to this new kind of dress and attributes to the coat of the
new dress a “striking resemblance to the janissary coat.”80 Buttons were another item in
use in the Middle East and Central Asia long before Europe use. While in early medieval
Europe brooches, pins and laces served as fasteners, evidence of buttons in Europe first
appeared in Paris  in the thirteenth century.81 Coats,  also an essential  part  of Eastern
dress,  had been adopted from the tenth century onwards.  With them a closure  with
horizontal bands, joined at the front with buttons and loops, appeared and in the twelfth
century coats were used for layering, also well known in the Eastern clothing tradition,
with short or long sleeves common.82 In the seventeenth century a variety of coats with
Eastern leanings made of Indian cotton became fashionable. Also the introduction of a
military uniform, together with the first standing army, in France in the last quarter of
the  seventeenth  century  most  probably  took  inspiration  from  the  Ottoman  Empire,
where the Janissaries wore uniforms since the fifteenth century.83
Concerning headgear Jirousek considered it “one of the most dramatic borrowings
form East to West.”84 Again a shift in Western stress on headgear appeared with the
Crusades. Before that, Jirousek attests to headgear only a marginal role as an indicator of
rank  and  affiliation  and  stresses  the  essentially  functional  use  of  hoods  and  hats. 85
Turbans first appeared in the eleventh century became an explicitly Oriental feature of
European dress between 1380-1450 in the forms of chaperons or roundlets and as well as
wrapped turbans and again Ottoman turbans, those worn at the court and casual ones,
were  prominent  in  Europe  in  the  late  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries.86 They  all
disappeared in the mid-sixteenth century but had a regular resurgence with reawakening
80 See Ibid., 242.
81 See Ibid., 240.
82 See Ibid.
83 See Ibid., 241. On Ottoman uniforms see also ‘John P. Dunn, ‘Clothes to Kill For: Uniforms and Politics
in  Ottoman Armies’,  The Journal  of  the  Middle  East  and Africa  2,  no.  1  (1  January 2011):  85–107,
doi:10.1080/21520844.2011.576961. 
84 Jirousek, ‘Ottoman Influences in Western Dress,’ 244.
85 See Ibid..
86 See Ibid., 244–246.
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fashions of turquerie. Jirousek also suggested that the bicorne took leanings from the East
namely from the Mamluk's headgear prominent during their reign over Egypt.87 Plums, a
central  Asian  item  of  status  and  prowess  continued  to  be  used  by  Ottoman  Turks,
attached to European men's headgear form the 1490's onwards, which had to be imported
via Middle Eastern trade routes.88 The mutual  influence of  supposedly occidental  and
oriental dress shows that demarcations between “the East” and “Europe” were not as
clear-cut  as  often  thought.  They  were  permeable  and  contingent  even  though  in
continuous reaffirmation from both sides.
Later, with the introduction of new modes of production and distribution in the
nineteenth century “the style of clothing which had been developed in Europe and the
United States began to spread through out the globe.”89 It acquired the meaning of being
civilized and “correct  clothing together  with the mastering of  the  body was a  major
element  of  the  ‘central  axiom  of  modernization,  the  passage  from  barbarianism  to
civilization’.”90 Hence, the wearing of European dress became equivalent to being modern
and  civilized.  This  mind-set  became  most  obvious  in  the  civilizing  mission  of  the
Christian  missionaries,  as  one  of  the  pillars  of  European colonialism.  They played  a
crucial part in the spread and regulation of modern dress. While propagating  civilized
dressing  of  colonized  people,  they  also  carried  on  this  mission  in  their  Christian
heartlands.  Civilized dress was set  in accordance with European mores.  Decent dress
became equivalent with the adoption of a certain notion of moral behaviour and conduct.
While  on  the  one  hand  they  promoted  “civilized  dress”  as  an  indispensable  part  of
Christian identity, they also in many cases regulated the particular kinds of dress to be
worn by converts in the colonies and by that guarded the maintenance of difference and
thwarted extravagance. Therefore, being civilized was inseparably linked to Christianity
through outward appearance and manners. The history of the Christian missions, thus, is
also a history of the globalization of Western dress. The missions controlled access to
cloth and styles of dress. Sumptuary laws issued in these colonial contexts ensured the
claim to supremacy of the Europeans,  i.e.  by the prevention of “immodest display of
extravagance.”91 
87 See Ibid., 245.
88 See Ibid., 246.
89 Ross, Clothing, 69.
90 Ibid., 72.
91 Ibid., 92.
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The implications of these politics of dress went far beyond outward appearance.
Within the paradigm of the modernization of power and labor it contained the dimension
of  social  discipline.  Ross  convincingly  argued  that  the  ideas  carried  and  embodied
through  the  spread  of  modern  dress  became  a  means  for  the  capitalist  economy.  It
entailed that the subjects in the colonies and also working classes at home were willing
“to perform labor [...] at minimum wages.”92
On the other hand colonized people used Western dress to claim acceptance and
equal  status towards the colonialist  and thus appropriated it  for their  own purposes.
Hence, modern European dress attained the double function of discipline and resistance
entailed  in  the  subjectivation  process.  Ross  assumes  a  common  sartorial  history  of
colonial  societies  brought  about  i.e.  in  Africa  the  “virtually  reclothing  of  half  a
continent,”93 within what he terms a major shift of African material culture between 1880
and 1950. With the appearance of modernized elites in many colonized regions in Africa,
from at least 1880 onwards, and their claim to “full acceptance in to the system of the
British Empire,”94 Ross assumed a shift in colonialism to establish indirect rule by the
British.95 That  entailed  how the British  favored “indigeneity”  and  countered  Africans
endeavors of modernization, sometimes in opposition to but sometimes in collaboration
with the missionary 'civilizing mission.' That included British opposition to the adoption
of European dress and the favouring of folklore models of dress which produced the
desired forms of 'indigeneity.'96 
Magret Pernau argues that in India a shift in British colonial politics of dress came
along with an altering of colonial rule from informal or indirect rule, initially considered
as  a  more  effective  and  lower-cost  version,  to  a  far-reaching  presence  of  colonial
administration. Pernau connects this shift to direct colonial rule to the fashioning of the
three-piece suit and the appearance of bourgeois styles and its prescriptions of a sober
look  for  males.  The  top  hat  thereby  became  a  sign  of  assumed  cultural  superiority
appearing in place of the tricorne.97 Male sobriety was contrasted to embellishments in
92 Ibid., 82.
93 Ibid., 121.
94 Ibid., 124.
95 See Ibid., 124.
96 Ibid., 123-124.
97 Magrit Pernau, ‘Shifting Globalities - Changing Headgear: The Indian Muslims between Turban, Hat
and Fez’,  in  Translocality:  The Study of Globalising Processes from a Southern Perspective ,  Studies in
Global Social History 4 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 259.
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female  styles  and  also  embroidered  Oriental styles,  both  of  which  were  regarded  as
uncivilized and effeminate. These kinds of middle class values incorporated by the three-
piece  suit  and  the top hat  were further  promoted  through the arrival  of  evangelical
missionaries in the 1830s.98
While these strategies were relatively successful concerning the wider population,
Indian elites followed their own interests and transgressed the boundaries set by British
interests. They drew there own sartorial boundaries and selectively adopted European
styles  predominantly  at  work in other  public occasions,  and then switched to Indian
dress at home or during leisure times. While some attempted and succeeded in passing as
respectable Europeans, most men preferred hybrid styles.99 However, these hybrid styles
became a  target  of  ridicule,  from both the  British  and  also  within Indian society.  A
famous  figure  was  the  Bengali  baboo,  a  figure  who  presented  a  threat  to  British
dominance as a rising Western educated Bengali elite.100 The British attempted to restrain
these local elites’ claims to equality by stressing the Indian character of their identity and
labelling their hybrid styles and general appearance as effeminate. It was a struggle over
the border of respectability and bears obvious similarities to the Ottoman dandy who was
ridiculed in a similar way to disgrace a rising middle/upper class. 
 4.2.2 Adoption of and Distancing from Local Dress by European Colonizers
Throughout the sixteenth century British colonialists in India, as merchants and
missionaries, made no efforts to propagate or maintain their appearance and practised
acculturation through the adoption of local Indian dress. However, with the continuing
rise of colonialism these widespread practices became outlawed and British officials were
put  under  pressure  to  abandon them.  Colonial  power  was  marked  increasingly  by  a
sartorial  order  that  aimed  at  maintaining  a  visible  difference  between  colonizer  and
colonized.101
The British themselves, as also pointed out by Robert Ross, had their own struggles
98 See Ibid., 258.
99 See Tarlo, Clothing Matters, 48.
100 See Ibid., 50. On the stereotype of the Bengali baboo see also  Mrinalini Sinha,  Colonial Masculinity:
The  ‘Manly  Englishman’  and  the  ‘Effeminate  Bengali’  in  the  Late  Nineteenth  Century ,  Studies  in
Imperialism (Manchester u.a.: Manchester Univ. Press [u.a.], 1995).
101 In 1830 an ordinance banned the adoption of Indian dress by British officials, see Ross, Clothing, 75.
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concerning dress. In the early days of British colonialism employees of the East India
Company and others readily adopted Indian dress, a practice that was banned in 1830 in
order  to  “preserve  impeccable  British  standards.”102 British  enhanced  sartorial
fastidiousness  was  linked  to  a  felt  need  to  distance  themselves  from  the  Indian
population that opposed colonialism and claimed equal rights through the adoption of
British  dress.  In  contradistinction the  British  further  elaborated  the  nuances  of  their
appearance and applied other measures to maintain sartorial distinctions. 
Hence,  “British  obsessions  to  overdress,”103 as  Tarlo  phrased  it,  and  the
preoccupation with nuances of distinction coincided with developments of Indian men's
dress  towards the adoption of  European dress  in various degrees.  Rigid  British  dress
codes were attempts to make British identity less accessible for colonial subjects and,
presumably, also for lower classes in Britain itself. The imitation of British appearance
ought to be as hard as possible. These efforts to maintain difference sometimes clashed
with British claims to civilize colonial people. It led to the appearance of a number of
styles which kept the civilizing mission and the spread of raiment of civilization within
controllable boundaries maintaining British dominance. 
Dutch colonialism pursued a different politics of dress. Dutch colonial staff were
urged to maintain the dress worn at their home countries much earlier, already in the
seventeenth  century,  while  Indonesian converts  to  Christianity  were  allowed to  don
Dutch dress.104 The Portuguese, on the contrary, maintained from the beginning their
dress in the fear of the inquisition which regarded the abandonment of prescribed styles
of dress as apostasy. Obviously colonial order was established and preserved amongst
other means by an order of dress and thus could be subverted by defiance of the same.
 4.2.3 Sola Topi, Fez and Top Hat
Throughout  the  nineteenth  century  the  top  hat  remained  the  most  respectable
headpiece, even though some kinds of felt hats appeared, i.e. during the 1848 revolution
as a part of revolutionary dress. Later in the century straw hats became fashionable as
102 Tarlo, Clothing Matters, 37.
103 Ibid., 38.
104 Ross, Clothing, 39.
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headwear for the summer.105 The cylindrical shape of the top hat was the repetition of the
leading  principle  of  uniformity  and  ostentatious  nonchalance  apparent  in  cut  of  the
clothes of late nineteenth bourgeois male dress, i.e. sleeves, trouser legs, trunk.106 
For British colonial rule in India the top hat proved insufficient as a demarcation
from aspiring Indian elites. Thus from the 1870s onwards the sun helmet took its place as
a marker of  British claim to superiority, and it became a “[...]demarcation of the danger
the Orient held for Europeans.”107 The sola topi or pith helmet was a means deployed by
the British to accomplish sartorial distinction from the Indian population. It is one of the
many  examples  where  headgear  became  a  major  sign  of  distinction  in  the  colonial
setting. Ross and other authors report that the compulsory wearing of the  sola topi  in
British India by colonial officials as a marker of the British claim to superiority in India
was widely despised because it was extremely uncomfortable.108 Nevertheless, it served
its  purpose  and helped to  strengthen the  labeling  of  Europeans as  topi  walas  (head-
wearing  people),109 suggesting  that  the  establishment  of  the  wearing  of  brimmed
European hats as a sign of imperial domination was part of colonial politics itself, not
just its expression.
Magret Pernau more specifically elaborated on the question of headgear in colonial
India in relation to British rule. She particularly focused on developments leading from
the  Mughal  turban  as  an  encompassing  headpiece  worn  after  the  establishment  of
Mughal  rule  to  the  development  of  elaborate  regional  styles  from  the  18th century
onwards.110 The development and preservation of these distinct styles was supported by
the  British  colonial  rulers,  who  saw  it  as  a  means  to  prevent  political  unity.  The
development of these elaborate “Indian” styles took place parallel to strict restrictions to
the adoption of the dress of the Indian nobility by British colonial personal. The British
colonial rulers fostered the differentiation of distinct ethno-religious styles of headgear in
105 See Brändli, Der herrlich biedere Mann, 144.
106 See Ibid., 199 and 263.
107 Pernau, ‘Shifting Globalities - Changing Headgear: The Indian Muslims between Turban, Hat and Fez,’
67. 
108 Headgear also played its part in the mechanization of clothes production insomuch as the first example
large-scale production, which took place in South London in the eighteenth century, were hats. See
Ross, Clothing, 26-27.
109 See Tarlo, Clothing Matters, 32-38.
110 Pernau, ‘Shifting Globalities - Changing Headgear: The Indian Muslims between Turban, Hat and Fez,’
255. 
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India as a measure to strengthen colonial rule.111
Also from the 1870 onwards, at the same time as the appearance of the  sola topi,
emergent  Indian  Muslim  middle  classes,  in  their  efforts  to  create  respectable  styles,
employed the Ottoman fez to create an Indian Muslim modernity. Pernau read this use of
the fez as the symbol of a newly emerging Islamic piety and of pan-Islamism but to a
greater extent as a Pan-Indian symbol.112 
The fez, then, with its cylindrical form, carried a basic principle of bourgeois men's
dress as it was established throughout the nineteenth century. The fez itself followed this
trend and developed its form towards a more strictly geometrical one. While the kind of
fezzes depicted from the time of its introduction under Mahmud II. were quite high and
voluminous, on the top broader than at the rim, sometimes without the sharp contours
known later, with an enormous tassel further blurring its shape, at the end of the century
they had became shorter with a sharper cut with a short unobtrusive tassel that often did
not appear in photographs taken from the front.113 Photographs also suggest not just a
chronological development but also a differing of forms according to social strata, as such
that later in the century the stiff straight fezzes were worn by military and civil elite and
those with a slightly different form, more narrow on the top and a bit shorter, by men
from lower classes.114 Nevertheless, I could not tell from my material if certain shapes of
the fez had been restricted to certain social strata.
The  politics  of  dress  were  crucial  to  postcolonial  nationalism  and  challenged
111 See Ibid.
112 See Ibid., 265. On colonial Muslim modernity see also  Ayesha Jalal, ‘Negotiating Colonial Modernity
and  Cultural  Difference:  Indian  Muslim  Conceptions  of  Community  and  Nation,  1878–1914’,  in
Modernity and Culture from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, 1890-1920, ed. Leila Fawaz (New
York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2012), 230–260.
113 Also Abdülmecid (1839-61),  Mahmud II's successor, was portrait with a huge fez with a big tassel.
Mahmud II's and Abdülmecid's fezzes might also indicate the prevalence of the ruler's headpiece as  a
marker of outstanding position. That also becomes apparent by the painting depicting Amhed I (1603-
17).  His  headpiece  and  the  way of  presenting  it  appears  not  so  different  from Abdülmecid's.  See
Jennifer Scarce, ‘Principles of Ottoman Costume’,  Costume 22 (1988): 12–31. For this research I could
not track how linear the process from softer to the stiffer shapes was. Remarkable in this regard is the
fez  with  which  Sultan Abdülaziz  (1861-1876?),  is  generally  depicted,  which  was  a  very short  and
conically shaped; it almost looks like a soft felt cap, and is very far from the stiff impression the Fez
normally provides. See i.e. Özendes, Photography in the Ottoman Empire, 152. Yet, this was not the only
form of fez present at that time, the cylindrical stiff shape also present in the 1860, such as the one
worn by Server Paşa in 1865, see Ibid.,151.  For an early example of the nineteenth century Ottoman fez
see Mustafa Reşid Paşa's portrait in Selçuk Akşin Somel,  Historical Dictionary of the Ottoman Empire
(Lanham, Md. [u.a.]: Scarecrow Press, 2012), 264. On the shapes of different fezzes see also  Ahmed
Rasım, ‘Fes Hakkında’, İstişare, no. 7 (Teşrin-i Evvel 1324 (October/November 1908)): 316–20, where he
quotes historical sources of fez descriptions.
114 See Özendes, Photography in the Ottoman Empire, 155 and 158.
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European claims to dictated dress codes that would secure their claim to superiority. As
in the Ottoman case, there are many examples of how headgear became a marker of
difference and national identity.115 It was a piece of dress not as easily given up as others
and marked national affiliation, such as in India where “too it was headcovering which
was the most likely to remain unchanged.”116 
 4.2.4 National Costume versus Civilized Dress?
Forth  emphasized  that  one  strategy  which  served  to  reconstruct  masculinity,
morally as well as corporally, and thus, counter the perceived threat to male power by
modernity, was nationalism.117 In the construction of national identity, engagement with
clothing and consumption were pivotal. Sumptuary regulations, as we have seen applied
to the Fez in chapter three, were not just a premodern phenomenon but stood also at the
wake of modernity.118 An aspect of the appearance of the dandy was his association with
cosmopolitanism.119 He  appeared  in  the  cosmopolitan  quarters  of  the  cities.
Cosmopolitanism was associated with the anti-national, and thus the effeminate was also
the anti-national.120 Nationalism was not only a dominant paradigm of the period,121 or at
least  some kind of  proto-nationalism,  but  was also to  become the main cure  for  the
colonial threat.
When the claim to equality made by the appearance of South and West African
elites dressed as British ladies and gentlemen did not lead to recognition, some West
African countries turned to sartorial nationalism. So did anglophone West Africa adopt
lose cotton robes instead of British style suits. These were promoted by the Dress Reform
115 Ross, Clothing, 81.
116 Ibid., 81.
117 See Forth, Masculinity in the Modern West, 47. For more about nationalism see Ibid., Chapter 5.
118 As  Brändli  assesses  for  the  German-speaking  world,  in  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century
international fashion was pondered against the establishment of national costume. These discussions,
however,  disappeared  and  gave  way  to  the  triumph of  bourgeois  fashionability.  See  Brändli,  Der
herrlich biedere Mann, 166.
119 See Elif Bilgin, ‘An Analysis of Turkish Modernity through Discourses of Masculinities’ (unpublished
doctoral thesis, Middle East Technical Univ., 2004), 105.
120 Keya Anjaria traces the reappearance of the dandy from Ottoman to Turkish Literature in the 1980s
and detects thereby a transformation: In her analysis the dandy turns from a upper class traitor of the
nationalist cause to a compatriot, who is part of the masses. See Keja Keja Anjaria, ‘The Dandy and the
Coup: Politics of Literature in the Post-1980 Turkish Novel, Üç Beş Kişi’, Middle Eastern Literatures 17,
no. 3 (2014): 263–82, doi:10.1080/1475262X.2014.997575, 268
121 See  Benedict Anderson,  Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism ,
Revised ed. (London [u.a.]: Verso, 2006).
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Society, founded in 1887. Ross noted a “considerable and surprising degree of coincidence
between the forms of colonial policy and politics of dress,”122 caused by the difference
between French and British colonialism, where the French in contrast to the British did
not  prevent  the adoption of  European attire  and simultaneously offered much easier
access to French citizenship.
Also,  in  Indian's  men's  dress,  a  shift  occurred,  partly  as  a  consequence  of
experiences that racist prejudices and structures could not be overcome simply by an
adaptation of British appearance and behavior. Tarlo pointed out that even though the
British colonizer attempted to orientalize their Indian subjects and prevent the adoption
of Western dress, also numerous anti-colonial activists of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century opposed its  adoption and pejoratively labeled it  as imitation. They
instead issued calls to wear swadeshi (Indian made) cloth.123 The first efforts to (re-)define
Indian dress appeared in the 1870s, namely with Jyndirindranath Tagore's attempts to
employ dress as a starting point for political change. The aim was to appear respectable
without becoming European, and it comprised the invention of a national costume out of
the vast variety of Indian dress.124 
This first attempt to create a sense of political unity through dress as part of an
anti-colonial struggle remained singular and did not find wide acceptance. Only in 1905,
after  the  viceroy  of  India,  Lord  Curzon,  announced  the  partition  of  Bengal,  a  first
collective movement of the rejection of European dress emerged. The dhothi,  a waist-
clothe for  men, worn draped, folded and tucked became the symbol of this struggle,
which also entailed the boycott and burning of foreign cloth. It remained nevertheless a
regional  struggle,  and from 1910 onwards many men returned to  European or  semi-
European clothes. The choice of dress remained a “private problem” and not a central
point of public debate until the appearance of M.K. Ghandi.125 In terms of headgear, the
British colonial  sola topi was countered by the Ghandian cap during the struggle for
national independence. Many times these headpieces, such as other national symbols and
clothes, were cases of invented traditions. So was a black cap worn in Java, called Peci,
derived from Dutch  petje, which became a sign of anti-colonial nationalist attitude and
122 Ross, Clothing, 136. 
123 See Tarlo, Clothing Matters, 11.
124 See Ibid., 58.
125 See Ibid., 60-61.
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adopted by the elites to demonstrate solidarity with the masses.126 
Postcolonial  nationalisms employed  various sartorial  strategies.  European pieces
were adopted selectively piece by piece, or mixed styles appeared that combined assumed
national or traditional styles with European pieces of dress. In his case studies of Indian
and  Indonesian  nationalism Ross  concluded  that  “the  wearing  of  European  dress  by
prominent Indian and Javanese men was the beginning, though not necessarily the end
of  anti-colonial  nationalism.”127 Forms  of  disciplining  the  population  through  dress
already employed by the missionaries were adopted by nationalist elites in postcolonial
nationalist movement and states.  Efforts to bring “backward” people up to date came
along with the promotion of particular forms of behavior and social engineering. The
restrictions  imposed  by  European  colonial  laws  to  the  wearing  of  Western  dress
generated certain acts of resistance such as the wearing of top hats in church as a claim
to equality with the colonizers in the region of today's Botswana and Namibia.128 
The fashion-obsessed dandy became a figure of the anti-national. Specifically, but
not only in non-Western countries, he became the imitator of the foreign and thus fitted
perfectly into the rhetoric of the degraded urban male who needed to be reintegrated into
the nation in order to strengthen the national collective.129 Even in Russia this process of
terming the appropriation of  ready-made clothes  by lower rural  classes  as  dandyism
occurred,  thus  limiting  the  possibility  of  social  mobility  or  equality  that  might
accompany the appropriation of a certain style of dress.130 In terms of nationalist dress,
126 Whereas Thailand's government ordered the wearing of hats in the streets by men in 1940, leading to
the establishment of hat hiring for those who did not posses one, in case of the appearance of the
police. See Ross, Clothing, 111.
127 Ibid., 79.
128 See Ibid., 102.
129 The dandy was a present trope in many countries, i.e. also in Russian satire and plays he became a
common figure.  See  Christine  Ruane,  The  Empire’s  New Clothes:  A History of  the  Russian  Fashion
Industry, 1700 - 1917 (New Haven [u.a.]: Yale Univ. Press, 2009), 152.
130 See Ibid., 75. Actually the Russian Empire under Peter the Great in the early eighteenth century had
been the site of a very early example of state introduced modernization of dress. After his return from
a journey in western Europe Peter  the Great of  Russia initiate d a dress  reform by a decree  that
required the Muscovite population to wear “German dress.” He also ordered men in his vicinity, with
some exceptions, to shave their beards. Peter' s Decree on Wearing German Clothes from 1701 read as
follows:  “[All  ranks of the service nobility,  leading merchants,  military personnel,  and inhabitants  of
Moscow and the other towns, except the clergy] are to wear German clothes and hats and footwear and to
ride in German saddles; and their wives and children without exception are also so to dress. Henceforth
nobody is to wear [traditional] Russian or Cossacks clothes or to ride in Russian [i.e., Tatar-style] saddles;
nor are craftsmen to make such things or to trade in them. And if contrary to this the Great Sovereign's
decree some people wear such Russian or cossack clothes and ride in Russian saddles, the town gatekeepers
are to exact a fine from them, [so much] for those on foot and [much more] from those on horseback. Also,
craftsmen who make such things and trade in them will be, for their disobedience, severely punished. ” And
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tsar Alexander III also used headgear as a sign of distinction by the introduction of kind
of papakha, or kalpak, in 1881.131
During  the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century  Forth  depicts  three,
interconnected metamorphoses which had an impact on the male body.132 The first was
the Social Darwinist discourse that vacillated between the praise of evolutionary progress
of  Western  society  versus  fears  of  physical  degeneration  coming  along  with  its
civilization. The second was a change in the social composition of the middle class, in
which members of lower classes claimed bourgeois status and privileges. For this upward
social  mobility  dress  and  other  consumer  items  became  pivotal  props  for  the
appropriation of a respectable masculinity. The last point was an enforced engagement
with  bodily  exercise,  especially  of  the  lower  middle  classes  as  a  compensation  for
ostensible effeminacy.
In colonial societies under direct colonial rule the local dandy’s position and his
endeavours for social enhancement through the adoption of modern dress were more
obvious.  Rudolf  Mrazek  scrutinized  the  appearance  of  the  Indonesian  dandy  at  the
beginning of the twentieth century: “The newly born native dandy was a 'native' who
borrowed Dutch clothes to place himself in a 'modern' colonial society.”133 
Since dress in the colonies was an important sign of distinction, the appropriation of
European colonialists dress by colonial subjects could question colonial domination and
white  superiority  and  claims  to  dominance.  At  first,  Dutch  colonialism  used  and
interpreted this acculturation in a different way: as a method to 'tame' the 'wild native' who
threatened Dutch dominance, which proved successful in this way. In the course of time
this is Peter's Decree on Shaving of 1705: “All courtiers and officials in Moscow and all the other towns,
as well as leading merchants and other townsmen, except priests and deacons, must henceforth by this the
Great Sovereign's decree shave their beards and moustaches. And whosoever does not wish to do so, but to
go about with [traditional Russian] beard and moustache, is to pay a [hefty] fine, according to his rank.
[...] And the Department of Land Affairs [in Moscow] is to give [such persons] a badge in receipt, as will
the government offices in the other towns, which badges they must wear. And from the peasants a [small]
toll is to be exacted every day at the town gates, without which they cannot enter or leave the town.” As
quoted and translated by James Cracraft “Laws of Peter I ,” in James Cracraft, ed., Major Problems in the
History of Imperial Russia, Major Problems in European History Series  (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath,
1994),  110-111;  on  these  reforms  see  also  Ruane,  The  Empire’s  New Clothes;  and Christine  Ruane,
‘Subjects into Citizens:  The Politics of Clothing in Imperial  Russia’,  in  Fashioning the Body Politic:
Dress, Gender, Citizenship, ed. Wendy Parkins (New York: Berg, 2002), 49–70.
131 See Ruane, The Empire’s New Clothes, 160. 
132 See Forth, Masculinity in the Modern West, 143.
133 Rudolf Mrázek, ‘Indonesian Dandy: The Politics of Clothes in the Late Colonial Period, 1893-1942’, in
Outward Appearances: Dressing State and Society in Indonesia , Proceedings / Koninklijk Instituut Voor
Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde 4 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1997), 131-132.
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these colonialized subjects formed a new force, especially those who acquired an academic
education and resisted  being defined and categorized  by Dutch colonial  rulers.134 This
resulted, in accordance with Brändli's observations of the German-speaking world, in an
obsession with cleanliness, discipline and militarized appearance:  colonial officers were
urged to wear their white, starched ceremonial uniforms even off duty, which meant an
enormous  effort  to  keep this  uniform in  a  nice  condition.135 Mrázek attributed  to  the
practice of Westernization a rebellious character and a revolutionary potential:  “Diving
into everything Western, and remaining elusive at the same time, demanded the courage of
a guerilla fighter.”136 His interpretation of the dandy is the reverse of his depiction of a
coward who submits to Western colonial dominance, as was done by late Ottoman authors.
4.3 The Spread of Mass Produced Dress in the Ottoman Empire
The term mass-fashion-system can be applied to the phenomenon of modern dress.
It  differs  from traditional  dress,  in  which  clothes  are  produced not  by the means of
modern mass production as well as its form of consumption. It is produced in higher
numbers and consumed in high rates. Under the mass-fashion-system, single pieces of
dress are not worn until they lose their function (through use), but are rather changed
when they become outdated. In the Ottoman Empire a mass-fashion-system had been
established in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, making ready-made clothes after
the  latest  European fashions  available  in  European  warehouses.137 The  mass-fashion-
system system brought forth the polarization of gendered appearance in the Ottoman
Empire just as it did in Europe, as Charlotte Jirousek has argued.  She shows that while
Ottoman basic garments were the same for men and women, those in Europe were cut
entirely differently.138 Men wore first a hose and later trouser, while women wore skirts
without  bifurcated  undergarments  of  any  sort,  whereas  Ottoman  dress  foresaw  the
wearing  of  a  şalvar as  a  basic  undergarment  for  everyone.  Both  Ottoman  men and
women wore a similar style of layered garments with similar pieces combined. 
134 See Ibid., 132.
135 See Ibid., 133.
136 Ibid., 133.
137 Charlotte Jirousek, ‘The Transition to Mass Fashion System Dress in the Later Ottoman Empire’, in
Consumption Studies and the History of the Ottoman Empire, 1550 - 1922: An Introduction , ed. Donald
Quataert (Albany, NY: State Univ. of New York Press, 2000), 201–41.
138 Ibid. 234, and Ibid. 217.
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Another  basic  difference  between  Ottoman and  European  clothes,  according  to
Jirousek,  was that  in  Europe from the fourteenth  century  onwards clothes  had  been
tailored so as to reveal or stress the contours of the body and individual fit.139 In contrast,
Ottoman clothes were shaped in a way to conceal the body. The Ottoman dress consisted
of a basic shirt and baggy pant combined with layered coats, vest, jackets, sashes and
headgear.140 According to Jirousek this basic style was not subject to major changes for
centuries since the sixteenth century, even though traditional dress, as she terms is, was
never static either, but differed substantially in the rate of change to mass-fashion. Yet, as
I think it is important to emphasize, basic items of modern mass fashion also remain
beyond changing fashions, as can best be seen in the permanence of the men's standard
suit.  Fashion  thereby  is  not  just  a  taste-driven  change  but  more  crucially  a  socio-
economic  system.  Thus,  with  the  transition from the  traditional  to  the  mass-fashion
system,  following  Jirousek's  terminology,  the  meaning  of  dress  as  well  as  its  form
changed. A significant example of a change in the fashion system in relation to social
relations is the gendered meaning of dress. With the introduction of the mass-fashion-
system gendered appearances became polarized. In the Ottoman Empire this began in the
eighteenth century, i.e. with the altered cut of the antari, its neckline becoming wide and
deep and its upper part tighter. It was combined with a kind of extremely large headgear,
and the silhouette thus produced resembled European bodies and headgear of the same
period, as Jirousek demonstrates.141
In the 1860s, the istanbulin as an Ottoman version of the frock coat appeared and
spread especially among the civil officials. It had a shortened, popped collar and was,
with variations, in use until the Republican period, while single-breasted frock coats with
short turned town collars were still in use. Parallel to this, according to Nureddin Sevin,
jacket  and  trousers  became  en  vogue.  Regarding  European  fashion,  the  models  of
Parisian and London tailors at that time appeared in Istanbul after five or six years. Sevin
also discusses multi-colored redingots, which were popular during this period.142
139 Jirousek,  ‘The  Transition  to  Mass  Fashion  System Dress  in  the  Later  Ottoman Empire,’  218;  and
Jirousek, ‘Ottoman Influences in Western Dress.’
140 Jirousek, ‘The Transition to Mass Fashion System Dress in the Later Ottoman Empire,’ 210; and Scarce,
‘Principles of Ottoman Costume’.
141 Jirousek, ‘The Transition to Mass Fashion System Dress in the Later Ottoman Empire,’ 217.
142 See  Nureddin Sevin,  Onüç Asırlık Türk Kiyâfet Târihine bir Bakış, 1. bs., Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları /
Kültür  Eserleri  Dizisi,   Türkei  Kültür  Bakanlığı.  -  Ankara,  1976-  1195  (Ankara:  Kültür  Bakanlığı
yayınları, 1991).
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Koçu defines setire, setre, setri as “a term used for coats of European shape.”143 That
means setre designates different kinds of jacket, such as a frock coat or sports jacket, cut
in  a  European  style.  The  redingot in  contrast  was  the  frock  coat  which  became
fashionable in the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Abdülhamid II. It was loosely cut
and  closed  with  two  buttons  before  the  breast,144 a  second  row  of  buttons  just  for
embellishment. Its color was mostly black, sometimes grey, and it was combined with
trousers  of  the  same  color  and  cloth.145 According  to  Koçu  the  gray  redingot was
exclusively  worn  by  very  rich  Westernized  men,  thus  denoting  extravagance.  The
denotation  of  the  wearing  of  gray  as  extravagant  points  to  the  adoption  of  late
nineteenth  century  sober  styles  which  made  the  slightest  variation  a  marker  of
divergence. The redingot was combined with a vest and shirt. The istanbulin, introduced
through the reign of Abülmecid and worn also during Adülaziz' reign, was completely
closed with buttons on the front. Koçu argues that it was specifically invented for those
older Ottoman statesmen who had trouble getting used to the uncomfortable starched
shirts with their stiff collars. Thus, the  istanbulin with its closed front, was invented to
prevent  them from the wearing of  starched shirts  and collars  as  well  as  the  necktie
(boyunbaği). 146 
In accordance with global  trends of modern male fashion,  during the Hamidian
period  Ottoman  men's  dress  became  more  sober  and  less  decorated,  and  European
fashion had become widely established among the elites. This was also indicated by the
abandoning of the  istanbulin-style frock coat in favor of the  redingot, which had closer
resemblance to those worn in Europe: “The normal European frock coat (redingot), worn
with vest, starched shirt, and necktie, took over […].”147 
143 In  the originial:  “Avrupa kesimi  ceket  karşılığına  kullanılmış  bir  isimdir,”  Reşat  Ekrem Koçu,  Türk
Giyim,  Kuşam ve Süslenme Sözlüğü, Sümerbank Kültür Yayınları 1 (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1967),
204.
144 “göğüsü iki düğme ile iklenip kapanır,” Ibid., 196. See entrence Redingot in Ibid., 196-197.
145 Koçu, Türk Giyim, Kuşam ve Süslenme Sözlüğü, 196.
146 Ibid., 134.
147 Carter V. Findley,  Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History  (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Pr., 1989),
213. On the constitutional period see Kemal H. Karpat, ‘Transformation of the Ottoman State’, in The
Politics of Modern Turkey: Critical Issues in Modern Politics , ed. Ali Çarkoğlu and William M. Hale, vol. 1
(London u.a.: Routledge, 2008),  77-80.
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4.4 Gender and Women's Dress in the Late Ottoman Empire
Women of the Ottoman elite altered their dress significantly with modernization
under the system of Western fashions.148 Different approaches to transcultural exchange
between Ottoman and British women become apparent according to Reina Lewis' study
on the biographies  of  several  women,  British  and Ottoman citizens,  who engaged in
practices of cultural cross-dressing. She stresses the great extent to which boundaries
between imaginations of Orient and Occident were blurred by these practices or had
already been blurred, as they never really existed as rigid boundaries, while at the same
times these women reaffirmed binary constructions of East and West.149
While Ottoman male styles basically adopted European clothing items, with some
exceptions such as the  istanbulin and the fez, the modernization of Ottoman women's
dress implied the “invention” of completely new items of dress or a reinterpretation of
already existing ones. Nora Şeni depicts how the çarşaf appeared next to the ferace as an
outer coat.150 It was a two-piece item that consisted of skirt and cape, and thus,induced
the transition to the wearing of a skirt,  in contrast to the common wearing of baggy
pants. And the  entari/antari,  a long blouse, was altered and became like its European
counterpart thereby radically transforming Ottoman women's dress as it enabled the use
of a corset, an item of extensive controversy for its encroachment on the female body and
morality.151 Women's headdress was also affected by these changes. Among the upper
and middle classes the hat become quite common; it was combined with a veil attached to
it.152 Women's wearing of the fez gave way to the new fashions, and ceased completely in
favour of more fashionable headpieces. It appears that in women's fashion the fez became
148 Despite the sartorial differentiation of religious communities Ottoman on legal grounds it is assumed
that Christian, Jewish and Muslim women dressed similar, see Suraiya Faroqhi, ‘Introduction, or Why
and How One Might Want to Study Ottoman Clothes’, in Ottoman Costumes: From Textile to Identity,
ed. Suraiya Faroqhi and Christoph K Neumann (Istanbul: Eren, 2004), 24.
149 Lewis, Rethinking Orientalism.
150 The ferace itself had  a quite recent appearance. A fact that cautions to be careful about the view on the
stable  character  of  preindustrial  styles,  the  changes  that  brought  about  not  neglected.  On  the
appearance of the ferace in the eighteenth century see Suraiya Faroqhi, ‘Female Costumes in the Late
Fifteenth Century’, in Ottoman Costumes: From Textile to Identity, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi and Christoph K
Neumann (Istanbul: Eren, 2004), 87.
151 See Nora Şeni, ‘Fashion and Women’s Clothing in the Satirical Press of İstanbul at the End of the 19 th
Century’, in Women in Modern Turkish Society, ed. Şirin Tekeli (London und New York: Zed Books Ltd.,
1991), 29; on the replacement of the  ferace see Ibid., 31; On these kind of developments concerning
Ottoman women's dress in the nineteenth century see also Lewis, Rethinking Orientalism.
152 See Şeni,  ‘Fashion and Women’s Clothing in the Satirical Press of İstanbul at the End of the 19th
Century,’ 35.
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obsolete earlier then it did for men’s fashion, having never really  acquired the meaning
of an explicit marker of Ottoman modernity.153
Lewis attributes specific significance to the wearing of the hat for both Ottoman
men and women in the politics of dress and the appropriation of Western dress. While
indoor dress had been Europeanized to a great extent, as several authors demonstrated,
the wearing of the hat marked a different level since it came along with the gendered
construction of space. While women's Western dress in public was mostly covered by
some sort of overcoat, such as the ferace or carşaf, and even though these were already
altered or even invented to accommodate the new styles underneath, the hat secured a
different level of visibility, as Lewis asserts.154 She attributes a “synecdochial function” to
the hat, for both the male and the female version. Thus, even though Ottoman men's and
women's dress both had been Westernized to a great extent, in public space it was staged
differently.  While women's dress was equipped with a “Ottoman cover,” men's dress,
even though it had some specificity, such as the İstanbulin, was fully Westernized in the
streets as well as at home.155 
Because of this altering and accustoming of modern dress to Ottoman practices and
styles, as Reina Lewis suggests, it might be more proper to talk of adaptation rather than
adoption. Therefore, while European dress could be a vehicle to induce modernity, it is
uncertain and parochial  modernity  that  is  produced.  Lewis  points  out  that  European
clothes, though adopted widely by both elite Ottoman men and women, “were already
indigenized into  the specialized  protocols  of  Ottoman dress.”  Thus the  adaptation of
European dress took place within connections between imperial European power and
local  powers,  which encompassed patriarchies as well  as class  systems.  Within these
dynamics  class  positions  were  secured  and  established  through  “association  with
colonizing powers.”156
153 See Ayşe Zeren Enis, Everyday Lives of Ottoman Muslim Women: Hanımlara Mahsûs Gazete (Newspaper
for Ladies) (1895 - 1908), 1st ed., Tarih Dizisi, Libra Kitap. - İstanbul 60 (İstanbul: Libra Kitap, 2013). 
154 Lewis, Rethinking Orientalism, 228.
155 Actually that is a question that needs further research, i.e. from autobiographies to see what kind of
dress was sported for which occasions.
156 Lewis, Rethinking Orientalism, 6; that has been elaborated extensively regarding the Indian male elites
by Sinha, Colonial Masculinity.
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4.4.1 Urban Jungles and Bourgeois Homes
The concept of borderland discussed in the previous chapter has been used in the
field of women's dress by Onur Inal, who draws on the example of port cities to reveal a
mutual  exchange  of  cultural  goods  between  British  and  Ottoman  women  that
transgressed  the  Westernization  paradigm.157 Ottoman  women  adopted  European
fashions increasingly from mid nineteenth century on, and even before that styles had
been altered due to contact. The adoption of Western dress occurred in a much more
informal manner, contrary to men's dress introduced by imperial decrees. And (upper
and  middle  class)  women  used  to  wear  hybrid  styles  with  varying  combinations  of
Ottoman and European pieces of dress in contrast to the almost complete Western style
men. Notwithstanding, Ottoman dress was completely abandoned by the 1860s/1870s in
certain social classes.158
The change of consumption patterns in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire came
along  with  a  transformation  of  gendered  spaces  and  gender  relations.159 These
transformations  were  triggered  significantly  during  the  Hamidian  period.  Elisabeth
Frierson analyses the gendered meaning of these patterns and how they developed. She
regards the 1890s as crucial in this respect because the main factors conditioning socio-
economic transformations, the print sector, the education system and commerce, expanded
exponentially during that period.160 These factors led to changing state-society relations in
which  basic  terms  of  social  interactions,  such  as  the  meaning  of  religion  and  its
157 See  Onur  Inal,  ‘Women’s  Fashions  in  Transition:  Ottoman  Borderlands  and  the  Anglo-Ottoman
Exchange of Costumes’, Journal of World History: Official Journal of the World History Association 22,
no. 2 (2011): 243–72.
158 See  Anastasia  Falierou,  ‘Ottoman  Turkish  Women’s  Clothing  between  Trade,  Tradition  and
Modernity’, in From Traditional Attire to Modern Dress: Modes of Identification, Modes of Recognition in
the  Balkans  (XVIth  -  XXth  Centuries),  ed.  Constanţa  Vintilă-Ghiţulescu  (Newcastle  upon  Tyne:
Cambridge  Scholars  Publ.,  2011),  175–93. On  the  global  spread  of  the  newest  styles,  in  this  case
designed for females, and with it bourgeois identity from the fashion center Paris, where designers
took their  inspirations from local  styles  on a  global scale  see  Kristin Hoganson,  ‘The Fashionable
World:  Imagined  Communities  of  Dress’,  in  After  the  Imperial  Turn:  Thinking with  and threw the
Nation, ed. Antoinette M. Burton (Durham, NC [u.a.]: Duke Univ. Press, 2003), 260–78.
159 The interrelation of modernization of dress and the reorganization of gendered spaces needs further
study. Christine Ruane already remarked for the dress reforms of Peter the Great in the eighteenth
century that these brought about a change in gender relations through a transformation of gendered
spaces. In that case it meant the common socializing of men and women on certain occasions, that did
not exist before. See Ruane, ‘Subjects into Citizens: The Politics of Clothing in Imperial Russia’.
160 Frierson concentrates on developments in Istanbul as example par excellence for these tendencies. See
Elisabeth B. Frierson, ‘Gender, Consumption, and Patriotism : The Emergence of an Ottoman Public Sphere’,
in Public Islam and the Common Good, ed. Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman, Social, Economic and
Political Studies of the Middle East. - Leiden : Brill, 1971- 95 (Leiden [u.a.]: Brill, 2004), 99–125.
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implications to determine social relations, became redefined. Unlike many accounts which
stress the rigidity of Hamidian censorship and the conservative traits  of  Abdülhamid's
regime Frierson pointed out that the print sector developed to a much greater extent then
usually acknowledged, as did its readership, due to growing literacy rates.161
Concerning gender identities, in this case women's identities, the education system
made its contributions to change, too. Women on the one hand became better educated
and were on the other trained for professional careers within the education system and
beyond. In terms of consumption they became visible as consumers while they also took
part in production through the professionalising of female skills,  such as sewing and
weaving, as well as in newly found factories and workshops. These women appeared in
and shaped public spaces due to their employment in wage labor, and they represented
transformed consumption patterns with their changing styles of dress. This new culture
of display, promoted by new departments stores, which sold Western fashion, thus was a
crucial part of the transformation of a gendered political economy. While men's fashion
was  characterized  by  a  call  to  uniformity  and  drabness,  the  regulating  emphasis  on
women's  dress  was  put  on modesty.  Even though especially  Muslim women did not
openly display their latest Western fashions, their outerware was not untouched by these
trends and it  became distinctively embroidered,  ornamented and colored. These were
regarded by some forces and actors in society as transgressions of accepted boundaries,
but interestingly Frierson shows that repressive interventions were mostly unsuccessful
and women continued these clothing practices undeterred.162 
New styles of women's dress and the Westernization of dress in general had several
economic  effects  that  were  also  linked  to  gender  relations.  Female  workforces   and
migrant workers provided a cheap workforce for the Hamidian regime to support and
establish Ottoman textile enterprises to counter European dominance of the market. The
textile sector also had close ties to the growing print market, especially illustrated by
women's magazines, which promoted the newest fashions as well as the purchase of local
products. 
Within the domain of the home the modernization of dress and other items also
shaped  gender  relations. With  reorganization  of  space  inside  the  house  towards
161 See Ibid., 105.
162 Frierson objects the assumption that these modernized practices, such as dress, were restricted to a few
elite women, but encompassed at least the middle classes. See Ibid., 116.
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functionality and the spread of Western furniture the former selamlik, the space where
men met with other men, was transformed into a living room where men and women of
the house received  their  guest  and appeared  both  “to  present  the  best  formal  image
available” braking partially with former gender segregation.163 Thus, the home could be
both a public space for the presentation of the newest fashions and a private sphere
where different dress codes might find expression.164 
In her comparison of Ottoman and Japanese adaptation of Western culture, Selçuk
Esenbel especially focuses on dress and related codes of conduct and the home. According
to Esenbel, in contrast to the Ottoman Empire, Japan in the Meiji period had an explicit
program of encompassing Westernization to prove that the country was 'civilized' enough
to obtain a revision of unequal trade treaties and thus restore sovereignty.165
Nevertheless,  similar  to  the  Ottoman  Empire,  a  critique  of  this  approach  to
Westernization existed. Similar to the Young Ottoman's critique of the Tanzimat politics
as imposed by the West, the rising middle class in Japan criticized the Meiji bureaucracy
for embracing standards set by the West.  In Japan, another famous example from the
nineteenth century,  an edict  issued 1872 had made Western clothing compulsory for
government officials. Additionally, in 1876, the frock coat became a must for business
men.166 The  critique  expressed  by  the  Japanese  middle  class  was  especially  directed
towards the official Western garb of Meiji elite. This critique emerged after the Japanese-
Russian War in which Japan regained national sovereignty, including the revision of the
trade  treaties  with  the  West.  One  intellectual  explicitly  linked  Western  dress  to
emasculation  by  stating  “we  the  Japanese  can  dispense  with  wearing  the  Western
morning coat and its trappings and proudly wear our manly hakama167 again.”168
In this quote it is striking that Fukuzawa Yukichi refers to dress worn in private
163 Selçuk  Esenbel,  ‘The  Anguish  of  Civilized  Behavior:  The  Use  of  Western  Cultural  Forms  in  the
Everyday Lives of the Meiji Japanese and the Ottoman Turks During the Nineteenth Century’, Japan
Review, no. 5 (1 January 1994), 156.
164 On a critical  review of the  public/privat  dichotomy,  the production of gendered spaces,  bourgeois
homes and the  harem, see also  İrvin Cemil Schick, ‘The Harem as Gendered Space and the Spatial
Reproduction of  Gender’,  in  Harem Histories :  Envisioning Places  and Living Spaces  (Durham [u.a.]:
Duke Univ. Press, 2010), 69–86.
165 Esenbel, ‘The Anguish of Civilized Behavior,’, 159 and 169.
166 See Ross, Clothing, 109.
167 A traditional kind of trousers worn over the Kimono.
168 From  the  autobiography  of  Fukuzawa  Yukichi  Yukichi  Fukuzawa,  The  Autobiography  of  Yukichi
Fukuzawa, ed. Eiichi Kiyooka, The Library of Japan (New York, NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 2007)  as
quoted by Esenbel, ‘The Anguish of Civilized Behavior,’ 162.
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spaces, the morning coat, and he touches thereby one of the main difference between
Ottoman and Japanese adoption/appropriation of Western dress. While Ottoman elites
accomplished an almost full shift to Western dress inside the home for both men and
women, in Japan it became widespread practice to wear fully Westernized dress outside
the home and change into Japanese dress at home.
Nevertheless, if we return to the case of Orman katibi Mehmed Efendi, presented in
Chapter Four who showed up in his entari combined with, allegedly, a hat, this hypothesis
might be questioned. Either the entari here was a European morning coat, labelled as entari
because of  the  resemblance and  similar  function of  both,  or  he  combined it  within  a
mixture of private and public space because he was in his (temporary) home, where a
public event took place, the theater play. I suggest that he felt very comfortable because it
seems he just donned what he liked and what he would not have displayed in a different
(public)  space,  that  is,  a  morning coat,  of  whatever  origin or  belonging,  along with a
Western hat. Both items he would have usually not displayed in public, but as he felt
himself  at  home  at  the  hostel  and  display  himself  wearing  these  garments,  he  was
undoubtedly surprised by the ensuing criminal prosecution of his dress.
Discourses about the dandy were closely related to a gendered perception of the
city. While urban centres were often perceived as the centre of civilization, they were
also the home of the laboring classes,  which represented, in a racialized manner,  the
limits of the civilizing process. Hence, Christopher Forth argues, was the city racialized
as the Other and gendered female, a “jungle” to be conquered by bourgeois men when
strolling at night. Forth compares the nocturnal conquering of the towns by these men
with the exploration of forbidden realms of their bodies.169 The dandy became the other
side  of  the  “public  face  of  bourgeois  masculinity.”170 Elif  Bilgin,  too,  regards  the
interrelation of masculinity and modernity as crucial to the analysis of transformations in
the  realm  of  the  public  sphere.  For  her  the  modern  notion  of  public  space  was
constructed as a masculine space. Through the reorganization of space the public man
became established through the figure of the flâneur and the stranger. Bilgin considers
the Ottoman dandy a more precarious figure then his central European counterpart. The
169 Forth, Masculinity in the Modern West, 61.
170 Ibid., 59.
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flâneur generally walked on the edge of what was permissible and most of the time
beyond.  Even though the dandy was regarded as deviant from the norm in Western
metropolis, too, she concludes that the Ottoman dandy's perceived effeminate appearance
had a different and greater political significance.171
In Britain, the new plain style that began to spread in the late eighteenth century
became a demarcation line against women and foreigners, particularly the French. 172 The
new style meant in spatial terms also the exclusion of women from public space. Thus it
was a style that symbolized male dominance with a new livery: “It was, of course, a style
in which the distinction between the sexes, and between the spheres which the sexes
should  inhabit,  was  maximized.  The  men  were  drab,  understated  and  powerful:  the
women  fluffy,  decorative  and  without  a  place  in  the  public  world.  Men  were  fully
covered, except for the head and the hands; at various periods, and on suitable occasions,
women might display their shoulders and parts of the upper chest. […].”173 For Ross these
divergent principles of male and female dress signified the exclusion of women from the
world of business.
4.4.2 Sexuality
The gendered discourse on fashion not only reinforced binary gender categories but
also produced perceptions of sexual deviance and the construction of the homosexual as
an ontological category. Men's preoccupation with dress became associated with male
same-  sex  relations  and  passions.  This  discourse  on  sexuality  contributed  to  the
normalizing  tendencies  of  the  hegemonic  discourse  on  masculinity  of  that  period.174
Already with the dawn of the modern age luxury consumption had been linked also very
closely  to  sexuality.  Male  consumers  of  luxury  were  imputed  to  exercise  same-sex
relations or other sexual acts regarded as deviant. Before the establishment of a notion of
homosexuality men were accused of sodomy, which could comprise a variety more acts
besides same-sex relations i.e. masturbation.
As  Dror  Ze'evi  demonstrates  the  nineteenth  century  Ottoman discourse  can be
171 See Bilgin, ‘An Analysis of Turkish Modernity through Discourses of Masculinities’.
172 Ross, Clothing, 32.
173 Ibid., 37.
174 See i.e. George L. Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in Modern
Europe, Reprint [der Ausg.] New York 1985. (Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988).
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characterized  by  a  silencing of  sexually  explicit  utterances  and  same-sex  practices. 175
Thus  even  though  sexuality  is  not  explicitly  mentioned  in  the  discussions  around
headgear I suggest that what was engendered by that silencing was the production of a
heterosexual  masculine  subjectivity  in  the  course  of  nation-building  via  headgear.
Therefore  while  talking  about  the  construction  of  citizenship  and  belonging,
interdependent relations of gender, sexuality and class were under negotiation. They can
be found in the construction of bourgeois respectability, and one should not be irritated
that they are not negotiated explicitly but are still deeply embedded in the struggle for an
independent nation-state. The nation-state cannot be imagined without them.
I argue that the concern about headgear in this period was also rooted in concerns
about  the  establishment  of  a  respectable  bourgeois  masculinity.  Thus,  sexuality  as  a
constituting factor should not be singled out or overemphasized; rather, it needs to be
considered that “fashionable identities through the class determinants [...]  also shaped
the pattern  of  sexual  discordance.”176 Concerning the dandy's  social  position and  the
more  general  meaning  of  the  dandy  figure  for  the  constitution  of  modern  identity,
Breward further argued that his
“ironic exposure of the eroticism and the arbitrariness of the commodity was itself a
function  of  spending  power  and  social  status  marked  by  the  psychopathology  of
affluence,  an affluence that  touched the construction of  masculine identities  at  all
social levels. Thus the new figure of the homosexual, while attracting opprobrium for
this  presumed association  with  material  excess  and  its  inappropriate  display,  also
reflected previously established anxieties regarding the connections between gender,
class and consumption.”177
175 Ze’evi,  Producing Desire. On a position that critically reviews the historical  study of sexuality in the
Ottoman Empire see Serkan Delice, ‘Friendship, Sociability, and Masculinity in the Ottoman Empire:
An  Essay  Confronting  the  Ghosts  of  Historicism’,  New  Perspectives  on  Turkey  42  (2010):  103–25,
doi:http://dx.doi.org.595713270.erf.sbb.spk-berlin.de/10.1017/S0896634600005598. 
176 Breward, The Hidden Consumer, 247.
177 Ibid., 247. On homosexuality and urban life see Forth, Masculinity in the Modern West.
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4.5 Is there an Ottoman Dandy?
Mardin considered the Bihruz-Bey-syndrome, the Ottoman literary discourse on the
dandy,  as  a  symptom  of  the  disintegration  of  traditional  cultures  manifested  in  the
cleavage between conservative Muslim society and life-styles in the European quarters of
Istanbul,  that  is,  between urban culture  and  rural  society.  Beyond  this  dimension of
conservative reaction to the urban dandy, Mardin regards conflicts within the Ottoman
elite, between Tanzimat grandees and the Young Ottoman generation, as an origin of the
dandy topos. The young Ottomans, he assesses, criticized the excessive consumption and
preoccupation with fashion of the Tanzimat refomers, who were busy confirming their
social position and displaying their wealth. 
According  to  Mardin  it  was  the  lifestyles  of  these  first  generation  of  Ottoman
modernizers,  and  especially  their  children's,  which  Ottoman  novelists  depicted  as
decadent.  It  was  common  to  display  the  dandies’  daily  life  as  consisting  merely  of
preparations for promenading as, i.e.,  Recaizade Ekrem  comments in his novel  Araba
Sevdasi (Love for Carriages) on the young protagonist: “He dresses at the most expensive
tailor in town, he goes to town only to buy suits or to have a haircut.” 178 To Mardin,
Ottoman novelists  who mocked the dandy in contrast  represented and promoted the
lifestyle  of  the  lower middle  class,  a  kind of  puritanism characterized by “work and
thrift” and Ottoman nationalist aspirations. While the Ottoman dandy was imagined as a
cosmopolitan who might even deny his Ottoman identity, just like Felatun Bey in Ahmed
Mithat's novel from 1876, who uses the name Plato to built his alter ego. 179 Furthermore,
Mardin derives the Bihruz-Bey-syndrom from the political and economical structure of
the  Ottoman Empire,  the  characteristic  dichotomy  between  ruler  and  ruled  with  no
autonomous  social  powers  such  as  urban  middle  classes.  Thereby  he  designates  the
Ottoman economic system as balanced by redistributive practices permeated from pre-
Selcukian  times.  Hence,  conspicous  consumption,  he  concludes,  throughout  the
centuries, had generally been a virtually non-existing feature of Ottoman politics. These
178 Mardin, ‘Superwesternization in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of the 19th Century,’ 408. On
the satirizing of these alafrange male types in late nineteenth century Ottoman theater plays see Metin
And, A History of Theatre and Popular Entertainment in Turkey (Ankara: Forum Yayınları, 1963), 80.
179 The novel is called  Felatun ile  Rakım Bey after the two protagonists who each personify the ideal
negative or positive male ideal of the Young Ottoman novelists. See  Mardin, ‘Superwesternization in
the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of the 19th Century,’ 406.
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ethics had only been interrupted by the introduction of private property, accompanied by
the accumulation of wealth. The disdain of the urban dandies had, thus, Mardin assesses,
an anti-capitalist dimension and was an expression of protest by those who could not
profit from private property.180 
On the other hand Mardin acknowledges the quality of the urban dandy in his defiance
of  social  norms and  the  critique  of  social  control  towards  subjects  transgressing  these
boundaries his practices entailed. Thus  the “dislike to conform to the norms of the masses”
Mardin argues can be used to show problems of the secular versus religious dichotomy, since
critics of the dandy were not necessary religious reactionaries but modernist reformists.181 In
sum Mardin states that “the anti-Bihruz attitude [was] a tri-partite alliance of persons of
lower class origins who climbed up on the band-wagon of modernization, alienated members
of the elite – and to the extent that their attention was drawn – lower classes.”182 
Beginning  with  the  15th century  Christopher  Forth  traces  the  construction  of
modern masculinity in Western Europe with a focus on perceptions of the male body and
the  way  it  was  rendered  problematic.  Thereby,  he  assesses  a  fundamental  tension
between modernity and masculinity, generated by the dialectic character of modernity
itself. The term crisis is located in the centre of this ambivalent character, in which being
modern or civilized was perceived as effeminacy. The Ottoman discourse on the dandy
was  part  of  this  gendered  discourse  on  civilization.  The  discourse  of  a  crisis  of
masculinity  was  recurrent  in  modernity  because  of  the  ambiguities  produced  by
modernity itself, expressed i.e. in the simultaneity of progress and decline endemic in the
double logic of modern civilization. Related to masculinity, this meant that modernity
simultaneously reinforced and destabilized representations of masculinity, as Christopher
Forth argues.183
I regard Ottoman politics of dress as an expression of the “paradoxes that lurk at the
heart of modernity’s relations with masculinity and the male body.”184 The perceived crisis
180 See Ibid., 422-423. According to Mardin, another interpretation is offered by Berna Moran, who sees
the dandy himself in his naiveté as a victim of greed for profit. Berna Moran, Türk Romanına Eleştirel
Bir Bakış: Ahmet Mithat’tan Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’a,  7. baskı.,  vol. 1 (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul:  İletişim
Yayınları, 1998), 86.
181 Mardin, ‘Superwesternization in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of the 19th Century,’ 415 and
436.
182 Ibid., 425.
183 See Forth, Masculinity in the Modern West, 5.
184 Ibid., 5.
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of masculinity in modernity was also a crisis of the (male) body, whose superiority was put
at the basis of the argument for male dominance. Modernity was perceived as a loss of the
virile  male body, and modernization was an attempt to regain this perceived loss and
“essentialized  embodied  masculinity  becomes  the  object  of  loss  and  grief.”185 Various
strategies were employed to restore this perceived loss of male dominance and power.
Dress was used as a means to restore the male body as the centre of power. The notion of
crisis metaphorically points to the body, Forth argued, in reference to Connell.186
The notion of crisis itself needs to be treated with caution. Evocations of a crisis of
masculinity must be considered as techniques of patriarchy itself rather than a symptom of
its dissolution, hence, a means to modernize male supremacy. Martschukat and Stieglitz
remark that crisis is mentioned in relation to masculinity numerously, that it appears to be
almost permanent.187 The invocation of a crisis of masculinity reinforces a binary gender
order and a heteronormative sexuality. While it polarizes male and female and essentializes
gender differences, it also suggests an essentialized masculinity (and femininity). Thus, a
hegemonic  masculinity  confirms  its  dominant  position  by  marginalizing  deviant
masculinities with reference to the term of crisis. Thereupon, when treated with this in
mind, the employment of the notion of crisis can be helpful  to trace the becoming of
essentialized notions of  gender and their  employment to counter claims of  equality of
marginalized groups, of women as well as marginalized masculinities. Thus the Ottoman
dandy  was  trapped  between  countering  European  efforts  to  maintain  colonialist
hierarchies and the overlapping ambiguities of modern masculinity.
Elif Bilgin in her analyses of modernity and masculinity in the late Ottoman and
Turkish context regards the literary Ottoman dandy as a unique cultural  figure.188 She
attributes the different perception and significance of the Ottoman dandy to the centrality
of masculinity to a notion of modernity which was perpetuated here. Here, modernity was
intrinsically in fusion with a masculinist centrality of culture, where masculinity was a
185 Ibid., 6.
186 See Ibid., 6.
187 Jürgen  Martschukat  and  Olaf  Stieglitz,  Geschichte  der  Männlichkeiten,  Historische  Einführungen
(Frankfurt/Main: Campus-Verl., 2008), 64-69.
188 See Bilgin, ‘An Analysis of Turkish Modernity through Discourses of Masculinities,’ 8. Bilgin draws on
Brummet's analysis of the journal articles about the dandy in the form of poems and other short texts,
in  Kalem in other journals,  to ridicule this figure  Palmira Brummett, ‘Dressing for the Revolution:
Mother, Nation, Citizen, and Subversive in the Ottoman Satirical Press, 1908-1911’, in Deconstructing
Images of ‘the Turkish Woman’, ed. Zehra F. Arat (Baringstoke, Hampshire [u.a.]: Macmillan, 1998), 83.
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product of male activity.189 Therefore, feminine or effeminate appearance not only meant
emasculization for this particular man and for Ottoman culture in general, but also being
anti-modern. Thus, the overt display of modernity termed as over-Westernization became
associated with being anti-modern. That was actually not different from the discourse in
central Europe, but it might have implied a greater threat towards national sovereignty and
independence. That means,  if  we follow Bilgin's  argument about the specificity  of  the
Ottoman dandy, that the symbolic meaning was similar but the (feared) consequences of
that kind of behaviour might have been different.
Yet,  the  dandies  appearing  in  the  Ottoman  discourse  of  masculinity  are  quite
similar to the rising lower middle class clerks, referred to by Christopher Forth. Depicted
as social climbers and newly rich, they also attempted to enhance and underline their
status by consumption and the display of dress.190 Thus, the way the the Ottoman dandy
was depicted through literature and caricatures might also have been an expression of
the perceived threat to their status of more established ranks of the Ottoman social strata.
Berna  Moran,  in  his  analysis  of  late  Ottoman  novels  also  traces  the  dandy
stereotype, and defines them as “Europeanized people who turned into admirers of the
West.”191 He stresses that the Ottoman dandy was not a uniform figure,  but one that
changed  according  to  political  and  social  conditions,  transposed  differently  in  the
respective author's vision as well. Moran mentions the literary figures Felatun, Bihruz
and Meftun as three different manifestations of the dandy. Berna especially discerns a
shift of the depiction of the dandy in Ottoman and later Turkish literature after 1914.
While before, the dandy had been depicted as a victim of Western imperialism after 1914
he could use his Westernized identity and admiration for the West for his own profit.
While they had been depicted as awkward fools before, now they became shrewd and
scheming characters, as Moran assesses.192 
A main theme surrounding the dandy is conspicuous consumption, the way the
189 See Bilgin, ‘An Analysis of Turkish Modernity through Discourses of Masculinities,’ 64.
190 See Forth, Masculinity in the Modern West, 154.
191 “batı  hayranı  yozlaşmış  alafranga  insanları,”  Moran,  Türk  Romanına  Eleştirel  Bir  Bakış:  Ahmet
Mithat’tan Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’a, 38-39.
192 “Tanzimat züppeleri zararlari kendilerine olan birer budala sayılır. 1914'ten sonrakiler ise, göreceğimiz
gibi çıkarcı ve kurnazdirlar. Alafrangalık onlarda para yapma olanakları sağlayan bir ziyniyetdir (The
Tanzimat dandies count in each case as fools giving harm to themselves. Whereas those appearing after
1914, as we will see, are selfish and shrewd. European manners are for them an attitude that ensures their
profit).” Ibid., 67. On later dandy figure see also Anjaria in reference to Finn: Anjaria, ‘The Dandy and
the Coup: Politics of Literature in the Post-1980 Turkish Novel, Üç Beş Kişi,’ 270.
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dandy deals with money. In the famous late Ottoman novels, the dandy owns a heritage
which he spends thoughtlessly on luxury goods or looses because of his foolishness and
credulity.  Figuratively  he  represents  Ottoman  society  which  is  fooled  by  European
capitalism, personified by Ahmet Mithat in his novel  Felatun Bey ile  Rakım Efendi  as
“hatted inhabitants of  Beyoğlu [başı şapkalı Beyoğlu ahalisi]” who themselves did not
give in to the temptations of consumer culture present in their daily surroundings. Such
thriftiness was rather more a bourgeois/middle class virtue than Ottoman tradition, as
Mardin suggested it. The different types of dandies in Ottoman novels represent different
approaches to modernization.193 
In terms of the changing cut of clothes towards the feature of the “Röhrenmensch”
as scrutinized by Sabina Brändli, Moran makes a noticeable remark by mentioning the
tight  trousers  worn by Felatun.194 Obviously,  Ahmet Mithat  regarded the  close  fit  of
trousers as a marker of a deviant masculinity. Remarkable, too, is that Moran stresses the
similarity between Felatun and Rakım as contradicting types in Ahmet Midhat's novel.
Both were Europeanized men and the line between Ottoman dandy and Europeanized
Ottoman were gradual, as might have been those between modern man and dandy in
general. That is another hint to how close the discourse on the Ottoman dandy was to
those in central Europe.
The congruence between central European discourses on masculinity and the topos
of  the  Ottoman  dandy  is  further  underlined  by  Nurdan  Gürbilek's  study  on  early
Republican controversies about masculinity that elaborate on the the late 19 th century
topos of the westernized dandy.195 Her analysis of the dandy and snob196 provides a link
between the dandy in late Ottoman literature and the dandy figure in Western European
literature. Similar to Moran Gürbilek traces the dandy's changing social position: From
her  analysis  she  concludes  that  in  the  late  19th century  Ottoman  Empire  the
“superwesternized”  'dandy'  was  constructed  against  the  moderate  Ottoman  with  his
distinct  (from  “the  West”)  but  modern  identity,  whereas  the  dandy  of  the  Turkish
Republic stood against a provincialized mass of Orientalized others.  
Gürbilek considers Serif Mardin's sociological approach insufficient to explain the
193 See Moran, Türk Romanına Eleştirel Bir Bakış: Ahmet Mithat’tan Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’a, 39.
194 Ibid., 41.
195 See Gürbilek, ‘Dandies and Originals’.
196 The snob  is another urban male figure that appears in modern literature, very similar to the dandy.
Gürbilek uses both notions interchangeable: See Ibid., FN 18.
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predominance and reappearance of the dandy. Instead, she takes nationalist discourse into
account and considers the dandy as an expression of the dilemma of the modern nationalist
desire for originality, in which the dandy, next to the 'unrefined provincial’ becomes the
abject other of the original self. While the dandy epitomizes the incomplete, the distorted,
and the foreign, the provincial embodies the failure to reach an authentic national self.
Hence,  both  are  despised.  The  dandy  is  always  already  'too’  Westernized  while  the
provincial is a “man of primitive taste” who is not able to modernize. 
In congruence with the developments of male identity Brändli  analysed, Gürbilek
locates the emergence of the derogative depiction of the dandy at the end of the nineteenth
century.  It  appeared  with  the  strengthening national  movements  and  their  search  for
authentic national identities. Young Ottoman authors, thereby, established the distinction
between “Tanzimat snob” and national self, an artificial boundary in Gürbilek's account.197
With  its  unsuccessful  search  for  authenticity,  which  could  never  be  reached,  this
“obsession  with  originality”  had  a  consequence  for  male  identity,  since  attempts  to
essentialize both the local and the foreign had been in vain.198 Gürbilek convincingly points
out that for modern men the choice could only be made between the pretentious snob and
unrefined  provincial,  two  faces  of  the  same  figure.199 One  was  either  too  modern  or
helplessly provincial,  a “man of primitive taste.” What is important in my case is that
Gürbilek does not reduce this dilemma to the Ottoman case, but poses it  as a modern
dilemma  in  general,200 similar  to  Forth's  account  of  the  problematic  relationship  of
modernity and masculinity. Modernity with regard to gender, was conceived as the loss of
real and authentic masculinity. Modern masculinity represents the dualism between self
and other,  while the poles sides of this binary, the 'local'  and the 'foreign',  are always
already distorted, thus there never existed an original self or other. Thus the search for an
original national self loses itself in the accusation against supposed imitation.
Gürbilek's analysis provides the link between the problems discussed in my archival
sources and the discourse on the dandy. They are both at the heart of the futile quest for an
original modern national identity, which can never be found. It finds its expression in the
ambiguity of  signified  and  signifier  and  in their  relationship.  Both  their  meaning and
197 See Ibid., 603.
198 Nurdan Gürbilek phrases this phenomenon as the “double deformation of the foreign and the local.”
Ibid., 605.
199 See Ibid., 621. 
200 See Ibid., 623.
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relations are continually redefined and escape attempts to fix their location. The attempt to
fix the meanings of certain items of clothing contains the impossible effort to essentialize
identities. As such the dandy is the modern figure par excellence, the embodiment of every
modern man, because the effort or attempt to be a modern man includes its failure, the
perception of either being too modern or provincial. This explains the similarity between
modern  urban  man and  the  dandy,  such  that  between  Felatun  and  Rakim Efendi,  as
remarked by Berna Moran, and the similarity between Bihruz in the novel Carriage Affair
and its author Recaizade Ekrem. Gürbilek convincingly argues that his critique of Bihruz is
also a self-critique and the Young Ottoman generation and not a critique of anz other
group,  such  as  the  allegedly  decadent  Tanzimat  reformers.  Recaizade  and  the  literary
movement he founded, Servet-i Fünun, had themselves been criticized by Ahmed Midhat
and  later  authors  for  their  alleged  decadence,  escapism,  artificiality  and  rootlessness.
Therefore, Gürbilek assesses, the national self was not to be found in the romanticized
Turkish peasant but in the gap between dandy and the imagined authentic national self:201
“Hence the Carriage Affair gives us the chance to think about the inevitable snobbism
not only of the Ottoman dandy, but also of the Turkish writer, critic, and reader,
since what is called Turkishness itself  involves at  the very origin the currently
irrevocable rift between a snobbish self and an authentic one, between an alafranga
self and an alaturka one.”202 
The dandy stereotype hides the impossibility of being a modern and authentic self.
And it provides the illusion of the existence of an authentic national self. The hatred of
the dandy as inauthentic and unreal hides the fact that there is no authentic self. The
generation of the dandy stereotype was nonetheless essential to nationalist discourse. Its
creation was an expression of the desire of authenticity. Its existence “is the guarantee
for our feeling genuine ourselves.”203 In reference to Henri Lefebvre, Gürbilek argues that
the dandy is an example of the “consumption of signs,” as in Carriage Affair, where the
real protaganist is the carriage as an object of desire, as well as the modern novel. Both
are objects which are sought in order to be modern. The same is valid for the brimmed
hat, which perfectly represented both the desire to be modern and to be an authentic self.
201 See Ibid., 615.
202 Ibid., 616.
203 Ibid., 608.
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It was the sign of modernity and the desire for an authentic national self, and it explains
why it was desired and despised viciously at the same time. Its adoption became a tool to
close the gap between metropolis and periphery. Even though the Republican adoption of
the hat was perceived as break with the Ottoman Empire, through the abolishment of the
fez, as the marker of an Ottoman national self, it was a continuation of the late Ottoman
discourse of the dandy as well as its nationalist politics of dress: 
“And  it  is  no  coincidence  that  the  dual  identity  called  Turkishness,  that  bipolar
modern self involving both the state of drifting toward the foreign ideal and the
effort to go back to an original self, that desire to be another and the fear of loosing
oneself  in the other, is always preoccupied with exteriorizing the figures of the
snob and the unrefined provincial in order to be autonomous and original itself.”204
Gürbilek relates the global dandy phenomenon, with reference to Rene Girad, to the
global spread of desires and aspirations, next to the spread of capital, and the mimetic
nature  of  all  desire.205 Hence,  the  problem of  mimicry  and  imitation  was  not  just  a
problem of so-called belated modernity, but of modernity itself. The dandy, or the snob,
expresses the desires of the modern self, not just in the late nineteenth century, because
it is “the tasteless caricature of our own desires.”206 That also explains why it was often
rather a literary figure than a real person. 
The critique uttered towards the dandy relates to his ambivalent position towards
modernity,  which  is  at  the  same  time  an  expression  of  the  ambivalent  position  of
masculinity and modernity.  While creating an aristocratic  odour,  his  existence comes
along  with  modern  consumer  capitalism.  According  to  Walter  Benjamin,  the  urban
flâneur, as a type of dandy defined through his relation with his urban environment,
belongs to the margins of the bourgeois class as well as to the margins of the city. 207 His
uncertain economic position and uncertain political function made him a marginal figure
in relation to the hegemonic bourgeoisie, yet emblematic of modernity.208 The dandy as
204 Ibid. 621.
205 See Ibid., 619-620. Gürbilek refers to René Girard's book Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Self and Other in
Literary Structure. See René Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure.
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965).
206 Gürbilek, ‘Dandies and Originals,’ 619.
207 See Walter Benjamin, Illuminations:, ed. Hannah Arendt, Harry Zohn, and Leon Wieseltier, 1. Schocken
paperback ed., [Nachdr.]. (New York: Schocken Books, 2012), 142-162.
208 See Gregory Shaya, ‘The Flâneur, the Badaud, and the Making of a Mass Public in France, circa 1860–
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flâneur  was  a  familiar  character  in  the  nineteenth  century  and  a  immense  body  of
literature exists on his appearance.209 The figure is central to a number of analysis of
modern urban life and it was frequently used to “trace the class tensions and gender
divisions of the nineteenth century city.”210 
The difficulties of appropriating bourgeois habitus through dress becomes apparent
in the comment of a British journalist, Edwin Pusg, in 1908. He mocks the efforts, in his
eyes unsuccessful, of a young working class man to appear fashionable. Even though this
person possessed “suitable clothes for any occasion”211 he was not able to perform to the
journalist's expectations, since his appearance “reeked of cheapness”212 and he was “blind to
those fine shades and delicate nuances of costume and speech and deportment.”213 As such,
Pusg considered his performance unconvincing and felt disturbed by his public presence.
Ottoman dandies had with other, i.e. Parisian, dandies, their uncertain class position
in common. A characteristic of the masculinity demarcated as dandy is that it aspired to a
different (always superior?) social position than it actually inhabited. That makes them the
focus of critique by those who already possess this social position (of power) and thereby
are  attempting  to  preserve  their  privileges.  Yet,  to  consider  the  transgression  of
respectability as a resistance against social norms, one needs to proceed with caution, as
Forth himself points out in the conclusion of his chapter. It  was part of the dominant
discourse to assess civilizational behaviour as a kind of veneer underneath which other,
abjected  forms  of  masculinity  regularly  appeared.  These  breakthroughs  could  be  an
affirmation of masculinity to the same degree as respectable gentlemanly conduct:214 
 “That the stereotypically muscular and coarse masculinity of the warrior, proletarian
or peasant is often presented as more ‘authentic’ than that of the bourgeois does
not necessarily upset the social system that allows the latter to exercise power in a
more general and effective sense.”215 
1910’, American Historical Review 109, no. 1 (2004), 47.
209 See Ibid., 47.
210 Ibid., 47.
211 Edward Pugh, The City of the World: A Book about London and the Londoner (London: Thomas Nelson,
1908), 41-43; as quoted in Breward, ‘Manliness, Modernity and the Shaping of Male Clothing,’ 175.
212 Pugh, The City of the World: A Book about London and the Londoner,  as quoted in Breward, ‘Manliness,
Modernity and the Shaping of Male Clothing,’ 175.
213 Pugh, The City of the World: A Book about London and the Londoner , as quoted in Breward, ‘Manliness,
Modernity and the Shaping of Male Clothing,’ 175.
214 See Forth, Masculinity in the Modern West, 151-152.
215 Ibid., 21.
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That underlines that the dandy can be or  is  a hegemonic figure in spite  of  his
rhetorical degradation. Actually, the dandies’ hegemonic position is underestimated or
misjudged, blurred or distorted. 
4.5.1 Late Ottoman Masculinities
Carter Findley recognizes the integrated position of the dandy as an embodiment of
an overtly modern figure. He exemplifies three male types of intellectual orientations and
respective masculinities in the late Ottoman Empire: The mystic Aşcı Dede İbrahım Halil,
who  exemplifies the marginalization and transformation of Muslim mystic identity and
practices;  the  literary  figure  Ali  Nizami,  as  another  Ottoman dandy  figure;  and  the
renowned statesman İbrahim Hakki Paşa as a prominent representative of a new post-
Tanzimat generation of the Ottoman elite.216 While all three are modern figures, Findley
puts emphasis on internal Ottoman dynamics at the modernization of identity, next to
the impact of Western European ideas. 
Findley attributes the genesis of these male types to an imbalance between four
major strands of Islamic learned culture: religious studies, mysticism, the philosophical
scientific tradition and a worldly literary culture. This imbalance appeared, according to
Findley, throughout the nineteenth century Ottoman reform process, where the latter,
the  adab tradition,  “extended  its  scope  of  worldliness  towards  the  West.”217 Scribal
officialdom,  which  was  attached  to  this  literary  culture  with  its  manifold  functions,
created a cultural dualism that came with the introduction of Western ideas, but which
developed  its  own  dynamics.  Civil  officials  as  the  successors  of  the  pre-  and  early
Tanzimat scribal service consequently became the vanguard of political and intellectual
innovation, which had far flung consequences for the texture of  Ottoman society,  as
Findley  elaborates  in  his  social  history  of  this  social  strata.  The  three  male  types
introduced by Findley exemplify this transformation and thereby provide insight into late
Ottoman constructions of masculinity.
Aşcı  Dede  İbrahım  Halil  (1823-1910)  was  an  Ottoman  official  who  Findley
characterizes as more dervish than official, given his life-style. While working for the
216 See Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom, 174-209. 
217 Ibid., 174.
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Ministry of War he pursued manifold mystical religious and magical practices which,
according to modern standards, looked superstitious and thus outdated. Throughout his
lifetime he associated with several mystical orders, among the Mevlevi and Nakşibendi as
the ones he was attached to most firmly. In Findley's words
“Aşcı Dede was a spiritual denizen of the “tangled magic garden”, and one valuable
point about his memoirs is the proof they offer that a mid-level civil official could
find it habitable as late as the beginnings of this century.”218 
Findley does not conceptualize this mystic as the other of modernity even though
he lived in a world not acknowledged by it.  He was a type in the emerging modern
Ottoman  world  which  did  not  survive  the  developments  to  follow  and  became  a
stereotype against which modernity projected itself until well after it had ceased to exist.
“In-between the worlds” is the characterization Findley offers for an already well
known  figure,  the  Ottoman  dandy.  For  him  the  super-westernized  over-privileged
Ottoman  elite  men,  with  their  excessive  consumption  habits,  were  insufficiently
modernized. To Findley, despite their lavish display of Western goods and habitus they
did not embody/represent Western power and dominance but rather a failed (Ottoman)
modernization.  They  were  just  the  spendthrifts  (mirasyedi)  of  their  fathers’
achievements, on material and cultural terrain as much as the embodied the perceived
failure of the Tanzimat bureaucrats as a whole by consolidating their power on the cost
of Ottoman society and maybe also the Ottoman state.
The dandy depicted by Findley is  Ali  Nizami,  a figure from a novel  written  by
Abdülhak Şinasi Hisar,  as late as 1952 which provides an idea of the persistence of the
dandy motif in Ottoman-Turkish literature.219 Findley labels Ali Nizami as “Playboy and
Şeyh,” who he counts, in reference to Şerif Mardin's analysis, among the group he terms
“frenchified playboys (alafranga çelebiler).”220 Like the figures analyzed by Mardin, Ali
Nizami has a passion for fashion expressed in his vast collection of canes and shoes.
218 Ibid., 184.
219 See Abdülhak Şinasi Hisar, Ali Nizamî Beyin Alafrangalığı ve Şeyhliği: Hikâye (İstanbul: Hilmi Kitabevi,
1952).
220 I  would  rather  translate  this  as  “Europeanized  gentlemen,”  since  frenk was  used  in  Ottoman for
European in general, fransiz would be french in turn. And çelebi in my perception does not have the
pejorative connotation of the notion playboy. I think this more neutral translation of the term leaves
more for an encompassing analysis of the dandy phenomenon.
192
 4  The Gender of Modernity and Ottoman Dress
Interesting  is  the  turn  in  his  fortune,  which  is  not  the  obligatory  bad  end  which
commonly “cultural  rootless” dandies suffer  in this genre but rather his reorientation
from  consumerist  spendthrift  to  piety  and  self-proclamation  as  şeyh.  Of  course,
considering his dandy nature, that does not bring him back to his roots, which seem to be
lost forever, but it is a step towards losing his mind. His desperate search for consolation
from  his  mental  suffering  leads  him  to  fatalism,  “Muslim  resignation  (müslüman
teveküllü),” and from there to a mental asylum.221
Even though the novel was written in 1952, it can be considered as the continuation
of the late 19th century Ottoman novels, employing very similar topoi. Important for my
further  analysis  of  the  dandy  is  the  equation  of  excessive  Westernization  and
consumerism with  Muslim  fatalism,  both  set  in  contrast  to  a  nationalist  worldview,
which propagated a different concept of identity. Another point I find striking is that the
dandy again only appears as a literary figure, in contrast to the more real sufis, Islamists
and eminent statesmen.
This latter kind is personified in Findley's last examples, the Ottoman Paşa İbrahim
Hakkî,  who  embodies  “new  ideas,  new  roles  and  a  new  man.”222 He  represents  the
hegemonic type of  masculinity  contrasted to the Islamic mystic  and the Westernized
dandy as presumably abjected figures, a “new personality type in elite circles.”223  İbrahim
Hakkî  was  the  civil  official  Westernizer  devoid  of  the  negative  connotations  of  the
dandies’ attitudes. He belonged to the successor generation of the Tanzimat bureaucrats
and did not carry the attributes of corruption and failure ascribed to them. Yet he was
still part of Ottoman culture in the sense that he bore the characteristics of the Ottoman
scribal  caste in a modernized mode, in his intermediate state between administrative,
political and intellectual functions and activities. He embodied Ottoman authority in a
modernized version: “He, too, was rotund and bewhiskered, as a statesman had to be in
those days, but in a fairly dapper, up-to-date way.”224 His habitus transgressed the beliefs
of Ottoman conservatives but was not suspicious in the sense of excessive modernization.
What disturbed conservatives about his behavior was his easy-going movement in public
space in defiance of a pride of place, which the former regarded as a sign of Ottoman
221 Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom, 193-194.
222 Ibid., 195.
223 Ibid., 198. 
224 Ibid., 198.
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decay.225 Yet, from another point of view he was the type to rescue the Ottoman state, not
to ruin it,  like  the dandy (or  the mystic  in  his  superstition).  One of  his  outstanding
characteristics  which  secured  him these  qualities  was  his  Ottoman education.  Unlike
many  other  Ottoman  bureaucrats  who  studied  abroad  or  at  foreign  schools  in  the
Ottoman Empire, as I have depicted above, his career was a result of recently established
Ottoman  educational  facilities.  After  he  graduated  in  1882  from  the  school  of
administration  (mülkiye)  he  began  his  career  in  several  state  offices  until  he  finally
became Grand Vizier in 1909, as the first alumni of that school. Before he had been the
first Ottoman in the position of legal counselor of the Sublime Porte and thus co-director
of the Legal council of the Foreign Ministry, a position previously occupied by foreign
experts.  In addition to his official  posts he worked as teacher at  the Law school and
school of Commerce and as author of extensive treatises unique to Ottoman legal history.
Where  are  the  Laz  sailors  located  within  this  typology  of  late  Ottoman
masculinities? The most outstanding feature here is  their  socio-economic position. In
contrast to the male identities presented by Findley, the sailors did not belong to the elite.
Remarkable  to  a  similar  extent  is  their  subjectivity  in  relation  to  modernity.  The
dismissal  of  Laz  sailors  and  their  exclusion  from urban  space  took  place  within  the
setting of dress as sign of civilized behavior and modern masculinity. With their rejection
of the military uniform, they did not behave in accordance with what Honeyman termed
a desire for conformity expressed in the standard suit or military attire.226 Ottoman elites
and other modern men might have aspired the bodily features of the Laz sailors, but
despised their “uncivilized” behavior. Their manpower became considered useless for the
Ottoman army without the qualities of a modern disciplined body. 
Yet, modern clothing also brought about its pitfalls. The interventions made by the
Ottoman  authorities  concerning  headgear  treated  in  the  previous  chapters  and  the
225 Did his “egalitarianism” go as far as sympathy with anarchist thought? According to his record in Son
Sadrazamlar he visited an anarchist conference in Rome, even though that seems hard to imagine. See
Ibid., 197 2nd paragraph and FN 96 on the same page and Findley's reference to Ali Çankaya, Mülkiye
Tarihi ve Mülkiyeliler  (Ankara: Örnek Matbaası, 1954); on his life see also İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal
İnal,  Osmanlı  Devrinde  Son  Sadrıazamlar  (İstanbul:  Millî  Eğitim  Basımevi,  1950). Findley  on
egalitarianism in Ottoman politics: “The social framework in which Ottomans attempted to apply the
policy of egalitarianism was thus unstable – in a way not noted in policy statements, demography
altered  perceptions  of  interest  that  the  administration  should  represent.”  Findley,  Ottoman  Civil
Officialdom, 35. Findley suggested that discourses on political participation in the late Ottoman Empire
took place under the ground of shifting social framework which also changed perspective on what he
called egalitarianism.
226 See Honeyman, ‘Following Suit,’ 428.
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controversies about men's consumption habits and their relation to fashion are linked to
each other by the discourse of modern masculinity. Şerif Mardin's analysis shows the
difficulty to grasp the dandy phenomenon, its meaning and the social position of the
dandy.  If the Ottoman critics of the dandy promoted the lifestyle of the lower middle
class, it seems much more plausible, as Gürbilek argues, that the critique of the dandy
was much more a self-critique as much as a critique of the Tanzimat grandees and their
representative lifestyles. They mocked their own aspirations for social advancement and
the flaws the adaptation of a modern bourgeois habitus brought about. Hence, a common
feature of the dandy was social mobility: The dandy pretended to be someone he is not,
but  aspired to be.  While  he might  be  from various social  backgrounds,  the  common
feature is that of imitation of social elites. 
Nonetheless, the  common appearance of the dandy as a literary figure also shows
that  his  appearance  more  generally  epitomizes  the  ambiguous  relation  between
masculinity  and  modernity.  While  in  the  Ottoman Empire  men's  effeminization  was
related to excessive Westernization and the threat of European imperialism, there are
many similarities to the European dandy. Modernity and modernization were regarded as
a threat to virility. Western (Metropolitan) European and Ottoman discourses are linked
by concerns about consumption, which explains the importance of clothing as one of the
most important items of modern mass production. All dandies had  in common that they
were accused of excessive consumption, which was considered as a female trait.
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Since  1904/5  the  oppositional  movement  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  gathered
momentum from the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese war and its implications for
anticolonial  movements,  which the historical  defeat of the European imperial  powers
brought about.1 The subsequent Russian revolution and other constitutional movements
inspired the Ottoman oppositional groups as well.2 In July 1908, a group of young officers
of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), also known as Young Turks, challenged
Sultan Abdülhamid's autocratic regime by a coup d'etat. The sultan finally had to give in
to  their  claims  to restore  the  constitution and reconvened the parliament. 3 The new
regime was confronted with an armed insurrection in April 1909, spearheaded by the
religiously conservative Ittihad-i Muhammedi (Muhammeden Union), but carried out by
different fractions of the opposition. The CUP succeeded in suppressing the mutiny with
the  dispatch  of  the  so-called  Action  Army  (Hareket  Ordusu).  Subsequently  Sultan
Abdülhamid II. was deposed and replaced by his brother Mehmed V., the revolt providing
an excuse to get rid of him, even though it seems he himself had not been a driving force
behind the uprising. The period following saw a great number of legal amendments, with
a huge number of new laws and regulations, such that it’s considered a new period in
Ottoman legal culture.4 This chapter traces the question of the transformations brought
about by the Young Turk seizure of power, investigating its implications on the politics
of dress and how these were related to discourses and contingent transformations of
gender.
1 Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: Tauris, 1997), 89.
2 Carter V. Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789 - 2007 (New Haven [u.a.]:
Yale Univ. Press, 2010), 192.
3 The  1889  foundation of  the  İtthad-i  Osmani  Cemiyeti  (Ottoman Unity  Society)  by students  of  the
Military Medical College is generally assumed to be the first organizational attempt of the Young Turk
movement. It was later named İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti  (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP).
See  M.  Şükrü  Hanioğlu,  Preparation  for  a  Revolution:  The  Young  Turks,  1902-1908  (Oxford:  Oxford
University Press, 2001); and Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity, 195. Eligible for vote of
the vote of secondary voters of the new parliament were taxpaying men from twenty-five and older,
see Ibid., 195.
4 Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity, 197.
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5.1. Young Turk Coup d'Etat  and its  Implications  on the  Politics  of  
Identity and Difference
Even though the Young Turk period did not bring about dramatic transformations
of gender hierarchies, debates about “women's place” in society intensified and became
institutionalized.  Women's  organizations  and  women's  modernized  identity  became a
target of satire, whereby modern Western dress became a symbol of social disorder and
(Ottoman) decline. That was again not an Ottoman singularity but, as Palmira Brummett
underlines, a phenomenon that appeared as a point of critique in the western European
press as well. The advent of mass fashion and with it department stores became, from a
nationalist point of view, an expression of moral degradation and with it the supposed
decay of patriarchy.5 
Nonetheless, the satirical press analyzed by Brummett neither considered the old
regime,  epitomized by Abdülhamid's  regime,  nor  the new Young Turk's  as  a cure  to
Western European imperialism. Fashion satire illustrated this view in the juxtaposition of
military uniform and three piece suit,  the first considered as symbol of the failure of
Ottoman military reform and the latter as sign of Ottoman surrender to Western cultural
imperialism”.6 The satirical press saw in the Young Regime a continuation of the old
regime in new clothes, which was civil Western dress. 
The colonial context was ever present in this period's satirical press in such a way
the domestic issues were always interpreted in relation to a “possible colonial outcome.” 7
Considered as a threat to social order from a 'foreign' force, the relations between foreign
and  indigenous  became  negotiated  in  terms  of  gender.  In  Brummett's  words,  the
treatment of  gender relations in Ottoman satirical  press were a “subset of the larger
question of the Empire in the world and the place of the Ottomans in Western society.” 8
Hence, those factions of the satirical press that uttered concerns about the destabilisation
of gender hierarchies under the Young Turk regime feared that this would sweep away
5 Palmira Johnson Brummett,  Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press,  1908 - 1911
(Albany, NY: State Univ. of New York Press, 2000), 252. On department stores, the Bon Marché, and
their  function of  producing a homogeneous bourgeoisie   as well  as  a  new space for  the common
socializing of Ottoman men and women see also Ibid., 202.
6 Brummett, Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908 - 1911, 255.
7 Ibid., 257.
8 Ibid., 220.
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the last reminders of the old stabilizing order, which in itself was considered a reason for
decay. Here,  European imperial  threat was used as an argument to preserve existing
gender  hierarchies  which  were  imagined  as  essential  to  the  restoration  of  Ottoman
sovereignty.  Thereby  “fashion  became  [or  rather  continued  to  be]  an  implement  of
critiques  of  European  imperialism  and  the  social  ills  and  cultural  transformation
contingent upon it”9 and the “struggle for control of the symbolic repertoire was distilled
into images of dress that bespoke allegiance and identity without words.”10
In her analysis of a caricature from August 1909 Brummett suggests that modern
styles were at that time peux a peux diffused down through different levels of Ottoman
society  and not restricted to a very small elite anymore, yet that still had its limits. 11
Fashion satire often considered fashionable European dress as a sign of collaboration
with imperialist powers. Yet it also had a positive image as a marker of success since
being fashionable and modern could also mean being progressive, civilized, enlightened
and having a share in world power, as Brummett states. Fashion satire targeted members
of the elite, men as well a women, and specifically members of the government for the
consumption  of  European  goods  and  services.12 For  the  skeptics  of  these  practices
Western  fashion  meant  the  personification  of  the  Western  victory.  And  also  on  the
economic level excessive consumption of fashion became increasingly regarded as anti-
national. Shrinking or rare national resources were spent on the latest dress styles and
not for the well-being of the nation, as the arguments ran. 
Fashion satire continued to mock the dandy that had made his appearance in the
late  nineteenth  century  Ottoman  novels.13 According  to  Brummett,  cartoon  satire
expressed  concern at  the  “dandification  of  Ottoman society,”  by  which  it  meant  the
subordination under European imperial dominance.14 One figure which personified that
9 Ibid., 221.
10 Ibid., 222.
11 See Ibid., 226.
12 Brummett is contradictory with her utterances about the targets of Ottoman fashion satire, stating first
that mainly elites and especially members of the government were criticized, and later argues that in
contrast to French/European satire not the critic of the ruling class but of foreign domination was
prominent, see Ibid., 221 and 255.
13 The topos of the dandy continued into the Young Turk Period not just in satire related to fashion but
also in a more general sense. Two examples Brummett mentions are poems published Kalem and resp.
Alem, published 1908 and 1909: Alem 2, 11 and 28 August 1324 (September 10th, 1908); Kalem 2: 11 and
28  Ağustos  1324  (October   1st,  1908),  see  Brummett,  Image  and  Imperialism  in  the  Ottoman
Revolutionary Press, 1908 – 1911, 64.
14 Ibid., 64.
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image was Chic Bey. He incorporated the threat of European cultural hegemony which
sold out the motherland in the name of progress.15 The satirical press set Chic Bey in
contrast to the gazi warrior, the hero of the frontier as an epic heroic figure representing
Ottoman military success and dominance.16 Female figures in traditional dress appeared
in the revolutionary satirical press as allegories for the honor of the nation, as symbols of
resistance  and  patriotism  and  as  territories  owned  by  men.17 Dressed  in  bourgeois
modern fashion women were often associated  with “subordination,  consumption and
dishonor.”18 Modern fashionable women were illustrated as traitors, opposed to women
in traditional garments as a victims of imperialist aggressors. The Ottoman state or parts
of  its  former or  present  territory were often depicted in female  allegories,  European
imperialist states as male figures.
Nevertheless, the polarizing symbolism was not unequivocal. Ottoman cartoonists
interpreted the dualism of modern and traditional in manifold ways.  Some saw this as a
dilemma not  as  an opposition between evil  and good,  but rather  between the choices
“prisoner of the harem” and “fashion slave.” Brummett underlines that while European
styles were sometimes used as a markers of subordination and dishonor, they could in
other cartoons as well appeared as a symbol of progress and success, and of European
education,  which  provided  the  individual  with  privileges.  The  depiction  of  traditional
clothing  ranged  from  associations  with  resistance  and  anti-imperialism  to  reaction/
conservatism. 
Headgear in these representations plays a predominant role, especially for women, as
they wear enormous hats while men are often bareheaded, sometimes wearing a peaked
cap. It seems that the wearing of hats was much more common in the depiction of women
than for men. This suggests a different symbolic meaning for women's and men's hats.
Might it be that for women the hat was more an embellishment while for men it was more
an  indicator  of  status?  Was  the  hat  for  women  an  indicator  of  individualism,  of
fashionability, while for men it was a homogenizing item, an item of national belonging?
15 See Ibid., 221.
16 See Ibid., 221. See also Kafadar and his elaboration of Ottoman frontier society which formed Ottoman
statehood  in  its  foundation  period.  Cemal  Kafadar,  Between  Two  Worlds:  The  Construction  of  the
Ottoman State (Berkeley [u.a.]: Univ. of California Press, 1995).
17 Here, in accordance with Yuval-Davis study on gender and nationalism, female figures were depicted
in the satirical press as symbolic border guards of the national,  Nira Yuval-Davis,  Gender & Nation,
Politics and Culture (London [u.a.]: Sage Publ., 1997).
18 Brummett, Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908 – 1911, 247.
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Or what else could have been the difference between (Ottoman) women's and men's hats?
In regard to hats it strikes me that hats were an outstanding marker of modern
fashionable women. Many of them are shown with enormous hats while modern men
often depicted next to them wear a fez or no headgear. Did these depictions imply a
critique that women went even further than men regarding modernization? Or was it a
sign that modernization of women was regarded as more problematic, or that the hat for
women meant something else and modernization took a different form for females than
it did for males? I think the latter is true, while it does not exclude the other options.
What is also striking is that in the archival sources, more often men are exhorted for
wearing hats. And also in sum there are more documents speaking against men wearing
hats. There are some decrees and maybe other documents which interdict in women's
dress but none is exclusively on headgear. 
Brummett mentions two items which were typically included in the depiction of
modern fashionable women which were plumed hats and ubiquitous parasols. What did
these items specifically express or mean. Coming back to the fact that women were more
often depicted with hats, it opens up to questions: were hats for women more in vogue
and were they more accepted than hats for men (even though they were criticized), and
finally was it more common for women to wear hats than it was for men? Was that
because national identity was constructed and thought as male and therefore the fez, as
an expression  of  Ottoman national  identity  was  much more  important  to  keep  then
traditional women's headgear since the fez not only expressed Ottoman identity but also
Ottoman  national  autonomy  and  modernity  at  the  same  time.  An  example  of  the
depiction and problematization of a woman wearing a hat appeared in December 1909 in
the periodical  Kalem: A man refused to take his wife to the theater unless she took off
her huge flowered hat.19 It needs further study to what extent that was similar or differed
from male fashions and their moral assessment.
Transgression of dress codes was also a transgression of social boundaries of gender
order. The appearance of modern dress stood in interrelation to the construction of modern
public space and was often associated with the entering of women into public space.20
Brummet points out that the question of fashion was linked to questions of space and
19 See. Ibid., 228.
20 See Reina Lewis, Rethinking Orientalism: Women, Travel and the Ottoman Harem (London [u.a.]: Tauris,
2004), 191.
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gender: “the same women who advocated Western dress were often depicted as violating
political and social boundaries. They represented the possible encroachment of women into
previously male-only spheres.”21 Deviation in dress marks the transgression of boundaries,
that  means  wearing a  certain  kind  of  dress  simultaneously  constructs  space.  Actually
Ottoman spatial order was confused by the modernization of dress. That entailed not just
discussions about women's rights and entering into public sphere, but also the construction
of a new heteronormative gender order, as analyzed by Afsaneh Najmadabi for the Iranian
case.22 Modernized patriotic men directed their desire towards the nation, imagined as a
female. Spousal affection was a crucial element of nationalism as it was an analogy to the
love of the country. Love for the homeland was conditioned by mutual affection of the
heterosexual married couple, or by romantic love in general. Women magazines discussed
compassionate  marriage  and  egalitarian  gender  relations.23 According  to  Findley  “the
desire for new gender roles and enlarged possibilities for women was not limited to the
radical Westernizers” but included also conservative authors, who with their imaginative
literary works contributed to socio-political change.24
In terms of socio-political organization and gender relations in the transition from
the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic a crucial aspect repeatedly treated is the
transformation of the Ottoman household into the nuclear family as the smallest unit of
social and political organization. Regarding gender hierarchy Nükhet Sirman has framed
this  transformation  as  the  transition  of  patriarchal  power  from  the  father  to  the
husband.25 It came along with the claim of male members of the rising middle class as
heads of small households to equal status. Beyond equality between middle class men,
the status of (bourgeois)  women became an issue up from mid 19 th century with the
appearance of an Ottoman women's movement in the 1860s.26
21 Brummett, Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908 - 1911, 252.
22 Afsaneh Najmabadi,  Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of
Iranian Modernity (Berkeley, Calif. [u.a.]: Univ. of California Press, 2005).
23 See Ibid., 184.
24 Findley discusses Ahmed Mithad's and Fatma Aliye's works within this framework and employs them
to  argue  that  transformation  of  gender  relations  was  desired  by  so-called  Westernists  as  well  as
conservative  authors.  Carter  V.  Findley,  Ottoman  Civil  Officialdom:  A  Social  History  (Princeton:
Princeton Univ. Pr., 1989). 190.
25 See Nükhet Sirman, ‘Gender Construction and Nationalist Discourse: Dethroning the Father in the
Early Turkish Novel’, in  Gender and Identity Construction: Women in Central Asia, the Caucasus and
Turkey, ed. Feride Acar and Ayşe Güneş Ayata (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 1999), 162–76.
26 See Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity.
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One of the main issues of middle class men's claim for equality was spousal choice,
as a major element of the reproduction of huge households. It mingled with women's
own claim for equality but did not question male dominance in general, as it came along
with the shift of power from father to husband as the head of household. Many studies
have  treated  the  modernization  of  patriarchy  and  the  emergence  of  the  modern
housewife  with  it.27 Findley,  hence,  situates  the  emergence  of  the  Ottoman women's
movement  parallel  to  the  emergence  of  bourgeois  self-consciousness,  parallel  to  the
growing women movements in western Europe. Specificities of the Ottoman case lay in
the status of Ottoman/Muslim women who, in contrast to European/Christian women,
i.e. had the right to own property, and thus enjoyed a somewhat different status.28
The  question  of  spousal  choice  was  closely  related  to  rising  middle  class
consciousness,  as  it  was  in  the  Ottoman  case.29 Thus,  while  the  house  as  a  unit  of
production and consumption gradually disappeared, gender relations became reorganized
towards the ideal  of  the  conjugal  couple,  mostly  within the terms of  clearly  defined
hierarchical  gender  relations.  To  the  same  extent  that  relations  between  individual
members of the nation were imagined as equal, and nationalist ideology used as a cover
for existing socio-economic differences, spousal relations became imagined as a unit of
mutual affection rather then an institution of patriarchy. Sirman relates reconsiderations
of gender to Partha Chatterjee's suggestions on the (re-)construction of authenticity that
came along with the anxiety of losing national sovereignty.30
Social  realities  reflected  a  trend  towards  small  households  already  within  the
Hamidian  period,  at  least  in  Istanbul.  Muslim  middle  class  households  consisted  of
nuclear families to a huge proportion, whereas extended households constituted only a
minority. Prosperous Istanbul families' households consisted of three or fewer members
according to the 1885 census; in 1907, they numbered 46 percent. Less then three percent
were polygynous in 1885. And of 16 percent of extended households in 1907 less then
27 Patriarchal household as the basic unit of the state: “[...] the codification of the patriarchal households
the basic unit of property and administration further facilitated social control.” James C. James C. Scott,
The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia, Yale Agrarian Studies
Series (New Haven [u.a.]: Yale Univ. Press, 2009), 67.
28 See Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity, 181.
29 See Ibid., 181.
30 Nükhet  Sirman,  ‘Constituting  the  Modern Family  as  the  Social  in  the  Transition  from Empire  to
Nation-State’, in Ways to Modernity in Greece and Turkey Encounters with Europe 1850-1950 , ed. Anna
Frangoudaki and Çağlar (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 187.
202
5 After the Young Turk Coup d'Etat: National versus Modern Hats?
four percent  were grand multigenerational  ones.  The rest  included just  the  widowed
mother of the husband as an additional member.31 
Duben and Behar  traced changes in family and gender  relations  from the mid-
nineteenteenth century to the 1930s based on demographic material, Ottoman Turkish
periodicals  and  novels.32 Drawing on demographic  data  Alan Duben and Cem Behar
observed a  very early  transformation from huge households  to  small  family  units  in
Istanbul. Independent from class marriage and fertility patterns differed greatly from that
of the rest of the empire with relatively late and equal marriage ages of both men and
women  and  few  children.33 Nevertheless,  they  consider  these  demographic  patterns
central to transformations of the whole Empire/Republic.  They compare demographic
data with ongoing discussions about the modern bourgeois family. 
As  demonstrated  in  the  previous  chapter,  modernization  came  along  with  a
perceived crisis of male identity and dominance. These concerns came to the surface in
the discourse about transformations of the family. What was perceived as a crisis of male
virility  came along with concerns about  women's  morality,  which allegedly loosened
with the vanishing grip of patriarchal control over sexuality.34 Behar and Duben, in their
analysis  of  Ottoman  periodicals,  assess  that  a  perception  of  the  dissolution  of  the
traditional  household  or  family  appeared  only  after  1910.  It  was  connected  to  the
perceived loss of fatherly authority and a shift towards arrangements between conjugal
couples. Yet, that left  “domestic gender roles,”35 as they term it, untouched. The sexual
division of labor was the core of the modern family. Worries about the spread of female
immorality  through  modernization  came  along  with  the  concern  that  women might
refuse to perform housework. Thus, similar to the perceived crisis of masculinity, the
discourse on the crisis of the family functioned to stabilize hierarchical gender relations
31 Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity, 181.
32 Alan Duben and Cem Behar, Istanbul Households: Marriage, Family and Fertility, 1880 - 1940, Cambridge
Studies in Population, Economy and Society in Past Time. - Cambridge : Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984
15 (Cambridge [u.a.]: Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1991).
33 Also demographical studies of rural areas suggest the organization of most households around nuclear
families, see Donald Quataert, ‘Ottoman Women, Households, and Textile Manufacturing, 1800-1914’,
in Shifting Boundaries: Women and Gender in Middle Eastern History , New Haven, ed. Nikki Keddie and
Beth Baron (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1991), 162. He argues that in rural Anatolia no more then 30
percent of all households were multiple family households.
34 See Duben and Behar, Istanbul Households, 199.
35 See Ibid., 199.
203
5 After the Young Turk Coup d'Etat: National versus Modern Hats?
and a gendered division of labor, with a confinement of women to household and child
rearing duties, even though WW I led to the employment of many women outside of the
house. Also the modern concept of romantic love was considered a threat to traditional
social order, where arranged marriage were considered a guarantor of its persistence. In
public debate, Duben and Behar locate the first appearance of the issue of women's rights
in the 1860s in the magazine Terakki.36 The discourse emerging from there did not entail,
as  I  stated  before,  the  questioning  of  prescribed  gender  roles,  but  rather  established
separate gendered spheres of labor and identity. 
Even though the conjugal couple appeared as an ideal of Ottoman reformers and
authors, female seclusion as a characteristic of elite Ottoman households constituted a
problem for the modern appearance of Ottoman men in the eyes of European observers
as well as in their own critiques. The appearance of modern living rooms in bourgeois
homes  entailed  common  socializing  of  men  and  women.  Yet,  while  the  interior  of
Ottoman elite  household changed,  high ranking Ottoman men generally  preferred to
appear without their spouses at social events, whereas Europeans in the Ottoman Empire
would appear with their wives. Thereby Ottoman man lacked a major element of male
bourgeois respectability and status which entailed a 'well-chosen' wife who was able to
pass the requirements of bourgeois sociability.37 Thus, Ottoman men of letters demanded
a Western education for girls and women not just for the sake of equal rights, but as a
necessity to achieve bourgeois identity and status. That means, while women where kept
away from social events out of considerations of female modesty and seclusion, their
husbands also were concerned about their lack of bourgeois etiquette, which prevented
them  from  bringing  their  wives  along.  The  combination  of  these  factors  led  to  the
persistence in the division of elite homes between selamlik and harem, where the former
became a bourgeois living room in function and appearance and the harem became its
'oriental' counterpart.38
36 Ibid., 214.
37 Many thanks to Malte Fuhrmann for drawing my attention to and providing me with information on
this issue. Malte Fuhrmann, “A Corner of Europe:” The Making of Modern Urban Culture in the Eastern
Mediterranean Port Cities, 1800-1914, (book manuscript), 34.
38 Serkan Delice comments on the appearance of women in public space: “It is my contention that there is
a persistent in-betweenness and anxiety in these narratives which oscillate between idealization and
denunciation of the increasing visibility of male-female relationships in public space.”  Serkan Delice,
‘Friendship, Sociability, and Masculinity in the Ottoman Empire: An Essay Confronting the Ghosts of
Historicism’, New Perspectives on Turkey 42 (2010): 103–25, doi:http://dx.doi.org.595713270.erf.sbb.spk-
berlin.de/10.1017/S0896634600005598, 120.
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With the shift from Hamidian to the Young Turk period, Brummett, in a study on
the relations of gender and empire, concludes that perceptions of gender had not been
fundamentally altered.39 Drawing on studies that emphasize the continuity between both
periods, she assesses, that empire was still a major point of reference and the resurrection
of  its  order,  or  a  supposed  traditional  order,  was  considered  a  guarantor  of  the
resurrection of the Empire's glory. She bases her study on a re-evaluation of three models
of Ottoman modernization with regard to gender: One account that assumes the Ottoman
society  and  state  as  backward  and  unable  to  modernize;  the  other  is  based  on  the
assumption that Ottoman society was in the process of modernization, though it was
conditioned  by  certain  factors  such  as  imperialism;  while  the  third  consisted  of  the
assumption of Ottoman exceptionalism, based on the belief of moral superiority of the
East. The latter  is  the  model  favored  by  Brummett  in  terms of  prevalent  notions  of
Empire,  where Ottoman female chastity made up for the losses in terms of  Ottoman
imperial power. Brummett regards a specific understanding of gender as the basis for
Ottoman exceptionalism, which was the framing of imperial glory and superiority within
a  notion  of  honor  which  contains  female  sexual  modesty.40 While  this  is  not  very
different from Partha Chatterjee's account on the Nation and its fragments, where he
shows that cultural specificity is gendered female and put at the core of national identity,
Brummett  also  emphasis  that  discourses  about  gender  were  class-based  in  the  first
place.41 During the Young Turk Period, she argues, empire was the political unit which
was the point of reference. Nevertheless, I think it is important to note that notions of
empire might have shifted during the course of time, and that especially the appearance
of  forms  of  modern  governance  might  have  changed  the  character  of  power  and
domination in the Ottoman Empire significantly.
In  terms  of  shifting  concepts  of  gender  Brummett  argues,  together  with  other
authors, that the Hamidian and Young Turk period were linked cultural visions as well as
39 See Palmira Johnson Brummett, ‘Gender and Empire in Late Ottoman Istanbul: Caricature, Models of
Empire, and the Case for Ottoman Exceptionalism’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the
Middle East 27, no. 2 (23 November 2012): 283–302.
40 Ibid., 287. On the continuation of the notion of honor within the Republican judicial system see Ayşe
Parla, ‘The “Honor” of the State: Virginity Examinations in Turkey’, Feminist Studies 27, no. 1 (Spring
2001): 65–88.
41 See Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1993).
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institutional changes.42 Significant changes in dress as well as mentality already appeared
throughout (or had already appeared before) the Hamidian period.43 Concerning dress
she refers to Nancy Micklewright, who assumes that most changes in dress already took
place  between  the  1830s  and  1860s.44 Throughout  the  Hamidian  period,  she  argues,
concepts of gender culture and space had became reorganized through institutions of
female education, the women's rights movement, newspapers and advertising directed to
women,  new technologies  which brought  about  newly gendered dress,  and gendered
entertainment, as well as common socializing of men and women in activities such as
skating  and  theater.  These  developments  led  to  the  rearticulation  of  gender
simultaneously to the desire to restore the old order and with it the Empire's glory. For
Ottoman reformers, women's advanced social status was at the same time a measure of
the  progress  of  the  state,  as  women's  chastity  and  moral  purity  a  guarantor  of  the
perseverance and strength of the Ottoman state.45 Were these seemingly contradictory
views two sides  of  the  same coin?  How did  the  discourse  on women's  chastity  and
women's progress relate to each other? Was the progress of women associated with the
nation and their  chastity with Empire?46 What can be said without doubt is  that the
household  and  the  family  were  a  basic  site  of  modernization  and  stood  in  close
interrelation to concepts of gender and the state.
5.2. Ottoman Railway Employees, Dress and State Power
Concerning incidents relating to men's headgear, the Young Turk Period starts with
a matter already treated throughout the Hamdian period, namely the activities of foreign
companies and investors within the Ottoman realm. In 1887 a survey of those companies'
42 Brummett refers to the re-periodization of 1874 – 1914 as a “new empire period.” Brummett, ‘Gender
and Empire in Late Ottoman Istanbul,’ 284.
43 See Ibid., 293.
44 See Ibid., 293, FN 43.
45 See Ibid., 300.
46 Literature on veil: Stephanie Cronin, Anti-Veiling Campaigns in the Muslim World: Gender, Modernism
and the Politics of Dress, Durham Modern Middle East and Islamic World Series (Hoboken: Taylor and
Francis,  2014);  and on Ottoman women in the late Empire see  Ayşe Zeren Enis,  Everyday Lives of
Ottoman Muslim Women: Hanımlara Mahsûs Gazete (Newspaper for Ladies) (1895 - 1908), 1st ed., Tarih
Dizisi, Libra Kitap. - İstanbul 60 (İstanbul: Libra Kitap, 2013). Enis analysed the contents of Hanimlar
Mahsus Gazetesi  (published during Hamadian period until  1908),  spanning the whole  period of  its
publication, and also writes on women's  and children's dress, see Ibid., 371-391.
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employees'  dress  had  been conducted  and  the  granting  of  concessions  bound to  the
wearing of the fez by its employees, with exception of the management and engineers. At
that time one of the companies concerned was the Rumeli railway company, and railway
companies are those targeted again in 1908 for the headgear of their employees.47 It is not
by chance that the Rumeli railway company appears here as an actor since the building of
the railway was a highly ambiguous endeavor. Even though the Ottoman government
considered them necessary for the desired economic development of the state and for
military mobilization, the building of the railway meant interference of and dependence
on Western European companies and loans.
The major part of the Ottoman railroad network had been built in the from the
1880s under Abdülhamid II's reign.48 Before that, some lines had been built in Western
Anatolia by British investors, in pursuit of their commercial interests. Railways were just
one  of  the  new  or  improved  means  of  transportation  established  throughout  the
nineteenth century with the appearance of steam engine technologies. These steamships
and railways accelerated the volume of commerce and vice versa and increased Western
economic  diffusion.49 Thus,  transportation  technology  had  a  massive  impact  on  the
perception and construction of space; it not only changed the conditions of trade but also
of traveling. Precarious Ottoman sovereignty got into even more dire straits due to the
economic influence the establishment of railway tracks in the Ottoman realms brought
with  foreign  companies  and  state  loans  to  build  them.50 Hence,  the  railways,  in
modernization  theory  commonly  associated  with  progress  as  a  core  element  of
modernity, once more underlined the close relation of modernization with imperialism,
creating on the one hand investment opportunities of Western European capital and on
the other hand a means to distribute Western European goods. It would not be too far
fetched to argue that imperialism entered the Ottoman Empire via railway. At least, the
development of the Ottoman railway system brought with it the creation of spheres of
influence by respective imperialist powers, staging their inter-imperialist rivalry on this
terrain.  Thereby,  railways  became  a  very  specific  and  multidimensional  spatial
investment.  Despite  the  imperialist  powers’ own  interests,  Ottoman  decision-makers
47 BOA ZB. 326/80; BOA DH.MKT. 2618/10; BOA DH.MKT. 2692/40.
48 For information on the railway system see Halil Inalcık and Donald Quataert, An Economic and Social
History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300 - 1914 (Cambridge: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994), 805. 
49 See Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700 - 1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), 120.
50 See Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity, 166.
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hoped to gain something for their own purposes.51 
The matter of headgear of Western European companies' employee's as I depicted
in chapter four already went back to 1887, when the granting of concessions for foreign
companies was linked to the obligation of wearing the fez.52 Concessions granted in the
following decades indeed contained a clause which prescribed the wearing of the fez by
these companies'  employees.  That was valid for the railway building encounters,  too,
such  as  the  concessions  granted  for  the  subsections  of  the  Anatolian  line  between
Haydarpaşa and Ankara, Eskişehir – Konya as well as the Anatolia – Baghdad line. 53 The
same obligation  was  introduced  for  port  and  dock  workers  as  employees  of  foreign
companies as well as concessions granted to Ottoman companies.54 
The mandatory wearing of  the  fez  went  along with the desired replacement of
foreign  workforces  by  Ottoman  staff.  This  is  illustrated  by  a  decree  dated  1903
concerning the obligation to  wear  the fez  for  all  officials  and employees  (memur  ve
müstahdem)  at  the  railway lines,  together  with  the  instruction to  replace  all  foreign
workers  by  those  with  Ottoman  citizenship  within  five  years,  except  high  ranking
officers.55 Cevdet Kırpık,  in his study on workers in the Ottoman Empire, mentions a
document issued in 1905 dealing with the replacement of Armenian and Greek Orthodox
workers by Muslims. The document reasoned the Armenians and Greek orthodox had
promoted the Bulgarian cause and thus had to be dismissed.56 Hence, the politics of dress
exercised  on  workers  of  the  railway  companies  belong  to  the  wider  context  of  the
management and control  of  labor by the Ottoman government.  Employment and the
51 See Zürcher, Turkey, 85-86; Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity, 166-168; Quataert, The
Ottoman Empire, 1700 – 1922, 122-126; Selçuk Akşin Somel, Historical Dictionary of the Ottoman Empire
(Lanham, Md. [u.a.]: Scarecrow Press, 2012), 236; Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd
ed., Oxford Paperbacks. - London [U.a.] : Oxford Univ. Press, 1960- 135 (London [u.a.]: Oxford Univ. Pr.,
1968),184.
52 Cevdet  Kırpık,  ‘Osmanlı  Devleti’nde  İşçiler  ve  İşçi  Hareketleri  (1876-1914)’,  (unpublished  doctoral
thesis, Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2004), 64, FN 247. He refers to BOA
Irade Dahiliyesi 82247, September 16th, 1887.
53 Dates of the concessions that were granted, differ within  Kırpık's account; he refers to  Arhangelos
Gavriel,  Anadolu  Osmanlı  Demiryolu  ve  Bağdat  Demiryolu  Şirket-i  Osmaniyesi  İdaresinin  İç  Yüzü
(Dersaadet (İstanbul):  Mahmut Bey Matbaası,  1327);  see  Kırpık,  ‘Osmanlı  Devleti’nde İşçiler ve İşçi
Hareketleri (1876-1914)’, 64-66, see there especially FN 248 and 250.
54 See Kırpık, ‘Osmanlı Devleti’nde İşçiler ve İşçi Hareketleri (1876-1914)’, 65.
55 22  Zilhicce 1320  (March  22nd,  1903).  see  Ibid.,  65,  FN  250.  As  cited  in  Gavriel,  Anadolu  Osmanlı
Demiryolu ve Bağdat Demiryolu Şirket-i Osmaniyesi İdaresinin İç Yüzü.
56 For a table listing the workers of the Eastern Railway company according to nationality, see  Kırpık,
‘Osmanlı  Devleti’nde  İşçiler  ve  İşçi  Hareketleri  (1876-1914),’  53;  and Gavriel,  Anadolu  Osmanlı
Demiryolu  ve  Bağdat  Demiryolu  Şirket-i  Osmaniyesi  İdaresinin  İç  Yüzü,  85.  Kırpık refers  to  BOA,
Y.A.HUS. 491/55. 26 Temmuz 1321 (August 8th, 1905).
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control  of  labor  were  used  as  a  means  of  keeping  Ottoman  integrity  and  creating
Ottoman  national  identity.  Despite  the  interferences  of  Ottoman  authorities  in  the
previous  decades  and  more  recently,  railways  employees  continued  to  wear  hats.
Obviously,  the matter had not been solved by concessions,  and the imposition of the
wearing of the fez could not be accomplished, as an exchange of letters between different
state offices in 1908 indicates.
The issue re-emerges with a letter of a Major general (mirliva), head of the artillery
department to the Police Ministry (Zabtiye Nezareti).57 It is a report from the inauguration
of construction works carried out the the Eastern Railway Company (Şark Şimendifer
Kumpanyası). At the ceremony, which he presumably attended, the company's clerks had
exclaimed: “Long live liberty (Yaşasın  ḥürriyet)!”58 Yet, he notes, it would have been a
much greater joy, if in addition it had been possible to denote them as Ottoman clerks, by
way of replacing their hats with the fez.59 A couple of days later, the addressed Police
Ministry  approached  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  with  the  mirliva's complaint  and
forwards his letter, stating that it would be of the utmost satisfaction to all Ottomans if
the aforementioned clerks donned the fez.60 The next institution involved was that of
Trade and Public Works (Ticaret ve Nafia Nezareti), which was informed by the Ministry
of the Interior on September 29, 1908.61 The author of the document presumes that the
mentioned subjects were Ottoman citizens who would be well advised to confess to their
national belonging, as the fez was the badge of the Ottoman people/nation  (ʿalāmet-i
ḳavmiyye-yi ossmāniyye).62 A reply of the addressed Ministry of Trade and Public Works
only returns on December 19.  1908,  almost three month later,  to the Ministry of  the
Interior.63 Therein it informed the latter that the company had decided that all employees
are going the wear the fez and that the necessary amount of fezzes had been ordered at
57 BOA DH.MKT. 2692/40. On the case see also  Kırpık, ‘Osmanlı Devleti’nde İşçiler ve İşçi Hareketleri
(1876-1914),’ 65. 
58 BOA DH.MKT. 2692/40. 
59 According to  Kırpık it  is  unknown if  the concession granted for  the establishment  of  the Eastern
Railway company (Şark Şimendifer  Kumpanyası) contained a clause on the wearing of the fez.  See
Kırpık, ‘Osmanlı Devleti’nde İşçiler ve İşçi Hareketleri (1876-1914),’ 66.
60 BOA DH.MKT. 2692/40, 10 Eylül 1324 (23. September 23rd, 1908), this document is the nice copy of BOA
DH.MKT. 2618/10, 9 Eylül 1324 (September 22nd, 1908). Interestingly during this correspondence the
designation of the company changes from Şark Simendifer Kumpanyası (Eastern Railway Company) to
Rumeli Şimendifer Kumpanyası (Railway Company of Rumelia) – why?
61 BOA DH.MKT. 2618/10, 16 Eylül 1324 (September 29th, 1908).
62 BOA DH.MKT. 2618/10, line 5-6.
63 BOA DH.MKT. 2692/40, 6 Kanun-i Evvel 1324 (December 19th 1908).
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the  imperial  fez  factory  in  Hereke.64 An  article  published  in  İttihad  ve  Terakki,  put
forward that employees of the Eastern railway company had “since always” donned the
same hats, as those of the Austrian railway company. The author(s) of the article declare
that  “it  strikes  out  chords,  that  our  [railway]  officers,  wear  something else  then the
national  headpiece  (serpūş-i  milliyye).”  The  author(s)  consider  the  wearing  of  the
Austrian hat as “quite harmful,” without specifying what kind of harm it provoked. But
now, they had heard, within the next couple of days, the Austrian hat would be replaced
by the fez.65 The matter already appeared in July 1908 in an the periodical  Donanma
(Navy), in an article concerning headgear by Mahmud Muin.66 He states that while up
until the Young Turk Revolution the railway officers had worn a hat, that was changed to
the fez after the beginning of the second constitutional period.
This intervention which intended to reinforce the fez as an Ottoman symbol  took
place at a time when the fez would at last partly depart from its meaning as a symbol of
Ottoman  citizenship  to  a  symbol  of  reactionary  religiosity  and  subordination  to
imperialist European powers.
 5.3 The Fez Boycott and the Question of  National Headgear
The Young Turk era began with political turbulences that also included the struggle
over headgear and its symbolism. It culminated in a boycott against Austrian goods that
started with protest against the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary’s
Habsburg Emperor Josef II on 5 October 1908. As an organized movement it was formed
by  the  a  coalition  of  member  of  the  CUP  and  the  port  worker's  guilds,  while  the
government did “not offer effective resistance to the annexation.”67 The boycott spread
64 Here again the railway company involved is denoted as Şark Simendifer Kumpanyası  (Eastern Railway
Company.)
65 See  'Şark Şimendifer Me'murları  [Officers of the Eastern Railway Company],'  İttihad ve  Terakki,  15
Kanun-i  Evvel  1324  (December  28th, 1908),  2;  see  also  Kırpık,  ‘Osmanlı  Devleti’nde  İşçiler  ve  İşçi
Hareketleri (1876-1914),’  65-66. The same issue of İttihad ve Terakki, also on page two, reports on the
boycott against Austria-Hungary.
66 Mahmud Muin, 'Serpūş-ı Millīmiz ve Fesler [Our National Hat and the Fezzes],' Donanma (1 Temmuz
1326 (July 14th, 1910)), 396-402
67 See Donald Quataert, Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881 - 1908:
Reactions to European Economic Penetration, New York University Studies in Near Eastern Civilization 9
(New York, N.Y. u.a.: New York Univ. Press, 1983), 144.
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throughout the Empire, but in many regions had only short-lived support.68 Among the
Austrian products that were boycotted was the fez, which was next to sugar one of the
major Austrian goods exported to the Ottoman Empire.69 Most of the fezzes worn in the
Ottoman Empire were produced in Austria.70 The boycott not only led to a refusal of the
fez but also unleashed a discussion about what kind of headgear would be appropriate. 
In what follows I scrutinize the extent to which the renunciation of the fez was also
a turning away from Ottomanism, as a concept of Ottoman citizenship and  belonging
transgressed existing and newly emerging ethno-religious boundaries. How (and why)
did the trans-confessional popular participation in the fez boycott result in the campaign
for a nationalization of economy (milli iktisat) with explicit reference to Turkish-Muslim
nationalist character and the final surrender of an Ottomanist vision of equal citizenship?
The  1908  seizure  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  constituted  a  territorial  loss  that
triggered a broad (public) discourse on identity in the ongoing political transformation
process.  Identity  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  was  reconsidered  along  with  economic
reasoning  due  to  the  import  of  Austrian  goods.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was not the only decisive political event in fall 1908.
A couple of days after the Austrian annexation, Bulgaria declared independence and also
Crete departed from Ottoman suzerainty and entered into union with mainland Greece. 
While I found only a few archival sources on the the fez boycott, the proliferation
of journal articles on the matter is vast. I will concentrate here mainly on the part of the
fez boycott and peripherally consider its broader scope, meaning the boycott of other
goods. The fez boycott was already quite extensively treated by other studies, yet I think
it is indispensable to include it within the broader scope of my research considering the
central place it takes in Ottoman discussions about headgear.
The boycott  began immediately,  within seventy-two hours,  after  the annexation
through blocking the entrances of Austrian shops in the Ottoman Empire by the crowds
that had demonstrated against the annexation; it lasted until the end February 1909.71 The
68 See Ibid., 140.
69 Ibid., 123.
70 See  Y.  Doğan Çetinkaya,  1908  Osmanlı  Boykotu:  Bir  Toplumsal  Hareketin Analizi,  1.  baskı.,  İletişim
Yayınları :  Araştırma - Inceleme Dizisi  161 (İstanbul:  İletişim, 2004);   and Roderic H. Davison, ‘The
Ottoman Boycott of Austrian Goods in 1908–09 as a Diplomatic Question’, in  IIIrd Congress on the
Social and Economic History of Turkey: Princeton University, 24–26 August 1983 , ed. Heath W. Lowry and
Ralph S. Hattox (Istanbul: Isis, 1990), 1–28.
71 Donald Quataert, “The Ottoman boycott against Austria Hungary,” in Quataert,  Social Disintegration
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fez was one of several Austrian products affected by the boycott,  which developed a
relative strength since the Austrian government feared to lose power in several aspects.
The Ottoman economy received fourteen percent of its import goods from Austria, while
it did not have to fear a return boycott of its own goods as exports to Austria were not
high.72 Goods important  from Austria  were mainly sugar,  cloth or  garments  and the
mentioned fezzes. The Austrian governments’ reactions to the boycott itself suggest that
a  concern  about  the  further  worsening  of  their  relations  with  the  Ottoman Empire.
Donald  Quataert  considers  Austria's  reaction  to  the  boycott  as  an  expression  of  its
limited power and on the other side surprising strength of the Ottoman Empire. Thus,
through  its  refusal  the  fez  gained  another  highly  symbolic  dimension  as  a  sign  of
Ottoman autonomy,  contrary  to  its  former symbolic  power  as  a  marker  of  Ottoman
modernity. 
The  Young  Turk  coup  went  along  with  the  intention  and  hope  to  stabilize  the
Ottoman state's sovereignty, but these hopes were dashed quite immediately. The political
events even put the newly achieved power of the Ottoman government in danger, as with
the loss of  Bulgaria,  Crete  and the final  loss  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The Young Turk
government feared and actually received discredit. And these events were only to be the
beginning of what continued with the Balkan Wars of 1912/13 and WWI. Brummett also
provides a short summary of how the boycott was discussed and depicted in the satirical
press.73 Similarly to Quataert she assesses the boycott as an opportunity that was used by
the  Ottoman  public  to  counter  the  powerlessness  of  the  Ottoman  state  towards  the
European Great Powers. While Brummett points out that in the long-term economic level
its effect was negligible, it  had an impact on Ottoman internal economic organization.
Zürcher argues that the boycott had as much an impact on Austria as on the Greek and
Armenian importers, while Quataert puts forth that those involved in trade with Austrian
goods had enough other products they could sell.74 Brummett emphasizes that the boycott
was an act of symbolic drawing of boundaries after the failure to keep European armies,
entrepreneurs and influence out of the Ottoman Empire.75 In that regard it is important to
and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881 – 1908, 121.
72 Ibid., 122.
73 See Brummett, Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908 – 1911, 176.
74 Zürcher, Turkey, 109; and Quataert, Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire,
1881 – 1908, 124. On the difficulties to estimate the economical impact of the boycott see Ibid., 141-143.
75 Brummett, Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908 – 1911, 175-176.
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note  that  the  boycott  stretched from Istanbul  through the whole  Empire  up to  North
Africa. Thus, she concludes that the boycott was very much an instrument to enhance
national  unity  and  to  refashion  Ottoman  citizenry.  The  boycott  made  visible  the
interrelation of foreign economic penetration, labor and the evolution of socio-political and
“nationalist” movements, which she states need further analysis.76
5.3.1 The Boycott in Ottoman Newspaper and Journal Articles
The boycott against Austria-Hungary and with it the fez boycott received broad
coverage in the Ottoman press.77 I want to provide some examples of that coverage and
look at the way Ottoman identity was negotiated there.
Tobias Heinzelmann gives a detailed account of how the boycott was perceived and
propagated in the satirical magazines Karagöz and Kalem, highlighting important aspects
of the broader meaning of the boycott.78 He stresses the close succession of Bulgarian
independence and the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That can be explained in
mutual  backing of  these  events  by  Russia  and  Austria-Hungary,  who promised each
other not to intervene militarily in these matters. Both events, Heinzelmann argues, were
a ”hard blow,” that meant a loss of prestige for the Ottoman government, and as such it
was  also  perceived  among  the  Ottoman  population.79 Subsequently,  on  the  8th  of
October, a huge demonstration was held in Istanbul which called out for a boycott.
Both  journals  analysed  by  Heinzelmann  regard  the  annexation  as  a  military
conquest disguised in the garb of  civilization.  Thereby,  they endeavor  to deconstruct
orientalist discourse and its barbarian versus civilization dichotomy by turning it on its
head.80 Authors and illustrators of Kalem and Karagöz criticized that Austria considered
itself more civilized than the Ottoman Empire. They attempted to refute this assumption
with examples showing that rather Austria itself was barbaric, not the Ottoman Empire. 
Heinzelmann asked why the annexation was perceived as a military act since the
76 Ibid., 175-176.
77 See Çetinkaya, 1908 Osmanlı Boykotu, 148, FN 30.
78 Tobias  Heinzelmann,  Die  Balkankrise  in  der  osmanischen  Karikatur:  die  Satirezeitschriften  Karagöz,
Kalem und Cem 1908  -  1914,  Beiruter  Texte  und Studien :  BTS.  -  Würzburg :  Ergon-Verl,  1964-  75
(Stuttgart: Steiner [in Komm.], 1999).
79 See Ibid., 31-34.
80 See Ibid., 133 and 138.
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Austrian military had occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina already since the Berlin Conference.
The symbolic act of annexation, however, received this broad popular attention and was
perceived as more serious by the Ottoman public than the actual military appropriation.
Heinzelmann relates this to hopes that a potential shift in power relations in favor of the
Ottomans would help to reintegrate Bosnia-Herzegovina into the Empire. The Ottoman
perception  of  the  annexation  reveals  the  importance  of  symbolic  negotiations  and
manifestations of power. It was also a test for the Young Turk regime and Heinzelmann
emphasizes that both journals criticized that the Ottoman government in the Bosnia-
Herzegovina question followed a similar path in foreign politics as the ancient regime.
The agreement that the Ottoman state received 2,5 Million Lira indemnity in return was
designated by Karagöz and Kalem as a sell-out.81
In the material  analyzed by Heinzelmann the fez  also appears  as  an issue of  the
boycott. On the 16th of November 1908 Karagöz published song lyrics written to the melody
of a traditional Karagöz song, the name of it  an eponym of the very popular Ottoman
shadow theatre and the periodical itself. The song propagated the kalpak as the headpiece to
be preferred and praised its beauty in contrast to the fez. Anticipatorily it predicted the end
of the era of the fez, though this took only place only with its ban in 1925.82 
Doğan Çetinkaya provides the most extensive account on the fez boycott as part of
the boycott against Austria-Hungary.83 He mentions numerous sources and has traced
the discussions on headgear in journals and newspaper of the time. His analysis reveals
the broad support of the boycott and the readiness to abandon the fez for another kind of
headgear.  Many alternatives  were  brought  up of  which  the  kalpak became the  most
popular  and  visible,  as  the  one  introduced  officially  as  an  alternative  to  the  fez.
Çetinkaya regards the prospect  of  a change of  headgear as a factor  of  motivation to
participate in the boycott,  based on the assumption that the fez was unpopular,  to a
certain  extent  anyhow.  Liked  or  not,  he  concludes,  certainly  the  fez was  the  most
tangible and visible sign of the boycott. It facilitated participation in the boycott and in
addition made that participation visible.84
81 See Ibid., 138.
82 See Ibid., 130.
83 See Çetinkaya, 1908 Osmanlı Boykotu; and Doğan Çetinkaya, ‘Muslim Merchants and Working-Class in
Action : Nationalism, Social Mobilization and Boycott Movement in the Ottoman Empire 1908-1914’
(Doctoral thesis, Leiden, 2010), https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/15553.
84 See Çetinkaya, 1908 Osmanlı Boykotu, 148.
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The experimenting with alternative national hats, and in a way a newly initiated
search for a national hat, started subsequently to the proclamation of the boycott. I think
this is a crucial point in nation-building even though one might discuss its success, with
contradictory outcomes. As I mentioned above the fez boycott was a first step towards a
movement  of  milli  ikisat  (national  ecomony)  that  entailed  multiple  animosities  and
atrocities against non-Muslim Ottomans.85 Albeit, for now, non-Muslim Ottomans were
actively involved in the boycott and supported the search for a new headpiece as a sign
of national unity. Thanks to Çetinkaya's analysis of Ottoman Greek newspapers these
voices can be heard. One newspaper, for example, reports that most Ottoman Christian
orthodox exchanged the fez with one of the alternatives. Interestingly the same article
states that especially in the rural areas the fez was exchanged for alternative headgear. 86
That shows the spread of the boycott to remote areas and the fundamental difference
between the introduction of the fez, which took place obviously from above, introduced
by the sultan, and its replacement from below.
People had started to appear in public with different kind of hats shortly after the
boycott  was started. In place of the Austrian fez they wore white fezzes which were
made  of  undyed  woollen  felt,  locally  produced  fezzes,  which  were  only  available  in
limited numbers, and arakiyye, which was another kind of felt hat, as well as the kalpak.
The latter, as I said before, received broad acceptance. People staged mass events where
they demonstratively took off the fez, threw them to the ground and sometimes trampled
on them. Shortly after that the kalpak was made part of official dress codes. Subsequently
different  state  offices  introduced  the  kalpak as  their  official  headgear,  and  at  the
inauguration of the national assembly on 3 July 1908 the kalpak was proclaimed to be the
new national headgear, although it provoked a quite lively debate whether one could be
forced to wear the kalpak instead of the fez.87 
Çetinkaya provides a  lengthy quote of  an article  by Ahmed Rasım in the daily
85 On milli iktisat  (national economy)  see Zafer Toprak,  Milli Iktisat - Milli Burjuvazi: Türkiye, Türkiye
Araştirmalari 14 (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınlari, 1995); and Zafer Toprak, Türkiye’de Milli Iktisat:
1908 - 1918, 1. baskı. (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2012).
86 On  the  more  general  attitude  of  Ottoman  Greeks  towards  the  boycott  see  Çetinkaya,  ‘Muslim
Merchants and Working-Class in Action,’ 147.
87 See Çetinkaya, 1908 Osmanlı Boykotu, 148 FN 30. On the decision whether to wear the fez or kalpak in
the national assembly, debt administration and pul administration: see Kürd Teavün Gazetesi ve Terakki
(29 Teşrin-i Sani 1324 (Dezember 12th, 1908)), 24. There had obviously as been conflicts on the issue, but
unfortunately I cannot comment on this here because the document I found that deals with the case is
missing. It is BOA BEO 258849/3452.
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newspaper Sabah. He argues in favor of the boycott and gives advices on what to do in
the situation. He states that now it was necessary on the one hand to extend local fez
production and on the other hand revitalize that of the  kalpak. Ahmed Rasım criticizes
how the Ottoman Empire is treated as a self-service store by those from outside, probably
the European great powers, but at the same times warns against being too upset and
annoyed about that. For him it was more important to concentrate on potential measures
to counter that image, rather then anger, which was of no use. Instead, the Ottoman
society should find alternatives which could replace Austrian products, and at the same
time  the  Ottoman  economy  should  start  producing  those  items  itself.  The  Ottoman
population,  meanwhile,  should  refrain  from  dressing  up  and  instead  concentrate  on
winning. The result, if successful, would be manifested in monetary wealth and then “if
we have money, we can even attach jewels and eagle feathers to our head”.88 By this
reference to former Ottoman practices of display of wealth and status, the adornment of
Ottoman kavuks and turbans, which ceased gradually with the introduction of the fez,
Rasım links the right of excessive consumption to the prosperity of the state instead of
individual wealth and status. Yet, he does not take into account the unjust distribution of
wealth which allows only a few to reflect a prosperous national economy via individual
consumption. Thus, his appeal was restricted to a small elite whom he calls on to display
modesty in favor of national prosperity. He thereby links the well-being of the national
economy and sovereignty to the conduct of  its  elites and relates the consumption of
Austrian  goods  to  extravagance  and  luxury.  Rasım does  not  consider  the  display  of
wealth as a vice per se, but as legitimate in relation to the condition of the Ottoman state.
He calls Ottoman elites to moderation, because they are the ones who can afford luxury,
as long as the state is in trouble. Why he invokes the topos of excessive consumption in
the relation to the fez, which was not at all an item of luxury, but of bourgeois modesty,
might come down to the fact that as a foreign product it considered luxury per se, even
though that might not have been valid for the age of globalized mass production,  and the
higher quality of Austrian fezzes.89 
In terms of the production of headgear, Cetinkaya mentions that many Ottoman
writers who commented on the boycott  thought the change of headgear would bring
88 Çetinkaya, 1908 Osmanlı Boykotu, 149.
89 There were also efforts to produce other local ready made clothes besides the fez, see Ibid., 155-156.
216
5 After the Young Turk Coup d'Etat: National versus Modern Hats?
advantages for the Ottomans. In contrast to the fez, they argued, headpieces such as the
kalpak and kece külah were much older then the fez. The tradition of kalpak and külah
manufacturing was  centuries  old  and  provided  a  quality  that  could  not  be  so  easily
copied by Austrian producers. That was a line of argument which regarded the fez as not
originally  Ottoman,  and  therefore  it  should  be  replaced  by  'real'  authentic  national
headgear. Here also, in my perception for the first time appears the argument that the fez
was actually a Greek piece of dress, one that was reiterated late especially when in 1925,
under the Republic, the fez and other headgear was to be abolished. In contrast to the
time of introduction, not least by the lack of a vivid press and therefore public discussion,
but also by other reasons, when the fez was made obligatory for civil servants no such
discussions on authenticity  and national  identity  took place.  Even if  the  fez  had the
function of homogenization and nation-building it was not introduced as an authentic
piece of dress expressing essential Ottoman identity. On the contrary, the fez came to
express Ottoman identity after its introduction. That does not mean arakiyye,  külah or
kalpak were actually more authentic, it was just the they were treated as such.
Quite opposite opinions on the fez and its  boycott  appeared, too.  Some authors
argued that alternative headpieces which had been proposed to replace the Fez were not
adequate. They regarded the fez not as a piece only introduced hardly a century in the
past but as a century old tradition. They labelled the kalpak “Circassian” and and thereby
inauthentic, as such not Ottoman or Turkish item, and they regarded it together with the
arakiyye,  which  was  designated  in  a  pejorative  manner  “camel  hair  colored,”  as  not
worth of Ottoman fame and glory. For its opponents the fez was a symbol of despotism, a
sign of Ottoman weakness, disassociated from the Ottoman state's strength and power,
while those alternative kinds of headgear subsumed under the designation “national fez”
symbolized constitutionalism and the beginning of a new era.90 In search for national
authenticity, Ottoman journal authors undertook efforts to define a “typically” Ottoman
or Turkish  kalpak which could not be confused with the Bulgarian or other  kalpaks.
Some considered Circassian kalpaks as originals to be adopted.91 The kalpak was made a
reference to pre-Ottoman Turcic times and the Ottoman Turks common history with
other central Asian peoples or communities. 
90 See Ibid., 151.
91 See Ibid., 168.
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An article of the newspaper Tanin, whose editor Hüseyin Cahit was a member of
the  CUP  central  committee,  reports  enthusiastically  about  the  dynamics  developing
through the boycott of Austrian goods and its consequences for Ottoman headgear. 92 At
the  beginning  of  his  article  the  unspecified  author  provides  his  impression  of  the
changing appearance in the streets. During the month following the beginning of the
boycott, he observes a sudden and completely new view appearing in the streets, which
he finds amazing. Watching people walking around with new headgear, “new fezzes”93 he
calls  them,  gave him the impression of  the  appearance  of  completely  “new Turks.”94
Enthusiastically he terms this experience as actually watching the renewal of the nation
before his eyes. Hence, he attributes an enormous power to headgear, the ability to built
a new nation, that consists in his eyes of all male members of Ottoman society, if we
consider who donned the “new fezzes.” That means in his understanding these national
hats reached way beyond the surface touching the substance of the national community,
rebuilding it from scratch. 
The author uses the term “Turks” here, when he talks about the new nation, but in
the following switches to Ottoman when talking about the national collective. He says
that Ottomans were quite aware of the fact that most of the fezzes came from Austria
and in order to fulfil their promise not to buy “rotten Austrian goods” they were ready
not to wear them. On the other hand, it was also a well known fact that the Fez factory in
Hereke did not produce enough fezzes and “missed the perfection” to provide enough
fezzes for all  in the Ottoman lands.  The people by themselves, he continues,  found a
solution pretty fast and started to wear  arakiyye and  külah.  The fact that these other
types of headgear worn during the boycott were called “new fezzes” shows that at least
the authors of the Ottoman press were quite aware of the function of the fez as an item
of nation building that could not so easily be replaced by a variety of local headpieces,
should it  fulfil  a  similar  purpose.  The author  of  this  article  also  points  out  that  the
wearing of alternative headgear became common all over the Ottoman realm. 
The  author  of  this  article  presents  himself  quite  enthusiastically  about  the
possibilities opened up by the fez boycott.  Pointing out the “new fezzes” were much
cheaper then even a fez of lowest quality they could become ideal “national hats” which
92 'Yeñi Fesler [New Fezzes],' Tanin, no. 73 (16 Ramazan 1326 (12. Oktober 12th, 1908)), 7.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
218
5 After the Young Turk Coup d'Etat: National versus Modern Hats?
had  been  worn  anyways  already  by  most  Albanians  in  the  Ottoman  Empire.  The
economic dimension opened up by these new hats could not be exaggerated in the eyes
of the author and will be discussed in many other articles on the subject. He points out
the possibilities of building up a national economy and regards the new fezzes as means
to  catch  up  with  Austria  in  terms  of  economic  development.  By  industrializing  the
production  of  the  new  headpieces  also  would  the  shape  be  perfected  and  thus
industrialization and enhancement of Ottoman outward appearance and inner cohesion
went together.
The author regards the adoption of the headgear virtually as a cure for all sorts of
problems of the Ottoman state, especially in terms of nation-building and the spread of
nationalism.  He  considers  the  shift  to  new  headgear  as  a  beginning  of  patriotism
(vatanperverlik) among the Ottoman population. He talks about the Ottoman nation here,
without  mentioning  who  might  be  included  or  excluded.  In  his  eyes  new  headgear
evoked national consciousness. He even talks about embodiment (tecessüm) of the nation
by means of them, by making the unity of the nation visible (was that not the case with
the fez). This remark suggests that even more people (men) donned the new headpieces
than did the fez before, otherwise it would be hard to understand why these created a
greater unity then the fez. It also suggests that the “national fezzes” included broader
segments of Ottoman society in to the nation than the fez, as an item introduced from
above and donned by the elites, would.
The fez boycott evoked much hope among some authors of national renewal, and
the change of  headgear was associated with the renewal of  strength of  the Ottoman
nation  and  consequently  with  the  renewal  of  the  strength  of  the  state.  Headgear
appeared once more as a symbol of power and strength. It might be compared to a crown
or turban as a sovereign symbol of power. For these authors, together with the return of
constitutionalism, the new fezzes symbolized the power of the people, even though that
power remained quite limited and without real consequences in participation. For many,
especially the non-Muslim Ottomans, this symbolic power rather turned against them,
proofing the destructive potential nationalist struggles.
Other were less enthusiastic about the power of “national fezzes,” such as Mahmud
Muin in his article that appeared in July 1910 in the journal Donanma (Navy) titled “Our
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national hat and the fezzes.”95 For him the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina had been a
blow  (darbe)  against  the  Ottoman  state  following  the  proclamation  of  the  second
constitutional period, leading to the boycott.  He remarks that the boycott went along
with a rising and enormous hatred against the fez, and the replacement of the fez by
kalpak,  kece külah  and many other types of headgear. Yet, it is important to note that
Mahmud Muin points out that even before the boycott strong resentments against the fez
existed.  That might  explain why the Fez boycott  received such great response.  Muin
mentions  that  fez  wearers  were  pejoratively  designated  as  “red  fez  wearers  (kırmızı
fezliler),” but does not mention if it was a specific social group which was termed like
that or the wearer of the fez in general. He also does not mention why the wearing of the
fez was assessed in such a negative way and by whom. There had been efforts to replace
the fez as the headgear of the military, he continues, and it was now hardly possible to
argue publicly in favor of the fez. Unfortunately, he does not mention which objections
exactly were brought up against the fez. In addition to the military he talks about the
introduction  of  a  “strange  kind  of  headgear”  for  the  police,  assumedly  some sort  of
kalpak and a competition for the adoption of the kalpak among all different kind of state
officers. He complains that also most daily newspapers propagated against the fez. The
points brought up against the fez, he says, had been repeated for several years. 
What becomes clear in the following is that the author is quite critical of the Young
Turk government and connects critiques of the fez with certain phenomenon coming
along with the constitutional period which he objects. Not mentioning clearly what he
means  by  that,  he  designates  the  Young  Turk  attitude  and  character  as  “crazy
pamperedness (mecnūnāne şımārılıḳ),”96 stating that there own pamperedness ended to a
certain degree with the anti-Unionist  actions  of  31st of  March (31  mart  olaylari).  His
incentive for this article, as he says, was to provide the people with information in order
to convince his readers of the advantages of the fez, since at the moment they were not
capable of serious judgement and needed to change ideals.
Emphasizing functionality Mahmud Muin undertakes a sort of  scientific approach
to the matter of headgear. Certainly what is more interesting is what lay behind his line
of argumentation, from what point of view he vividly defend the fez. He starts out with a
95 Mahmud Muin, 'Serpūş-ı Millīmiz ve Fesler [Our National Hat and the Fezzes],'  Donanma (1 Temmuz
1326 (July 14th, 1910), 396-402.
96 Mahmud Muin, 'Serpūş-ı Millīmiz ve Fesler,' 396.
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lengthy elaboration on color theory, mainly on the absorption of light  resulting in the
question  which  color  was  most  suitable  for  headgear.  He  contends  that,  since  black
absorbed  a  biggest  amount  of  light,  black  hats  were  less  breathable  and  thus  less
functional than red or white hats. Obviously, he alludes to the black color of the kalpak
versus the red fez.  His  next point is  the breathability of  different  types of  headgear,
which of course he concludes was more favorable in red or white headgear. I want to
take a look at his line of argument on the material aspects of headgear to find out what
may lay behind it and why the fez was so important for some to the same degree it was
despised  by  others.  What  can  be  concluded  by  his  line  of  argument  regarding  the
symbolic importance of the fez and other headgear? In terms of the production of the fez,
Muin elaborates on different materials coming to conclude that silk and wool, again in
terms of transportation of heat, are best suited. Yet silk he deems too expensive, and thus
he chooses wool as the preferable material for headgear. Muin's argument very much
follows a track which relates male appearance and thus male fashion to rationality. 
As  I  demonstrated  before,  with  modern  male  attire  throughout  the  nineteenth
century, beginning with the French revolution or even before, men's dress was designed
more and more to a real or conceived functionality. That was expressed in a sometimes
extreme reduction of  ornamentation and a demonstrative plainness.  In  line  with this
Muin based his  arguments for his preference of the fez on a pure functional basis, and it
becomes obvious throughout the text that this has its flaws. He recounts his points many
times and obviously runs out of arguments.97 
Another point besides functionality is that of hygiene, which makes the fez more
suitable for the maintenance of health. Muin repeatedly returned to it, arguing that the
fez was easier to clean, and that cleanliness was a special feature of Islam, adding religion
to his line of argument. He adds a Muslim connotation to the fez, and does not make any
reference to the trans- or interreligious characteristics of the fez as an item of Ottoman
citizenship;  quite  to  the  contrary,  as  many  of  the  state  archival  documents  in  the
previous decades show.
Muin combines religious conservatism with the invention of tradition concerning
the fez, which is made an emblem of Islam, and the modernist arguments of functionality
97 Another reason for his focus on functionality were probably the repression against opponents of the
CUP.
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of  dress.98 He  contrasts  sober  modern  male  dress  to  female  embellishment  and
extravagance. In just two lines he remarks on females wearing skirts, the kind of which
he  does  not  specify.  He  notes  that  this  was  not  his  topic  and  interest  but  for  the
reader/for me it confirms his political stance, and secondly, which, might be even more
important, his view on the contrasting character of male and female dress. Muin puts
emphasis on the matter that the fez worn at official  occasions should be determined
exactly, in its shape, this taking reference to uniformity and the even tube-like shape. He
again praises the low maintenance and ready-to-wear quality of the fez, again in contrast
to female dress and to the kalpak: It only needed a shaping and fumigation once in while.
The fez was antibacterial, while the  kalpak full of microbes. He wonders how it came
about that the kalpak could be considered on the same hygienic level as the fez. 
Mahmud  Muin  combines  his  elaborations  on  the  economic  aspects  of  the
production  and  consumption  of  headgear  with  ethical  considerations.  He  calculates
yearly incomes and the amount available for the purchase of headgear per year,  and
demonstrates the low costs of the fez or kece külah in contrast to the kalpak. He argues
that in contrast to the high costs the quality of  kalpaks  was low and they would loose
their fur within two days, while the fezzes generally were of good quality. Further, he
continues his argument on an ethical basis, arguing that the killing of newly born lambs
for the production of the  kalpak was against “celestial human feelings.”99 He links this
ethical argument to the economic dimension, pointing out that this mode of production
on the one hand was inefficient, because it was expensive and unsustainable, and on the
other hand it  was cruel,  because as he says it  was “an attack against generations of
sheep.”100 He also points out the sustainability of the fez which when out of shape was
recyclable, as it could be reshaped and dyed again.
Mahmud Muin does not confine himself to point at external factors of different
kinds of headgear. He also touches the issue of embodiment. By returning to the issue of
color he elaborates on the positive impact of the fez on the human body. He again turns
to the issue of color. He aims at demonstrating the effect the wearing of certain colors
98 On the invention of the fez as traditional Ottoman see also Çetinkaya, 1908 Osmanlı Boykotu, 104.
99 “ḥissiyāt-i ʿulviyye-i beşeriyye ḳarşı,” Mahmud Muin, 'Serpūş-i Millīmiz ve Fesler,' 399.
100 Mahmud Muin, 'Serpūş-i Millīmiz ve Fesler,' 399. On animal rights in the Ottoman Empire during that
period see  Cihangir Gündoğdu, ‘The Animal Rights Movement in the Late Ottoman Empire and the
Early Republic: The Society for the Protection of Animals (Istanbul, 1912)’, in Animals and People in the
Ottoman Empire, ed. Suraiya Faroqui, (İstanbul: Eren, 2010), 373–95.
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had on the body. Not surprisingly it comes down to his perception of the positive impact
of the color red, more specifically of the red fez, on the human body. The red color of the
fez led the cheeks to appear redder than their natural color; people with a fez appeared
just as in the popular proverb as if “redness hid their faces.”101 But the effect of wearing a
red fez, according to Muin, was not restricted to the facial color. It would come along
with a feeling of consolation and peace of mind caused by one's own healthy impression
in  the  mirror.  He  argues  that  this  had  the  effect  that  those  wearing  a  fez  not  just
appeared healthier, they actually became healthier by wearing a fez. The black color of
the kalpak in contrast had the effect of giving a complexion that reminded the observer
of “infantile convulsion.” In addition the black color was not suited for the cold, he states,
as would be seen at animals who changed their fur to white in the winter. Because of all
these disadvantages of black colored clothes, Muin assesses, would the wearing of these
been abandoned completely anyway.
After these elaborations on functionality Muin turns to what he calls the “political
and religious benefits”102 of the fez. First he refers to Ottoman nation-building in general
attesting a recent lack of it. He sets the starting point of Ottoman-nation building with
the beginning of the reforms known as  Tanzimat-i hayriyye  in 1839. Before that, Muin
states,  neither  a  national  flag (millī bayraḳ)  nor  national  dress  had existed.  Thus,  he
locates national character not in traditional dress or habits but defines it as a degree of
unity and uniformity. In its 600-years existence and despite its auspicious status, he says,
the Ottoman state was missing national unity. Yet he acknowledges the relative novelty
of  the  idea  of  national  unity,  admitting  that  European  states  also  lacked  it  until
recently.103 Before the Tanzimat each military commander had made up his own design of
flags, of which thirty to forty different existed once at a time and no agreement on a
common  design  could  be  reached  among  them.  This  was  similar  to  language.  He
mentions the example of the decree issued against Muhammed Ali Paşa of Egypt which
had been published in Farsi in the government gazette. Never had the Ottomans been
sure about which was the official language of the state, and it shifted between Farsi,
Arabic  and  Turkish.  In  addition  he  associates  the  fez  with  Pan-Islamism  and  the
101 “ḳızıllıḳ yüzüne vurmuş,” Mahmud Muin, 'Serpūş-i Millīmiz ve Fesler,' 398.
102 Ibid., 399.
103 He refers to the Paris Conference of 1856 (he just says Paris Conference, but it must be that), which
concluded the Crimean War. That means he considers European nation building to have taken place
more recent then Ottoman, Mahmud Muin, 'Serpūş-i Millīmiz ve Fesler,' 399.
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worldwide recognition of the Ottoman’s sultan as the Caliph of all Muslims.104 Thus Muin
associated Ottoman national identity firmly with Islam. Also European colonialist powers
helped to shape the assumed Islamic character of the fez, Muin argues: The clothes of all
local colonial armies, be they Moroccan, Algerian, Tunisian, or German West African,
resembled Ottoman soldiers dress, and all of them wore a fez. That most of them or all
were Muslim soldiers, he states, contributed to the perception of the fez as a Muslim
piece of headgear.
Even  though  some  of  Mahmud  Muin's  assumptions  about  the  fez  might  be
questioned, his remarks on the different aspects of the fez provide insight into how the
discourse on headgear was embedded in other discourses on society,  politics and the
human body.
Another  defence  of  the  fez  against  its  opponents  is  Mustafa  Sabri's  article  in
Beyanü'l-hakk.105 Mustafa Sabri was an example of the conservative elite who considered
the boycott, and its popular character, as a symptom of social disorder and unrest, and
thus did not approve of it.106 His arguing for uniformity of appearance might be equal to a
desire  of  social  discipline  as  an  instrument  of  power.  The  “carnival”  according  to
Cetinkaya a characteristic which made the boycott popular, with its appearance of many
different  külahs and  arakiyyes, was  quite  a  horror  to  him  in  distinction  to  popular
perception.107 Sabri defends the fez against its critics who appeared with the Austrian
boycott, or before. His defense has at least two levels: one is economic and the other
consists of aesthetic and related arguments. His article is a direct response to an article in
the daily  Sabah, a proponent of the boycott and another unspecified author of another
also unspecified newspaper. He opposes the depiction of the  kalpak as a piece of dress
with local  origin and puts  the fez in its  place,  in a manner  of  invented traditions,  a
headpiece donned by Ottomans/Turks “since always.” It is striking that he uses the term
Turk, not Ottoman, probably using it in the sense of Ottoman Muslim, not in the strict
104 On the proto-nationalist character of pan-Islamism see Nikki Keddie, ‘Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism’,
Journal of Modern History 41, no. 1 (1969): 17–28.
105 Mustafa Sabri, 'İctimāʿiyyāt - Fes ve Ḳalpaḳ [Sociology – Fez and Kalpak],' Beyānülḥaḳḳ (3 Teşrin-i Sani
1324/21 Şevval 1326 ( November 16th, 1908)), 146-149.
106 See  Yusuf Şevki Yavuz, entry 'Mustafa Sabri Efendi'  in  Âkif Aydın, İbrahim Kâfi Dönmez, and Bekir
Topaloğlu, ed., Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi: Muhammediyye - Münâzara, vol. 31 (İstanbul:
Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2006).
107 See Mustafa Sabri, 'İctimāʿiyyāt - Fes ve Ḳalpaḳ'; on the positiv popular perception of the fez boycott as
“carnival” see Çetinkaya, ‘Muslim Merchants and Working-Class in Action, 64. On the “elite's fear of
the masses,” see Ibid., 66.
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ethnically defined sense, even though he does not comment on this. The article in Sabah
had argued that the fez could never be Ottoman (note that Sabah used Ottoman), stating
that  it  was  not  possible  to  provide  the  fez  an  “elegant  and  plain  form.”  Again,  like
Mahmud Muin, the aesthetic standards used by both the author of  Sabah and by Sabri,
are in accordance with those of bourgeois aesthetic values of men's dress, outlined in the
previous chapter. 
Thus, we are dealing with a competition over the compliance with these standards,
from the proponents as well as the opponents of the boycott. According to Mustafa Sabri,
Sabah's author terms the kalpak as a choice of good taste and elegance in appearance, a
marker of good taste (ẕevḳ-i selīm). Whereas Mustafa Sabri states the “the Turks” donned
never  anything  else  but  the  fez,108 and  that  it  was  their  distinctive  and  categorical
characteristic  within  as  well  as  outside  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Like  Mahmud  Muin,
Mustafa  Sabri  considers  the  fez  a  Muslim item;  he  does  not  mention Ottoman non-
Muslims at all. 
While proponents of the boycott argued that Ottoman fez production was not able
to compete the Austrian industrial standards and qualities, and for that reason alone it
was necessary to find an alternative for the fez, Sabri argues against this kind of solution
to  European economic dominance. He instead promotes the expansion of the Ottoman
fez production to counter Austrian hegemony, while  proponents of the boycott rather
propose to escape the competitive situation altogether. Thus, for Sabri, the fez is more
authentic to Ottoman identity, while for the boycotters it is rather the kalpak. Sabri finds
it  necessary  to  defend  the  fez  against  theses  utterances  which  he  considers  insults
(against whom these insults might have been directed he does not mention).
Sabri explicitly distinguishes himself  from two other authors  he refers to,  as a
proponent  of  conservatism  delimiting  himself  against  their  outspoken  endeavor  to
change. The author of  Sabah, Sabri quotes, wanted to change just headgear, while the
other  unspecified  authors  had  proposed  a  change  more  encompassing,  namely
“ourselves”  as  a  necessary  reaction  to  and  measure  against  Austrian  dominance.109
According  to  Sabri,  these  author's  motivation  for  considering  a  more  or  less
encompassing social change was critical of the derogatory and contemptuous European
108 See Mustafa Sabri, 'İctimāʿiyyāt - Fes ve Ḳalpaḳ,' 146.
109 See ibid., 147.
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gaze  noted  by  the  referred  author.  He  states  about  Ottoman's  tralleling  in  Europe:
“Feeling  anguished  under  the  Europeans  contemptuous  gaze  they  eventually  had  to
throw away the fez and don a hat.”110 The unknown author attests a necessity for change,
which goes beyond a change of headgear to escape this “humiliating gaze.”111 Sabri did
not mention in which respect this change was to take place or if the quoted author talked
about  it.  Yet,  it  might  be  fair  enough  to  say  that  it  was  a  kind  of  change  towards
European (bourgeois) standards, represented by the hat. Or is it rather a change towards
national unity, since Sabri agrees with this author about a lack of uniform appearance
caused by abandonment of the fez and the sudden use of many different kinds of külahs
and  arakiyyes,  among  them the  kalpak which  themselves  had  a  number  of  different
shapes. To cure these ills the mentioned author calls for a uniform design of the kalpak,
which had to be “plain and elegant”,112 since those kalpaks donned at the moment differed
to much in shape. National unity, here Sabri agrees with the other author, was necessary
in  order  to  counter  Austrian  claims  to  hegemony  and  challenge  European  imperial
dominance in general. Nonetheless, Sabri comments, such an item of national unity was
already available,  and he saw no necessity  to invent  one:  the fez.  It  would not  only
express and create unity but represent a “higher value” which was continuity.113 The fez
comprised values such as continuity, a sense of what was right, honour, zeal and public
spirit. Apparently the public spirit expressed by the fez boycott was not the one Sabri had
in mind. On the contrary the huge kavuks, which were yet another thing than the külahs
and  arakiyyes,  represented  social  order  before  the  introduction of  the  fez,  so  maybe
kavuk was just  as an expression for  the social  order before the Mahmudian reforms,
represented for him as a kind of carnival, social unrest, which in contrast to popular
perception and attraction to the boycott for him had an unappealing attraction. In Sabri's
opinion the new headgear did not have the quality to preserve social order, referring here
explicitly to the question of  class and its  boundaries which he argues would become
invisible by the diversity of new headpieces. Sabri points out that the new headpieces
entailed all kinds of ambiguities, quite in contrast to the fez. The külah would not suit the
social status of an “efendi”, these “strange hats (tuḥaf serpūşlar)”. Hence Sabri assumes
110 “Frenkleriñ enẓār-ı istiḥḳārı altında sıḳılaraḳ nihāyet fes atıb şapḳa giymeye mecbūr oluyorlar,” ibid., 147.
111 “naẓar-ı teẕlīl,” ibid., 147.
112 “sāde ve ẓarīf,” ibid., 147. 
113  Ibid. 147.
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that many of the newly introduced  külahs undermined elite identity and authority by
blurring social boundaries. Above the threat of social disorder, Sabri senses the threat of
a gradual shift towards “mimicry” (taḳlīd), considering the new headgears as an almost
inevitable shift towards the adoption of the European hat. In a certain sense he might not
be that far from the truth, because global comparisons show the search for national dress
did often result in the adoption of bourgeois standards.  The unspecified other author
actually had proposed the adoption of a hat similar to European caps.
Like Muin, Mustafa Sabri refers to color and the supposed healthy look provided by
the fez, while others, the opponents of the fez, obviously argued that the fez would led
the face appear ill (bozuk).
In terms of production Sabri argues that in contrast to fez production there were no
kalpak factories at all and thus it appears not logical to him to count on the  kalpak as
appropriate  replacement  for  the  fez.  Thus,  it  would  be  much  more  appropriate  to
strengthen  and  improve  local  fez  production,  rather  than  a  change  of  headgear.
Returning to European stereotypes and contest against Ottoman, Sabri argues that the
wearing of külahs would rather strengthen pejorative views about the Ottomans from the
European perspective and therefore was not suitable to counter these stereotypes, which
depicted  the  Türks  as  impermanent  and  inconstant.114 Sabri  questions  the  effect  the
wearing of the kalpak had against Austrian dominance and power.
As these examples suggest was the European gaze is central both to the proponents
and opponents  of  the  fez.  Even though they  argue with  authenticity  as  a  quality  of
national identity, international standards are important to them to a similar extent.
5.3.2. The Fez Boycott in State Documents and the Appearance of the Kalpak as 
an Item of Ottoman Identity
Contrary  to  the  rich  discussions  in  the  Ottoman  press  on  the  boycott,  the
documents on headgear and the boycott in archival material are just few. That underlines
that the boycott was not initiated by the government, its dynamics developed to a great
extent outside of it. The issue of the fez boycott is discussed in a number of documents
114  Mustafa Sabri, 'İctimāʿiyyāt - Fes ve Ḳalpaḳ,' 148.
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depicting the situation in different parts of the Empire, further illustrating some of the
details which went along with the fez boycott. 
In  Beirut  the  boycott  of  Austrian  goods  and  the  related  discussion  about  local
substitutes included the need of a distinction of Sunni identity from Shiite identity as it
was embodied by the Persians.115 The kalpak made of lamb skin was refused due to its
resemblance  with  the  Persian  headgear  as  the  document  states.  Instead  the  kind  of
kalpak suited  to  substitute  for  the  Austrian  fez  should  be  made  of  camel  hair.  This
decision is reported to the Ministry of the Interior by the governor of Beirut. He claims to
talk in the name of the people (ahālī), who had first begun to wear the lamb skin kalpak
instead of the fez, to which the provincial government objected. After its intervention,
the governor reports the people “unanimously (müttaḥiden)” decided on the production
of kalpaks made of camel hair.116
From Adana the provincial governor reports to the Ministry of the Interior about
the refusal of the fez among the population. Instead of the fez, people had begun to wear
headgear of various shapes and colors. This practice was also adopted by state officials,
soldiers and other individuals (efrād). Given the huge variety of headpieces donned by
various strata of the population, the governor expressed worries about public order. His
concerns are not shared by the Ministry of the Interior, who tells him headgear was not
the main issue here but customs.
This  document relates  to the fact  pointed out by Tobias Heinzelmann,  that the
Austrian boycott not only was a matter of protest against the annexation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina  but  generally  against  the  import  of  goods  from  European  countries
conditioned by very low Ottoman import taxes that prevented the development of local
industries.117
I  also  want  to  refer  to  some  documents  that  reflect  discussions about  the
introduction of the kalpak as part of official uniforms which took place a couple of years
earlier  and provides insight into the treatment of  the kalpak as  an item of  Ottoman
identity.  Even  though  the  kalpak  became  famous  only  with  the  fez  boycott,  in  the
military it had come into use already a couple of years prior. 
115 See BOA DH.MKT. 2644/69.
116 See also BOA Z.B. 589/78 about violation of dress codes by some police commissioners.
117 See Heinzelmann, Die Balkankrise in der osmanischen Karikatur, 132.
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After  insurrections  in  Macedonia  in  1903  the  military  and  gendarmerie  were
organized under the supervision of the Great Powers. For its accomplishment military
officers from Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Great Britain and Germany were sent to the
three vilayets.118
In April 1904 a document issued by the office of the Grand Vizier concerned itself
with foreign soldiers in the Ottoman army who wanted to wear a  kalpak.119 There it is
discussed and eventually negated if  those foreign soldier could be subsumed under a
paragraph that  regulated  the  wearing of  kalpaks by  certain  army units.  Initially  the
Austrian and Russian embassy had approached the foreign ministry to inquire if their
soldiers were covered under the above mentioned paragraph. In another document of
April about the wearing of  kalpaks by düvel-i sitte  officers, meaning those of the Great
Powers of Europe120 sent by the Grand Vizierate to the chief in command (serasker), the
Grand  Vizierate  reports  on  the  correspondence  between  Austrian  and  Russian
ambassadors on the dress of the military officers of these states stationed in the Ottoman
Empire.  Obviously  the  concerned  soldiers  stationed  in  the  vilayat-i  selasa,  the  three
administrative units comprising the region of Macedonia: in Selanik (Salonika), Üsküp
(Skopje) and Manastir (Bitola), the uniform was recently regulated by a decree, which
also encompassed the wearing of a kalpak. The regulation issued for the Ottoman officers
concerns the gendarme cavalry  and artillery soldiers.  As  the  kalpak was part  of  the
gendarme uniform, the Grand Vizierate stated it would not be accepted, in any case, that
foreign officers wore a  kalpak. That was what the chief in command decided, and the
Russian and Austrian ambassadors were informed. In addition, the same French Paşa,
here called Corcis Paşa, is also mentioned and was exhorted to follow these instructions,
even though this time French officers are not targeted.
The issue reappears in July 1904, dealing with the wearing of kalpak and fez by
French gendarmes under the French Paşa Ferik Decorcis.121 The headscribe of the Yildiz
Sarayı reports a correspondence with the French ambassador and the French Ministry of
Defence on that issue. This time the outcome is that these police officers should wear
118 Nadine Akhund, ‘Muslim Representation in the Three Ottoman Vilayets of Macedonia: Administration
and Military Power (1878–1908)’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 29, no. 4 (2009), 451.
119 BOA BEO 2309/173171,  28 Mart 1320 (10 April  10th,  1904);  and on the same issue:  BOA Y.A.HUS.
470/44,  about the donning of kalpak of the police forces in the Three Vilayets.
120 BOA BEO 2309/173171.
121 BOA İ.HUS. 1322/Ca001/119.
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nothing else then a kalpak made of astrakhan with broadcloth at its top and that other
the foreign officers in the service of the above mentioned Paşa should wear the same
kind of kalpak.
These cases show that it was quite  uncertain  if  the  fez  and  kalpak were  rather
part of military uniform, a maker of national belonging and demarcation of Ottoman
sovereignty. What is in fact surprising is the wish of these European soldiers, or their
commanders, to wear fez or  kalpak. Nothing is said about the reasons for the desire to
adopt the kalpak. 
 5.4 Children and Heads of Households: Contesting Public Spaces
The satirical paper Karagöz considered as an outcome and success of the Austrian
boycott  the  strengthening  of  Ottomanism,  or  more  generally  a  result  of
constitutionalism, which had led to the identification of Ottoman non-Muslims with the
state.122  Visually that was expressed by the wearing of some kind of “national hat.” One
sign of the awakened loyalty and identification of Ottoman non-Muslims for  Karagöz
was expressed by the decline of the import of children's hats. When after the end of the
boycott  trade  with  Austria-Hungary  had  been  resumed  and  the  boycotted  product
became purchased again, among the sugar, clothing, and paper, one product, according to
Karagöz,  was exempted.   The article  states  that  persons responsible  in Vienna asked
themselves why now that the Ottomans imported the same Austrian products as before,
such as sugar, fezzes, clothes, paper and mineral ores, one product was missing: That was
children's  hats  (cocuk  şapkaları).  Before,  those  had  been  ordered  in  great  amounts.
Karagöz observes a change in Ottoman non-Muslim clothing practices, encompassing a
shift from the endeavor to resemble Europeans in appearance to the awakening of an
Ottoman identity.123 
122 Heinzelmann, Die Balkankrise in der osmanischen Karikatur, 152. He quotes a report from Karagöz 71,
March 29th, 1909, 3: 'Telegraf. Harici.'
123 While the Austrian boycott had often an Ottomanist character, at which the author of Karagöz refers
to,  in  the following  years  Ottoman non-Muslims  became main target  of  succeeding boycotts.  See
Çetinkaya, 1908 Osmanlı Boykotu.
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Contradictory to the awakening loyalty  and Ottoman identity  of  Ottoman non-
Muslim attested by Karagöz, expressed by the donning of “national hats,” some Ottoman
Muslims seem to pursue different ideals. In times of national awaking, archival records
show Ottoman Muslims as those inducing their children to wear brimmed European hats
as a number of incidents in summer 1910 suggest.124 Some high-ranking members of the
military and civil official appear in the archival records, because their children had been
reportedly walking around with brimmed European hats in some famous public spaces of
Istanbul. The police reproached their fathers that they had encouraged this kind of dress.
The first of these accounts is dated May 21th, 1910 (8 Mayıs 1326).125 Without providing
names it generally reported that some Muslim families would let their children wore hats
and  that  the  police  had  been  cautioned  about  these  actions,  as  well  as  the  families
received  copies  of  these  police  reports.  It  says  that  due  to  summer  time,  pertinent
investigations took place on the part  of  the police  because this kind of  practice  was
contrary  to  and  unacceptable  on  grounds  of  Islamic  morality  and  customs (ādāb-ı
islāmiyye). It’s necessary consequence would was a bad influence—for  whom it does not
say, though probably on other Muslim families and society in general. Furthermore, the
police would from now on pay attention to this issue.126 
The phenomenon of the public appearance of Muslim children with European hats
was not new. Already in May 1902 complaints had been raised against parents letting
their  children  wear  hats.  A  former  member  of  the  municipality  council  of  Istanbul
(şehremaneti), Mustafa Efendi, sent records of a meeting of the council to the Ministry of
the Interior reporting mischiefs and problems they saw in town.127 Among them was the
wearing of hats by children, which Mustafa Efendi stated had been “observed by eye
witnesses.” According to Mustafa Efendi the wearing of hats was “strictly forbidden by
religious law,” because of its abomination of imitation or mimicry (taḳlīd), and it was
124 The first report of these kind of incidents appeared in May 1326 and last in August 1326. 
125 BOA DH.MUİ. 96/-1/381, 8 Mayıs 1326 (May 21th, 1910).
126 This first statement on children of Muslim families wearing hats is mentioned in the same document as
another case. I am not sure if these two are purposely linked but I get the impression that this is to a
certain  extent  the  case.  I  think both are  subsumed under  the  violation of  “local  morals  (maḥall-i
aḫlāḳ),” BOA DH.MUİ. 96/-1/381, line 7. A women, called Madame Helen, is accused of taking young
school  girls  (genç mekteb  ḳızları)  to her house,  a hostel  named “Muradyan Han.”  Is  an allusion to
prostitution  implied  here?  The  document  was  sent  to  the  Public  Security  Directorate  (emniyet-i
umumiyye müdüriyet-i bahiyyesi). A note beneath the actual report on the case talks about (not) giving
information to newspapers on the matter. It also says that the police should provide no space (meydān
verilmemek) for this kind of “immoral behavior.”
127 BOA DH.MKT. 511/48, 18 Mayıs 1326  (May 31st, 1902).
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“contrary to religion” because it was against “Islamic morals and customs.”128 
Back to summer 1910: All together sixteen of these cases occurred from May until
the end of August. In these documents twenty men were addressed who had been send
admonitions.129
I want to begin with a case described in detail that took place on Büyükada, the
largest of the Princes'  Islands close to Istanbul, in the Marmara Sea.130 The document
issued May 31st, 1902 (18 Mayıs 1326) entitled “Referring to the matter that on Büyükada
some put hats on their Children,” deals with two cases, the first of them not actually
concerned with children wearing hats,  but  with headgear  in general.  It  refers  to  the
participation of Muslim children in the celebrations of a European (frenk) holiday, as the
documents termed it, Christian Ash Wednesday celebrations.131 The document termed to
the church, where the ceremony took place as “the European (frenk) church,” indicating
the conflation of  cultural  and religious identity.  The document,  as  the  others  treated
below,  explicitly  addressed  the  children's  fathers,  sometimes  grandfathers,132 as  those
being responsible for allowing their  children to wear hats.  What might have been at
stake here were these men's identities and not those of their children. 
The police reports that on Ash Wednesday, about a hundred Christian women and
students of the adjacent Christian school held a procession, followed by a church service.
Irritation and a subsequent police investigation had been provoked by the participation of
two Muslim students in the procession: Former General İbrahim Paşa’s eight-year old son
and the ten-year old daughter of Büyükada's former Mayor Hafız Efendi, reportedly took
part in the ceremony and  thereby had taken off their fezzes both during the procession and
in the church. It is here striking that Muslim children participated in Christian ceremonies,
while the case tells us that both boys and girls donned the fez as part of the school uniform.
128 BOA DH.MKT. 511/48, 18 Mayıs 1326  (May 31st, 1902).
129 İbrahim  Paşa; Büyükada's former Mayor Hafız Efendi (1); Hafiz Efendi (2); Şakir Paşa; retired general,
Halil Bey;  Şehr-i  Emanet  sabıkı Reşid Bey Efendi; Fezci Said Efendizade Ali Bey, former governor of
Ankara;  Ekmekcibaşı Süleyman; Nuri Efendi;  Halil  Bey; the president of the naval court  Fezcizade;
merchant and son in law of İbrahim Paşa, former high military officer is targeted called Şakır Paşa;
Safvet Paşa; Ibrahim Bey, son in law of Kıbrıslı Mustafa Paşa; Mustafa Paşa, formerly in charge of the
governmental  landing  pier  storehouse  (İskele  Miri  Anbarı);  Abdülsamet  Bey,  who  worked  as  an
interrogator at  the court  (bidayet  mahkemesi  – court  of  first  instance);  Bekir  Paşa;  director  of  the
imperial museum Halil Bey; Hasan efendi, a centurion's son living in Süleymaniyye. 
130 BOA DH.EUM.THR. 35/54.
131 Fireng/Frenk in Ottoman Turkish.
132 Is this relevant in reference to the differentiation between fathers, as heads of nuclear families and
grandfathers, as potential heads of huge households?
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Even though the document's title suggests their fathers’ consent with this practice,
or even presents them as the initiators of it, in this case Hafiz Efendi is reported to have
beaten his son and having expressed his disagreement about his son's participation and
behavior. In contrast the police report suggests that İbrahim Paşa,133 had sent his children
intentionally  to  the  ceremony,  since  they  were  students  of  the  above  mentioned
Christian-school. 
The same document engages with another episode that took place on Büyükada.
The indicted person was Şakır Paşa, a retired general who was living on the island. He
was  admonished  because  his  daughters  had  donned  white  hats  adorned  with  black
ribbons while he want for a walk along the pier with them. The case is also treated
individually in an undated draft of a letter addressed to Şakır Paşa.134 It says that someone
had reported him walking, towards evening, along the pier with his two daughters, both
8 years old. Here for the first time the police mentions that the practice of these people,
because they were of  high social  standing,  could have a  bad influence of  the public.
Meaning others might follow their example and influence their opinion on the wearing
of the hat. The charges pressed and the moral judgements are similar to those in the
other examples, this practice being against Muslim customs and expressing ignorance of
Muslim sentiments.135
Two other men targeted by the police for letting their children wear hats were Halil
Bey, former  employee  of  the  Istanbul  municipality,136 and  Reşid  Bey  Efendi,  former
governor of Ankara.137 The documents on their case were issued on the June 4 th, and June
7th, 1910 (22 and 25 Mayıs 1326)138. The report says that Halil Bey had visited Reşid Bey at
his summerhouse (yalı) in Çengelköy, a village on the Anatolian side of the Bosporus.
Halil Bey's thirteen-year old daughter and Reşid Bey's twelve-year old daughter were
viewed walking along the the landing pier in Çengelköy, both donning a hat, the former
133 Was it İbrahim Hakkı Paşa (1863-1918)? He was designated as Westernizer, see Ekrem Çakıroğlu, ed.,
Yaşamları ve Yapıtlarıyla Osmanlılar Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 1999),
1999,  vol 1, 626-627.  See also  Mehmed Galib, Ali Riza, and Fahri Çetin Derin, Geçen Asırda Devlet
Adamlarımız: XIII. Asr-i Hicrîde Osmanli Ricâli (Istanbul: Tercüman, 1977).
134 BOA DH.EUM.THR 35/45.
135 The document contains some more general statements on the matter, that are unfortunately mostly
illegible:  It is something about relation between the season of the year and the wearing of these kinds
of brimmed hats by daughters of exalted officials.
136 Şehr-i emanet sabıkı..BOA DH.EUM.THR 35/66.
137 Ankara vali-i sabıkı, BOA DH.EUM.THR 35/66.
138 BOA DH.EUM.THR 35/66. 
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described as white with black ribbon. The police in Üsküdar had spotted the girls and
reported  to  the  Istanbul  police  directorate  which  informed  also  the  Public  Security
Directorate  (emniyet-i  umumi  müdürlüğü).  Again  the  police  reports  contain  moral
judgements of the incidents and base their argumentation for action: these kind of hats
did not conform with “the morals and customs of national dress.”139 Such indifference or
ignorance as displayed by these men, the police state, would injure Muslim sentiments
and would leave a remaining (dā'imī) impression on the Muslim population. Why is only
the  Muslim  population  mentioned?  Were  there  no  concerns  that  the  hat  would  be
adopted by the non-Muslim population? Does millī here just mean Ottoman Muslim? In
this case there was some confusion about whose daughters wore hats. In the document
dated  June  7th,  1910   (25  Mayıs 1326) only  the  twelve-year  old  daughter  of  former
governor of Ankara Reşid Bey was mentioned to have worn a hat. And the report by the
Police director of  June 4th, 1910 (22 Mayis 1326) stated that the former employee of the
municipality Halil Bey, visiting Reşid Bey, led his thirteen-year old daughter to wear a
white hat with black ribbons while with them, though only Resid Bey's twelve-year old
son was present at the landing pier, and it is not mentioned if he wore a hat or not.
Accordingly, the Police director demanded that an admonition would only be send to
Halid Bey.
On June 10th,  1910  (28 Mayis 1326) the police directorate received a response of
Halil Bey.140 He had been the one walking on the landing pier in Çengelköy on the shores
of the Bosphorus. He refers to that report that says his thirteen-year old daughter had
been watched from a distance wearing a white had on the landing pier, close to Reşid
Bey's house. He asserts that he had received a letter, telling him that his daughter should
not wear these kind of hats. But he states first since he lived in Çubuklu, which is farther
up the Bosphorus, part of todays district of Istanbul Beykoz, he did not visit Reşid Bey,
and on the other hand he did not have a thirteen-year old daughter. So he stated that he
was mistaken for someone else, another person also named Halil Bey. Yet, he did not
mention if he had a daughter at all.
Two documents, dated June 6th, 1910 and June 12th, 1910  (20 and 30 Mayis 1326) deal
with a number of persons accused of the same offense, who all lived in Göztepe.141 The
139 “ʿādāt ve ādāb-i milliyye muvāfıḳ olmayan,” BOA DH.EUM.THR 35/66. 
140 BOA DH.EUM.VRK. 2/85.
141 Close to the northern shores of the  Marmara Sea of present-day district Kadıköy of Istanbul.  BOA
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first one, issued by the police directorate mentions the president of the naval court Halil
Bey, retired military officer Hamid Paşa, a person called Doktor Cemal and Fezcizade Ali,
designated as merchant son in law of İbrahim Paşa.142 The second document, again issued
by the Polis Directorate addressed to that of Public Security, talks about Faik Paşa, Fezci
Seyyid  Efendizade  Ali  Bey  and  Ekmekcibaşı143 Süleyman  and  a  person  called  Nuri
Efendi.144 In both documents the mentioned persons, addressed as “Muslim individuals,”145
were accused of promenading with their children wearing hats in the vicinity of Istanbul.
The  documents  neither  mention  the  children's  gender  or  age.  There  is  also  no
information whether these people were out and about together or if these incidents were
spotted in the same place and time but independent from each other.  
Another person addressed by the police was  Safvet Paşa. The documents dealing
with the case stretch over a month.146 It took place in the historical city of Istanbul in the
vicinity of Hagia Sophia and thereby adds another venue to the public spaces at which
these kinds of events occur. This time it was not one of the places of summer retreat
where people took off to escape from city life and maybe their daily duties, where they
maybe felt more relaxed than in the center of the old town and maybe less observed.
Again we are dealing with an official  of  the  judicial  administration.  Safvet  Paşa had
received this admonition because the police saw his daughters, no age is provided, with a
black hat walking around in the district of Hagia Sophia. The first letter on the issue is
dated June 13th, 1910 (31 Mayis 1326), written by the assistant of the police directorate.
This time a date is given when the girl was observed which was the June 10 th, 1910. The
girls were seen together with a black women. Their parents would live close to  Hagia
Sophia, in the Yere Batan Mahallisi (Cistern neighbourhood). Safvet Paşa worked for the
Ministry of War.
The second document on the issue,  presumably a letter to Safvet Paşa or just a
report on the matter, dated June 16th, 1910  (3 Haziran 1316) signed by the director of
public security (emniyet-i umumiye müdiri).147 Safvet Paşa was a member of the juridical
DH.EUM.THR. 36/1, and BOA DH.EUM.THR. 36/50.
142 BOA DH.EUM.THR. 36/1
143 head of the court bakers
144 Nuri Efendi's  position is mentioned, but I could not find out what it  was, see  BOA DH.EUM.THR.
36/50, line 1.
145 “ẕevāt-ı islāmiyye,”  BOA DH.EUM.THR. 36/50 (ḫulāṣa)
146 BOA DH.EUM.THR. 37/12.
147 BOA DH.EUM.THR 52/61.
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department (muhakemat dairesi) of the War (harbiyye) ministry. I think the letter was
directed to him, because again, it puts emphasis on the moral aspects of the matter. As in
other statements on this issue it  pointed out the high social  standing of the persons
involved. It says that because these were children of men of highest social standing and
well  known and exalted persons the situation was of  public  interest.  These  heads of
families were inattentive and ignored the fact that their children wore hats. Here not so
much responsibility but sheer neglect is suggested on side of the state office. That puts
agency away from the heads of families, not as I suggested before all responsibility was
given to them. Is there a complaint that fathers lost authority over family members? That
they neglected their  role  as  head  of  households?  Not  only  would  they  neglect  there
parental  duties,  but  even tolerate  to a  high degree their  children's  behavior,  or  even
embrace with enthusiasm the wearing of hats by there children. Again it is said that
these kinds of hats were against Muslim codes of conduct and customs (ʿādāt be  ādāb),
but this time not just against dress-codes but in general. By the extraordinary influence
these  families  were  assigned  due  to  there  high  social  standing  the  author(s)  of  the
document stated it would stir up general Muslim sentiments.
Safvet Paşa is another rare cases where I found a reply to these admonitions. That
might be because most of the accused persons accepted the admonitions, or at least did
not refuse them, because the only replies I  found were contradictory appeals against
these accusations, like Safvet Pasa’s, explaining the situation from his perspective. I think
he adopted a two track strategy. On the one hand he blamed the neighbour’s children. It
was their  influence exerted while accompanying his children on the way home from
school, which led to the wearing of these hats. In addition, he sayed that this was an
issue of a one time faux pas and from now on he would take care that his children wore
headpieces conforming with religious and national customs. He emphasized that for him
it was doubly worthy to take care of this matter “since these investigations are due to
religious motivations.”148
Then follows the case of Ibrahim Bey, son in law of Kıbrıslı Mustafa Paşa, who lived
in Fındıklı.149 The documents referring to the case are dated June 14 th and June 15th, 1910
(1  and 2  Haziran 1326) Here one child, age seven or eight, is mentioned, which would
148 Line 1, BOA DH.EUM.THR 52/61, added to the case of Safvet Paşa is a list of names of four children
and their age.
149 DH.EUM.THR. 36/67.
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belong to Ibrahim Bey's family. No further information is provided in the case, like where
this child was seen and with whom. The document is almost word by word the same as
that on Safvet Pasa's case. Again the supposed enthusiasm on the part of the families or
heads of families in inducing their children to wear hats was stressed.150 New is that this
time the  document splits  between nation and religion,  stating that  this  practice  was
“incompatible with national customs and religious practices.”151   
The report on the following case is dated June 16th, 1910 (3 Haziran 1326).152 It uses
those now well known lines of argument, but provides some information on the case and
the proceedings taken by state offices. I am not sure if the person wearing the hat is a
child or an adult.  She is called Meliha Hanim, designated as “daughter of an exalted
family (kerīme-i vālāları).”153 In terms of space the place where the police watched her
wearing a hat is the Galata Bridge which links old Istanbul to the quarters of Galata. So
again a prominent public space and in addition placed between the centers of power of
the  Muslim  Ottoman  state  and  the  ancient  quarters  of  Levantine  merchants.  The
document does not mention with whom she was when she passed the bridge. What is
new is that here the interference of the Ministry of the Interior was demanded, I think by
some police department or the public security directorate (emniyet-i ummiye müdiriyeti),
it does not bear any sender or receiver. The document states that if there were really
among the families of high social standing those who would let their children wear hats
with enthusiasm it was important and of general interest to prevent the adoption of this
practice by others by stopping the wearing of the hats. Why was it feared that others/the
masses would adopt the hats? What was the danger for social order? Which kind of order
was feared would break up? 
Dated  June  13th,  1900  (10  Haziran 1326) the  following case  is  just  a  short  note
concerning  the  daughter  of  Mustafa  Paşa,  who  was  formerly  in  charge  of  the
governmental storehouse at the landing pier154 and who lived in Doğancılar, a hillside
neighborhood  of  district  Üsküdar,  also  on  the  Asian shores  of  the  Bosphorus.155 His
150 “if there are really [people], who enthusiastically let their children wear hats  (fi'l ḥaḳīḳī sevḳ-ı hevesāt
ṭıflāna ile şapḳa giyene varsa),”  BOA DH.EUM.THR. 36/67, line 6-7.
151 “[…] şiʿār […],”  BOA DH.EUM.THR. 36/67, line 5.
152 BOA DH.EUM.THR 37/6. 
153 BOA DH.EUM.THR 37/6, line 1.
154 Iskele Miri Ambari, BOA DH.EUM.THR 37/6.
155 BOA DH.EUM.VRK 3/32. Again the incriminated person in charge is only mentioned by his former post. 
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daughter, Halide Hanim, was twelve years old and watched wearing a hat at a landing
pier, the name of which is not provided. 
Many of the cases were reported by the police of Üsküdar. Is that because it was a
conservative  district  or  because  many  Ottoman  high  officials  had  their  (summer)
residences in the vicinity of Üsküdar along the shores of the Bosphorus? The document is
signed by the  police director and addressed to the  public  security  director (emniyet-i
umumiye müdiri)
Again a short note exists on the next case, dated June 27th, 1910 (14 Haziran 1326).
The incident again took place on the Princes islands,  this  time on the small  island of
Kınalıada.156 The police department of the island had reported it to the police directorate of
Istanbul. The girl was again twelve-years old and her father was named Abdülsamet  Bey.
He worked as an interrogator at the court.157 This time the person in charge seems to still
hold his post, at least nothing contrary is mentioned. No more information is provided
about this case. On June  29th, 1910 (16 Haziran 1326,) another of these incidents takes place
in  Kızıltoprak, a neighbourhood on the northern shore of the Marmara Sea.158 Nail Bey,
son-in-law of the director of the Yıldız Electric Company, targeted because his daughters
had been watched with hats.159 They were called Fatma and Selma and are twelve and ten
years old. According to the description they wore a laced hat made of flax.160
In a short note of the Istanbul police director of July 5th, 1910  (22 Haziran 1326,)
again a girl was in the focus of attention.161 This was the eight to ten year daughter of
retired  Bekir  Paşa,  who lived in a rented house in Şaskınbakkal  quarter  in Bostancı.
Wearing a white straw hat with laces, she was watched on a boat leaving the Kadıköy
landing  pier  in  the  company  of  four  women.  The  police  director  requested  that  an
admonition was sent to Bekir Paşa. 
The following two documents are letters of admonition sent by the director of the
public  security  directorate  (emniyet-i  umumuiye  müdürlüğü).162 Both  documents  are
almost  identical.  In  the  first,  dated  July  27th,  1910   (14  Temmuz  1326) case  a  man's
156 BOA DH.EUM.VRK 3/36.
157 at the bidayet mahkemesi – court of first instance. BOA DH.EUM.VRK 3/36.
158 Located in the present-day district of Kadıköy.
159 BOA DH.EUM.VRK 3/39.
160 “ḳuṭundan maʿmūl tenteneli şapḳa,” BOA DH.EUM.VRK 3/39.
161 BOA DH.EUM.VRK. 3/50.
162 BOA DH.EUM.THR 97/76; BOA DH.EUM.THR 97/86.
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granddaughter, seven years old, was watched wearing a hat. No information where this
girl  was seen was included.  Süleyman Ihsan Efendi  was  Senior Captain (Kolağa) of  a
regiment of the Third Army, and he lived in Korbağadere, Kadıköy. This letter could not
be delivered as notes on the attached envelope declare as such a person was unknown
and not registered in Kadıköy. The other one, issued on August 4th,  1910 (22 Temmuz
1326), is a letter of admonition sent to the  director of the imperial museum Halil Bey.
Halil Bey's daughter, called Belkis Hanim had donned a hat, a practice which is termed to
have a potentially “bad influence on Muslim views,”163 as the line of argument goes, and
thus had to be avoided. Therefore the director was requested not to use this hat anymore.
On  August  8th,  1910  (26th  Temmuz 1326),  the  daughter  of Hasan  efendi,  a
centurion's son living in Süleymaniyye,  was spotted by the police with a hat decorated
with roses in Beyoğlu.164 She had been in the company of a Muslim women the report
says. A letter of admonition is requested.165
Many of the police reports stressed the exalted social position of the protagonists.
Many of the documents stated that this kind behavior was regarded as inappropriate in
regards  to  national  dress-codes  and customs and that,  if  continued,  it  would leave a
permanent impression on the Muslim community, influence public opinion and offend
Muslim  feelings.  The  authors  of  these  reports  and  admonitions  justify  the  state
intervention insisting on the purported disturbance that the occurrences had aroused in
the Muslim public and on the concern that this behavior would be adopted by the masses.
The commotion had caused the Ministry of the Interior to commission a report on the
matter of heads of families permitting their children to wear hats.
Adab
Most of the documents on children wearing hats refer to the  concept  of ādāb-ı
milliyye, national or religious customs or manners. In what sense is millī, national,  used
here?  What areas of  social  life  does it  cover here?  The  etymology of  the word  ādāb
shows that it could open up a whole universe of codes of conduct in different fields and
163 “Enẓār-i islāmiyye-i su'i tes'iri”,  BOA DH.EUM.THR 97/86.
164 BOA DH.EUM.THR 98/10.
165 For hat satire of August 1326 and the following year see Brummett,  Image and Imperialism in the
Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908 – 1911, 228 and 412, FN 28.
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that it related to an encompassing understanding of etiquette  or/social norms.166 In an
etymological sense ādāb meant an all encompassing education and could be used in the
sense of “Bildung.” The late Ottoman use of the word is close to or the same as the
original Arabic meaning.167 
Adāb as  it  is  used  in  the  documents  on  children  wearing  hats  would  actually
suggest a meaning like custom or habit. And  ādāb,  according to the Encyclopaedia of
Islam, in its oldest sense actually bears the meaning of habit, hereditary norm, conduct or
customs, or values which were something praiseworthy and inherited from the ancestors.
Yet ādāb thereafter acquired a much wider sense and lost its meaning of and relation to
tradition. From a meaning of high quality of soul and good upbringing in the pre-Islamic
Bedouin period it developed a meaning in a specific urban context under the influence of
Islam. From the beginning of the Abbasid period168 on and throughout the whole period
of medieval Muslim civilization it carried the meanings of civility, courtesy refinement. It
encompassed the etiquette of a broad range of social fields: dress, drinking, eating, boon,
companion, disputation, study. 
In  addition,  ādāb had an intellectual  dimension,  intellectual  learning as  distinct
from  a  religious  one.  This  meant  poetry  and  the  art  of  poetry,  and  the  first  Arab
historical  and  tribal  traditions  and  corresponding  sciences:  rhethoric,  grammar,
lexicography,  metrics.  The  context  of  this  kind  of  humanistic  concept  of  ādāb was
broadened by the contact with Indian, Iranian and Hellenistic cultures, integrating them
into the  ādāb “kanon.” Next to this broad educational concept existed a more narrow
understanding of  ādāb.  It  was  related  to  more  functional,  one  might  say  vocational,
knowledge necessary to fulfil a certain office or task, such as that of a scribe. Or it could
relate to the sphere of “belle-lettre.”
166 Gabrieli, F., "Adab."  Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E.
Bosworth,  E.  van  Donzel,  W.P.  Heinrichs.  Brill  Online,  2014.  Reference.  Staatsbibliothek  zu  Berlin
Preuss.Kulturbesitz.  10  January  2014,  <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-
islam-2/adab-SIM_0293> First appeared online: 2012. First Print Edition: isbn: 9789004161214, 1960-2007.
167 See Şemseddin Sami, Kamus-i Türkî, ed. Paşa Yavuzarslan, 1. baskı., Türkiye Türkçesi Sözlükleri Projesi
[Türkiye Türkçesi Sözlükleri Projesi / Eski Sözlükler Dizisi] . - Ankara : Türk Dil Kurumu, 1999-  (Ankara:
Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 2010):  ādāb - “discipline of the mind; training, education; accomplishment;
breeding, manners, respectfulness; philological science; a usually observed mode of action.” 
168 1261–1517.
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Millet
The term  millī of which ādāb is used as attribute in many of the documents on
children  wearing  hats  derives  from  the  term  millet meaning  religion,  religious
community,  nation.  It  came  into  use  with  the  rise  of  nationalism  as  a
synonym/translation for nation but carried on its religious connotation and use. That is
why I think it is important to ask, what was meant by millī in these cases in summer? 190
What group of people was hinted at? I  think it  is an expression of Ottoman Muslim
nationalism  which  included  communities  and  people  of  other  religions  to  a  certain
degree depending on time and space, with a stress on Muslim hegemony at many times.
Thus  these  children  were  not  designated  as  Ottoman  children  wearing  hats  but  as
Muslim children wearing hats. Yet in some of the documents a differentiation between
millī (national) and  dīn (religion) is made by the police officers and administrators in
charge. Is that of any relevance to understand dynamics, especially politics of difference
in the Ottoman Empire and the relation of the different communities among each other
in the Empire?
I  think  some  information  on  the  meaning of  millī is  necessary  to  answer  that
question. As I said before millet/millī then meant nation/national and the question would
also  be  if  millī just  meant  national  then  or  if  it  kept  the  religious  meaning  of
millet/milla.169 could mean either religion or designate a religious community or nation.170
Millet in the Koranic context had an identical meaning with religion and that was still
valid  during the  Post-Koranic  period  and  could  still  be  recorded  in  official  Ottoman
documents in the nineteenth century.
The use of millet in the sense of religious community before the reform period in a
contradictory way on the one hand designated Christians outside the Ottoman Empire
and on the other hand Ottoman Christians within the framework of the Ottoman millet-
system  or  it  could  encompass  Ottoman  non-Muslim  meaning  Greek  Orthodox,
Armenian, Roman Catholic Christians as well as Jews.
It  was  not  so  frequently  used,  in  the  Ottoman realm,  for  Ottoman Muslims  or
169 According to  Sâmi, Kamus-i Türki, millī contained both meanings: Milli -  “pertaining to a religion,
sect, community, or nation; national”
170 M.O.H. Ursinus, "Millet." Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis,
C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online, 2016. Reference. Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
Preuss.Kulturbesitz.  23  May  2016  <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com.549439870two.erf.sbb.spk-
berlin.de/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/millet-COM_0741>
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Muslims in general.
Millet as in an equivalent for nation or people appeared also already before the
nineteenth  century  (Ursinus  in  his  article  in  the  Encyclopaedia  of  Islam mentions  a
sources of mid to late seventeenth century). Millet would appear in the meaning of  a
synonym for ẕimmī (non-Muslim Ottomans, protected peoples of the book). Thus when
an  ethnically  or  linguistically  defined  group  such  as  the  Serbs  or  Greeks  sought
independence from Ottoman sovereignty and lost its ẕimmī status they were designated
as millet. What does that mean now? With its manifold meanings it’s hard to grasp the
content of millī or millet referring to different concepts, maybe not at the same time for
the group but at the same time for different groups. Ẕimmī were designated as millet in a
sense of non-Muslim Ottoman first and later as movements of national independence as
millets in the sense of nation. So millet was a very open notion to designate any kind of
ethno-religious-linguistic groups not one at a time but with very fine nuances. So millet
used for the same group of people could have different meanings at different times. Or
that  may  not  be  true  or  only  partly,  because  Rum milleti in  the  sense  of  religious
community  might  designate  all  Greek  Orthodox  non-Muslim,  all  Ottoman  Greek
Orthodox or the Greek nation after independence.171 
Significant for my case is the transformation of the Ottoman concept of millet in the
nineteenth century.  Kemal Karpat considers  the Ottoman millet-system as a means of
incorporation of  the  various groups living within Ottoman territory into the Ottoman
system, administratively, politically and economically. Even though theoretically based on
the Suras 5 and 49 of the Koran that granted “Peoples of the Book” a certain status under
Muslim supremacy, the Ottoman millet system went far beyond granting a  privileged but
subordinated status. Ottoman non-Muslims, even though administratively organized along
religious lines, were positioned in relation to their administrative position to the state.
Rather than being subdued to the same condition according to religion, the ẕimmī status
and its accompanying head tax, did not determine the condition of many Ottoman non-
Muslims. Individuals’ relation and social ranking thus was not strictly based on religion but
rather on the provided service to the state. Thus the administration determined the tax
status rather than primarily religion status of individuals. 
171 Ibid., 5.
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This complex system of state-subject relations changed significantly throughout the
nineteenth  century,  which  came  up  with  well-known  dichotomies,  which
reintroduced/generalized the ẕimmī status for non-Muslims and made them into so-called
minorities in contrast to the Muslim majority.
Before, even though religion was a major part of the framework of the concept of
millet, far from ethnic or national connotations, it provided a universal belief system to
in  many  aspects  heterogeneous  groups.  According  to  Karpat  the  concept  of  millet
“superseded  ethnic  and  linguistic  differences.”172 Especially  in  the  Balkans  it  served,
Karpat argues, to integrate “clusters of urban and rural communities” and thus provided
a means to control and manage social diversity, beginning with Mahmud II.173 But rather
than  producing  a  common  identity,  i.e.  as  Orthodox  Christians,  it  supported  local
parochialism.174 
Transformations in Ottoman socio-economic organization that abolished the millet
system appeared in the second half of the nineteenth century.  These entailed, as has
been stated before,  the rise of  local  notables,  or  lay primates,  through administrative
reforms such as changes in land tenure, Karpat assesses. These measures had massive
impacts on state-subject relations. Karpat stresses that the family, as a remainder of the
old system, formerly the basic unit local communities, gained extraordinary significances
as  “the  only  unit  from  the  old  era  which  retained  its  structure  intact.” 175 Thus,  the
extraordinary emphasis  on family life  during the Ottoman reform era,  which is  also
reflected in the cases on children wearing hats. The family thus became the chief agent in
the transmittance and preservation of culture, if the millet is considered the guarantor of
cultural  in  its  shifting  meanings.  Structural  transformations  that  appeared  in  the
Ottoman Empire from the early eighteenth century saw the rise of new social groups,
such as merchants and secular intellectuals who opposed the clergy and lay primates of
the old millet structure as backward. Even though aspiring national unity on the broader
basis they nevertheless sided with the Ottoman central state, a situation also referred to
172 Kemal H. Karpat,  Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays, Social,
Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East. - Leiden : Brill, 1971- 81 (Leiden [u.a.]: Brill, 2002), 613.
173 Ibid., 620.
174 Ibid., 618.
175 Ibid., 614; see also Talal Asad on the meaning of the family within the introduction of modern civil
codes  in  Egypt,  Talal  Asad,  Formations  of  the  Secular:  Christianity,  Islam,  Modernity,  Orig.  print.,
Cultural Memory in the Present (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2003), 230.
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by  Isa  Blumi.  Thus,  even  though  the  millet-system  on  first  sight  favored  social
organization  along  religious  lines,  differences  in  faith  gained  weight  throughout  the
nineteenth  century  and  became  serious  sources  of  conflict  later  on,  in  the  form  of
antagonizing nationalist movements. Nevertheless, Karpat stresses that until 1878, these
posed no serious problems to the Ottoman government until 1878. Karpat's account thus
cautions to assess references to a Muslim-non-Muslims diversity as phenomena closely
related to the social conditions that appeared throughout the nineteenth century, not as a
timeless phenomenon of Ottoman social relations in general.
The appearance of a modern concept of citizenship, began with the imperial reform
edict of 1839, which first refers to Ottoman subjects as “tabaa-yi saltanat-i seniye,” or
Subjects of the High Majesty.176 The concept of citizenship undermined the autonomy
and self-rule of the millets. Hence the new political significance of Muslim character of
Ottoman government, by the division of society in minorities and majorities. Muslims
claimed  special  status.177 Yet  Ottoman  citizenship,  expressed  in  the  concept  of
Ottomanism, entailed the “idea of regarding as Ottoman subjects all individuals living in
Ottoman territories regardless of their  faith and language.”178 Further integration was
reached by the new administrative structure, such as local administrative councils, where
members,  according to Karpat,  were  not  primarily  representatives  of  their  respective
(non-Muslim) communities, but had been chosen as individuals within the concept of
Ottoman citizenship that had established itself until the 1850s, long before, the formal
nationality law was passed in 1869.
The presented examples provide insight into the highly contradictory concept of
Ottoman citizenship.  National  custom here  designates  as  well  a  concept  of  Ottoman
citizenship,  with  the  fez  as  its  outstanding  marker,  which  was  disregarded  by  the
mentioned  heads  of  families.  They  obviously  had  a  different  concept  of  Ottoman
citizenship than the authorities who interfered in these clothing practices. They were
admonished to adhere to national and religious clothing practices that were part and
176 The terms “tabaa” or “tabiyet” literally meaning “subject” and “subjection,” acquired the meaning of
citizen in modern Turkish,  Karpat, Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History, 639-640.
177 The millets themselves became reformed in the 1860s, see Ibid., 641-642. Thereby the millet's functions
were  reduced  to  religious  matters  in  many  of  their  responsibilities  went  over  to  the  Ottoman
government.
178 Ibid., 639.
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outside of the concept of Ottomanism.179 Striking in these cases is that the intervening
authorities do not argue on legal grounds the fez as the common marker of all Ottoman
subjects, but rather on the basis of ethics, morality encompassed in a notion of conduct,
that relate to embodied practices.The wearing of hats by Ottoman Muslim children also
appears in famous autobiographical accounts such as those by Selma Ekrem (1902-1986)
and Halide Edib (1884 – 1964). The former was Namik Kemal's daughter, the well-known
Young Ottoman author. She reports an incident that must have taken place also around
1910, of walking the stress with her hat, and the harassments she suffered.180  
In contrast to Selma Ekrem, Halide Edip only started to wear a hat when she was an
adult. Nevertheless, a remark by Halide Edib on her fathers' attitude towards her dress
provides insight into how children became the objects of their father’s politics of clothes
and the importance a father’s preoccupations with his children's dress could have. Halide
Edib’s father was a secretary of Abdülhamid II, and she herself was an author and very
active Turkish nationalist.
She comments, taking about herself in the third person:
“Now  her  father  Edib  Bey,  secretary  of  his  Majesty  Adul  Hamid,  had  a  strong
admiration for the English and their way of bringing up children. He believed that
the secret of their greatness was due to this, and so his method of bringing up his
first-born was  strongly  influenced  by  English  ways  as  he  had  read  of  them in
books. He occupied himself personally with her dresses, underclothing, shoes, and
stockings – even handkerchiefs. Turkey having, however, not yet entered the road
of reform and modernism with a slavish imitation of English outward apparel, he
did not make her wear a hat. As a matter of fact it would never have done a thing
for him even to express a desire to do such a thing, for hats were the outward and
visible signs of Christians, yet he only covered her head in winter with a kalpak (a
179 The unequivocal meaning of what might be ādāb-i milliyye is not just a question of opposing factions
but withing the different reform movements themselves, who that inhabited “multiple temporalities”
on their own, see Asad, Formations of the Secular, 222.
180 Elisabeth B. Frierson, ‘Gender, Consumption, and Patriotism : The Emergence of an Ottoman Public
Sphere’, in Public Islam and the Common Good, ed. Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman, Social,
Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East. - Leiden : Brill, 1971- 95 (Leiden [u.a.]: Brill, 2004),
117. On Selma Ekrem and her autobiographic work in the light of Orientalism see Gönül Pultar, ‘An
“American  Venture”:  Self-Representation  and  Self-Orientalization  in  Turkish-American  Selma
Ekrem’s’,  in  How Far Is  America from Here?: Selected Proceedings of the First World Congress of the
International American Studies Association,  22 -  24 May 2003,  ed.  Theo D’haen, Textxet :  Studies in
Comparative Literature - Amsterdam [U.a.] : Rodopi, 1993- 47 (Amsterdam [u.a.]: Rodopi, 2005).
245
5 After the Young Turk Coup d'Etat: National versus Modern Hats?
snug Caucasian headdress which for some subtle reasons ranks with fezzes and
tarbooshes rather  than  with  hats  and  bonnets)  and  let  her  go  bareheaded  in
summer.”181 
This remark is a found in part one of the book, which treats the period between
1885 and 1908. And the dressing practices Halide Edib recounts probably were from the
1890s. As my documents show, the appearance of Ottoman Muslim children with hats at
the latest occurred in 1902, but Halide's father as an employee of the palace might have
demonstrated reluctance regarding his position rather than because of objections against
the hat. Yet, this example shows again the special meaning of headgear as a marker of
identity and the transgression of boundaries.
Halide also comments on how she perceived her own dress in contrast to the other
children, pointing out the plainness and bourgeois sobriety as a specific feature of her
dress:
“She wore short black dark blue frocks in winter, all English-made, and white linen in
the summer. Her arms and legs were bar after the manner of the English children,
which shocked her Granny and made her anxious lest she should catch cold. 
But  the little  girls'  objections were not  as  to  the weather  and its  changes.  She
looked different from other children of her age and class. She attracted attention,
and she was envious of the gorgeous-colored silk gowns, frills and ribbons, even
jewels, with which other little girls were decked. To this day she feels occasional
longings for gaudy clothes and vulgar apparel although her true tastes are quite
otherwise.”182
All  this  took  place  before  the  Young Turk coup d'etat.  Then,  later,  in  1909,  the
dethronement of Abdülhamid, Halide Edib mentions another experience with dress, this
time actually wearing of a hat. She recounts it in passing, not as a remarkable incident,  as
part of her preparations for her first journey to England, when she practiced donning the
hat,  during  “a  happy  fort-night  spent  at  sight-seeing”183 in  Alexandria.  She  does  not
181 Halide  Edip  Adıvar,  House  with  Wisteria:  Memoirs  of  Turkey  Old  and  New  (New Brunswick,  N.J:
Transaction Publishers, 2009), 19.
182 Ibid., 19-20.
183 Ibid., 241.
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mention why she decided to wear a hat and how she felt. From that I assume it was not
remarkable to her from either the feeling of wearing it nor the perception by other people. 
5.4.1. Nationalism or Participation in Global Community
The display of hats in summer 1910 in exposed public spaces was a spatial practice,
employed by Ottoman Muslim families, that was closely related to the restructuring of
urban spaces.  The  Ottoman central  state,  in  corporation  with  local  forces,  applied  a
number  of  measures  of  urban  planning  throughout  the  nineteenth  century,  such  as
investment in infrastructure, and the construction of urban landscapes in geometrical
shapes and regular forms, including the design of public places and promenades. As we
have  seen,  these  became  important  sites  of  the  negotiation  of  social  relations.  That
included the negotiation and construction of  Ottoman citizenship,  especially in these
public spaces that were frequented by a diverse ethno-religious groups, in parks, cafés,
theaters and promenades.184
Diane Crane also opens up a perspective to integrate a notion of space into the
analysis of dress. She points out that the motivation for working class members to adopt
middle class dress was the participation in social activities in the city.185 One of the most
common of these activities was walking in the city or countryside. Hence, dress became
closely interrelated with the construction of public space and the participation of life in
these spaces.186 That could have serious consequences on spatial practices: Crane reports
a family in nineteenth century Paris, whose members would not move outside of the
house  on  Sundays  because  of  a  lack  of  appropriate  clothes.  Participation  in  the
construction of public space required specific styles and items of dress. 
These requirements of participation in a global or local bourgeois society might
have been contrary to beliefs of Ottoman authorities, as in the cases presented above.
The fathers of these children might have had aspirations in mind, very different from the
184 See Yonca Köksal, ‘Urban Space and Nationalism: Changing Local Networks in the Nineteenth-Century
Ottoman Empire’, in Spatial Conceptions of the Nation : Modernizing Geographies in Greece and Turkey ,
ed. Nikēphoros Diamanturos, Thalia Dragonas, and Çağlar Keyder (London [u.a.]:  Tauris Academic
Studies, 2010), 35–52; and Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700 – 1922, 160.
185 See Diana Crane, Fashion and Its Social Agendas: Class, Gender, and Identity in Clothing (Chicago [u.a.]:
University of Chicago Press, 2000), 42.
186 On the interactions of elite women with public spaces and their related clothing practices see Lewis,
Rethinking Orientalism, 191.
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nationalist and/or religious fundamentalist views of some Ottoman police officers. The
hat for them was a means of participation and inclusion into a certain social stratum that
was more important than conforming to a certain notion of ādāb-ı and ʿādāt-i milliyye.
The aspiration of bourgeois respectability by these men, with its decency and modesty,
surpassed concepts of national specificities, modern or traditional, and probably was not
contrary to notions of Ottomanism for them. Public spaces appeared here as a means of
social control, as well as spaces of the constructions (subjectiviation) of  modern subjects
and citizens, as it took place literally via police admonitions. 
Palmira Brummett  concludes  that  after  the  Young Turk revolution Ottomanism
prevailed  in  Ottoman  cartoon  satire  as  a  means  to  assert  integrity.  Even  though  it
emphasized differences within this unity and used stereotypical binaries to comment on
Ottoman society, satire assumed a common Ottoman identity. According to Brummet,
the binaries perpetuated in satire were not so much those between Islam and the secular
West or Ottomanism and Turkism, but rather those appearing out of the revolutionary
present  political  situation,  which  were  old  and  new,  tyranny  and  freedom,  glory  or
humiliation  and  not  so  much  as  a  struggle  between  secular  constitutionalism  and
religious monarchy.187 
Brummet argues that the Ottomanism that appeared in the satirical press imagined
the nation not necessarily as homogeneous but within the framework of the multi-ethnic
Empire:  “The  nation  was  not  in  general,  an  entity  envisioned  as  having  reduced
boundaries or ethnic or linguistic homogenisation.”188 Nevertheless, the term millī in the
modern meaning of nation became popularized by Ottomanism as it was perpetuated in
the revolutionary press. At the same time that the satirical press ridiculed the failures of
the old as well as the new regime, it reinforced Ottomanism in its rethoric, Brummett
assesses.  Ottoman was thought  to  be  an inclusive  category,  as  a  locus  of  unity  that
implied a existence of a common Ottoman culture.189 
187 The  former  must  be  understood  as  rather  projected  onto  the  past  later  on,  then  those  of  the
comtemporaries. Brummett, Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908 - 1911, 317.
188 Ibid., 213.
189 Ibid., 120. Also state elites after the Young Turk coup generally adhered to Ottomanism as Quataert
puts forward, see Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700 - 1922, 190.
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5.5 Conclusions:  Politics  of  Headgear  as  a  Popular  Movement  and
Ottomanism
There is no decisive shift in the politics of dress after the Young Turk coup d'etat.
From the point of view of an analysis  of archival records, I  cannot detect significant
changes. Some tendencies though do become visible: The number of archival records is
less.  That  might  hint  to  less  interference  of  the  state  in  matters  of  dress.  The  most
decisive event in terms of headgear is, of course, the fez boycott. Here also the number of
state archival documents is rare. I suggest that the politics of dress during the Young
Turk period were to a lesser degree made from the state level than by other actors as in
the fez boycott and the wearing of and propaganda for other headpieces instead. State
interference  still  was  employed  as  demonstrated  by  the  series  of  cases  of  children
wearing  hats.  And  the  wearing  of  brimmed  hats  by  Muslims  was  still  regarded  as
inappropriate.  The fez  boycott  constitutes  an  important  historical  cornerstone  in  the
politics of dress and questioned the symbolic reliance of the fez. However, it was still
driven by Ottomanist forces, and no other headpiece could replace the fez, even though
the  kalpak won popularity.  The Balkan Wars 1912-1913, rather than the Young Turk
coup, constituted a profound break in Ottoman politics of identity even though this shift
is not reflected in state records on the politics of dress.190 Nevertheless, parts of the policy
of  the  Austrian  boycott  were  continued  in  the  movement  for  the  nationalization  of
economy under Muslim hegemony, whose foundations had been laid during the boycott
through the tensions it had created between Anatolian Greeks and Muslims.191
After 1910 the hat and headgear in general almost disappears from archival records.
I surmise that this is due to several circumstances. The Balkan Wars and WWI might
have made quarrels about dress less relevant and not existential during a war economy.
Records might not have been kept so thoroughly during the turmoil of war. 
190 See Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity, 202.
191 See Quataert, Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881 – 1908, 155.
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One more case appeared regarding the issue of wearing of hats which I want to
refer to. On July 10th, 1911 (27 Hazıran 1327) a sentence issued in martial court (divan-i
harbiyye örfiyye), turned on three men who had been arrested in Istanbul because of the
wearing of the hat. Subhi, a suspended policeman, reported to reside in a room above the
coffeehouse at the  Tavuk Pazarı (Chicken Market). Hurşid bin Muhammed a student of
Islamic theology (talebe-i ulum) was living at the Fatih medrese (religious college). Sabri
Bey  lived  at  Anadolu  Hısarı.  The  police  report  states  that  investigations  had  been
conducted because the three men donned hats contrary to the Sharia. This in itself is
remarkable because the Sharia had not been provided as grounds for state intervention in
any of my other cases. Even when it was argued that the respective hats were against
Islam, Sharia,  as the body of  Islamic religious law, was never brought up. As I  have
shown before, the authorities rather referred to codes of conduct and custom, but not to
Islamic law. Even though Sharia is mentioned in the case files, the men were sentenced
according to military law. 
Surprisingly, contrary to this ongoing prosecution of hat-wearers in 1911, and my
previous conclusions on the politics of dress after the Young Turk coup in 1908, the final
triumph of the brimmed hat within the state bureaucracy, was suggested by an article in
İslam Dünyasi published in November 1913.'1 Indeed a couple of years had passed since
the fez boycott and the legal persecution of heads of families who let their children stroll
around in public spaces in Istanbul. The Balkan Wars of 1912/13 and the coup d'etat of
January  1913,  that  had  brought  the  government  under  CUP control,  had  meanwhile
changed the political climate. I have no further empirical evidence of the dispersion of
the types of headpiece at this point; still, the present article, I think, suggests hegemony
of certain men within state bureaucracy that did not actually don hats, especially when
being on duty, but who, from the point of view of the more conservative opposition,
occupied the positions of radical Westernizers. 
İslam Dünyasi was published Abdürreşid İbrahim, a migrant from Russia, a very
1 'Şabḳasızlara bir Hafta Soñra [A Week Later for Those without Hats],' İslam Dünyası, vol. 1 no. 18 (21
Tesrin-i Evvel 1329 ((3. November 3rd, 1913)), 280-282. On the periodical  İslam Dünyası and its editor
Abdürreşid  İbrahim,  who  can  be  situated  in  the  sphere  of  Tatar  Pan-Islamism see  Nadir  Özbek,
‘Abdürreşid  İbrahim  ve  İkinci  Meşrutiyet  Yılları:  Tearüf-i  Müslimin  ve  İslam  Dünyası  Dergileri,’
Toplumsal Tarih 4, no. 20 (1995): 18–23.
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active editor of a number of other journals and author of articles before and after his
migration. In its editorial  Islam Dünyasi was dedicated to the “benefit of Islam (Islam
faidesine).”  In  contrast  to  previous  publications  by  Abdürreşid  İbrahim  it  mostly
addressed  Ottoman  Muslims.  The  article  titled  “Those  without  hats  a  week  later”
suggested that men who applied to administrative authorities with some kind of request
and did not wear a hat were always put off from week to week without their paperwork
being completed. While those wearing hats could come and go, the waiting room was
crowded with fez-, turban-,  sikke- or  külah-donning men. It seems the author did not
restrict his critique to privileging non-Muslims as hat-wearers but rather to Muslims. In
his reflections on the reasons for the privileged treatment of hat-wearers in public offices
and beyond, he concludes that it  is related to a shift  in employment politics.  Asking
himself  what kind of men entered public offices,  he concluded that in previous days
“every idiot” had become pacified by a regular income, that had led to the occupation of
administrative  appointment  by  incompetent  men.  Thus  he  concludes,  quite  to  my
surprise, that it was justified to tell the hatless to “come next week”, as it was justified to
give to the hat-wearers “everything they wanted.” This conclusion is quite irritating. On
the one hand, it is quite unlikely that in 1914 most men in public offices, if any, donned a
hat, and on the other hand, that he really agreed with this practice. Yet, his critique of
incapable men in public offices seems to be real.  Whatever the case may be, the text
depicts hat-wearing men as capable and uncorrupted in contrast to those wearing all
other kinds of headgear.
Even though a couple of documents on the regulation of dress during the Balkan
Wars and World War I exist, I will continue analyzing here the depictions of and debates
about dress that took  place from 1919 to 1925. 
The armistice concluded in Moudros on October 31st,  1918 between the Ottoman
Empire and the Allies terminated World War I for the Ottomans. In May 1919 the Greek
army, backed by Britain,  occupied Izmir and subsequently advanced into Asia Minor.
Peace  negotiations  among  the  Entente  powers  took  until  August  1920,  when  they
resulted in the Treaty of Sèvres. According the Treaty, the Ottoman Empire remained a
rump  state  in  northern  Asia  Minor.  Against  the  peace  conditions  and  the  Greek
occupation, a national resistance movement took shape in Anatolia and finally led to the
revision of  Treaty of Sèvres, with the signing of the July Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923.
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The Turkish Republic was proclaimed on October 23rd, 1923.
Concerning headgear, in June 1920 the member of parliament Emin Bey suggested
that the fez would be replaced by the kalpak officially, but most deputies vote against his
request.2 In a short debate proponents of each item argued for the greater authenticity of
their preferred headpiece. Other options besides either a hat or kalpak are not mentioned.
Members of the first national assembly between 1920 and 1923, according to numbers
provided by İhsan Güneş, predominantly donned the fez, 45%, while 22% wore a kalpak,
18,1% a Turban, 1,2% local headpieces, and a remarkable number of 12,5% did not use any
kind  of  headgear.3 The  numbers  provide  another  hint  that  the  kalpak  was  far  from
replacing the fez altogether, but remained restricted to a certain group. Remarkable is
also the distinct presence of the turban, often neglected in accounts of late Ottoman and
early Republican accounts of headgear. Also, the fact that 12 % went without headgear is
of significance in the face of the often uttered assumption that going without headgear
was quite indecent in the Islamicate world.4 The number corresponds to the frequent
depiction of Ottoman (Muslim) men without headgear in Ottoman satirical illustration.
Further, fezzes are mostly donned by civil officials or those with civil professions, while
about 50% of the members with military position don the kalpak.  The turban is,  not
surprisingly, mostly donned by religious men and also by local notables, but also by some
state  bureaucrats  who  are  not  listed  as  inhabiting  religious  functions.  None  of  the
religious functionaries appears without headpiece, while the can be found among most
other  professions  and  positions.  İhsan  Güneş  also  listed  parliamentarian  activities
according  to  headgear;  these  numbers  correspond  roughly  to  the  distribution  of
headpieces in general. Any kind of brimmed hat does not appear at all, which leads to the
question about those who preferred to wear a hat. Interestingly then, the lack of any
headpiece corresponds to the practice of removing the hat inside of buildings. 
During the period of  the  struggle  for  national  independence the Journal  of  the
2 See T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi, 29.4.1336, 149-150. 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/TBMM/d01/c001/tbmm01001007.pdf
3 See  İhsan Güneş,  Birinci TBMM’nin Düşünce Yapısı : (1920 - 1923), 3. genişletilmiş baskı, [Türkiye İş
Bankası Kültür Yayınları  /  Genel  Yayın]  Türkiye İş  Bankası  Kültür Yayınları  /  Türkiye İş  Bankası
(İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009), 104-105.
4 On the discussion of going bareheaded see Orhan Koloğlu, Islamda Başlık (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu
Basımevi, 1978), 79; photographs of each of the members of the First National Assembly including their
headgear can be found in Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, ed., 1. Dönem TBMM Albümü (Ankara: TBMM,
1945).
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Ottoman/Turkish  history  committee  published  a  survey  on  Ottoman  headgear
throughout history, describing different types of turbans and other pieces, their material,
names, and by whom they were donned. It mostly concerns headpieces of the Ottoman
sultans and court members.5
In  my research  I  came  across  some  Ottoman and  Turkish  journal  articles  that
appeared during a period of almost forty years that provide surveys of different headgear
or discuss the advantages or  disadvantages  of  certain items. By referring to some of
them, I want to draw a line from the debates on headgear during the Hamidian period to
the Republican era, as these texts bear some striking similarities. It might be possible
through the juxtaposition of these texts to carve out what structured the discourse on
headgear and answer the question what characterizes and distinguishes the Republican
discourse on headgear from the late Ottoman.  
The earliest of these, titled 'Serpuş (Headgear)', was published in 1877 (1294) in the
journal  Muharrir.6 I  picked this text because of the striking similarities to Republican
discussions of headgear, especially the discourse on hygiene and functionality but also to
point  out  shifts  in  dressing practices  that  cannot  be  reduced to  Ottoman or  Turkish
developments and discourses, such as the question of the meaning and appearance of
brimmed hats themselves.
The unknown author of the text in Muharrir claims to scrutinize what was the most
appropriate headpiece by comparing hat to fez and some other headpieces such as wigs.
He aspired to enlighten his readers so that they might be able to decide the most suitable
piece for themselves.  The hat becomes thereby part  of a certain discursive formation
about health and the body. This provides further clues on the meaning of the hat beyond
the surface of the body. It is part of the production of knowledge about the body and its
coming into existence through discursive practices.
Concerning the article in  Muharrir, leaving aside the author's elaborations on the
5 Mehmed  Zeki,  'Serpūş,'  Türk  Tārīḫ Encümeni  Mecmūʿası [[TTEM]_[Tārīḫ-i Ossmāni Encümeni
Mecmūʿası] [TOEM]  vol. VIII-XI, no. 49-62 (İstanbul, 1335-1337 (1919-1921)), 103-121; and Mehmed
Zeki, 'Yine  Serpūş,' Türk Tārīḫ Encümeni Mecmūʿası   [TTEM]_[Tārīḫ-i Ossmāni Encümeni  Mecmūʿası]
[TOEM] vol. XI-XIII, no. 62-77 (İstanbul, 1336-1339 (1920-1923)),  181-185.
6 'Serpūş,'  Muḥarrir,  vol.  1,  no.  7  (1294  (1877)),   217-219;  on  Muharrir see  also  Hasan  Duman,
Başlangıcından Harf Devrimine Kadar Osmanlı-Türk Süreli Yayınlar ve Gazeteler Bibliyografyası ve
Toplu  Kataloğu,  1828 -  1928,  ed.  Christopher Bailey and Cengiz Ketene (Ankara:  Enformasyon ve
Dokümantasyon Hizmetleri Vakfı, 2000). Muharrir was published in Istanbul between 1876 and 1878, in
altogether eight  issues,  its  editor  was Ebüziyya Tevfik (1848–1913),  who was active  in the Young
Ottoman movement.
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military helmet and the wig, I am interested in the author's comparison of the fez and
hat. The article attributes the origin of what is understood as a hat to the French military
in the fifteenth century under Charles VIII. From there it had spread among the European
civil  population.  Its  basic  form  was  the  tricorne,  that  altered  its  shapes  during  its
dissemination among the European population. Departing from this initial description of
the hat, in the subchapter “The hat's harm,” the nineteenth century top hat had become a
target of the author's critique. From the assumptions of the European's self-proclaimed
elegance and diligence and “extreme attention and considerations with respect to the
preservation  of  health”7,  and  in  sharp  contrast  to  these  claims,  was  the  hat  these
Europeans donned: “Shapeless and unattractive and especially from the aspect of health-
care  it  was hard  to  imagine something more  harmful,”8 the  article  assesses.  In  what
follows it  becomes clear that the article  refers to the top hat and its  shape that was
contrary to the natural curves of the hat, and inflexible anyway. “These good old black
top hats” besides their uncomfortable shape were a “dangerous tool” since it prohibited
the circulation of air, entrapping and accumulating it inside. A headpiece that would not
adapt to the round shape of the head was unacceptable. It would provoke skin disease
and premature hair loss. Accordingly most Europeans (frenks) were bold.9 
This does not mean the article opposes brimmed hats in general. When turning to
the  issue  of  straw hats,  they  are  depicted  quite  contrarily  as  “preferred  to  all  other
hats”10 , as long as they are “light and thin.”11 Air circulation and the cooling effect of the
brim, helping against the heat of the sun, made them superior to other headpieces. The
brim  receives  its  own  sub-chapter  underlining  its  “scientifically  proven”  quality  of
protection of the eyes from the sun. On top of this it helped to avoid public expenses and
troubles, probably otherwise caused by the harms coming along with the unprotected
exposure to the heat.
Despite the praise of the straw hat, another headpiece comes to be preferred by the
article, and that is the fez: With its soft fabric that could adapt to the shape of the head
7 “[...] ḥıfẓ-ı ṣıḥḥat emrindeki diḳḳat ve iʿtināları fevḳalġāyedir.” 'Serpuş,' Muḥarrir, 1/7, 218.
8 “Biçimsiz ve yaḳışıḳsız ve bitaḫṣīṣ ṣıḥḥat  ḳāʿidesince baş içün andan muẓirr bir şey taṣavvur olamaz.”
Ibid., 218.
9 There  heads “opened like  [empty]   plates  (ṭabaḳ gibi  açılır)”  and looked like  “covered with silver
(gümüş gibi ḳaplanmış başları),” Ibid., 218.
10 “şapḳların kāffesine müreccaḥdir,” Ibid., 218.
11 Ibid., 218.
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and its  light weight,  it  was most beneficent and supreme as a headpiece.  There  was
nothing more health-promoting to wear during winter time as a protection from the cold.
Yet, to make it suitable for the summer, the fez needed adaptation, with a silk lining or
some other suitable material. Somehow irresolute, the article concludes that while the
top hat was the worst of all headpieces the fez was the best: “In short, of all headpieces –
apart from the advantages of the brim – the worst is the hat and – the lack of the brim
disregarded – the supreme one is the fez.”12
And despite its praise of the brim, in a concluding reference to Ottoman identity.
the  article  argues  that  nothing else  but  the fez  was thinkable  for  the whole  Muslim
community (ümmet), since the fez was a marker of Ottomanism (Osmanlılık). Thus, the
author of the article broadens Ottoman identity not by including all Ottoman citizens but
rather all Muslims beyond the limits of Ottoman suzerainty. Nevertheless, the fez and
modern felt hats meet here, shortly before the emergence of modern felt hats, that in
many occasions began to replace  the stiff  top hat  as  the  single  marker  of  bourgeois
identity.
Illustration 2:  'Serpūşlarıñ Dili  [The Language of  Headgear],'  Aydede vol  1,  no.  6  (19  Kanun-i  Sani  1338
(November 19th, 1922)), 4.
Now in 1922, the fez was still widely in use, also it has been under attack at latest
since the fez boycott. It survived because its manifold meanings within Ottoman society,
12 “Ḥāṣlı  başa  giyilen  şeyleriñ –  semş  siperce  fā'idesi  bir  ṭaraf  –  en  fenāsı  şapḳa  ise  –  şems  siperce
noḳṣānından ṣırf-ı naẓar olunduġu ḥālde – en āʿlāsı fesdir.” 'Serpuş,' Muḥarrir, 219.
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despite all efforts to fix its meaning, or attribute it to a certain group or mindset. This
flexible  function  of  the  fez  is  emphasized  by  a  caricature  published  in  Aydede in
November  1922.13 While  the  kalpak  represents  the  “national,”  the  fezzes  donned  in
respectively  specific  way,  combined  with  a  certain  kind  of  beard,  express  certain
(ideological)  mindsets.  The fez  tilted to  the forehead,  with the tassel  in  front,  marks
“unity.” Unity probably points at the CUP, but might refer here to Ottomanism, the fez
either a sign of Muslim unity or of Ottoman citizenship, or of both. The men in addition
sports a mustache. The straight fez, with the tassel at the back, expresses neutrality, and I
suggest it  comes closest  to bourgeois identity,  as I  suggested before,  and thus rather
expresses ideals of bourgeois masculinity rather than any national or political affiliation,
even though that is implied as well. İtilaf, accord or association, part of the name of the
Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası (The Freedom and Accord Party) that was active between 1911
and 1913, was the second largest faction in the parliament of 1909, and main opposition
to the CUP. It was re-established in 1919, but existed only for a short period. In this
depiction  İtilaf represents the old regime, the old order, with a buckled fez and a full
beard. The last person is designated a socialist, with a fez inclined to one side. Thus the
last and the first persons are both a variation of the norm, that is the neutral person,
while the nationalist and the reactionary are constituting types of their own as deviations
from the norm.
The variety of fezzes and the appearance of other headpieces in Ottoman daily life
are illustrated in the following depictions: 
Illustration 3: 'Kadıköy İskelesi [Kadıköy Pier],' Aydede, vol 1, no 27,  (14 Temmuz 1338 (July 27th, 1922)), 4.
13 'Serpūşlarıñ Dili [The Language of Headgear],'  Aydede vol 1, no. 6 (19 Kanun-i Sani 1338 (November
19th, 1922)), 4.
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Illustration 4: 'Üsküdar İskelesinden Çikanlar,' Aydede vol 1 no. 74 (14 Eylül 1338 (September 27th, 1922)), 4.
Illustration 5: 'Tıb Fakültesi [Medicine department],' Aydede, vol 1 no 63 (7 Ağustos 1338 (August 20th, 1922)), 1.
Illustration 6: 'Resim Sergisinin Küşadı Münasibesiyle [At the Opening of the Painting Exhibition],' Aydede, vol
1 no. 28 (20 Temmuz 1338 (August 2nd, 1922)), 1.
Furthermore the  Aydede volume of 1922 contains a huge number illustrations of
Ottoman “notables,” ministers, civil and military officials in each issue, with emphasis on
dress and headgear or on different “male types.”14 These provide an overview of post
WWI styles of dress and especially the headgear worn by them or attributed to their
14 Similar cartoons can be found in the 1922 volume of Ayine, some of them also by Ramiz Göce.
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attitude. Also the men's bodies are depicted in a way that they provide an image of the
interaction of dress and bodily features, and the person’s character. Even though kalpaks
appear, fezzes are depicted (more) frequently. Of importance thereby is especially the
shape and position of the fez. Thereby a relation of the posture and the shape of the fez
to bodily conditions is recognizable. 'Reactionaries”/Conservatives' are depicted with a
crooked posture. That means the fez did not have a meaning in general, but different
fezzes carried different meanings and constructed different kind of subjects. Often a stiff
straight fez is accompanied by an erect body. 
Women are mostly depicted in modern bourgeois dress in elegant and elaborate
dress, with caps typical of the 1920s or brimmed hats adorned with feathers, ribbons or
flowers.
Male hats appear only in a very few drawings in  Aydede.15 Just fezzes (mostly),
some kalpaks and turbans, while some men are bareheaded. Kalpaks mainly appear in
portraits of Ottoman dignitaries and mostly at the heads of military officers.
In addition to Ottoman dignitaries  Ramiz Göce and other  illustrators  also drew
different male types, such as the “lover of ceremonies” in an elegant three piece suit with
a long flowing coat, a cigarette and a fez, narrowing at its top.16 Those types wear even
more individually-shaped fezzes than those dignitaries portrayed weekly. There is also a
reference  to  the  practice  of  Ismail  Hakkı  [Baltacioglu],  the  Ottoman  reformer,  who
argued against the tassel of the fez.17 That means discourses started before Word War I
were seized upon. The illustrator depicts Ismail Hakkı with a tassel-less fez and quotes
real or alleged speech of his, mocking the contents and seriousness of his utterances on
Turkish identity: “Being a Turk means (being a) minaret.”18 
In Aydede illustrators make a clear generational differentiation: Only older men are
depicted in the styles of conservatives, with looser fitting clothes, crumpled fez and full
beards, while most young men correspond to the image of neat appearance.19 Does the
15 For depictions of hats, see i.e. Aydede, vol. 1 no. 48 (10 Hazıran 1338 (Juni 23rd, 1922), 2; or Aydede vol 1,
no. 79 (2 Teşrin-i Evvel 1338 (November  15th, 1922), 4.
16 Aydede, vol. 1 no. 13 (13 Şubat 1338 (Februar  26th, 1923)), 3.
17 On Ismail Hakkı [Baltacioglu] see Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal:
McGill, 1964), 403; and his pamphlets on education and conduct: Ismail Hakkı [Baltacioglu] Terbiye-i
Avam (Istanbul 1914); and Talim ve Terbiyede İnkılap (Istanbul, 1914).
18 ”Türk demek mināret demekdir,” Aydede vol. 1, no. 14 (16 Şubat 1338 (Dezember 15th, 1922)), 2.
19 See i.e.  Aydede nr. 15, vol 1, (20 Şubat 1338 (Dezember 15th,  1922)),  2. The generational contrast in
clothing style is here visible between father and son.
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shape of the fez also relate to social class, the more neat and even, the higher the person’s
social standing? The question of age was addressed in a depiction that contrasts the style
dress of two old men to that of two younger ones.  One each of them in nationalist,
militaristic dress and the other in modern bourgeois Ottoman style with suit and fez.
There are obviously differences between the two generations in bodily posture and the
accuracy of dress. The old man's dress is tattered and their bodies stooping, whereas the
young military officers presents himself in a somewhat exaggeratedly energetic s-shaped
posture, while the men in suit and fez looks down on him somewhat pejoratively. The
two old men in contrast are on the same level, looking in each others eyes.20
Illustration 7: 'Ātī [The Future],' Aydede, vol. 1, no. 15 (20 Mart 1338 (Dezember 15th, 1922)), 3.
Aydede provides a profile of post-war Ottoman styles and their social meaning, as
well as the relations of a person’s physique and character and their dress. Besides the
various  depiction  of  headgear  and  male  dress,  the  depictions  of  blurred  gender
20 'Ātī' (The Future), Aydede, vol 1, no. 15 (20 Mart 1338 (Dezember 15th, 1922)), 3.
Gençlere nazaren (from young people's perspective): 
1) – Bendeniz de māliye'de me'mūrum.... (Your humble servant, I am  also an officer at the treasury)
-  Oh  oh,  ātīmiz  ḳaleme/ḳalma gibi  sāğlam  ….  (Oh  oh,  our  future  is  stout  like  our  
officers/inheritance)
Iḫtiyārlara nazaren (from the elderly's perspective):
2) – Sizin teḳāʿüdiyeyi de ḳısıyorlarmı? (Do they also dock your pension?)
-  Tabiʿi  …. gençler  düşünmiyor ki  āti  …  (Sure … the young people,  they do not  think of  the  
future ...)
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boundaries by means of modern dress are striking.21 Still, the fez prevails also in these
depictions. It is hard to draw conclusions from the few depictions, yet I think they serve
to illustrate that the uses of modern male dress were not restricted to men, and while on
the one hand modern European dress displayed a disparity between male and female
items of dress, the possibility of appropriating male or female dress by all kind of persons
implied the possibility of blurring these gender binaries. These kinds of illustrations also
might imply the fear of feminization through modern dress, as in the illustration titled
“Politics of taste: Modern women, modern men.” Striking are the similar body shapes of
men and women as in another caricature, similarly titled “Modern women and modern
men: The difference between them,” where a person is dressed half as a woman half as a
man, with a body shape with a very thin waist, suggesting wearing a corset. Another
caricature that shows a female figure wearing a fez and a jacket is subtitled: “Don't pay
attention to my dress, I am still a women … there will be many saying that.”22
Illustration 8: 'Sevk Sistem: ʿAṣri Ḳadın
ʿAṣri Erḳeḳ [Drive System: Modern 
Woman, Modern Man],' Aydede vol. 1 
no. 12 (9 Subat 1333), 1.
Illustration 9: 'Kart Postal: Örümcek Ağı[Postcard: The 
Cobweb],' Aydede, vol. 1, no. 59, (24 Temmuz 1338 (May 24th, 
1922)), 1.
21 See also illustration 'Kart Postal' Aydede, vol. 1 no. 59 (24 Temmuz 1338 (May 24th, 1922)), 1.
22 “Ḳıyāfetimi baḳmayınız, ben yine  ḳadınım … diyenler  çoḳ olacaḳ  [There will be many who say:  don't
pay attention to my dress … I am still a women.”  Aydede vol. 1  no. 78  (28  Eylül 1338 (October 11th,
1922)), 3.
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Illustration 10: 'Kıyafetimi bakmayınız … ben yine kadınım 
diyenler çok olacak [There will be many saying: don't pay 
attention to my dress … I am still a women],' Aydede vol. 1, 
no. 78  (28 Eylül 1338 (October 11th, 1922)), 3.
Illustration 11: ʿAṣri Ḳadın ile ʿAṣri 
Erḳeḳ: Arasindaki Farḳ [Modern 
Woman and Modern Man: The 
Difference between them] Aydede vol. 
1, no. 90 (9 Tesrin-i Sani 1338 
(November 22nd, 1922)), 4.
The cartoonists rarely addressed national attire, but it appeared in illustrations once
in a while, i.e. one illustration asked for the introduction of national dress for men, just as
it existed for women, as the illustrator assessed. And that is his proposal:
Illustration 12: 'Ḳadın Kıyafetlerde olduğu gibi: Erḳeḳlere Milli Kıyafet [Just like for Women's Dress: National 
Dress for Men],' Aydede vol. 1, no. 25,  (17 Temmuz 1338 (July 30th, 1922)), 3.
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Here  an idea  of  national  dress  is  presented  as  a  slight  modification of  modern
bourgeois dress according to ideas of the character of Turkish national dress: The coat is
cut shorter than the usual sack coat of the contemporary up-to-date three piece suit and
the trouser legs are cut looser and wider at the thighs than beneath, evoking a slight
resemblance  with a  şalvar.  Thus,  this  author  imagines  national  dress  as  a  variety  of
modern bourgeois dress, not as a completely different style.
Illustration 13: 'Değişen Başlar [Changing Heads],' Ayīne, vol. 2, no. 63 (Tesrin-i Sani 1338 (November 14th 
1922 November 1st 1922)), 1.
In  1922,  the  Ottoman-Turkish  humorist  magazine  Ayine published  a  caricature
entitled “Changing Heads” narrating the history of World War I and the following War
of Independence from 1918 to proclamation of the Turkish Republic. It consists of six
strips  representing different  historical  moments.23 Set  in  1918  the first  scene  entitled
“War” depicts Ottoman soldiers and their German allies, recognizable respectively by the
Ottoman military cap kabalak and the Prussian spiked helmet.24 The second strip “After
the War” from 1919 shows several headpieces with Ottoman connotations: the fez,  the
23 'Değişen Başlar  [Changing  Heads],'  Ayīne,  vol.  2,  no.  63  (Tesrin-i  Sani  1338 (November  14th 1922
November 1st 1s922)),  1. See also  Katja Jana,  ‘Changing Heads and Hats:  Nationalism and Modern
Masculinities in the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey’, in Masculinities and the Nation in
the Modern World, 1800-1945, ed. Simon Wendt and Pablo Dominguez (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2015), 217-218.
24 The kabalak is a cloth helmet padded with cork, worn by the Ottoman army in WWI, also known as
Enveriye, after Enver Paşa.
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kalpak and  the kabalak,  as the  dominant  pieces  donned  during  the  period.  The
appearance of the kabalak makes visible the participation of the rank-and-file.
The next  one down refers to the armistice  of  Moudros of  October  1918,  which
marked the end of  World War I  for the Ottoman Empire.25 The image represents an
Italian and a British man wearing a military cap, and a French one with a bicorne. The
two other men wearing a turban and a fez symbolize the occupied territories on Northern
Africa  and  Arabia.  “After  the  Armistice,”  dated  1921,  depicts  the  Turkish  War  of
Independence and refers to the British occupation of Istanbul on March 16 th 1920 and the
1919  invasion  of  Asia  Minor  by  Greece.  The  headwear  in  this  image  include  three
European brimmed hats,  Greek national headgear, and a military cap. The next sequence
called “Peace” addressed the Armistice of Mudanya that took place in the Autumn of
1922 and preceded the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne, showing five fezzes and a
turban. The establishment of the Turkish nation-state was predicted and anticipated by
the last strip “After the Peace”.26 The headgear depicted here are indeed a military cap,
several kalpaks and one fez.
The cartoon illustrates the end of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the
Turkish nation-state  through the  appearance  and  disappearance of  different  types  of
headgear within Ottoman territory. By representing male bodies as national allegories,
the  comic  strip  tells  an  intertwined  history  of  nationalism,  nation-building,  and
masculinity.  At  the same time, it  documents the conditions of  nation-building in the
Ottoman Empire, its embedment in international politics. With regard to the interplay
between  nationalism  and  masculinity,  the  strips  draw  parallels  between  national
characteristics  and  male  identity;  they  point  to  the  emergence  of  Turkish  national
identity  after  the  Turkish  War  of  Independence,  depicting  men as  the  actors  of  the
nation-building process. These men are national allegories and actual representatives of
the nation. Especially in the last two strips the displayed male figures form a collective
national body, characterized by Ottoman or Turkish headgear. What the cartoon did not
anticipate, however, was the 1925 replacement of the traditional and local headgear with
25 The negotiation between the members of the Entente following the armistice of Moudros resulted in
the Treaty of Sèvres, signed on 10th August 1920. This divided and distributed the Ottoman territories
amongst Britain (mandates in Palestine, southern Syria and Mesopotamia), France (mandates in Syria
and Lebanon), Greece (Eastern Thrace and the area around Izmir) and Italy (southwestern Asia Minor).
An independent Ottoman territory remained in Northern Asia Minor. 
26 'Değişen Başlar,' Ayīne, 1.
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the brimmed hat as the symbol of modern Turkish identity.
But the hat had not disappeared from the agenda. In September 1923 the periodical
Maḥfil, in the editorial designated as an Islamic journal, discusses the question hat versus
fez via a translation from an Egyptian journal.27 The article is a reply to someone named
Yusuf Hamdi, who recently in the same newspaper had argued to replace the fez with the
hat. It is a statement in favor of the fez, a statement shared by Maḥfil. It starts out from
an aesthetic perspective, the fez was more beautiful than the hat, and then largely draws
on arguments of functionality, as well as religion/culture and religious practice. The fez
was the only item that distinguished the Easterner from the Westerner, and it was a
specific feature of Islamic identity. In regards to religious practice, the hat prevented a
Muslim from performing prayer with dignity. 
Even though the hat was above all not functional, in windy weather it did not stay
on  the  head  i.e.,  in  the  expectation  of  some  sort  of  profit  some  Egyptians  adopted
everything  harmful  from  Europe.  Conversely  in  Europe  no  one  exchanged  their
headgear, since headwear there was fixed and determined. From the Egyptian example
the author contends that European dress was not in use before the appearance of the
European colonial administration in Egypt. That had been the beginning of a “secret war”
against Islamic dress. The article concludes that, in a nutshell,  compared to European
dress, Muslim dress (libās-i islām) was more suitable to maintain health.28
Besides the fact that similar discussions about the hat also took place in the Egyptian
press and that its arguments are adopted and considered relevant and applicable to the
Ottoman/Turkish context by  Maḥfil,  the repeated emphasis on functionality is striking
here,  even though other  arguments,  such as  the relation between European dress and
colonialism and Muslim religious practice and identity, all appear as well.
27 'Fes ve Şapḳa [Fez and Hat],' Maḥfil, vol. IV, no. 40 (İstanbul, Safer 1342 (September 1923)), 61.
28 See 'Fes ve Şapka,' Maḥfil, 61, line 12-13.
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 6.1 Representations of Dress and Discussions about Headgear after the 
Establishment of the Turkish Republic
Discussion  of  the  hat  continued  after  the  proclamation  of  the  Republic  and
concerned women's as well as men's hats.
An article in Sebilürreşād on November 28th, 1923 was bothered by the display and
positive comments on the latest  European hat pieces for women for the forthcoming
winter in the newspaper Vakit.29 The mentioned headpiece seems to be some kind of cap
or cape,  “of  elegant style” made of  dark coloured velvet that  was combined with an
overcoat.  Sebilürreşād accused Vakit of propaganda with these kinds of hats for Muslim
women. It was clear, according to  Sebilürreşād, that by these lines  Vakit suggested the
adoption  of  this  hat  by  Muslim  women.  Sebilürreşād warned  of  the  disastrous
consequences  that  might  follow  for  the  country  (memleket).  Propaganda  for  the  hat
would not  help anyone besides the hat-makers,  the  articles continues,  for whom the
newspaper obviously made its pages available. Those who wanted to Europeanize the
country and wrongfully seized its identity would not understand the harmfulness of this
behaviour  and  ignored  the  sentiments  of  the  people,  Sebilürreşād argued,  without
specifically mentioning the contents of this harm.
In 1924 a number of articles discussed on the issue of wearing hats. In September
Adullah Cevdet  in  İctihad commented on the arrest  of  a  hat-wearing Muslim named
Hayreddin Bey, criticizing the persecution of hat wearers by comparing the arrest to the
situation to a number of European metropolises. He poses the question, whether a fez-
wearing citizen of the respective states would have been likewise arrested. The denial of
that possibility leads him to criticize the restraint of freedom in Turkey compared to the
mentioned European countries.30 
Also in 1924 there appeared the pamphlet Frenk Mukallitliği ve Şapka (The imitation
of  Europeans  and  the  hat)  by  İskilipli  Atıf  Hoca.31 In  reference  to  the  hadith  “min
29 ''Frenkleşmek Hevesi (Müslüman Ḳadınlarına Şimdide Şapḳa Giydirmek mi İstiyorlar [Europeanization
Efforts (Do Muslim women now want to wear the hat, too)],' Sebilürreşād (Sırat-ı Müstakim) (15 Teşrin-
i Sani 1339 (November 28th, 1923)), 42 – 43: It refers to the an issue of Vakit of the same week, I was not
able to reach to issue. 
30 Abdullah Cevdet, 'Şapka-Fes,'  İctihad, no. 169 (September 1st, 1924), 3414.
31 İskilipli Mehmet Âtıf,  Frenk Mukallitliği ve Şapka  (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Kader, 1340); and  İskilipli Atıf
Efendi, Frenk Mukallidliği ve Şapka, 1. Baskı., Yakın Tarih Dizisi 1 (İstanbul: Nizam Yayınları, 1994).
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tashabbaha bi-qavm fa-huwa minhum”32 - “who imitates a(nother) people becomes one of
them,33“ he discusses what kind of modernization is compatible with Islam and argues
that the wearing of the hat was illicit.34 Next to basing his argument on the hadith he
assesses  that  the  wearing of  the  hat  was  irreconcilable  to  the  free  and  independent
development  of  the  individual.  The  pamphlet  held  a  prominent  role  after  the
promulgation of the hat law, when real or alleged opponents of the hat law had been
persecuted on the basis of their relation to Atıf Hoca and his writing, as was Atıf Hoca
himself, who was sentenced to death by the Independence Tribunals.35 
In  August  1924  Sebilürreşād  published  an  article  on  the  wearing  of  hats  by  a
growing number of youngsters, showing itself scandalized by the phenomenon.36 During
the summer the article states, among the “kids” (çocuklar), the wearing of white cotton
hats gained currency. Even some of their close friends, the authors recount, noticed that
their children donned these hats. When asked why, their children stated, they could not
find  fezzes  or  kalpak's  in  the  stores  and  hence  bought  these  hats.37 The  merchants
themselves had “shamefully apologized,”38 that the vendors always brought these kind of
hats from Europe. On market days Muslim girl  of thirteen or fourteen appeared with
hats, the article continues. And on the ferries, being visible for everyone, Muslims as well
as  Christians,  some  Turkish  women  who  imitated  (taḳlīd)  the  fashions  brought  to
Istanbul by Russian wives during the occupation by French, British and Italian forces sat
32 See also Mirza Tokpinar, ‘Men Teşebbehe Bi-Kavmin Fe-Hüve Minhum’ Hadisi Üzerine Bir İnceleme’,
Hadis Tetkikleri Dergisi (HTD) 3, no. 2 (2005): 85–109.
33 Uriel  Heyd, ‘The Ottoman Ulama and Westernization in the Time of Selim III  and Mahmud I’,  in
Studies in Islamic History and  Civilization, ed. Uriel Heyd, vol. IX, Scripta Hierosolymitana (Jerusalem:
Hebrew University, 1964), 93.
34 His arguments are countered by Vedi Karabay in  Vedi Karabay,  Şapka Giymek Haram Değil  (Hatay:
Matbaatü’l-İktisad, n.d.). Another book contains a writen discussion of Süleyman Nazif with Atıf Hoca
on the issue: Süleyman Nazif, İmana Tasallut (Şapka Meselesi) (İstanbul: Maarif Kütüphanesi, 1926).
35 On İskilipli Atıf Hoca see Koloğlu,  Islamda Başlık, 81;  Cihan Aktaş,  Tanzimat’tan Günümüze Kılık
Kıyafet ve Iktidar, Nehir Yayınları : İnceleme - Araştırma Dizisi ; 30 5 (İstanbul: Nehir yayınları, 1989) ,
146; Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Tek Adam: Mustafa Kemal, 4. baskı (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1969). On
İskilipli Atıf Hoca see also Martin Strohmeier, ‘İskilipli ʿĀṭıf Hoca : Osmanischer ʿālim und ʺMärtyrer"
der islamistischen Bewegung in  der  Türkei’,  in  Frauen,  Bilder  und Gelehrte,  ed.  Sabine Prätor  and
Christoph K Neumann, vol. 2 (Istanbul: Simurg, 2002), 629–50.
36 ''Baʿżı Gençleriñ Soḳaḳlarda Şapḳalarla Dolaşmaları  [The Strolling in the streets of some Young People
with hats],' Sebilürreşād (Sırat-ı Müstakim) (7 Ağustos 1340 (August 20th, 1924)), 207. 
37 The authors label these stores, that sell hats,  dönme stores, obviously assuming that “real Muslims”
would not sell  hats, just apostates oder  (secret)  converts like the dönme.  On the  dönme and their
relation  to  Turkish  nationalism  see   Marc  Baer,  ‘The  Double  Bind  of  Race  and  Religion:  The
Conversion of the Dönme to Turkish Secular Nationalism’, Comparative Studies in Society and History
46, no. 4 (2004): 682–708.
38 “[...] maḥcūb olaraḳ itizāre ḳalkışıyorlar,” 'Baʿżı Gençleriñ Soḳaḳlarda Şapḳalarla Dolaşmaları,' 207, line 5-6.
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with their hat-wearing daughters who were older than fourteen, among the men, proudly
speaking French. The newspapers reported that some youngsters had started to wear
straw hats as well. And some newspapers had inquired the governor on the matter that a
bunch of male and female youths donned hats. The governor appeared baffled what to
reply, and said he wasn't aware of the hat-wearing practice, and if he got informed about
it,  he  would  consider  what  to  do.  Currently  it  was  hard  for  him to  imagine  that  a
youngster would take off  the fez and wear a hat instead. The writers of  Sebilürreşād
concluded  that  he  would  approach  the  government  in  Ankara  about  the  necessary
measures.  Newspapers  were  keen  to  know  what  the  government  thought  of  this
significant issue. Moreover, they'd likely conduct a survey on the wearing of the hat. And
just as these newspapers had paved the way for Turkish women's appearance in bars,
dance floors and stages, their wearing of décolleté dresses and their drinking of alcohol
through a survey, the author's assess, the same might happen for the wearing of the hat.
That way the hat would spread through different segments of society, from young to old,
the authors conclude.
In its  August  31st,  1924  issue,  Sebilürreşād discussed in a  short note  the actual
affinity of  women in Turkey for  the hat.39 The women this  time were designated as
Turkish, not as Muslim, such as in the comment just eight month before.40 Their affinity
was towards a new lifestyle depicted by a contrasting image, assessing that the Turkish
woman, just as she formerly lay at home in her soft cushions, warbling Asian songs and
eating sweets, now goes out to the ballroom to dance. With an attitude the Sebilürreşad
considered an Eastern treat, Turkish women, the magazines argued, poured out into the
streets, restaurants, theatre and cinemas, while they left the household to elderly mothers
and nannies.
Sebilürreşād links  modern  Western  dress  to  a  certain  lifestyle  that  entails  the
participation  of  women  in  leisure  activities  in  public  spaces  and  the  neglect  of
housework.
39 'Baʿżı Türk  Ḳadınlarında Şapḳaya Meyil  [Some Turkish Women's Prediliction  for  the Hat] Sebilürreşad
(Sırat-ı Müstakim), vol. 34, no. 610 (31 Temmuz 1340 (August 13th, 1924)), 190 – 191.
40 Does this mean Muslim and Turk are interchangeable or is their a difference in meaning?
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 6.2 Şapka İnkılabı  - A Hat Revolution?
The  new  Republican  regime  declared  the  hat  to  be  a  symbol  of  progress.  A
campaign  waged  in  summer  1925  propagated  brimmed  hat  as  the  headpiece  to  be
preferred by everyone. Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk] the first president of Turkey, visited
several provinces, where he delivered speeches about dress and other issues. Mustafa
Kemal himself appeared with a Panama hat.41 
The Turkish hat law of November 1925 was legally preluded by the introduction of
peaked caps in the Navy in 1925 and the obligatory wearing of hats for civil servants in
September of the same year.42 It thus strikingly resembled the introduction of the fez
almost a century ago, even though the hat law itself concerned only headgear and no
other items of dress. And also the circumstances of the promulgation of these decrees
were quite different, since what was at stake was not the restoration of imperial power
under modern signs but the establishment of a Turkish Republic. Yet, similar to both of
these fundamental interventions concerning dress was the international recognition as
an independent state in the face of Western European imperial powers.
In September 1925 the cabinet issued a decree which ordered “the common and
universal dress donned by all civilized nations on earth”43 for all civil servants, which
included the wearing of the hat outside and its doffing inside of buildings. This decree
was followed by the “Law on the Wearing of the Hat,” the legal text of which read:
41 Mustafa  Kemal  Atatürk,  (1918  -  1937), ed.  Nimet  Arsan,  2.  baskı.,  Türk  Inkilâp  Tarihi  Enstitüsü
Yayinları; ZDB-ID: 13251703 3 (Ankara: Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1961), 220-221 and 226;
on Mustafa Kemal's trips to the Eastern provinces see Ergün Aybars, İstiklâl Mahkemeleri: 1923-1927,
Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları 429 (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1982). On the Panama
hat as a symbol of power see Penelope J.  Corfield, ‘Dress for Deference and Dissent: Hats and the
Decline of the Hat Honor’,  Costume, no. 23 (1998), 70; Tom Miller,  Auf den Spuren des Panamahutes,
National  Geographic  2002;  Koloğlu,  Islamda Başlık,  79;  Abdullah  Cevdet,  'Şapka-Fes'  ,  İctihad,  169
( September 1st, 1924), 3414.
42 Regarding this matter  a statement of  the  president for  religious matters Rifat  exists,  see  Gotthard
Gotthard Jäschke,  Der Islam in der neuen Türkei: Eine rechtsgeschichtliche Untersuchung , Die Welt des
Islam 2 (Leiden: Brill, 1951), 45. 
43 Resmi Gazetesi, vol. 3 no. 168 (5 Eylül 1341 (September 5th, 1925)), 445: decision number 2413, issued by
the ministers council on September 2nd, 1925: “Tekaya ve Zevayanın Seddine ve ilmiyye Sınıfı Kisvesine
ve  Bi’l-umum Devlet  Me’murlarının  Kıyafetlerine  Dair  icra Vekilleri  Hey’etinin  2  Eylül  1341  Târihli
ictimi'ında Müttehiz Karâr Üzerine Tanzim Edilmiş  Olan Karârnâme .”  The decree  also included the
prescription of a ritual of saluting, which was, inside of buildings accomplished by a nodding of the hat
(“selam teatisi baş işaretiyle olur.”), outside of buildings by doffing of the hat (“binalar haricinde selam
teatisi şapka ile olur.)”
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“All members of the Turkish National Assembly, all officials and employees in local,
regional and central state offices are obliged to wear the hat donned by the Turkish
nation.  The  common  headgear  of  the  Turkish  people  is  also  the  hat  and  the
government interdicts the continuation of any practices/habits contrary to this.”44
Also the law, if often interpreted as addressing only men during Mustafa Kemal’s
hat-propagating journey, actually openly demanded that the hat would be adopted by
women as well. This and other hints suggest that the hat law included women, even if it
is  often  interpreted  differently.  Still,  that  does  not  mean  it  did  not  have  specific
implications for masculinity.45
The law was implemented with the help of severe punishments, enabled by martial
law that  was  in  force  since  rebellions  north  of  Diyabakir  took  place  and  had  been
suppressed at the beginning of the year 1925.46 In March the Turkish parliament passed
the “Law on the Maintenance of Order”47 that provided the government with far-reaching
competences  such  as  the  authority  to  outlaw  organizations  and  publications  by
administrative  measure.48 Furthermore,  the  government  reinstalled  the  “Independence
Tribunals” (İstiklal Mahkemeleri), a court martial introduced during the Turkish War of
Independence.49 The tribunals and the law were utilized by the Turkish government to
first suppress the insurrections and later to police any political opposition. On this basis
it accomplished an extensive reform program that included the hat law. The law caused
open resistance in some Eastern provinces of Turkey and other more subtle forms of
everyday resistance to avoid the wearing of the hat.
44 “Türkiye  Büyük  Millet  Meclisi  azaları  ile  idarei  umumiye  ve  hususiye  ve  mahalliyeye  ve  bilümum
müessesata  mensup  memurin  ve  müstahdemin  Türk  milletinin  iktisa  etmiş  olduğu  şapkayı  giymek
mecburiyetindedir. Türkiye halkının da umumi serpuşu şapka olup buna münafi bir itiyadın devamını
hükümet meneder.” 'Şapka İktisası Hakkında Kanun,'  Resmi Gazetesi vol 3 no 230 (28 Tesrin-i Sani 1341
(January 10th ,1926)).
45 Bursa Speech 1925, Söylev ve Demeçler, 229, as quoted in Serap Kavas, ‘“Wardrobe Modernity”: Western
Attire  as  a  Tool  of  Modernization  in  Turkey’,  Middle  Eastern  Studies  51,  no.  4  (4  July  2015):
doi:10.1080/00263206.2014.979802, 533.
46 See Robert W. Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion , 1880 - 1925,
1. paperback printing. (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1991); Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History
(London: Tauris, 1997), 176.
47 Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu.
48 See Zürcher, Turkey, 171;  and  Erik J. Zürcher,  Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The
Progressive Republican Party ; 1924 - 1925 (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 7 and 26.
49 See Aybars, İstiklâl Mahkemeleri.
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In the newly founded Republic, the hat law was subsumed under the term İnkılab,
meaning reform, revolution, transformation, restructuring. Revolutionism or Reformism
(İnkılapçılık)  was  part  of  the  six  pillars  of  Kemalism,  the  set  of  ideas  of  a  kind  of
framework which structured early Republican politics.  It  had some principles set and
subsumed the measure taken to transform state and society. The other four principles
proclaimed by the early Republican government were laicism, nationalism, etatism and
republicanism.  The  Hat  Law  issued  in  1925  was  one  of  these  measure  which
encompassed the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, the adoption of the Western clock
and numerals in 1926, the Latin alphabet and numerals in 1928, Western weights and
measures in 1931, the introduction of family names in 1934.
The self-proclaimed radical change of society by the Republican regime needs to be
treated with a certain caution, because it mainly legitimated its power by demarcation of
old from new. Thus, besides the massive transformations undertaken, many studies have
pointed to the Ottoman legacy of the measures, and the dictatorial character of the one-
party regime.50
An objection that limits the scope of these measures, it the denial of structural class
differences by Kemalism, as pointed out by Zürcher, and thus organizations which acted
on the basis of class were considered illegitimate. The same was applied to other kinds of
identity  politics  besides  Turkish  nationalism.  Hence,  women's  organizations  and  the
women's party were banned as well.51 Class differences made visible by the adoption of
new headgear were denied and tried to use to create a homogenous nation. The notion of
class was regarded as a European category that could not be applied to Turkish society,
yet communist and socialist activists existed and were fought fiercely by the new regime.
İnkılapçılık  as Zürcher put it -  “meant a commitment to ongoing (but orderly and
state-led)  change  and  support  for  the  Kemalist  reform  programme.”52 Similarly  Paul
Demont defines inkılab as “radical change with order and method.53 Taha and Parla most
50 Such as  Erik Jan Zürcher,  The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to
Atatürk’s Turkey  (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010);  Eric J. Zürcher, ‘The Ottoman Legacy of the Turkish
Republic: An Attempt at a New Periodization’, Die Welt des Islams 32, no. 2 (1992): 237–53; and Michael
E. Meeker,  A Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity  (Berkeley [u.a.]:  Univ. of
California Press, 2002).
51 Zürcher, Turkey, 180.
52 Ibid., 182.
53 Paul Dumont, ‘The Origins of Kemalist Ideology’, in Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey, ed. Jacob
M. Landau (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), 34.
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elaborately worked on the definition of early Republican ideology, including the notion
of  inkılab, and also put emphasis on the authoritarian character of the regime and its
limited scope in terms of social justice.54 
 6.2.1 Mustafa Kemal's Speeches, the Hat Law and Gender
The family, and with it gender relations, is one of the main foci in Mustafa Kemal's
talks held in the context of  the promulgation of  the hat law.55 Modern dress became
closely  linked  to  the  emergence  of  the  modern  bourgeois  family.  The  family  as  the
smallest unit of the nation state has been widely discussed; nevertheless, the importance
of this focus on the family cannot be underestimated and is crucial to the formation of
modern Turkish identity. Kemal Karpat, in his account of the millet system, and Talal
Assad, in his study on the codification of family law, have both emphasized the centrality
of the concept of the family to the discourse of modernization.56
New legal regulations regarding the family were released after the hat law. The hat
law can be considered as the basis of Turkish nation-building since it provided a means
of Lacanian interpellation as conceptualized as a means of subjectiviation by Althusser.
Every single person, thus, could be addressed by the institutions of the state constituted
as a modern subject. It was the basis for a number of subsequent laws such as the family
law in 1926 and the surname law in 1934.57 Through these “the citizen could now become
a subject ruled not by kinship ties or loyalties, but through his own sentiments: love for
family and country.”58
54 In order to define  inkılab Taha and Parla  compare its  meaning to the Ottoman Turkish  terms or
revolution and reform, ihtilal and ıslahat. The former hinting to radical change of political and social
conditions not necessarily from above,  also containing the meaning of revolt.  As for  inkılab these
authors opt for a translation of this notion of Kemalist revolutionary ideology as transformationism,
Taha Parla,  Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey : Progress or Order? (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Univ.
Press, 2004), 47.
55 On this issue and other aspects of the hat law see also Katja Jana,  'Hut,  Fes und Turban:  Nation-
building und Männlichkeit in der frühen türkischen Republik' (unpublished Magister Thesis, FU Berlin
2009.)
56 See Kemal H. Karpat, Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays , Social,
Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East. - Leiden : Brill, 1971- 81 (Leiden [u.a.]: Brill, 2002) ,
and Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Orig. print., Cultural Memory
in the Present (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2003).
57 See Nükhet Sirman, ‘Constituting the Modern Family as the Social in the Transition from Empire to
Nation-State’, in Ways to Modernity in Greece and Turkey Encounters with Europe 1850-1950 , ed. Anna
Frangoudaki and Çağlar (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 187.
58 Ibid., 187.
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To get a clue as to the meaning of the hat and the hat reform had for the Kemalist
regime, it is helpful to look at the talks Mustafa Kemal held to propagate the hat and its
implications. In August 1925 he delivered a speech in the Black Sea town Inebolu and
another in Kastamonu, the capital of the Black Sea province named after it.59 A source on
Mustafa  Kemal's  view of  the  hat  law is  the  so-called “speech” [Nutuk]  where Kemal
outlines his perspective on the Turkish War of Independence.60
The different talks held on the journey in Kastamonu were structured similarly:
Mustafa  Kemal  began with  praising the  progressive  attitudes  of  the  local  population
while in one breath he uttered threats towards non-conformists, that were followed by
an introduction to his reform program, including headgear. His elaborations of dress and
headgear were brief but significant with regard to the Kemalist view on modernization.
Mustafa Kemal assessed that current clothes of the people he saw was uncivilized and
neither national nor international. Instead dress consisted of hybrid styles, that did not
correspond to his aesthetic standards or his standards of taste, by the combination of
pieces that did not fit together. 
Concerning the question of national dress Mustafa Kemal explicitly argues against
the search for an authentic “Turanian” style of dress and instead lists the components of
the kind of dress he has in mind: 
“I want to speak frankly: On our feet we wear low shoes (iskarpin) or buskin on our
legs pants (pantalon), waistcoat (yelek), a shirt (gömlek), a tie (kıravat), a removable
collar (yakalık), a jacket of a suit (caket), and of course to complete the head a hat
59 To the documentation of  this  journey see Mehmet  Baytimur,  ed.,  Atatürk’ün Kastamonu Gezisi  ve
Sapka Devrimi: Atatürk’ün Dogumunun 100. Yıldönümü Il Kutlama Komitesi Adına (Ankara: n.d., 1982);
Mustafa Selim İmece, Atatürk’ün Şapka Devriminde Kastamonu ve İnebolu Seyahatleri, 1925, Türkiye Iş
Bankasi Atatürk ve Devrim Serisi  ; ZDB-ID: 10227155 6 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1959);
Mahmut Goloğlu,  Devrimler ve Tepkileri:  1924-1930  (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası,  1979).  At the end of
September Mustafa Kemal went on another journey where he frequently touched the matter of dress,
see Koloğlu,  Islamda Başlık; and Ayten Sezer Arığ,  Atatürk Türkiyesi’nde Kılık Kıyafette Çağdaşlaşma
(Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2007).
60 On Kastamonu and its position during the Turkish War of Independence see  Nurettin Peker,  İstiklal
Savaşının Vesika ve Resimleri:  İnönü, Sakarya, Dumlupınar, Zaferlerini Sağlayan İnebolu ve Kastamonu
Havalisi: Deniz ve Kara Hârekatı ve Hatıralar (İstanbul: Gün Basımevi, 1955); and Baytimur,  Atatürk’ün
Kastamonu Gezisi ve Sapka Devrimi: Atatürk’ün Doğumunun 100. Yıldönümü Il Kutlama Komitesi Adına,
who  mainly  draws  on  Peker;  Klaus  Kreiser,  Atatürk:  eine  Biographie  (München:  Beck,  2008),  240;
Houchang  Chehabi,  ‘Dress  Codes  for  Men  in  Turkey  and  Iran’,  in  Men  of  Order:  Authoritarian
Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah, ed. Touraj Atabaki and Erik J. Zürcher (London: Tauris,
2004), 213. The most impressive description of the journey can be found in Koloğlu, Islamda Başlık, 87-88.
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with a brim ([siperi] şemsli serpuş). This headpiece is called a hat.”61 
To delegitimize the fez he terms it futile for Turkish nation-building for its alleged
Greek origin, thus disposing it of any Muslim connotation and instead attributing it to the
current arch-enemy of the Turkish nation.
In his talk in Kastamonu Kemal further elaborates on the undesired mix of styles in
contrast to the list of pieces of dress which should and could be combined. He picks a
person from the audience, ridiculing his dress. Thus, wearing certain pieces of Western
dress was not enough in his eyes and not a sign of modernization but quite the opposite.
Kemal thus asks: “Would a civilized human being wear such strange dress and embarrass
himself?”62 Actually Kemal disregarded class differences and does not include the option
that the addressed person could not afford a full modern suit even if the person wanted to.
Mustafa Kemal embeds his remarks on dress and Turkish national identity in the
context of the family and gender. He argues that next to a mindset, the shape of families
was a characteristic which set the civilizational level of a society/nation, stating that “the
Turkish Republican people need to show through its family life and its lifestyle that it is
civilized.”63 The juxtaposition of lifestyle, family life and the hat law link the hat and male
headgear to male identity and sexuality, and thus render visible the close relatedness of
gender, dress and nation-building. 
While on the one hand references to the family can be read as a call  to gender
equality, I think it should rather be read as a reorganization of gender that appealed to
women's place  in the family but  also referred to the participation of  women in other
spheres.  Underlying gendered constructions of citizenship need to be considered here,
since modern concepts of citizenship contained certain ideas of masculinity and femininity
that implied hierarchical gender relations.64 
Kumari  Jayawadena  analyzed  the  interrelation  of  nationalism  and  feminism,
especially in the context of postcolonial nationalisms.65 She scrutinized how the call for
61 Mustafa  Kemal  Atatürk  and  Nimet  Arsan,  Atatürk’ün  Söylev  ve  Demeçleri,  Türk  İnkılâp  Tarihi
Enstitüsü Yayınları 1 (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1945), 221.
62 “Medeni bir insan alelacaib kıyafete girip kendine güldürür mü?” Ibid., 226.
63 Ibid., 220.
64 See  Erna  Appelt,  Geschlecht  -  Staatsbürgerschaft  -  Nation:  politische  Konstruktionen  des
Geschlechterverhältnisses  in  Europa,  Reihe  ‘Politik  der  Geschlechterverhältnisse’.  -  Frankfurt,  M :
Campus-Verl, 1994- 10 (Frankfurt/Main [u.a.]: Campus-Verl., 1999).
65 See 'Civilization' Through Women's Emancipation in Turkey,' in Kumari Jayawardena, Feminism and
Nationalism in the Third World, 1. reprint (London [u.a.]: Zed Books, 1986), 25-42.
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gender equality went along with a discourse on population politics where feminist causes
were linked to the reproduction of the nation. A new type of family with “civilized” and
enlightened housewives was to secure a healthier nation. She argues that this kind of
feminist-nationalist union produced an instrumental discourse on women and the family.
The nuclear family was the kind of family identified and thought of as most appropriate
with modernity. The call for modern housewives contained the desire to fulfill the needs of
the modern man. The nuclear family was to be based on stable monogamous marriage, free
choice of the spouses and relationships among the family members based on partnership.66 
Turkish  nationalism,  as  utterances  by  Mustafa  Kemal  show,  linked  these
emancipatory values to certain virtues and morality. Thus emancipation was only desired
within  the  nationalist  framework  and  within  the  framework  of  the  heteronormative
nuclear family and served primarily the reproduction of a healthy nation. The following
quote of one of Mustafa Kemal's talks conveys this:
“The  Turkish  Woman  should  be  the  most  enlightened,  most  virtuous,  and  most
reserved  woman of  the  world  [...].  The  duty  of  the  Turkish  Woman is  raising
generations  that  are  capable  of  preserving  and  protecting  the  Turk  with  his
mentality, strength and determination. The Woman who is the source and social
foundation of the nation can fulfill her duty only if she is virtuous.”67
There was also another critical dimension in the call for female emancipation and
gender-equality,  which  was  the  ethnic  dimension.  Emancipation was  only  meant  for
Turkish  women,  those  marked  or  read  as  ethnically  Turkish  or  those  committed  to
Turkish nationalism. Christopher Huston has commented on this in his analysis of the
complex  relation  Kemalism  constructs  between  emancipated  women  and  ethnic
minorities.68 Kemalism/Turkish nationalism confined women's emancipation to a certain
degree to their function in the family which was expressed in expressions such as “millet
ana”  or  “millet  kizi”,  mother  or  daughter  of  the  nation.69 Kemal  depicts  women who
deviate from his ideal depiction of the “new women” as a threat to the nation's image.
66 See also Ayşe Parla, ‘The “Honor” of the State: Virginity Examinations in Turkey’, Feminist Studies 27,
no. 1 (Spring 2001): 65–88.
67 Mustafa Kemal 1925 as quoted in Zehra F. Arat, ‘Introduction: Politics of Represention and Identity’, in
Deconstructing Images of 'The Turkish Woman,' ed. Zehra F. Arat (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 1.
68 Christopher Houston, Kurdistan: Crafting of National Selves (Indiana Univ. Press, 2008), 129.
69 See Atatürk and Arsan, Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, 221-227.
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Women veiling and hiding away from men are considered a threat to the honor of the
state and the male citizen's masculinity. The (re)creation of Turkish masculinity in the
Republic,  in  contrast  to  the  feminization  through  imperialist  European  states  in  the
Ottoman Empire, was closely linked to the behavior of women and ethnic minorities.
In his talks Mustafa Kemal's undertakes the attempt to construct the nation as a
homogeneous unit by different strategies: He points out common will, depicts the nation
as an organic being, as a suprahistorical entity and attributes certain characteristics such
as  an  inclination  to  progress.  At  the  same  time  he  marks  its  borders  especially  by
articulating  threats  against  opponents  of  Kemalist  politics  and  opponents  of
Westernization. He argues that national independence was not yet secured or achieved
but that it  needed to be proved to the Western world by implementation of reforms,
stating that no one in the Western world should have a doubt that the civilizational
project had been implemented and “the nation has absorbed the entire warmth of the sun
of civilization.”70 He states that Turkish sovereignty was in danger if the reforms were
not implemented. Mustafa Kemal evoked the danger of being considered as the other of
western civilization and thus in the danger of losing national independence as from a
colonialist point of view “uncivilized people” are denied the right to govern themselves.
In one of his speeches Kemal equates civilization with a flood which inevitably washes
away Turkish society if it does not adapt to its requirements, which are contained in the
Kemalist reforms.71
It appears in postcolonial states there was a conflict of interest between individual
and collective freedom. Not only individual subjects needed to emancipate themselves
from repressive  structures  but  also  the  state  itself  needed  to  emancipate  itself  from
European supremacy. Houchang Chehabi points out that states such as Iran and Turkey,
which had not been directly colonized, employed a different strategy than states which
had been directly colonized. The latter employed “culture” as a terrain void of colonial
domination or a place of resistance against colonial domination, while the former relied
to  a  great  extent  on  westernization  as  a  means  of  emancipation  from  imperialist
domination.72 Chehabi regards emancipation from imperialist power as the main motive
of Europeanization in the respective states.
70 “bu millet medeniyet güneşinin bütün sıcaklığını alınmıştır, masetmiştir,” Ibid., 221.
71 Ibid., 221.
72 See Chehabi, ‘Dress Codes for Men in Turkey and Iran,’ 225.
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Mustafa Kemal links concerns about the image of the nation to concerns about its
health and thus picks up discussions about hygiene functionality of dress and especially
headgear in the Ottoman context lead before. The hat now is depicted as a healthier piece
of dress then the fez and the turban, which is degraded from being sacred to a “dirty
piece of cloth.”73 The fez is made the symbol of a failed modernization, being useless as a
protector  from  the  sun  with  its  lack  of  a  brim.  In  his  speeches  Mustafa  Kemal
personalizes the nation by attributing it reason and consciousness and the ability to walk,
talk, sleep and get sick. Hence, the hat-wearing nation promises to possess a healthier
body and different lifestyle.
Critics of the hat law, who remarked that a change of headgear would fail because
it did not change the mind beneath the hat missed that the hat law or any politics of
dress are far from superficial, but rather reach far beyond the surface of the body and the
mind.74 Yet, what the law could not change was material inequality, and thus most of the
people never reached the bourgeois lifestyle promised by the fashions of the Republican
elite. Nevertheless, the masses became effected by measures of social engineering and
social  control implied by the hat law. Thus even if many people could not fashion a
bourgeois  lifestyle,  their  bodies  were  effected  by  social  engineering  and  disciplining
measures, and body techniques that were an expression of bourgeois hegemony.
These concerns about the health of the nation are closely linked to modern notions
of masculinity, as George Mosse has shown.75 What he depicts for European nationalisms
can certainly be  transferred to  the  context  of  Turkish nationalism and Kemalism, as
identity  constructions  in  Turkish  nationalism are  very  similar  to  those  described  by
Mosse.  He draws on the fusion of  aristocratic  values  with bourgeois  virtues  such as
discipline, order and self-restraint in the male stereotype at the end of the eighteenth
century. Nationalism came into these constructions of masculinity especially in the late
nineteenth century. He also talks about the relation of modernization to masculinity and
states  that  modernization  came  along  with  an  ideal  of  masculinity  that  combined
73 Such as by James de Kay in Sketches of Turkey: “the turban, infinitely varied in shape and color, often
ragged, and frequently dirty, suggesting the idea of walking toadstools,”  James E. DeKay, Sketches of
Turkey in 1831 and 1832 (New-York: Harper, 1833), as quoted in Berkes, The Development of Secularism
in Turkey, 123.
74 See Orhan Koloğlu, ‘Şapka Devrimi Kafanın Dışına Degil, Içine Yönelikti’,  Toplumsal Tarih 14, no. 83
(2000), 23; and Houston, Kurdistan, 13.
75 George L. Mosse, The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1999).
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aggressive  virility  with  self  constraint.  Thus  Ottoman  and  Turkish  modernization
measures could never be gender neutral even when they aimed at men and women at
once, given the inherent gendering of modernity. 
This masculine ideal represented the healthy nation which had, according to Mosse,
a great continuity over time, especially in its aesthetic forms. That is significant for the
analysis of dress because it probably played a big part in producing and constructing an
appearance which corresponded to this ideal. The production of this ideal was realized
through the construction of a racialized, gendered and sexual other, in which Jewish,
black  and/or  homosexual  men  were  regarded  as  effeminate.  That  means  within  the
modern stereotype Oriental men/Ottoman men were the other of modernity per se, and
in  order  to  be  recognized  as  subjects  by  the  modern/Western/hegemonic/dominating
states, they had to counter the attribute of effeminacy. 
If aesthetics were of such importance to modern masculinity, as Mosse argued, it is
no  surprise  that  dress  was  central  to  the  Ottoman  modernization  process.  Those
representing the other of modernity also stood for the perceived sickness of the nation.
The healthy masculine ideal of modernity further explains the appearance of metaphors
like the “sick man of Europe,” which did not only hint at the precarious political situation
of  the  Ottoman  state  but  also  to  the  construction  of  modern  masculinities  through
recourse to the male body and its perceived physical condition and the way health was
constructed  through  racial  and  gendered  othering.  Mosse  further  elaborates  why
outward appearance was so importance in the construction of a male ideal of modernity.
Beauty, he says, was stressed because this male ideal reflected the enlightenment idea of
unity  of  mind  and  body.  Thus  outward  appearance  provided  information  about  the
individual's character.76
The hats in Turkish nation-building contributed to modern aesthetics in a two-fold
way, creating unity and difference at  the same time. Made compulsory for all  (male)
citizens, they contributed to nation-building by homogenizing outward appearance while
the construction of this new bourgeois self produced the above-mentioned stereotypes as
its other. In Mustafa Kemal's seven-day speech of 1927, this function of the hat becomes
obvious, as he delineates the fez and hat via well known stereotypes. He states: 
76 Ibid., 25.
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“Dear gentleman our nation has thrown off the fez off its head, which carried the
characteristics of ignorance, heedlessness, religious fanaticism and hostility against
progress and civilization, and put on the hat, which is the headgear of the entire
civilized world […].”77 
 6.2.2 Implementation of the Hat Law: Repercussions of the Hat Law beyond 
'Islamist Reaction' and 'Cheerful Adaption'
Considering the implementation of the hat law amongst the population Turkish
newspapers, historiographic and other accounts produced images of a dichotomy, a split
between unconditional excitement for the new legislation on the one hand and a harsh,
religious refusal on the other. 
Halide Edib provides an insight into the circumstances of the promulgation of the
hat law and responses to it.78 Being part of the political elite, yet intermittently persona
non grata in the establishment of the Republic, she offers a fresh and unique point of
view by carving out the political circumstances that enabled the hat law as well as her
impression on what people thought about it. She traces the circumstances that led to the
promulgation of  the hat law back to the Sheikh Sait  rebellion and the release of the
Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu (Law on the Maintenance of Order) in its aftermaths. She states
that the Sheikh Sait rebellion, which she labels as a Kurdish rebellion, had been a trump
card in the hands of those who she terms the “extremists” within the CUP who regarded
freedom of expression and thought as an obstacle to progress. Mustafa Kemal had stirred
anxieties on the possibility of more rebellions and used the atmosphere created by that to
enforce drastic political measures. Halide Edip assesses that an atmosphere of state terror
was created and used to suppress any political opposition. In addition, the speed and
harsh measures to implement the reforms specifically functioned to blur the origin of the
Kemalist reforms in the Ottoman Empire and thus produced a false picture of what the
Republican  Regime  accomplished.  Contrary  to  prevalent  depictions,  Halide  Edib
expounds,  besides  “reactionary  Islamists”,  many  other  people,  if  not  the  majority,
77 “Efendiler,  milletimizi  başında  cehil,  gaflet  ve  taassubun  ve  terakki  ve  temeddün  düşmanlığının,
alametifarikası gibi telakki olunan fesi atarak onun yerine bütün medeni alemce serpuş olarak kullanılan
şapkayı  giymek  […],”  Mustafa  Kemal Atatürk,  Nutuk/  Kemal Atatürk,  13.  basılış.,  vol.  2:  1920-1927
(İstanbul: Millî Eğitim Basımevi, 1973), 895.
78 See Halide [Adıvar] Edib, ‘Dictatorship and Reform in Turkey’,  The Yale Review, no. 19 (September
1929): 27–44.
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opposed the hat law for various reasons.  And “[a]mong all the recent measures [it even
was] […] most seriously opposed in the country itself.”79 
Hale Yılmaz assumed, in her account on everyday resistance to the hat reform, that
“economic  reasons,  often  conjuncture  with  personal,  emotional,  generational,  social,
cultural, or factors helped determine one's reaction to the new clothing regulations.”80 On
the implication of  the  hat  law Yılmaz referred  to  the reports  of  two inspectors,  one
delivered shortly after the release of the hat law and the other more than a decade later,
in  1937,  dealing with the Kurds and Turkification efforts on the part  of  the  Turkish
state.81 They show by their utterances that the dress was explicitly regarded and used as a
means for the assimilation of Kurds the under the slogan of modernization. The first
report was delivered by an inspector, Sami Efendi, who traveled to Van on the Iranian
border. He reported on the practices of the Kurdish population of rolling up their conical
hats  when  they  went  to  visit  administrative  centers.  In  1937  a  police  inspector  was
disturbed by the outer appearance of Kurds in Tokat, located in the mid Black Sea region
of Turkey, when he refers to the “un-Turkish” dress of some men he watched at a public
space close to the railway station.  He mentions concerns about Turkey's international
reputation at the sight of these men's dress. To reach a more satisfying appearance from
his point of view he suggests that at least they tuck their shirts into their pants.
Regarding the mixture of different styles,  especially of local  styles with modern
dress,  Yilmaz  draws  on  examples  from South  Eastern  Anatolia,  were  people  wore  a
mixture of  different styles and also altered between a kind of dress worn when going to
the towns and getting into contact with state officials and a more traditional dress when
being in the rural areas where they lived. According to Yilmaz this was not regarded as
opposition to the hat law but “a practical solution for all parties involved.”82 
The hat law contained no descriptions on the types of hats that were permissible.
Yet a notice of the Ministry of the Interior, referred to by Hale Yılmaz, defined melon, fötr
veya kasket (bowler, felt hat or peaked cap) as “civilized headgear.”83 Other forms such as
79 Ibid., 30.
80 Hale  Yılmaz,  Becoming  Turkish:  Nationalist  Reforms  and  Cultural  Negotiations  in  Early  Republican
Turkey, 1923-1945, First Edition., Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East (Syracuse,
New York: Syracuse University Press, c2013), 37.
81 Ibid., 29-30.
82 Ibid., 37.
83 Ibid., 36.
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the self-invented hats were prohibited. Accordingly brims added to headpieces such as
kalpaks and külahs, with a brim attached that could be folded in on occasions, and the
wearing of the brim on the side or back, were not allowed, as the Ministry of the Interior
let the provincial governors know.84 
“Uncivilized” styles of wearing hats are also documented in other accounts. The line
drawn between legitimate and illegitimate ways of donning the hat was very thin, but at
least in the beginning it seems that the boundaries between traditional and modern were
most rigidly supervised. Irfan Orga, in his autobiographical account  Portrait of Turkish
family, comments on the wearing of women's hats by men in order to avoid arrest.  This
suggests  that  the  transgression  of  gender  boundaries  through  dress  and  specifically
headgear was considered more acceptable than the deviance from what was defined as
modern. Houchang Chehabi quotes a travel book by Sir A. Telford Waugh that provides
an account  of  the implementation of  the  hat  law and the various practices involved,
reporting that many people donned hats in a way that they resembled banned headpieces
as much as possible. 
Another deviant practice was the wearing of berets and peaked cloth caps, even
though it was permissible. Mango, in his biography of Mustafa Kemal, talks about the hat
law and the appearance of peaked caps, too. He comments on the class component of
these items, and, different than other authors, he mentions their plentiful appearance in
urban  settings  where  many  people  chose  the  berets  and  peaked  caps  after  the
promulgation  of  the  hat  law.85 The  peaked  cap  amongst  others  the  designator  of
industrial proletariat, could be an item of adjustment as well as resistance. Amongst the
street sellers who could not afford any kind of the required headpieces, self-made paper
hats came into use, as striking example of the economic character of the modernizing
measures. 
A practice that was persecuted by the police harshly, at least that as it is suggested
by Irfan Orgas report, was the tying of handkerchiefs on the head underneath the hat: 
“The  old  men  took  to  tying  handkerchiefs  on  their  heads,  placing  the  offending
Christian  hat  over  this,  but  the  police  became  wise  of  this  use  and  promptly
arrested  them.  Arrested  men  were  hauled  to  the  police  stations  in  such  great
84 See Ibid., 36.
85 See Andrew Mango, Atatürk, Reprinted. (London: Murray, 2000), 437.
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numbers that they could not be dealt with and the white handkerchiefs were pulled
off the bald plates, the insulting headgear being firmly clamped over the naked,
uneasy heads.”86
The Republican regime closely linked the wearing of hats to the issue of citizenship
and subjectivation. Orhan Koloğlu recounted that people would not have treated their
causes if they tried to enter public buildings without a hat. So wearing a hat and knowing
the  rules  of  conduct  related  to  it  were  conditions  to  be  recognized  by  the  state  as
subject/citizen. 
 6.2.3 Is Modernity Secular?
Despite the fact that Kemalist elites assigned the religious to the realm of tradition,
recently a number of studies have shown that religion and Republican modernity were
not as incompatible as often assumed, and quite to the contrary were interdependent in
many aspects.
Michael  Meeker  argued,  in  his  account  on  the  Turkish  Republic,  based  on
anthropological study in the province on Trabzon, and historical study of the provincial
administrative structure of the Ottoman Empire, that the latter served to built up the
Republican political and administrative system. He assessed that “counterrevolutionary
practices  and beliefs  […]  nonetheless  served as  the  hidden devices  of  the  nationalist
revolution itself.87 Imperial institutions in the old province of Trabzon became part of the
Republican system through local elites, and local hocas and aghas become loyal subjects.
That does not mean these structures did not modernize, but rather that they evolved
along with other transformations of the state.88
Similarly did Kemal Karpat argue for the emergence of a modernist version of Islam
that differed from previous religious practice. It came along with an emerging landed
86 See Irfan Orga, Portrait of a Turkish Family (London: Eland, 1988), as quoted in Mango, Atatürk,  223.
Another reaction to the hat law was exile, see Ersin Kalkan, 'At onu kellenden diyen yaşlılarla şapkasız
sokağa çıkmam diyen torunlar,' Hürriyet Pazar (Mart 19th  2006).
87 Meeker, A Nation of Empire, Preface x1.
88 Even though I think Meeker's approach with its emphasis on structures and continuities comes along
with some problems, it nevertheless helps to question assumptions of the dichotomy between tradition
and  modernity  and  the  way  provincial  society  was  involved  in  modernization.  However,  the
significance  of  notions  like  “imperial  discipline”  as  a  continuum  in  power  relations  and  the
“interpersonal associations” as its basis remain open questions.
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middle class that used the emerging public space to model populist Islam to its needs.
Karpat attributes this to the Ottoman Empire's unique position in relation to the colonial
powers  and  an  independent  Muslim  state.  Kemal  thus  points  out  the  historicity  of
religious identity and its blending with modern secular identity. Crucial here is also the
discourse of 'the West and the Rest' that is produced by and referred to religious as well
as  secularizing  movements.  Cemil  Aydin  encapsulate  it  in  his  comment  on  the
Republican elite's and its Islamist opposition towards the West: 
“It is clear that neither was the self-consciously pro-Western Republican elite simply
imitating the higher Western model, nor similarly was the self-consciously anti-
Western  Islamist  opposition  simply  a  reactionary  rejection  in  terms  of  its
assessment of Western civilization. Both camps produced occidentalist discourse of
the West to formulate and legitimate their domestic reform agendas.”89
With those in mind the protests against the hat law, as they place in some Eastern
provinces of Turkey need to be reconsidered. Already Garvin D. Brockett carved out the
multiple dimension of these protests and framed them as popular resistance. 90 Instead of
terming resistance to the hat law as anti-modern, Camilla Nereid defines four different
types  of  modernity  in  relation  to  the  Kemalist  approach  that  take  different  stances
towards the relation of dress and modernity.91 Nereid differentiates between
1) “Modernization equals Westernization equals Kemalism statement,” that is the
position as it appears in Mustafa Kemal's talks treated above, where civilization is defined
as exclusively and singularly western or European, to which assimilation was deemed
necessary.
2)  The  “Modernization  equals  democratization  and  thus  differs  from  Kemalism
89 Cemil Aydın, ‘Between Occidentalism and the Global Left: Islamist Critiques of the West in Turkey’,
Comparative Studies in South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East: Special Issue on Sex, Gender, and Family
Structure 26, no. 3 (2006), 452.
90 see Gavin S. Brockett, ‘Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution: Towards a Framework for the
Social History of the Atatürk Era, 1923-38’, in  Turkey before and after Atatürk: Internal and External
Affairs, ed. Sylvia Kedourie, Middle Eastern Studies. - Abingdon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 1964- ;
34.1998,4,  Special  Issue  (London:  Cass,  1998),  44–66. On  other  accounts  of  the  protest  and  the
persecution of political opposition by means of the hat law and the Independence Tribunals see Mete
Tunçay,  Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması  (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2005); and
Ahmet Turan Alkan, İstiklal Mahkemeleri ve Sivas’ta Şapka Inkılabı, Ötüken Yayın : Kültür Serisi ; 897
471 (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2011). 
91 See Camilla T. Nereid, ‘Kemalism on the Catwalk: The Turkish Hat Law of 1925’,  Journal of Social
History 44, no. 3 (2011), doi:10.1353/jsh.2011.0003, 709.
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argument” as exemplified by Nereid by the parliamentarian debate initiated by Nureddin
Paşa.92 Nereid grounds her arguments on the modernist reasoning of Nureddin Paşa, who
appeals to civil rights and liberties guarantied in the Turkish constitution.93
3) The “Modernization equals secularization argument” that is very close to the first
definition, and the mental map of Kemalism that divided Islam and the Kemalist project
along a timeline.94
4)  Within  the  “Modernization  does  not  equal  Westernization  thus  differs  from
Kemalism  argument”  Nereid  recognizes  “modernizing  agents  within  the  Islamic
establishment, whose modernist principles were something other than Westernization”95.
She  considers  İskipli  Atıf  Hoca  as  representative  of  this  group,  whom  she  terms  a
“renowned Islamic intellectual scholar”.96 In Nereid's opinion, the Kemalists disliked Atıf
and opposed him because he was “a carrier of continuity from the Ottoman Empire.”97
5) Within the “Modernization equals Westernization thus differs from Kemalism
argument” Nereid locates a group she terms “urban intellectuals, who argued against
superficial Western mimicry.”98 She considers the novelist Sadri Ertem as a representative
of these urban intellectuals who built a counterpart to the Muslim establishment. She
depicts  Ertem  as  an  advocate  of  the  position  that  saw  Western  mimicry  as  the
internalization of inferiority and Westernization as a matter of attitude or rather than
style.  As an essayist and columnist Ertem “engaged in the discussions around Turkish
identity in the post-Ottoman era.”99 He argued for the modernization of Turkish identity
but not necessarily in the Kemalist manner. In the context of the Sheik Said rebellion he
was  charged  by  the  Independence  Tribunals,  but  acquitted  later  and  continued  his
activities  as  a writer,  becoming one of  the  “most  influential  representatives  of  social
realism in Turkey.”100 In two of his writings Ertem particularly dealt with the matter of
headgear: “European Hats: The villager with a top hat.”101. Nereid reads Ertem’s fictional
92 On the debate see TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi / Büyük Millet Meclisi, 1920-1946 (Ankara: TBMM Matbaası,
1920), November 25th 1925, 1. period, vol. 19, 221-229.
93 Nereid, ‘Kemalism on the Catwalk,’ 714 and Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi: TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi / Büyük
Millet Meclisi, 1920-1946, November 25th 1925, 1. period, vol. 19, 222.
94 Nereid, ‘Kemalism on the Catwalk,’ 715.
95 Ibid., 716.
96 Ibid., 707.
97 Ibid., 717.
98 Ibid., 718.
99 Ibid., 718.
100 Ibid., 718.
101 Avrupa Kafası;  Silindir  Şapka giyen köylü.  It  had been published in the newspaper  Vakit in 1920:  ,
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account as political statements on Turkish society. In a period of rigid press censorship
this was a way to express criticism. In Avrupa Kafası Ertem elaborated on the relation of
attitude and outward appearance in relation to Turkish republican politics of dress. In the
known dualist manner he contrasts the European Turkish man to the one with oriental
appearance. “Ertem thus uses masculine appearance and manner as a means to depict
several pairs of dualistic concepts, such as educated versus ignorant, theocratic versus
democracy,  yesterday  versus  today,  and  top  hat  versus  turban.”102 But  then  he
differentiates  between  those  who  just  appear  as  Europeans  and  those  who  have
internalized Europeaness or European values. Ertem does not divide between material
and mental culture, both come along with each other.103
Neireid  concludes  that  the  existence  of  diverse  modernizing  agents  that  were
considered or considered themselves as legitimating their arguments or actions through
religion and were considered by the Kemalist elite as traditional, Muslim oriental Other,
prevented an essentialist  reading of  Islam.104 I  will  further pursue to what extent the
conception of different types of modernity served to deconstruct certain implications of
the modern versus tradition binary, but what it definitely does is situate certain agents
within the discourse of modernity and thereby alter assumptions neglecting religion as
part of modernizing movements. That is also underlined by Brian Silverstein's study on
Sufism and modernity, where he concludes that “[...] some of the important groundwork
for the eventual secularization of the state in the republic was laid by debates among
Islamic scholars and Sufi sheikhs like the ones examined in this article.”105
Ibrahim  Kaya  elaborated  on  the  modern  character  of  Islamism,  which  opposes
modernity but nevertheless adopts many of its features.106 He also draws on the concept
of  multiple  modernities  and  argues  that  the  West  is  not  necessarily  congruent  or
equivalent with modernity. There are modernities, in Kaya's view, that did not adopt
“Avrupa Kafası” (The European Mentality),  Vakit  (August 8th, 1929); and  Sadri Etem Ertem,  Silindir
Şapka Giyen Köylü: Küçük Hikayeler (s.l.: İstiklal Lisesi, 1933).
102 Nereid, ‘Kemalism on the Catwalk,’ 719.
103 See Ibid., 720.
104 Ibid.,  724.  See  also   İsmail  Kara,  Türkiye’de  İslâmcılık  Düşüncesi:  Metinler,  Kişiler,  2.  aufl.,  Risale
Yayınları [Risale Yayınları / Büyük Eserler Dizisi] . - Cağaloğlu, İstanbul : Risale, 1986- 1 (Cağaloğlu,
İstanbul: Risale, 1987).
105 Brian Silverstein, ‘Sufism and Governmentality in the Late Ottoman Empire’,  Comparative Studies of
South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 29, no. 2 (30 August 2013), 175.
106 See  Ibrahim Kaya,  Social Theory and Later Modernities: The Turkish Experience, Studies in Social and
Political Thought 9 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2004).
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Western civilization.107 Yet he completely neglects the influence of the European colonial
endeavor to the emergence of modernity in the Ottoman Empire, considering Ottoman
and Turkish modernity as well as Ottoman and Turkish Islam as a specific kind of its
own. The conditions of Turkish modernity could rather be found, Kaya argues, in the
specific quality of Ottoman society, culture and polity as located on the margins of the
East as well as of the West. For him a specific aspect of Turkish modernization was the
emphasis  on gender  equality  from its  beginning,  lacking in  Western Europe modern
societies. As an example he mentions the early introduction of women's suffrage and
opening of universities for women.108 
Kaya considers Islamism as a distinct modernity because it denies liberalism. But
what about fascism or other forms of Western European modernities that deny liberalism
as well? Kaya has a somewhat essentialist perception of culture that adds its specifies to
respective modernisms which are confined to national boundaries, thus operating within
methodological  nationalism.  Kaya  also  reinforces  the  binary  of  the  Orient  versus
Occident,  but  attributes  liberal  democracy  exclusively  to  the  presumed  West  as  an
ostensible  homogenenous entity.  Nevertheless,  at  the  same time Kaya points  out  the
contingent character of culture and civilization and opposes perceptions of the clash of
civilization, such as expressed by Huntington, who constructs Islam as the Other of the
modern  West.  By  way  of  de-essentializing  civilization,  Kaya  essentializes  culture,  in
which he divides presumed civilizations into a number of distinct cultures.109 
In the end Kaya's analysis of Kemalism provides a differentiated view that does not
necessarily need his differentiation of different models of modernity: 
“Thus,  Kemalism  reflects,  first  of  all,  that  a  project  of  modernity  means  the
disciplining of the population. However, Kemalism cannot be conceived simply as a
disciplining  project,  because  it  was  also  a  liberating  movement.  The  tenets  of
secularism,  republicanism,  populism,  revolutionism  and  nationalism  were
important for the sake of liberty.”110 
The last part of this quote is rather Kemalist in nature, counting the self-proclaimed
107 See i.e. ibid., 138.
108 Ibid.
109 See Ibid., 144.
110 Ibid., 147.
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basis of the Kemalist reforms. However this again is not specific to Kemalism, but again
refers to the ambivalences of modernity itself, which claims to be universally liberating,
but often acts or appears to be the contrary.
Alev  Çınar  as  well  underlined  the  nexus,  as  well  as  the  parallels  of  secularist
modernity and Islamic movements.  The latter's  intervention in the public sphere had
“subversive effects on secularist modes of power and control,”111 she argues, but could
become themselves  part  of  modernizing project  that  sought  power  and  control  with
similar implications. Umut Azak pointed out that secularizing measures were neither an
invention  of  the  Republican  Regime  nor  unique  to  European Christian  contexts,  but
could be traced back to the advent of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. These
secularizing  reforms  were  conducted  while  “Islam  continued  to  be  the  legitimizing
framework  even  for  modernizing  reforms.”112 This  legitimizing  function  of  Islam,
however,  was  not  contrary  to  these  measures.  Azak  delineated  the  materialist  and
positivist  stance  of  the  new  Western  educated  “intelligentsia'”  which  followed  the
generation of the Young Ottomans and their attitude towards religion, such as Beşir Fuat,
Celal  Nuri,  Ahmed  Rıza.  Ahmed  Rıza  and  others,  she  argues,  reconciled  Islam with
modern ideas.113 
One  major  point  was  that  Islam  remained  a  major  factor  in  the  definition  of
Turkishness  even  though  Islam  lost  its  status  as  official  religion  codified  in  the
constitution. But it needs to be emphasized that this took place after a long period of
Islamification and Turkification politics of the population turned hegemonic structures
into demographic realities. 
This  is  also of  importance concerning the redefinition of  the hat  as an item of
national identity in the Republic. Due to the disappearance of large proportions of non-
Muslims  from  the  former  lands  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  by  measures  of  social
engineering, forced migration and genocide, a redefinition of symbols was enabled. With
the decreasing number of non-Muslims the European hat could be appropriated as an
item of Turkish identity and even be used for Turkification measures. Norton in his essay
on 'Faith and Fashion' in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey mentions that after the release
111 Alev Çınar,  Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time (Minnesota: Univ. of
Minnesota Press, 2005), 30.
112 Umut Azak, Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Kemalism, Religion and the Nation State (London [et al.]:
Tauris, 2010), 3.
113 See Ibid., 5-6.
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of the hat law, people entered a hat shop abandoned by an Armenian, who had been
deported in 1915, in order to supply themselves with the required hats.114 I think that is a
striking  example  of  how  deportations  and  genocide  contributed  to  Turkish  nation-
building.  Dispossession  here  took  place  on  different  levels,  that  of  the  material  and
symbol level, of properties and commodities. The latter became extraordinarily valuable
at that historical moment of the introduction of the European hat. The extinction of the
Other within made it possible to become part of the European Other. 
Concerning the critics of the wearing of the hat, as they appeared in the periodical
Sebilürreşad, it already became apparent that they based their arguments on modernist
discourses such as function and hygiene, and at the same time the broad range of the
authors of this periodical, according to Esther Debus, opposed secularism, Westernization
and constitutionalism.115
These references to hygiene and function indicate the importance of the body and
bodily practices in the discourse on appropriate headgear. That is also implied in the
question of religious practice, the impracticability of prayer ritual with the brimmed hat
and  the  issue  of  taklid,  of  imitation,  assimilation  or  mimicry,  which  implied  the
possibility  of  becoming  the  assumed  Other,  not  just  in  appearance  but  in  a  more
encompassing pervasive sense. 
Talal Asad connects the analyses of secularism, his anthropology of secularism, to
the analyses of embodied practices, by drawing on the notion of habitus as first defined
by Mauss and later elaborated by Bourdieu. Thus secularization’s impact went beyond
the  surface,  and  altered  religious  practices  and  the  body  itself. 116 Thereby  a
“straightforward  narrative  of  progress  form the  religious  to  the  secular  is  no  longer
acceptable,”117 since within the modern nation state “categories of ‘politics’ and ‘religion’
turn out to implicate each other more profoundly than we thought.”118
Asad argues that secularization does not necessarily mean an emancipation from
114 John Norton,  ‘Faith and Fashion in Turkey’,  in  Languages of  Dress  in  the  Middle  East  (Richmond,
Surrey: Curzon, 1997), 161.
115 Esther Debus,  Sebilürreşâd: Eine vergleichende Untersuchung zur islamischen Opposition der vor- und
nachkemalistischen  Ära,  [Europäische  Hochschulschriften  /  3]  Europäische  Hochschulschriften.
(Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1991); On these Muslim intellectuals see also Ismael Kara,  ‘Turban and Fez:
Ulema as Opposition’, in  Late Ottoman Society -The Intellectual Legacy, ed. Elisabeth Özdalga, SOAS
RoutledgeCurzon Studies on the Middle East; 3 (London [u.a.]: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 162–200.
116 See Asad, Formations of the Secular.
117 Ibid., 1.
118 Ibid., 200.
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religion.119 Differences between the secularist and the Islamist projects might derive from
the latter's claim to regulate conduct in accordance with religious principles,  and the
secular nationalist project derives its guidelines from a different source, be it bourgeois
or national cultural, whereas the latter might overlap to a great extent to that of religion,
I would argue.120 
Asad refers to the Egyptian discussion of  taklid and the practice of  fiqh,  Islamic
jurisprudence, that involved a reform of the Sharia as a practice of secularization. He
thereby contrasts ictihad to taklid, the former as legal reasoning about disagreements and
the latter as “unreflective reproduction of tradition.” That provides the discussion of the
secular versus religion discussion in the context of the hat law with another dimension,
and lets me conclude that taklid is not confined to any political faction but that it takes
place  all  the  time.  Especially  the  definition  of  uncritical  reproduction  of  traditional
practices does not confine taklid to the copying of the alleged Other, but includes every
kind of practice.121 Asad points out that a certain civilizing mission, set within a modern
paradigm, was shared by Islamists and secularists alike, and that is also suggested by the
recurrent  embedding  of  treatises  on  headgear  in  discourses  of  hygiene  and
functionality.122
The concept of mimicry as becoming the Western colonizer has been discussed
extensively in postcolonial literature. In the context of the hat law, and previous Ottoman
discourses  on  modernization,  it  is  desired  to  the  same  extent  as  it  is  was  despised.
Arguments oscillate between the advantages of the appropriation of modern techniques
of power to warnings of submission to European or Western hegemony. 
Beyond  the  discussion  of  submission  or  assimilation  Homi  Bhabha  considered
mimicry, even though or precisely because it was an instrument of colonial rule, 123 as a
form of resistance to colonialist hegemony or rule. A basic element of it was ridicule or
parody. It can be exemplified by the praxis of donning women's hats by men in order to
119 See Ibid., 191.
120 See Ibid., 196.
121 See Ibid.,  219.  On  taklid as  religious conversion through the change of dress  see also İrvin Cemil
Schick's account on Middle Eastern and Islamic Laws of differentiation, talking also about practices of
conversion.  İrvin Cemil  Schick,  ‘Laws of  Differentiation’,  in  Berg Encyclopedia  of  World Dress  and
Fashion, ed. Joanne B. Eicher and Gillian Vogelsang-Eastwood, vol. 5 (Oxford [u.a.]: Berg, 2010), 449–
55; and  İrvin Cemil Schick, ‘Sumptuary Laws’, in  Berg Encyclopedia of World Dress and Fashion, ed.
Joanne B. Eicher and Gillian Vogelsang-Eastwood, vol. 5 (Oxford [u.a.]: Berg, 2010), 465–461.
122 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 253.
123 How does this relate to the maintenance of difference of colonialist policies?
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comply to the hat law. By Irfa Organ considered as submission to the hat law it could
also be regarded as a form of resistance, by formally adapting to the rule, nevertheless
having a subversive effect,  such as the transgression of bourgeois gender norms that
came along with  highly dichotomized forms of dress.
Homi Bhabha, from a deconstructive perspective, takes up the question of identity
building within a colonialist setting to argue against the usefulness of the concept of the
West at all to explain and to analyze the phenomenon's relation to modernity. Certainly
the figure of the West cannot be completely ignored since it is so prominent in countless
approaches  to  modernization.  But  it  needs  to  be  seriously  questioned  if  accounts  of
assumed Westernization are helpful at all to explain these phenomena.
In the following I want to relate Bhabha's notion of mimicry to the phenomena
discussed throughout this study and specifically to discussions and discursive formations
arising from the foundation of the Turkish Republic and the proclamation of the hat law. 
Mimicry for Bhabha was at once a colonialist strategy of assimiliation124 and a form
of  resistance  against  colonialist  power.  The  subversive  potential  arises  from  a
performative conception of identity, potentially reversesing discriminatory practice. That
makes mimicry an ambivalent phenomenon. One of Bhabha's definitions goes as follows: 
“[C]olonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed recognizable Other, as a subject of
difference, that is almost the same but not quite. Which is to say the discourse of
mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry
must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference.”125
For the concept of mimicry it is important to note that the identity of the colonizer
is  no  preexisting  entity,  an  original  that  can  be  copied.  But  is  itself  (re-)contructed
performatively in a  non-identical  manner.  Bhabha considered the  flawed copies  as  a
subversion  of  colonialist  power  because  it  reveals  the  character  of  identity  as  non-
essentialist,  revealing  the  performative  character  of  identity.  And  the  colonialist
discussion about mimicry reveals the ambivalence of the colonial discourse that entails
the  preservation  of  difference,  and  with  it  colonial  hierarchy,  at  the  same  time  it
comprises  and  draws  on  enlightenment  and  humanism  and  its  supposed  equality,
124 Homi K. Bhabha, ‘Of Mimicry and Man : The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse’, in The Location of
Culture (London [u.a.]: Routledge, 1994), 85.
125 Ibid., 86.
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nonetheless  undermining  the  material  effects  of  colonialism  and  producing  sharp
distinctions.  The colonial  hierarchy between “the West and the Rest” is  produced by
discourses  that  want  the  colonized  alike  but  not  identical.126 The  ambivalence  of
colonialist discourse is that difference is at once disavowed and claimed:127 “The menace
of mimicry is its double vision, which in disclosing the ambivalence of colonial discourse
also disrupts its authority.”128 
126 David Huddart, Homi K. Bhabha, Repr., Routledge Critical Thinkers (London [u.a.]: Routledge, 2007), 59.
127 Bhabha, ‘Of Mimicry and Man : The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse,’ 91.
128 Ibid., 88.
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Communities of Fashion
In my study, I demonstrated that the late Ottoman politics of dress and discourses
on the modernization of dress were entangled with the nascent globalization of modern
male  attire  and its  implications regarding gender,  race  and class.  I  assumed that  the
politics of dress and related practices would reveal further insights into the formation of
modern identity, on the one hand, and about techniques of modernity at large, on the
other. And I assumed that seen in a wider frame from a postcolonial perspective would
allow to  critically  interrogate  binary  oppositions  between  'the  West  and  the  Rest',
especially with regard to the Ottoman realm's role in the making of the West through
cultural practices, socio-economic conditions and modernization discourse. In order to
accomplish this, Ottoman modernization needed to be reconsidered in the light of these
presumptions.  I  argued  that  the  politics  of  dress  scrutinized  here  were  part  of  the
emergence of  an Ottoman bourgeois  culture and that,  beyond the global  dimensions,
internal Ottoman dynamics that conditioned the emergence of an Ottoman middle class
must be considered in order to properly understand Ottoman modernization in the global
context.  That  enables  to  challenge  accounts  which  regard  Ottoman  modernity  as
implemented from “outside,”  as dictated by western European powers,  and from this
perspective, the Ottoman Empire rightly becomes a modernizing force itself. 
The introduction of the fez as a uniform headpiece, in the military and civil sphere,
needs to be viewed against this background. The fez is often considered an expression of
a failed modernization and failed resistance against European imperialist domination, yet
as I  have demonstrated, its  meaning was rather multi-dimensional,  and it  very much
contributed  to  the  construction  of  modernity.  The  fez  was  as  at  least  as  much  an
Ottoman as it was a modern feature, and it contributed to the construction of modern
bourgeois male identity to a great extent in its resemblance yet difference from the top
hat. Even though an Ottoman feature, left out its use in other Muslim countries for now,
the  fez needs  also  be  considered  in  relation  to  efforts  to  nationalize  dress  in  many
modernizing contexts, be it in Western Europe or many other places around the globe.
Thus, one of my main insights is the close interrelation between the creation of modern,
sober bourgeois male looks and the fashioning of nationalism.  
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The  incidences  concerning  headgear  that  emerged  as  clashes/conflicts  between
Ottomanism and ethnically-connoted nationalisms were thereby part of the negotiation
of these identities, between the particularity of parochial constructions of identity and
universal  concepts  of  modern  identity.  The  appearance  of  separatist  movements,
especially after  the Ottoman-Russian War 1877-78,  did not  mean the obsolescence of
Ottomanism or  its  vanishing,  but  rather  were part  and parcel  of  the  construction of
modern  identity.  The  interventions  of  the  central  state  and  local  authorities  and
administrations  concerning  headgear  were  part  of  the  implementation  of  modern
governmentality  that  was  conjured  also  due  to  the  legitimacy  crisis,  as  it  has  been
assessed  by  Selim  Deringil,  during  the  Hamidian  period,  that  was  rectified  by  the
establishment of a normative order and appeals to its adherence, facilitating governing
through the production of modern subjects. This entailed the endeavors of strengthening
Ottoman identity to counter the precarious situation at  its  borders and threats to its
sovereignty. Thus, the Ottoman government and administration, in sharp contrast to pre-
Mahmudian approach, aspired to a similar appearance of male subjects of the Empire in
conformity with Ottoman modern standards. That meant in most cases to enforce the
wearing  of  the  fez,  especially  in  situations  and  spaces  that  were  considered  as
threatening to Ottoman sovereignty, such as European economic activities in the Empire,
precarious borderlands and foreign and missionary schools. The decree, issued in 1894,
on the obligatory wearing of the fez for all Ottoman subjects/citizens shows that, at least
where  the  fez  was  concerned,  the  inclusion of  the  wider  (male)  population into  the
modern dress reform was desired. This did not concern other pieces of modern bourgeois
dress, as far my research indicates. 
The cases that took place in the borderlands in the Balkans and the Aegean show
the reciprocal history of center and periphery, between the European imperial centers
and its  colonial  and  imperial  peripheries,  through interactions  between the  Ottoman
government, provincial state officials, locals agents, central European and local powers.
That also implies the reciprocal history of the national and the transnational, conditioned
by global  capitalism,  modernity,  colonialism and imperialism.  Certain pieces of dress,
such as the headpieces here, were an expedient means to constitute and negotiate these
relations.
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Another  question  is  that  of  the  different  character  of  supposedly  Eastern  and
Western dress. Studies have proved the complexity of this issue, be it Jirousek's study on
the adoption of  Eastern styles in Western Europe from an early time, as well  as the
modern features of supposedly “national” dress in the period I scrutinized. While for the
Ottoman  Empire  a  development  of  looser  body-concealing  dress  to  the  comparably
tighter European dress can be discerned, in Europe, very tight body-revealing clothes
became replaced by late nineteenth century clothing; the implications for embodiment
and the way the body was conceptualized requires further elaboration. Contemporary
works must begin from the premise that perceived boundaries between East and West
were permeable and contingent, as were citizens’ identities.
As for the appropriation of Western European dress in the colonial  context,  its
double  function  of  discipline  and  resistance  needs  to  be  noted.  While  it  could  be
perceived as subordination to colonial  domination, it  was also a sign of  resistance,  a
claim  for  equal  status.  When  supposed  national  specific  dress  was  “invented”  or
employed for the construction of national identity, it must be considered that these often
also had the function to produce modern uniformity in appearance, and bringing about
normative implications that induced modernity. 
All this took place in relation to the globalization of bourgeois male dress, as it
appeared in the centers of modern fashion such as Paris or by producers in Britain. It
became apparent that headgear was used as a sign of distinction to the same degree it
expressed uniformity. It was an outstanding marker of identity, not just in the Ottoman
context. As manifested in the appearance of the sola topi it was also used to distinguish
Western  European  colonizers  from  local  populations  who  themselves  had  adopted
modern bourgeois dress to such a degree that it could not be used anymore to maintain
the requisite regime of colonialist distinction. Thus, headgear became a means of politics
in many senses; it was used to construct body politics as male, healthy, modern, as well
as sovereign. Modern male dress, and specifically headgear, marked the boundaries of
bourgeois bodies as it marked to boundaries of states seeking national independence. It
affirmed European claims to superiority to the same degree as it challenged them. Yet,
the employment of nationalism was not just a means to counter colonialist claims; it was
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also a means to reconstruct masculinity in many respects, in face of the perceived threats
to it by modernity. This is why the dandy, in his cosmopolitan attitude, in the Ottoman
as well as in other colonial contexts, had a double function, as he embodied the threat to
male  power  exerted  by  modernity  as  well  as  by  colonialism,  both  understood  as
emasculation. Thus, colonialist domination and imperialist threat could be countered by a
double  strategy:  One  was  the  appropriation  of  modern  bourgeois  dress,  the  other
sartorial nationalism. Yet these two were not mutually exclusive, but always appeared
not just side side by side but were inseparable, in constant reciprocal relation.
I have pointed out how late nineteenth century discourse on dress globally dealt
with the problematic relation of the male body and modernity induced by the dialectical
character  of  modernity  itself.  Within  this  ambivalence,  modernity  was  perceived  as
effeminacy of male identity and thus masculinity appeared in almost permanent crisis,
and thus many endeavors were undertaken to ameliorate this perceived loss. Measures to
stabilize masculinity, such as by fashioning nationalist appearance, were at the same time
perceived as destabilizing, once attributed a modernizing characteristic such as uniform
appearance and modern shapes. The discourse on modern male dress was embedded in
the  ambivalent  relation  of  modernity  with  masculinity  that  determined  male
fashionability as a condition of modern male identity as well as emasculation at the same
time. This paradoxical relation to male fashion became expressed in the figure of the
dandy who was very vivid in many modernizing bourgeois environments. In the colonial
and semi-colonial contexts it attained a specific meaning of subordination to European
colonial  and  imperial  domination,  and  thus  modern  colonial  masculinity  appeared
especially precarious. 
The dichotomy of progress and decline was endemic to the double logic of modern
civilization. Related to masculinity, this meant that modernity simultaneously reinforced
and destabilized representations of masculinity, as Christopher Forth argued. Thus the
perceived  loss  of  masculinity  was  not  specific  to  Ottoman  modernity  nor  to  other
colonial or semi-colonial context but stood in close relation to the perceived loss of the
virile  male body in modernization contexts globally.  Dress was not just  employed to
counter imperialist dominance but always had the component of the restoration of the
male dominance and the male body as  the center  of  power.  Dress was so important
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because the crisis metaphorically pointed to the body to-be-restored by the means of
dress, while headgear linked the mind to the body and thus had an overexposed position
in many senses. The Ottoman dandy, even though perceived as submitting to European
hegemony, actually countered colonialist hierarchies at same time as he dealt with the
ambiguities of modern masculinity. 
For subsequent studies,  it  would be valuable to trace the different positions the
dandy figure inhabited throughout time and space, to trace shifts in its social position,
such as put forward by Berna Moran and Nurdan Gürbilek, who argued that the dandy's
social recognition fundamentally changed after 1914, at least as it can be traced through
Ottoman/Turkish literature, as it  changed from that of a victim of imperialism to the
employment  of  his  'super-modern'  identity  for  its  own profit.  A  question  of  further
research might be, if this can be traced in journalistic literary genres as well as in the
politics  of  dress,  how  can  be  traced  through  additional  sources?  Here  follows  the
question, how the Republican hat law and its related discourse of dress and masculinity
relate to this process. Can the Republican politics of dress be considered an expression of
the hegemonic character of the dandy? I have also shown, with reference to Gürbilek and
other authors, the close interrelation of the dandy figure to the search of and desire for
national authenticity. The search for an original self always fails,  due to a lack of an
authentic original self, ending either with the appearance of a dandy figure that is too
modern or some kind of parochial identity, assumed to represent national identity that is
not  modern  enough.  This  is  evident  in  related  incidences  in  the  Ottoman Bulgarian
borderlands and other spaces to the literary phenomenon of the urban dandy as two sides
of the same coin. This is why the derogative image of the dandy, in contrast to its more
positive image in the early nineteenth century, appeared with a strengthening of national
movements  of  the  late  nineteenth  century.  This  is  the  very  same  dichotomy  as  it
appeared in the costume album  Les Costume Populaire  by Osman Hamdi Bey and de
Launay  and  their  endeavor  to  sponsor  an  alternative  Ottoman  modernity,  whereas
Osman Hamdi Bey was far from epitomizing his own concept himself. The album thus
was the expression of a desire for national authenticity and mourning of its loss and the
impossibility of its realization before it ever had existed. The desire for real and authentic
national identity was central to the mourning of the loss of virile masculinity that was
embodied by the supposed authentic origins of modern national identity. And here the
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notion of imitation into play, and its centrality becomes visible, because the mourning of
the loss of authenticity always implied the accusation of fluffy imitation, the failure to be
authentically modern or national. Thus, the dandy becomes the epitome of the modern
figure, as he embodied this failure. Also in terms of class, the dandy was emblematic of a
type who pretended to be someone he wasn't and thus again embodied failure: a type
who aspired to higher social status, either someone of the lower classes who imitated
bourgeois identity, or a bourgeois who imitated aristocratic styles. These facets of the
dandy  make  clear  that  despite  its  ridicule,  it  had  a  paramount  position  in  modern
discourse. 
This dualism between the national authentic and bourgeois, between modern and
traditional,  yet  appeared  not  unequivocal  and  was  interpreted  in  manifold  ways  by
contemporaries. Through Palmira Brummett's analysis it became apparent that after the
Young Turk coup d'etat in 1908 the press treated the appropriation of modern Western
styles ambivalently, also honoring the elevation of social status it brought about, next to
its  aspects  of  subordination and dishonor in the imperialist  setting.  Dress considered
traditional or national, correspondingly, was perceived as resistance to imperial power as
well as signs of reactionism and conservatism. One of the major fields were the dualism
between modern and traditional was played out was indeed during the fez boycott of
1908, which inspired extensive discussions on Ottoman national authenticity. Authors
commented on the boycott and took sides either for or against it, and thereby argued for
or  against  the  use  of  respective  headgear,  doing  this  also  on  the  basis  of  national
authenticity,  whereby  their  favored  piece  was  imagined  to  represent  these  traits  of
authenticity.  Coupled  with  modernist  arguments  about  functionality  and  hygiene  it
becomes clear that the national could not exist without the modern.
Striking for the Ottoman satirical press, at least for the period after the Young Turk
coup, is the frequent and prominent appearance of enormous women's hats/ Ottoman
women with enormous decorated hats in contrast to the lack of depiction of men with
brimmed European hats. That is also a subject that need further study by comparing a
huge variety of Ottoman satirical publications and their depictions of headgear as well as
study of  the  meaning of  women's  hats  in contrast  to men's hats,  as well  as possible
common features. That also includes interventions of Ottoman authorities to women's as
well as men's dress set in relation to these journalistic treatment of the issue. 
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Further study of late Ottoman dress might include state archival resources that deal
with other pieces of dress besides headgear. In that regard, what struck me from the
selection of sources which I viewed that dealt with general dress was that most of them
addressed  what  can  be  considered  regional,  ethnic,  national  types  of  dress,  and  the
unauthorized appropriation of them by other groups (tebdil-i kiyafet), a scrutiny of which
might  reveal  more  about  the  discussion  of  mimicry  and  its  relation  to  a  variety  of
discourses relating to the politics of dress.
Regarding  the  fez  boycott,  it  is  important  to  note  that  proponents  as  well  as
opponents of the boycott  made their  judgments in relation to the European gaze,  by
taking,  next  to  other  arguments,  international  standards  and  Ottoman  international
reputation into account. Another aspect is an emphasis on uniformity, which appears in
the  writings  of  a  number  of  authors,  interestingly  often  from opponents  of  the  fez
boycott, who saw in the appearance of the huge variety of headpieces a threat to social
order. Those authors who praised the “carnival” appearance, as it was termed, recall de
Launay's  and Hamid Beys vision of  unity in diversity as a characteristic  of  Ottoman
identity.
Concerning the different headpieces, it becomes obvious that their meaning was
fluid  and under constant negotiation. That becomes especially apparent in the case of
the kalpak, which initially just appears as a marker of Bulgarian national belonging, but
which then became part of Ottoman military uniform in the early twentieth century,
indicating  Turkish  Muslim  or  Ottoman  Muslim  nationalism  during  the  War  of
Independence (a  period that  could not  be  treated here),  and later  disappears  only to
remain a nostalgic point of reference to national(-ist) glory.1
The wearing of brimmed hats by children of men, who (formerly) occupied exalted
social  positions is  another  example  of  how modern identity  was negotiated  between
bourgeois  universalist  standards  and  national  belonging.  The  fear  of  these  practices
spreading  specifically  among  the  Muslim  population  shows  that  even  though  these
practices  were  marginal,  they  should  be  considered  as  some  efforts,  as  far  as  the
1 The central Asian reference of the kalpak, as the origin of the kalpak itself as well as the “Turkish
people,” probably is relevant here, even though not discussed in any of my sources, besides the case of
the forest scribe Mehmed Efendi, who claims to have donned a Kasghar kalpak. The relation of the
growing popularity of the kalpak as marker of Ottomanism in relation to immigration of Muslims from
the Russian Empire needs to be considered.
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interference of the Ministry of the Interior, which were exerted to marginalize them and
keep  them  marginalized,  while  others  regarded  them  as  compatible  with  Ottoman
identity.  The  appearance  of  these  incidences  in  prominent  public  spaces  once  more
demonstrate the significance of space in the negotiation of social relations, as well as the
meaning of dress as a spatial practice. Also these cases could be further scrutinized in
relation to discussions about dress and identity taking place during summer 1910 that
might be found in the Ottoman press, that might have even been reported about and
reflected on these incidences or on the wearing of hats by Ottoman children in general.
Another  ambivalent  relation  within  modern  discourse  that  appears  in  these
contexts is the question of gender equality and gender relations. While on the one hand,
modern bourgeois dress was employed to establish hierarchies among men along the
lines of class and race, also in relation to female dress and women's social position, dress
was  involved  in  renegotiations  of  hierarchies.  Ottoman  reformers  argued  for  more
gender  equality,  while  claims  for  gender  equality  implied  in  modernization  were
simultaneously conceived as a threat to masculinity, and thus the politics of dress sought
to reestablish and strengthen gender binaries.2 On the one hand progress was understood
as a leveling of gender hierarchies,  while this  leveling was at  the same considered a
threat to progress. Thus, modern dress was employed to (re-)establish these binaries. I
was asking myself how Ottoman politics of dress were related to gender, and what the
discourse  on  headgear  might  reveal  about  the  negotiation  of  gender  in  context  of
modernization. While Mustafa Kemal,  in his talks on dress and the hat,  connects the
modernization of dress to the institution of the modern family, my other sources mostly
do not speak so explicitly about gender relations. Yet, we have seen that modern dress
very much relates to the construction of space, at home and outside of the house, that in
2 Much has already been said about the ambivalent relation of Ottoman and Turkish modernization,
gender  and  feminism,  to  name  just  a  view:  Deniz  Kandiyoti,  ed.,  Women,  Islam  and  the  State
(Basingstoke,  Hampshire  [u.a.]:  Macmillan,  1991);  Deniz  Kandiyoti,  ‘Some Awkward  Questions  on
Women and Modernity in Turkey’, in Remaking Women : Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East,
ed.  Lila  Abu-Lughod (Princeton,  N.J:  Princeton University Press,  1998),  270–88;  Zehra F.  Arat,  ed.,
Deconstructing  Images  Of  ‘the  Turkish  Woman’  (Baringstoke,  Hampshire:  Macmillan,  1998);  Ayse
Parla,  ‘The  “Honor”  of  the  State:  Virginity  Examinations  in  Turkey’,  PoLAR:  Political  and  Legal
Anthropology Review 23,  no.  1  (1  May 2000):  185–86,  doi:10.1525/pol.2000.23.1.185;  Ayşe  Zeren Enis,
Everyday Lives of Ottoman Muslim Women: Hanımlara Mahsûs Gazete (Newspaper for Ladies) (1895 -
1908), 1st ed., Tarih Dizisi, Libra Kitap. - İstanbul 60 (İstanbul: Libra Kitap, 2013). 
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itself was gendered. Here again appears an ambivalent relation between the claims for
equality  and  participation  and  the  strengthening  of  gender  binaries  concerning  the
gendering of  spaces and dress.  The most  striking and obvious fact  is  that Mahmud's
reforms of dress were restricted to men, while the established dress-codes for women
continued to  exist.  We have seen that  this  did  not  prevent  urban elite  women from
wearing modern dress, but in contrast to men's dress, that was not encouraged by the
state. In terms of headgear it seems that it was not uncommon for women to don the fez.
It can be suggested that here a similar difference existed as that  between women's and
men's hats, as in differing styles and functions. Yet, more information on the spread and
styles of these fezzes donned by women are required to answer these questions.
Through the inclusion of sources from Ottoman periodicals much more could also
be elaborated on the relation of gender and headgear, as well gender and dress generally.
How did  the  globalization  of  modern  male  attire  and  dress  in  general  relate  to  the
construction of female identity beyond the well-known dichotomy of  ideal bourgeois
separate spheres expressed in the diverging styles of male and female dress and emerging
claims to gender equality. Modern male dress was not just related to men as is indicated
by  the  caricatures  published  in  Aydede in  1922.  In  a  wider  scope  it  would  also  be
instructive to scrutinize what discourses on dress reveal about transformations of gender
from before the Mahmudian dress reforms in the 1820s to the early Republican period,
with its inclusion of women into official dress reforms, as well as generally incidences
related to dress  that took place in the decades  before  the introduction of  the fez,  as
recorded in the Ottoman archives, to those afterwards.
Another question that needs further research is the relation of religious dress to
modernity,3 as embedded in the wider debate about the relation of religion to modernity
and nationalism. As I have argued, especially in Chapter Six, religion is not necessarily
contrary to modernity, nor situated outside of modern discourse, as the modernist lines
of arguments of opponents of Westernization prove. Another striking feature is the, at
least,  rhetorical  reference to modern values such as individualism and civil  rights by
3 Hale Yilmaz as well a  Ayten Sezer Arığ have focused on this for the early Republican Period; see  Hale
Yılmaz,  Becoming Turkish: Nationalist Reforms and Cultural Negotiations in Early Republican Turkey ,
1923-1945, First Edition., Modern Intellectual and Political History of the Middle East (Syracuse, New
York: Syracuse University Press, c2013), and  Ayten Sezer Arığ,  Atatürk Türkiyesi’nde Kılık Kıyafette
Çağdaşlaşma (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2007).
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those labelled as reactionaries, such as Atıf Hoca and Nurettin Paşa. On the other hand,
conservative journals such as Sebilürreşad related the wearing of the brimmed hat to the
dissolution  of  a  hierarchical  gender  order  and  gendered  division  of  labour  and  the
appearance of women in (mixed) public spaces.
Concerning  the  hat  law  of  1925,  I  think  in  addition  to  Hale  Yılmaz  latest
contribution, that elucidated a number of details on the implementation of the hat law, a
number of questions about its significance, especially in the field of the globalization of
modern male attire, body politics and the question of postcolonial nationalisms could be
further traced, even  though I  am not sure about  the richness  of  sources  available to
accomplish  this.  Besides  Gavin  D.  Brockett's  outstanding  endeavour  to  reframe  the
analysis of the protests against the hat law beyond the modern versus reactionary binary,
no encompassing study on these insurrections has yet been done. That also implies the
inclusion of the records of the Independence Courts4 that have hitherto not been included
in any study. Even though the information that can be extracted from them might be
scarce,  a  reading between the  lines  might  reveal  some interesting insights.  Also  the
gendered implications of the hat law need to be reconsidered in relation to Ottoman
politics  of  dress,  theories  on  the  relation  of  modernization  and  masculinity,  and  to
accounts that assume the hat law was just addressed men and male dress. 
Throughout this study I demonstrated how the politics of dress generally and the
discourse  on headgear  more specifically shaped state-subject  relations,  and how both
were thereby constituted reciprocally.
While I have started out scrutinizing the specificities of the Ottoman case within a
postcolonial setting and from a postcolonial perspective, I ended with the situation of late
Ottoman politics of dress within a broader context of the globalization of dress. While on
the one hand all  the  cases  scrutinized here,  in  a  way,  were specific  to the Ottoman
context,  nevertheless  their  significance  can  rather  be  conceived  within  the  broader
context  of  the  globalization of  modern male  attire  that  was  crucially  conditioned  by
Western European colonialist endeavors. The examples of conflicts around headgear I
have presented point to tensions within modern constructions of masculinity than to
4 See Ahmed Nedim, Ankara İstiklâl Mahkemesi Zabıtları, 1926, 1. baskı., İşaret Yayınları 68 (Cağaloğlu, 
İstanbul: İşaret Yayınları, 1993).
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dichotomies of East versus West or tradition versus modernity, as it is revealed by the
nexus  with  discourses  on  masculinity  and  modernity  appearing  globally.  It  becomes
apparent that definitions of modernity and masculinity are neither fixed nor self-evident,
but need to be regarded as contingent results of social practices.
The  examples  I  have  presented  provide  insight  into  the  question  posed  at  the
beginning of who wears which kind of styles and when. Obviously this is reduced to
certain points and places in time and does not provide an all-encompassing overview
about clothing practices in late Ottoman society, yet it  provides insight into the way
different styles acquired their meaning in relation to certain contexts, such as the kalpak,
hat and fez in the north-western Ottoman borderlands. 
Considered from Arif Dirlik's critique of the concept of alternative modernities, the
fez is not a failed modernity but a modern feature in itself, a fact that becomes visible
when modernity is reviewed and confronted as a historical concept. But in contrast to
approaches of alternative modernities it is not an exclusively Ottoman phenomenon nor
an expression of authentic Ottoman identity, but has to be considered within a global
context of the modernization of dress that in the first place has modern features and not
those of nation-building, even though the latter cannot be separated from the former.
The fez is an expression of the culture of modernity rather than of Ottoman culture.
Counter-positions  to  Euro/American  modernity  that  appeared  in  the  form  of
traditionalism and conservatism are not necessarily anti-modern.  These conflicts over
modernity are actually  what  constituted modern societies.  I  suggest  that  the  conflict
between hat and fez was rather more productive than repressive, that it was crucial to
the production of  modern identities  in the opposition between the universal  and the
specific, between the national and the super-westernized in their reciprocal relation. The
intersection  of  power  and  knowledge,  to  speak  in  Foucaultian  terms,  is  thereby  a
productive web that produces subjects through acts of interpellation. Subjects thereby
appear as processual, identity as fluid, performative and contextual.
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